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This study investigates how white and foreign-owned mining companies have complied with the 
Mining and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) and Mining Charter, the core of the 
Broad- Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) policy in South Africa‟s mining industry. 
The Mining Charter demands that white and foreign-owned companies transfer 15 per cent equity to 
blacks by 2009, increasing to 26 per cent by 2014. It also demands 40 per cent black control and 
management of mining companies regardless of the shareholding that blacks own. The study used a 
sample of 72 mining companies to explore broad aspects; these include changes in equity ownership 
(company shareholding and mining assets) and in particular mining deals concluded by white and 
foreign-owned companies with blacks between 1990 and 2012. It also explored black representation 
on the board and management of mining companies and conducted interviews with 35 executives 
from 27 mining companies.  
 
The study findings are that equity targets are low and reached only 7.4 per cent (R1.8trillion-
£163billion) of the total market capitalisation of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) as per 12 
July 2011. However there is an emergence of large black owned-owned companies (those with 50 + 1 
share) such as African Rainbow Nation, Exxaro, Shanduka Resources and Royal Bafokeng, 
empowered enterprises (25 +1 share) and a broad category of beneficiaries including consortiums, 
community shareholders and Employee Share Ownership groups which some hold small amount of 
shares (between 1-5 per cent). Most deals however were concluded by the Anglo American and BHP 
Billiton. Out of the 468 board members and 226 managers identified, black representation on the 
board and top management of white and foreign-owned companies was 25.9 and 18.5 respectively. In 
companies where blacks have majority shareholding board membership was 53.7 per cent and top 
management at 35.7per cent.  
 
The study has highlighted impediments faced by blacks in the mining industry. They lack capital, 
some are in debts and others liquidated, use poor technology and face difficulties in accessing land 
and export markets. The first main argument of the study is that the impediments and lack of 
government support limits their success and survival in the industry. The second is that ownership 
structure determines control in the mining industry. The reasons are historical, as the industry‟s 
corporate structure was and is still concentrated, has cross shareholding, significant control of assets 
by financial institutions and families and low voting shares are conditions are used in empowerment 
mining deals. This is challenging to the attainment of the 40 per cent target of control and 
management demanded by the Charter. 
 
The conclusion from this study is that the entire B-BBEE implementation process in the mining 
industry is controlled by the white and foreign-owned companies. They have a free hand in the choice 
of black-owned companies; which assets to have full ownership and which to offer shares or sell to 
ii 
 
blacks; the type of shares they offer; the conditions to attach to the transactions; and the manner that 
they deal with their community partners. This situation arose mainly because blacks lack their own 
funds and face a host of impediments. Unless the government establishes institutions to guide and 
monitor implementation of its B-BBEE policy and puts in place support mechanisms for black 
entrepreneurs, black equity ownership and attainment of management and control of mining assets 
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1.1 Why Research BEE Equity Ownership and Control in South 
Africa’s Mining Industry? 
This study seeks to establish the extent to which black people in South Africa have 
acquired equity ownership and attained control in South Africa‟s mining industry 
after the passing of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 
(MPRDA) of 2002 that was followed by the Mining Charter (2002)
1
 and the Black 
Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) Act of 2003. All of these legislations came into 
force in 2004. These are core policies that guide the ANC government‟s economic 
intervention in the predominantly market economy, in order to redress the economic 
imbalances created by the apartheid regime. The regime had used extensive laws and 
regulations that racially dictated to social, political and economic life.  
 
The B-BBEE Act defines the term „black people‟ as a generic term that represents 
Indian, Coloured and African citizens of the Republic of South Africa by birth or 
decent. The three race groups are also referred to as Historically Disadvantaged 
South Africans (HDSAs) in the MPRDA. Throughout the study I have used the term 
„black people‟ or simply „blacks‟ and HDSAs collectively, with no pejorative 
connotations. In the same manner, I have also used the term „white people‟ to 
represent the non-black population in South Africa. 
 
The reasons for ANC government‟s intervention in the economy were initially 
spelled out in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) published in 
January 1994 as ANC‟s election manifesto. The aim was to mobilise the country‟s 
resources in order to de-racialize the economy. The RDP spelled out five programs: 
meeting basic needs, developing human resources, building the economy, 
                                                 
1
 The Charters represent an agreement between stakeholders in each sector. The Mining Charter, for 
example, was concluded between the government and the representatives of the mining companies on 
how the MPRDA is to be implemented in the Mining Industry. For the roles of charters in the 
implementation of MPRDA and the B-BBEE policy, see Khehla and Reddy 2007. BEE 2006: 




democratisation of the society and implementing the RDP programs (see RDP 
Document section 1.4). With regards to building the economy, the RDP prescribed to 
government how to address racial and gender inequalities in ownership, employment 
and skills. Regarding the mining industry, the RDP dictates how to transfer private 
mineral rights to the state and how to transform the industry to the benefit of all the 
people through government intervention and the use of incentives and disincentive 
measures (see RDP document section 4.5.1.2 and 4.5.1.3). It would thus appear that 
the ANC has shifted from the 1955 Freedom Charter. According to this Charter, “the 
mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry should be 
transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole”, that is, through 
nationalisation (ANC 1955:82). Nationalisation was dropped in the final version of 
the RDP document, as it would have been expensive and unattractive to both 
domestic and foreign investors.  
 
Upon assuming power in 1994, it took time for the ANC government to come up 
with a formal policy that would transform the economic character of the country 
where people of all races were going to participate as equal citizens in the economy. 
The earliest intervention began with the changing of the 1991 Mining Law, under 
which minerals under the ground were privately owned. This intervention introduced 
a new mineral law - the MPRDA where the state became the custodian of mineral 
resources. The government used licencing as a policy instrument to grant mineral 
rights to private companies, and in doing so; it offered preferential treatment to 
blacks aspiring to participate in the extractive activities. The Mining Charter required 
all white and foreign-owned companies that existed before the act to convert their 
mining licences, referred to as old order rights to new order rights by 2009. The 
government used the process of conversion of licences to enforce entry of blacks and 
ensure compliance of the Mining Charter. In particular the Charter required all white 
and foreign-owned companies to transfer equity to blacks and for blacks to 
participate in management and control of mining assets regardless of their 
shareholding. Thus, equity ownership transfer involve blacks acquiring shareholding 
in the white and foreign-owned companies, having their own companies that engage 




companies. In order to control the mining assets, blacks have to make up 40 per cent 
of the management of mining companies. The prescription was specified in the 
Mining Charter Scorecard which came with the Mining Charter. The equity targets 
were set at 15 per cent by 2009 (which coincided with the end of the mining licences 
conversion period) and increase to 26 per cent by 2014. The transactions were to be 
conducted under market principles. The Charter specifically states that:  
 
“Whilst it is government policy to play a facilitating role in the transformation of the 
ownership profile of the mining industry it will allow the market to play a key role in 
achieving this end and it is not the government‟s intention to nationalize the mining 
industry.” (Mining Charter Preamble) 
 
Instead of nationalisation, the government sought to change the ownership structure 
of the economy. The transferring of equity was expected to increase participation of 
blacks in the economy, de-racializing it. To that effect, there would emerge within 
the industry black controlled companies (where blacks own 50 plus 1 per cent vote), 
strategic joint ventures or partnership (with blacks having 25 plus 1 vote) and others 
would be passive shareholders that may own up to 100 shares with no control (see 
Mining Charter section 4.7).  
 
The terms black controlled, black enterprises and black owned companies are used 
interchangeably in the literature about the BEE policy. This thesis has also used these 
terms in the same manner. The term Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
(B-BBEE) policy has been used mostly after the enactment of the B-BBEE Act in 
2003 while the term Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) was used before the 
official policy was in place to refer to the issues of economic empowerment policy in 
general and is still widely used in this manner. This thesis uses the term B-BBEE to 
relate to the issues of the official policy and the term BEE for general applications. 
For example, the term BEE deals is used to refer to business deals concluded 
between white and foreign-owned companies with their black counterparts, while 





How the B-BBEE Act is to be implemented is defined by the Generic Score Card and 
the Codes of Good Practice. The Generic Score Card outlined six broad elements that 
the white and foreign-owned companies are obliged to comply with. These are equity 
ownership, management and control, skills development, employment equity, 
enterprise development and preferential procurement. The same elements also appear 
in the Mining Charter. The entire policy processes are further elaborated upon in this 
study‟s Chapter Two. The bulk of this research, however, limits its focus to equity 
ownership, control and management of firms in South Africa in the mining industry.  
 
The study‟s interest in ownership and control in the mining industry has been 
building up over years inspired by reading various literature, being involved in 
discussions at conferences and having conversations with friends and colleagues 
about Africa‟s economic development and challenges. The conversations often 
drifted to Africa‟s mineral wealth and its potential not only to create wealth and 
alleviate poverty but mostly the overwhelming ownership and control of mineral 
assets by foreign investors, who are thought to reap most of the benefits, repatriate 
profits, and pay little tax to their host countries. Citizens are often concentrated in 
artisanal and small scale mining activities but not in large mining companies even 
after fifty years of Africa‟s independence. The government leaders are suspected of 
corruption, because they conclude mining contracts with the multinational 
corporations secretly. To many, mining ventures have become ivory towers with 
little trickle-down effect to the rest of the economy. Communities where the mining 
operations are taking place have nothing to show for and know very little of what 
takes place in the gated mining compounds and fenced mining areas. This reality has 
been portrayed by the media and acknowledged by the African Union and the 
Economic Commission for Africa (Kenny and Mather 2005; Schroeder 2006; 
Garande 2008; Mabasa 2007; Raftopoulos 2007; African Union 2009; Economic 
Commission for Africa 2011).  
 
Mnwana (2014:826) argued that direct control of natural resources by local 
communities is a precondition for equitable utilisation of natural resource wealth and 




around the mines. Giving an example of Nigeria (in particular in the oil rich Delta 
area), Sierra Leone and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mnwana said that the 
absence of direct community participation in their mineral wealth has contributed to 
conflicts and agitation for local autonomy and control of mineral resources by 
indigenous populations in their respective localities.  
 
Having control of mineral resources has always been part of the policy agenda of 
mineral rich African countries. Immediately after independence some governments 
in Africa sought ways to directly own and control mineral resources and have 
citizens participate actively in economical production in general. As indicated by 
Wilson 111, governments resorted to state ownership and indigenisation policies or 
the mixture of the two. Indigenisation was preferred in countries where there was an 
emergent local business class, but where this group was insignificant, government 
ownership was extended to all sectors of the economy. In particular, governments 
sought to have monopoly over mineral resources which went as far as nationalisation 
and forbidding or limiting foreign and local ownership (Wilson 111 1990:406). For 
example indigenisation and state ownership was extensive in Nigeria (under different 
political leaderships), while nationalisation was pursued in countries like Tanzania 
under President Nyerere, Zambia under President Kaunda, Mali under Modibo Keita 
and Zaire (now DRC) under President Mobutu Sese Seko in the hope of having 
control and increase benefits from the mining sector. The end result was almost total 
collapse of their mining industries (Cawood et al 2001; Campbell 2013:57).  
 
In order to understand the limitations of mineral wealth benefits to those countries 
that have them, extensive literature has been explored. First to be scrutinised is the 
literature on „minerals as a resource curse.‟ Under this body of literature, scholars 
have argued that mineral exploitation in mineral rich developing countries has not 
led to improved economic performance, significantly contributed to economic 
development and alleviate poverty. It is this that is regarded as a resource curse. 
Regrettably, common among these countries are high levels of corruption, conflicts 
and civil wars (Sachs and Warner 1995, 2001; Cilliers and Dietrich 2000; Marshall 




2008; Bhattacharyya and Holder 2009; Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2009; Mnwana 
2014). 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, Sub-Saharan African countries were forced under the 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund to introduce reforms. These included liberalisation, privatisation, and 
promotion of foreign investments. With regard to the mining sector, increased 
transparency of mineral revenue flows, control of illicit flows of minerals and better 
resource governance were foregrounded. It was expected that these reforms would 
increase benefits to mineral rich countries in Africa (Campbell, 2013:2-3).  
 
It has been generally accepted that reforms under the structural adjustment programs 
(SAPs) have contributed significantly to increased foreign direct investments and 
mineral exports (Maliyamkono and Mason 2006). However, SAPs contributions to 
the increase in government revenue, employment, improving human rights and 
protecting the environment have been questioned. Campbell, in his study that 
covered the DRC, Guinea, Ghana, Madagascar and Mali, found that these countries 
still did not experience significant increase in revenues. He said there were two main 
reasons for this failure. First is that extensive incentives such as exemptions from 
customs and import duties, capital gains tax, dividend withholding taxes, corporate 
taxes, liberal capital allowances, offshore sales revenue retention, repatriation of 
dividends and the payment of loyalty at the lowest rates have limited governments‟ 
revenues from mining. Second, the relegation of states to the roles of regulators and 
more to the facilitators of foreign investments in the mining sector and the emphasis 
on mining for export has limited the trickle down effects, industrial diversification 
and infrastructural development. Instead the implementation of SAPs has resulted in 
the spread of mining enclaves (Campbell 2009:26, 247).  
 
SAPs were not geared to promoting indigenous or citizen investors to own or control 
large scale mining assets. Instead, SAPs shifted the national governments‟ attention 
to attracting foreign investors in the midst of their quest for adhering to market 




enforcing corporate social responsibility. Although this literature is enlightening, 
national policies that promoted locals/indigenous citizens to own mineral assets is 
limited. Little is therefore known about policies that seek to promote indigenous 
citizen entrepreneurs to own particularly large scale mining assets. This thesis sought 
to fill this empirical vacuum.  
 
There have been, of course, few exceptions to the resource curse epidemic in sub–
Saharan Africa. Among the exceptions is Botswana (which became my home from 
the mid-1980s to early 1990s). The country used its mineral wealth (mainly 
diamonds) to develop the economy. The government has unique partnership with De 
Beers, one of the biggest diamond mining companies in Southern Africa. The 
government of Botswana has entered into a 50 – 50 shareholding deal with De Beers 
in Debtswana, a company they formed to carry out diamond mining in the country. 
De-Beers hasn‟t offered other host governments such a deal. In 2012, the country 
established its 100 per cent state-owned company-the Okavango Diamond Company, 
to market diamonds right from Gaborone (Rapport News; 17 September 2013). 
Botswana‟s success is hardly associated with its ownership structure, but to its sound 
macroeconomic policy. This policy enabled the country to accumulate foreign 
reserves, mitigated the effect of the Dutch disease and avoid wasteful spending and 
indebtedness (Wright 2002; Mwaipose and Matsheka 2002; Mwaipose 2003; Save 
the Children 2003; Robertson 2009; Luong and Weinhal 2013. To Mwaipose 
(2003.3) Botswana‟s success is due to having strong political and economic 
institutions and autonomous technocrats who are committed to long term 
development goals. Thus, institutions are endogenous to a successful management of 
mineral resource and their absences are underlying cause of a resource curse.  
 
Before the dawn of non-racial democracy in South Africa the mining industry has 
been very important to the country‟s economic development. The country has 
successfully used the exploitation of its mineral wealth to bring about economic 
diversification and a higher level of industrialisation. This has happened, however, 
through deliberate policies that excluded blacks from participating in the economy 




equity ownership and control in South Africa‟s mining industry was, therefore, an 
opportunity to explore how the country has succeeded in enabling those once 
excluded, to own and control mining assets.  
 
This thesis is timely, as it coincides with an increasing number of the discoveries in 
Africa of potential mineral and other natural resources such as natural gas and fossil 
oils. Examples of such countries are Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Mozambique, and 
South Sudan. South Africa‟s BEE policy is seemingly showing the way to increase 
citizen participation in the economy and in the mining sector. Namibia and 
Zimbabwe, which gained independence in 1989 and 1980, respectively, have 
embarked on the transfer of mining assets to indigenous citizens (LaRRI and NUNW 
2003; Ritter and Gaomab 2005; Law Development Commission 2007; Mabasa 2007; 
Andreason 2010; Sibanda 2014). During South Africa‟s negotiations of the transfer 
of power from apartheid rule to non-racial democracy, Saki Maxozoma, a leading 
ANC party member at the time, was also involved in negotiations that led to the 
promulgation of Zimbabwe‟s Indigenous Act in 2007. This is an indication of 
cooperation at higher levels of policy making leadership among the neighbouring 
countries. Zimbabwe‟s Indigenisation Economic Empowerment Act of 2007 initially 
demanded that companies with share capital above $500,000 surrender 51 per cent of 
their asset to indigenous Zimbabweans within a period of five years. This sparked a 
contentious debate between the supporters of the policy who saw this as a chance of 
the “domestication of resources”, on the one hand, and those against the policy, on 
the other hand. The latter pointed to the negative economic effects of the policy such 
as driving away foreign investments (Sibanda 2014:25-26).  
 
Nigeria, having pursued indigenisation forty years with the aim of empowering its 
indigenous citizens in business, experienced capital flights and limited cooperation 
from the foreign companies. Thus, this study offers new insights on how to approach 
policies that seek to empower citizens or indigenous people. It is likely to help in 
countries rich in mineral resources in dealing with the challenges of empowering its 





As indicated earlier, the MPRDA and the Mining Charter represent South Africa‟s 
government economic intervention in the mining sector. This can be appreciated 
when it is placed within the broad context of the importance of mining in the 
country‟s development and the apartheid policies that excluded blacks from owning 
and controlling economic ventures. The following two sections address these two 
elements. 
 
1.2 The Importance of Mining to the South African Economy  
Going back to the discovery of diamonds in 1870 in Kimberley and to the discovery 
of the world‟s largest gold reserves in the Witwatersrand area in 1886, the South 
African mining industry is well established. According to Handley (2004), the 
extraction of minerals led to rapid industrialisation in the country as the 
manufacturing sector grew to produce intermediate goods to satisfy the needs of the 
mines and other sectors of the economy. The diversification of mining assets allowed 
the capital accumulated in mining to be used in expanding the country‟s industrial 
structure. Mining activities led to the improvement of infrastructure (electricity, 
transport and water supply), financial services and attracted foreign investments 
(Seidmann and Seidmann 1977:50-51; Falkena 1979:33; Nattrass 1981:163-164; 
Fine and Rustomjee 1996; Baxter 2009).The minerals are spread in various parts of 
















Figure 1.1: Selected Active Mines 
 
Source: Council for Geosciences 
 
South Africa‟s main mining areas are: the Witwatersrand basin which is a source of 
93 per cent of South Africa‟s gold output, uranium, silver, pyrite and osmirdium; the 
Bushveld complex associated with large deposits of PGMs, chromium and vanadium 
and large deposits of industrial minerals (titanium fluorspar and andalusite); the 
Transvaal Super-group with large deposits of manganese and iron-ore; the Karoo 
Super-group which covers two-thirds of the country and extends through Northern 
Cape, North-West, Free State, Gauteng and Mpumalanga, Kwa Zulu Natal, and 
Limpopo provinces and from which coal and anthracite are mined; the Palaborwa 
Igneous Complex has copper, phosphate, titanium, vermiculite, feldspar and 
zirconium ores; the Kimberlite pipes found around Kimberley and Witwatersrand 
produce diamonds. Diamonds are also found in secondary alluvial, fluvial and 
marine areas. In the coastal areas, there are heavy mineral sands, zircon and 
magnetite. The Bushmanland Group has significant deposits of lead-zinc ores, 
copper and silver (DMR, 2009c; Baartjes and Goudan, 2011). The mining 
conglomerates have mining leases in most of these areas and most of the Bushveld 
complex falls under the area owned by the Royal Bafokeng nation which has become 





Despite many years of extraction, South Africa still has huge and diverse of mineral 
reserves. According to SAMI‟s 2009 report, mineral reserves were worth US $2.5 
trillion, making this country the fifth largest in terms of GDP value in the world. The 
country produces over 60 different minerals. It accounts for 88 per cent of the 
platinum group metals (PGM), 80 per cent of manganese, 72 per cent of chrome, 32 
per cent of vanadium, 13 per cent of gold and over 30 per cent of ferrochromium and 
alumino-silicate in the world (DMR 2009c; DMR 2010b). Some of the important 
minerals produced in South Africa are shown in table 1.1 below.  
 
Table 1.1: South Africa’s Mineral Reserves 
Commodity Reserves 
 Unit Mass World percentage 
Alumina-silicate Mt 51 X 
Antimony Kt 350 16,7 
Chrome Ore Mt 5 500 72,4 
Coal  Mt 30408 7,4 
Ferro-chrome X X X 
Gold T 6 000 12,7 
Iron –ore Mt 1 500 0,8 
Lead Kt 3 000 2,1 
Manganese ore Mt 4 000 80,0 
PGMs T 70 000 87,7 
Phosphate Rock Mt 2 500 5,3 
Uranium Kt 435 8 
Vanadium  12 000 32.0 
Zinc Mt 15 3,3 
Zirconium Mt 14 25 
Source: Compiled from various SAMI Reports 
KEY: Mt= Meter ton; Kt=Kilo ton; T= ton; X= Data not available 
 
Over the years, mining has contributed to the country‟s GDP, which reached its peak 
in 1980 when it accounted for 25 per cent. However, since 1990, mining contribution 
to GDP has been continuously declining. It was 10 per cent in 1999 and then 
declined to 7.6 per cent in 2000 (Tshitekere 2012:71-73; the DMR 2009c:10). It 
dropped to a low of 6.4 in 2004 before rising again to 9.2 in 2008 as indicated in 
table 1.2. Compared to other sectors of the economy, mining‟s importance as a 
contributor to GDP has been overtaken by manufacturing and wholesale trade. 









Source: Created from Statistics South Africa Data 
 
Mining‟s contribution to fixed capital formation and exports has also been declining. 
Fixed capital formation averaged at 10 per cent between 2001 and 2009 and fell 
below 10 per cent in 2005 and 2006 (SAMI Report 2009:10). While in the 1990s 
mineral exports accounted for more than 60 per cent of total exports and over 50 per 
cent of foreign exchange earnings (Jones 2010:80), its contribution to total exports 
declined to 30 per cent between 2001 and 2009. According to Tshitekere (2012:80), 
the fall in export earnings has mainly been attributed to a decline in gold production 
and exports. Gold production weakened from 568.7 tons in 1987 to 342.7 tons by 
2004 and lost its number one position to PGMs (DMR 2009c:10). Table 1.2 indicates 
the contribution of the mining sector to the GDP, fixed capital formation and exports 










Table 1.2: Contribution of Mining to GDP, Fixed Capital Formation and Total Exports 
Contribution to  Value Added Contribution to Fixed Capital 
Formation  
Contribution to National 
Totals 





From Mining Total 
Exports 
From Mining 
 R mn From 
Mining 
% R mn R mn % R mn R mn % 
2001 1020007 77214 7.6 153525 15871 10.3 265832 89943 33.8 
2002 1171086 92730 7.9 172151 19802 11.5 333251 109357 32.8 
2003 1272537 82770 6.7 196999 21706 11.0 291434 86747 29.8 
2004 1415237 91198 6.4 226180 17917 7.9 310525 89546 28.8 
2005 1571082 105992 6.7 263754 16743 6.3 358361 102486 29.1 
2006 1767422 132301 7.5 324083 27715 8.6 447690 138878 31.8 
2007 2017102 156969 7.8 406918 39742 9.8 533791 161755 30.3 
2008 2283223 210079 9.2 513749 51266 10.0 704293 219593 30.8 
2009 2176599 198180 9.1 531957 64940 12.2 556432 176837 31.7 
Source: SAMI Report 2009:10 
 
The contribution of the mining industry to employment growth has also been 
declining. For instance, in the 1980s, the gold industry alone accounted for the 
employment of around 500,255 people, but this fell to 120,000 by 2005. Even if one 
considers employment for the mining industry as a whole, it has also been declining 
and stood at 498,141 in 2010 (Tshitekere 2012:95).  
 
Apart from the gloomy picture indicated here, the Chamber of Mines (2010:2) 
estimated that the direct and indirect contribution of the mining industry was 19 per 
cent of the GDP and mining still contributes significantly to the national budget 
through corporate tax and royalties. For example, in 2010 the industry contributed 
R17 billion (£1.5 billion) in corporate tax and R6 billion (£545 million) in royalties 
(Statistics South Africa 2010). Jones (2010:73-74) and Netshitenzhe (2010a) refers to 
its positive contributions should be considered in terms of the multiplier effect, 
backward linkages (products used by the industry from other industries), forward 
linkages (products from mining used by others) and lateral linkages (mining 




form the backbone of the country‟s Mining and Energy Complex (MEC) and it is this 
industry that the government considers important for its de-racialization program.  
 
It is important at this juncture to look at the policies that have resulted in blacks 
being marginalized. This historical analysis helps to understand the root of the social-
economic imbalances that exist and the challenges that black people face. This is 
important if policy makers have to search for a much holistic approach that will 
make the BEE policy succeed.  
 
1.3 The Wrongs of Apartheid and the Roots of Social and Economic 
Imbalances 
South Africa‟s social and economic imbalances that blacks face can be traced back to 
the laws that the underpinned the colonial and apartheid governments‟ policies for 
years. Although space does not permit for these legislations to be detailed, a few 
need to be discussed. First was the 1913 Native Land Act (No 27)2 which the 
colonial government used and which limited the land available to blacks to 7 per cent 
despite the fact that they constituted over 80 per cent of the population. When non-
racial democracy dawned in 1994, black people, who were 90 per cent of the 
population, occupied only 13 per cent of the land while whites, who constituted less 
that 10 per cent of the population, occupied 87 per cent of the land and commanded 
all heights of the economy (Luhabe 2007:136–138). With limited access to land, 
blacks could no longer economically engage in farming and were forced to provide 
unskilled and cheap labour. The Act also denied black people the right to have 
individual land titles even in the Bantustan areas (that were historically reserved for 
Africans). Here tribal land ownership was strongly promoted and supported by the 
apartheid regime (Hirsh 2005:13).  
 
Second, is the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 which prevented blacks from 
purchasing or leasing land in areas designated only for whites. The Natives (Urban 
Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945 prescribed that black businesses could only sell 
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daily essential goods, a list of hardly twenty necessities such as milk, cigarettes, 
paraffin, candles and local beers. More discriminatory laws were put in place by the 
apartheid government that came into power in 1948. These acts include the 1951 
Bantu Authorities Act (No. 68) which restricted blacks to their tribal, regional and 
territorial authorities. This came to be known as separate development policy which 
saw some homelands being granted independence within the Republic of South 
Africa. These were Transkei, Bophuthatswana Venda, and Ciskei (generally referred 
to as the TBVC states).  
 
The Bantu Authorities Act was immediately followed in 1952 by the Native Laws 
Amendment Act (No 54) which curtailed the migration of blacks to urban areas. 
Those who had to work in urban areas had to possess work permits and restricted to 
12 hours of stay. They were forced to live in black townships as mandated by the 
Group Areas Act (Act no 41 of 1950). This act prescribed for the demarcation of 
residence in terms of race, such as „white areas,‟ „coloured areas‟ „Indian areas‟ and 
„black townships.‟ Most townships had and still have „shacks‟, informal houses made 
of pieces of discarded old wood, plastics and rusty-iron sheets with no modern 
sanitation system. Shacks have remained one of the scars of apartheid that we see 
today across major cities and towns. However poverty and lack of job or expanded 
business opportunities escalated the influx of blacks to urban areas. The one man 
business policy was established in 1963 and prevented black people from running 
more than one business. The policy also prevented them from forming partnerships 
or establishing financial institutions or wholesale business, owning shares in public 
companies, owning business or any immovable property in “white areas” (those 
resided by people of the white race. 
 
More acts were passed in 1953 and 1956 with respect to education and jobs. The 
Bantu Education Act (No 47) of 1953 decreed that blacks should be provided with 
separate education. This was to be provided in black alone facilities which were very 
poor and offered in native languages and Afrikaans (introduced by early European 
arrivals in the country and which became an official language). The act was 




prohibited blacks from attending white institutions (with a few exceptions like the 
University of the Witwatersrand and Rhodes University). The apartheid government 
established separate universities for Coloureds, Africans (mainly in the homelands) 
and Indians. These universities also differed in terms of the quality of education, with 
those of blacks offering inferior education. Education of poor quality is considered 
the main reason for the blacks‟ weak managerial, entrepreneurial, technical and 
intellectual knowhow. As a result, a large proportion of unskilled black labour was 
seen as a major stumbling block for increase in productivity (De Villiers 1974:22).  
 
Other discriminatory acts that were passed included the 1911 Mine and Works Act 
(No.12); the 1926 Job Reservation Act and amendments such as the 1956 Industrial 
Conciliation Act (No 28). These reserved skilled jobs for whites and pushed blacks 
to unskilled jobs. Whites were paid higher remunerations and protected from 
competing with blacks. In short, economic opportunities for blacks were 
systematically blocked from the highly sophisticated and diversified economy. They 
ended up being taxi owners, hawkers and vendors, small shop keepers, backyard 




Apart from the repressive policies, over years the economy was controlled by few 
conglomerates. By 1992 top six white conglomerates accounted for 85% of the 
market capitalization of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). These were Anglo 
American Corporation (with 33%), the Rembrandt Group (14.6%), Anglovaal 
(2.9%), the Liberty Group (4.7%), SA Mutual (14. 2%) and Sanlam (15.6%).They 
had various subsidiaries spreading in many sectors of the economy which resulted in 
a pyramid structure, cross ownership and interlocking directorship (Halse 1982, 
Hirsh 2005).  
 
It is these realities that led former President Mbeki to say that one finds in South 
Africa the existence of two nations. One of these nations is white, relatively 
prosperous, regardless of gender or geographical dispersal. It has ready access to a 
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developed economy, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure. 
The second and larger nation is black and poor. This nation lives under conditions of 
grossly underdeveloped economic, physical, educational, communication and other 
infrastructure (Mbeki 1998: 71-72).  
 
Few changes occurred in the South Africa‟s corporate structure just before the dawn 
of non-racial democracy, 1994. In early 1990s the conglomerates unbundled their 
corporate structure, but this was much on how they performed their functions and not 
much in terms of their control of mining assets. Thus, by the time the ANC took over 
power, the economy was still in the hands of white capital (Kantoor 1998; Randall 
2000; Chabane et. al., 2006) and this has not substantially changed apart from the 
unbundling that has taken place. The unbundling process and its outcome are 
expanded on in chapter two of this thesis. 
 
1.4 Black Economic Empowerment in South Africa: the Literature 
The literature on BEE policy and its implementation continues to grow and not all 
can be captured here. The literature analysed here is irrespective of whether it came 
prior to or after the passing of the MPRDA, the Mining Charter and the B-BBEE 
Act. The discussion is grouped into three themes. These themes are: the justification 
for the BEE policy; acceptance of the policy by white and foreign-owned companies 
and; the implementation and outcome of the policy. The literature on implementation 
is limited to compliance levels, the strategies that white and foreign-owned 
companies use to finance BEE deals, unintended consequence such as fronting and 
cronyism and the absence of government institutions to oversee the implementation. 
Each of these is elaborated below. 
 
There is almost a general agreement in the literature that the BEE policy was 
necessary, that is, given white domination of the economy. Thus Southall (2007:68), 





“The ANC‟s use of state power to assert greater black ownership and control of the 
commanding heights of the economy was politically necessary and inevitable given 
the overwhelming extent of white domination of the economy in 1994.” 
 
Cargill (2010), who grew up seeing preferences given to whites by the apartheid 
regime against their black counterparts, had this to say about the justification of the 
BEE policy: 
 
“The unashamed preference given to Afrikaners during Nationalist rule rooted out 
Afrikaner poverty, ensured quality education in Afrikaans and created Afrikaner 
capitalists and corporations of world class standing. The Pondos are still 
impoverished, hailing from an area that ranks among the poorest in the country. So, 
when I took a leap from childhood to 1994, when the political arena changed and the 
scope for black opportunity widened, I saw logic in the baton of affirmative action 




The above indicates that using preference policies to favour a race is not a new idea 
in South Africa‟s political and economic landscape. The Afrikaner government used 
preferential treatment to benefit whites; and now the ANC government is doing the 
same to redress white racist inequities. 
 
Balshaw and Goldberg (2008.25) indicate that given the racial policies that 
exclusively benefited the white race, de-racialization of the economy was necessary 
in order to equitably distribute economic opportunities and wealth for the benefit of 
all, but mostly to those who were denied the opportunity in the past. Hirsh 
(2005.164) said that the ANC government was aware that failure to redress racial 
inequities could reignite damaging conflicts between blacks and whites. The de-
racialization of the economy was therefore a pre-requisite for political stability in the 
country. 
 
Tied to the de-racialization of the economy was the need to create a class of black 
bourgeoisie, or what is also referred to as black entrepreneurial class or the black 
middle class (Mbeki 1999; Luhabe 2004; Iheduru 2004 and Marais 2011). The 
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former President Mbeki (the main architect of BEE) stated clearly the importance of 
government assisting the formation of a black middle class (Mbeki 1999:1-3). He 
wrote that: 
 
“The struggle against racism must include the objective of creating a black 
bourgeoisie. The government must come to the aid of those among the black people 
who might require such aid in order to become entrepreneurs.” 
 
The growth of the middle class was expected to bridge the massive wealth and 
economic gap inherited from apartheid, erode the industrial colour bar, allow blacks 
to become „custodians of black capital‟ and act as allies of the government against 
the white race that had economic control (Sidiripoulos 1993; Luhabe 2004:66; 
Iheduru 2004:25). Marais calls the middle class the business elite class and pointed 
out that: 
 
“--having business elite on top would also be a huge boon, not only for the ANC as 
an organisation, but also to individuals within it.” (Marais: 2011:140)  
 
For him the ANC‟s quest for building the business elite made the party not to object 
to the conglomerates‟ restructuring and disinvestment from South Africa. It was 
expected that the black bourgeoisie would finally overtake a number of white 
bourgeoisies in the country as more blacks make their entry in business. Marais 
continues to state that: 
 
“If large South African corporations shifted parts of their operations abroad in the 
context of BEE drive ....a black capitalist class could be assembled more rapidly in 
the abandoned space.” (Marais 2011:140-141)  
 
The focus on the middle class stems from the general belief that it is this group that 
determines the rate at which innovative and progressive ideas are introduced to 
society to initiate development (Business Map 2005:15). The assumption is also that 
this class has the ability to boost the economy through increase in demand 
(purchasing power) and to bring about both political and economic stability (Burton 
and Hawthorne 2007:6). The class‟ growth is an indicator of social justice and an 





There has not been a clear definition of the term middle class or bourgeoisie or the 
elite business class by those who wrote about it or the ANC itself. Generally, two 
approaches are used in determining the middle class in a given society; the statistical 
and the consumption approaches. The statistical approach selects households that fall 
in the „actual middle‟ of the spread of household incomes in a country. The 
consumption approach chooses an interval of per capita household income that 
indicates some conception of relative affluence often associated with certain patterns 
of expenditure and possessions (Visage 2013:1). Although the income intervals may 
differ between developed and developing countries, using the 2008 South Africa‟s 
household survey, Visage identifies three groups that fall in the middle class. The 
first is those whose income earning falls between R1520 (£116) and R4560 (£350) 
per month, and the second is a relatively affluent middle class constituted by those 
earning between R5600 (£430) and R40000 (£3076) (Visage 2013:3).
 5 
The two 
groups each account for 31 per cent of the population. These, however, do not appear 
to be the middle class that Mbeki was talking about as a group that would have the 
ability to afford their daily consumption and leave them with enough income to 
engage in business. Visage identifies the third group as the elite - those earning more 
than R40000 (£3076) a month. This accounted for only 4 per cent of the population 
but the majority of this group were whites (60 per cent).  
 
Mbeki (2003:1) has alternatively used the term black bourgeoisie or entrepreneurial 
bourgeoisie. In its original usage in France, the term stood for the group between the 
feudal lords and the peasants which was made up of city dwellers who became 
artisans engaged in business and were important for the economic growth that was 
achieved in the 18
th
 century. According to classic Marxism, the term developed to 
mean the owners of the means of production, as opposed to the workers (the 
proletariat) and the peasants.  
 
                                                 
5
 There is lack of consistent in the literature on how much daily income a middle class earns. Melber 
(2013) puts the daily income amount that allows for a lifestyle or social status that qualifies a person 




The challenge that arises from the above is how the BEE policy can produce the 
bourgeoisie class. As Lucky (2011) and Obaji and Olugu (2014) said, the role of the 
government cannot be ignored in stimulating both the demand and supply of 
entrepreneurs. Demand can be stimulated by the government employing tax 
incentives, start-up grants, bilateral and multilateral international agreements, 
privatisation and promotion of competition that expand both domestic and overseas 
business opportunity. On the supply side, government is required to offer support for 
business in terms of education and training, protection of intellectual property, 
stimulating entrepreneurial culture and establishing institutions that help 
entrepreneurs in both start-up and established enterprises.  
 
Both the Generic Score Card which accompanies the B-BBEE Act and the Score 
Card for the Mining Charter included clauses on entrepreneurial development. These 
require the white and foreign-owned companies to promote entrepreneurship and 
skill development of blacks in the mining sector. One would have expected that the 
government would have its own strategies for attracting and mentoring those blacks 
who are ready to take entrepreneurial risks in the mining industry and identify 
incentives that may apply exclusively to them.  
 
The strong emphasis on growing the black middle class under the BEE policy has 
been criticised by Duma Gqubule (2005:5-6) who says it confines the majority of the 
black population (which is still very poor) to the status of spectators who celebrate 
the success of others who benefit from the policy. In the First National Bank Report 
(2006:12), concentration on the middle class has resulted in overshadowing the 
efforts of eradicating poverty, creating employment and enhancing economic growth. 
Emphasis on the middle class resulted in larger income disparities within the black 
community itself.  
 
The elitist bias of the BEE policy and growing inequality is, according to Saki 
Macozoma who is one of ANC stalwart, something to be expected under capitalism. 





“--while many critics of BEE accept this imperative (de-racializing the South African 
economy) they also argue that the process has elitist consequences. They suggest that 
BEE does not alleviate poverty, but enriches a few. What did they expect? Where 
have you seen a capitalist system producing socialist results?” (Macozoma 
2007:177) 
 
From the above, it seems that the expectations of what economic maladies the BEE 
policy can cure in the economy are extensive. Saki Macozoma questions the ability 
of the policy to cure a lot of economic maladies. Economic wisdom tells us that 
issues of poverty alleviation and bridging income gaps will not depend only on BEE 
policy, but rather on how the economy grooms successful entrepreneurs, employs 
much appropriate technology, creates more jobs and how the government employs 
equitable policies. Such issues fall under normal government functions, irrespective 
of whether there is BEE policy or not. The RDP that was later replaced by GEAR 
and other policies that followed were also concerned with poverty eradication.  
 
Another justification for the BEE policy was according to Iheduru (2004:25), the 
need to deal with market failures. He argued that apartheid policies covered vast 
issues that included land ownership, education, employment, business ownership and 
social and economic life in general. Apartheid policies created market distortions and 
barriers against blacks. Thus, without the discriminatory laws in education, blacks 
would have obtained good education, acquired good skills and jobs. Those who 
would have justified their productivity would have climbed the job market ladder. 
Those with land would have obtained land titles that would have helped them as 
collaterals to get finance and other business contracts or used their land to develop 
their farming skills and produce more to earn incomes. Restrictive business laws for 
blacks prevented them from developing their entrepreneurial skills. He contends that 
the correction of such market failures could not be left under the whims of the market 
system, but required government direct intervention. To leave the status quo would 
have been to accept the continuity of racial stereo-types that had emerged where 
whites are regarded as superior and blacks as inferior. It is thus that Chapter Seven of 





The three justifications for BEE discussed above need to be related to the broader 
arguments for government economic intervention. First, government economic 
intervention under the free market system is acceptable if it addresses market failures 
which normally arise from normal market operations. The aim here is to enhance 
market performance (Stiglitz 1993, 1988; 1996, 2010; Tangri 1999; Samuleson and 
Nordhaus 1989; Lipsey 1989; Mohir and Fourie 1995:454 and Blundell and Robison 
2000). Second, even in market economies, government economic intervention has 
been applied to deal with past economic injustices arising from slavery, colonialism 
or racial discrimination (George and West 1996; Bergman 1996; Tomasson, Crosby 
and Herzberger 1996; Herbert 1998; Uche 2011; Adejugbe 1984; Iwuagwu 2009). 
Economic empowerment policies fall in this category and thus may call for both 
political and economic decisions. In apartheid South Africa, the market distortions 
and economic imbalances were a result of deliberate government‟s racist policies, as 
explained earlier. It argued in this thesis that addressing such failures might call for 
more instruments than those directly applied to market enhancing purposes. Scholars 
have compared South Africa‟s BEE policy with that of Malaysia (Cargill 2010; 
Ponte, Roberts and van Sitter 2006 and Mandla 2006). Chapter Three of this thesis 
explores these contrasts with reference to the USA, Malaysia and Nigeria. 
 
Third, government economic intervention is discussed in terms of promoting rapid 
industrialisation and economic transformation. The economic growth in general has 
seen different models of success. In this thesis, the rapid industrialisation of Asian 
countries in particular Japan is considered. The Japanese government directly 
influenced the allocation of resources, selected which sectors to grow, which 
companies to support or even which production mix were important to take the 
economy forward. Success has been influenced by the government‟s creating of 
public institutions for planning and enforcement, control over finance, maintaining 
co-operation with business groups and stimulating entrepreneurial talent by using 
incentives and other support mechanisms but also disincentives where necessary. In 
short, the Japanese government went beyond market enhancement to market 
intrusion (Rhee 1994; Lall 1996; Yu 1997; Wade 2004; Kohl 2004; Kaplan 1972). 




bourgeoisie or entrepreneurs as a means of transforming and de-racializing the South 
African economy. It is for this reason that chapter three details the above three forms 
of government economic intervention and gives specific examples of Japan and to 
draw more lessons and also make pertinent inferences.  
 
A second set of literature focuses on why white and foreign owned companies 
accepted the BEE policy (Iheduru 2004, 2008; Dansereau 2005; Burton and 
Hawthorne 2007; Sartorius and Botha 2008; Marais 2011; Capps 2012; Lynch 2012). 
Iheduru (2008:338), referring to the MPRDA and the Mining Charter in particular, 
argues that whites accepted the policy for their own self-interest or profit motives 
and quest to control resources worldwide. Iheduru pointed out that globalisation 
exerts tremendous competitive pressure on corporations to beat other firms in order 
to capture market shares, appease shareholders and control mineral resource. In that 
case firms make fateful compromises to accept and comply with interventionist 
regulations provided their profits and other interests are not compromised. It is 
therefore “simple strategic calculations that lead them to fateful compromises.” 
(Iheduru (2008: 349).  
 
Capps (2012:217) says that the BEE policies and, in particular, the MPRDA and the 
Mining Charter were designed to eliminate the barriers to investment and did not 
deny private ownership. The BEE policies thus protect capitalist interests and allow 
the conglomerates to open up for competitive entry of global and local players 
(including black -owned companies) (Lynch 2012:548, 549). According to Sartorius 
and Botha (2008), white and foreign-owned businesses, especially those that rely on 
government tenders and contracts, accept the BEE policy, because it allows them to 
exploit business opportunities provided by the government sector.  
 
The acceptance of BEE policy by conglomerates is seen as an expedient strategy to 
appease the possible rise of nationalisation sentiments (Marais 2011.140-141) and 
which threatens the business community, its profits and wealth guarantees 
(Dansereau 2005:56). Nationalisation had been the ANC‟s basic policy since its 1955 




forces ideologies when it took over government. The white conglomerates also 
accepted the policy for the sake of peace and security of the country. Given the 
country‟s strong labour union movements and civil society, white conglomerates 
feared that non-compliance might trigger trade union actions that would disrupt 
businesses and fuel political instability. The understanding appears to have been that 
turmoil would risk investment and negatively affect the profit making process 
(Iheduru 2004:25-26; Burton and Hawthorne 2007:6).  
 
The acceptance of the BEE policy for Ntim and Soobaroyen (2012:123) is because it 
forms part of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) which white and foreign 
companies in South Africa have voluntarily accepted. They mention the same seven 
elements of BEE compliance as those indicated in BEE policy documents
6
.The 
compliance to these elements are seen as part of CSR because the compliance of the 
elements are not legally binding. I differ with their thinking, because the BEE policy 
in South Africa goes beyond the CSR areas in particular when it comes to the setting 
of equity targets to be given to blacks and enforceable through licensing. The 
elements are clearly stated in the policy documents. (For the elaboration of the 
elements see section 2.5.2 of this thesis). The issues of corporate social responsibility 
in the mining sector were also highlighted by Hammann and Kapelus (2004) in the 
context of Southern Africa. 
 
The third set of literature considers the implementation of the BEE policy and its 
outcome. The application is discussed in terms of stages or phases, and the outcomes 
in terms of beneficiaries to the policy, challenges and impediments experienced, and 
unintended consequences that have arisen. These effects are rent seeking and 
corruption. Different terminologies and time demarcations have been used to 
describe the phases. There is however, a general agreement that the implementation 
has gone through three broad phases (Hirsh 2005; Roberts and van Sitter 2006; 
Southall 2007; Acemoglu et.al 2007; Jack 2007; Nattrass and Seeking 2010; Capps 
2012). The three phases are best described by Southall. The first phase started before 
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the 1994 democratic elections and ended with the Asian financial crisis of 1997-
1998. In this phase, there was no formal economic empowerment policy, and hence 
the reference to the “uncoordinated phase” or “the private sector driven phase” 
Southall (2007:76). 
 
Both the conglomerates and the government made efforts to incorporate blacks in the 
mainstream of the economy. As noted by Hirsh (2005.105), the conglomerates 
started this process by unbundling their non-core assets in early 1990s. Some were 
sold among themselves and a small proportion to blacks. Blacks had acquired shares 
in telecommunication, media, and entertainment and financial services to the value of 
R 20 billion (£153 million) (10 per cent of the JSE), but this was reduced to a mere 
R5 billion (£38million) by the end of 1999 when the JSE crashed because of the 
Asian crisis (Capps 2012:320). The Asian financial crisis thus destroyed almost all 
the gains of black economic empowerment.  
 
In its quest to incorporate blacks in the economy, at this stage, according to Hirsh 
(2005:105) and Southhall (2006a: 6), the government employed three measures. 
First, government used the partially privatised State-owned Enterprises (SOEs), that 
is, Transnet, Denel, Telekom and Eskom and other important public corporations, in 
order to place few blacks mostly connected to the ANC in top management positions. 
Second, government used its procurement facilities to grant black-owned enterprises 
government tenders. Third the ANC itself created business enterprises (for more in 
this, see section 2.2 of the thesis).  
 
It is also in this stage that government concentrated on changing apartheid 
legislations in order for the country to operate under a racially free environment and 
bringing harmony between the people who were affected by murders and other 
atrocities that were committed during apartheid (Taylor 2007: 161-163).  
 
This early phase of black economic empowerment was faulted for a lack of a clear 
formal policy. This was considered as one of the reason for a slow pace of inclusion 




number of beneficiaries and cronyism as most of those benefited are connected to the 
ANC government (Sunday Times 26/6/2005; Khehla and Reddy 2006; Mbeki 2007; 
Gqubule 2006, Duncan 1996; Cargill 2010). Thus the Black Management Forum in 
November 1997 called on the government to clarify the nature of empowerment, the 
standards to be followed and the benchmark for its implementation. This led to the 
formation of the BEE Commission in 1998 (BEE Commission 2001). 
 
Another criticism of this phase has been the concentration on blacks‟ acquiring 
shares from existing companies and not establishing any new ventures. This has 
made the entire empowerment process, according to Cargill (2010: 192), look like 
the redistribution of the spoils of war among the ANC victors. For Cargill, it would 
have been more productive if the capital used to buy shares in existing companies 
was used to promote new business ventures, fight poverty, and invest in low income 
housing or land redistribution.  
 
The second phase started in 1998 with the establishment of the BEE Commission and 
ends in 2004 with the coming into effect of the MPRDA, the Mining Charter and the 
B-BBEE Act (Tangri and Southall 2008:704-707). According to Capps (2012:320), 
this is the period in which efforts to come up with a formal policy were taken under 
President Mbeki‟s leadership, resulting in the state adopting an interventionist role. 
The period has been referred to as „the big push phase‟ or the „assertive phase‟ or the 
„institutionalisation phase‟ (Acemoglu et.al 2007:10; Nattrass and Seeking 2010). 
The government was called upon to develop a formal economic policy (Capps 
2012:320), and hence the establishing of the BEE Commission in 1998. This 
Commission produced its report in 2001 which proposed the model in which it 
should take place (BEE Commission 2001). This further led to the passing of the 
MPRDA, the Mining Charter and the Score Card for the Mining Industry both in 
2002 followed by the B-BBEE Act in 2003. The B.BBEE Act was accompanied by 
the Generic Score Card and the Codes of Good Practice which explains how the 
white and foreign-owned companies are to comply with the Acts. The evolution of 





The third phase, which started with the coming into force of the MPRDA, Mining 
Charter and B-BBEE Act in 2004, is on-going. This study specifically focuses on this 
phase. It is sub-divided into two periods. The first sub period runs from 2004 to 
2009, the period by which the mining companies were expected to have completed 
the conversion process from the old-order rights to new-order rights. This can be 
regarded as the time of BEE euphoria in which many BEE deals were concluded. 
The literature focused on assessing the compliance of BEE policy and, in particular, 
the value and number of BEE deals concluded (Empowerdex 2004, 2009; Business 
Map 2005; South Africa Institute of Race Relations 2010/2011; Ernest and Young 
2011). It is during this period that the Generic Score Card and Codes of Good 
Practice were drafted with the final version in 2007 (DTI 2004, 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 
2007c). Attention then was on the interpretation of the Generic Scorecards and the 
Codes of Good Practice and its implications for compliance by the white and foreign-
owned companies (Balshaw and Goldberg 2005, 2007). But the existence of two 
different scorecards, one for the mining industry (2002) and the Generic Score Card 
for the economy at large (2007), has contributed to misinterpretations and confusion 
as to what elements the mining companies have to comply with and which not to 
(Pinnock and Buttler 2005; Peter Leon partner, Webbel Wentel Bowans 2007).  
 
In contrast to the early phase where critics pointed to few beneficiaries, there has 
been an increase in the number beneficiaries. This can be deduced from a number of 
directories on BEE beneficiaries in the various sectors (Research Channel Africa 
2006, 2008a, 2008b; DME 2008b; DMR 2010c, 2010j). The rapid growth in the 
number of BEE deals and values (968 deals with value of R335.3 billion or £22.3 
billion between 2004 and 2009) for the economy at large was an indication that the 
policy had opened more space for black participation (South Africa Institute of Race 
Relations 2010/2011:351). The broadened nature was clearly noted by Southall who 
said: 
  
“BEE deals, large and small are being concluded over a wide array of sectors, by a 
various array of BEE entities (owned variously by individuals, managers, employees, 




purchase, joint ventures with established firms, buy out and partnerships).” (Southall 
2007:79) 
 
Patel and Graham (2013:203) based on BEE deals between 2004 and 2006 also 
highlighted a broaden nature of the beneficiaries that included employees, women, 
disability groups, development/education trusts and community organisations 
through their trusts. Sartorius and Botha (2008:440) group BEE beneficiaries into 
two main categories: internal partners and external partners. Internal partners include 
black employees, managers or directors. External partners do not have direct control 
but benefit from the dividends and are divided into two: those having their own 
businesses (entrepreneurs, suppliers and business associates and investment holding 
companies) and broad-based groups (management companies, community and 
development trusts, trade unions and business association funds). The findings in 
chapter five of this thesis indicate that majority of BEE beneficiaries fall in this 
group. 
 
It is in this period that, for the first time in the country‟s economic history black, 
billionaires and millionaires appeared. Most of them were concentrated in the mining 
industry (Paradzi and Kulula 2007:25; Business Map Foundation 2005:15). For 
example, by 2011, Patrice Motsepe, one of the black mining moguls, was reported to 
have R22.9 billion (£2 billion) worth of investments, while Cyril Ramaphosa, a black 
politician-turned-entrepreneur (now in politics again), had R2.2 billion (£2 million) 
in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listed companies (Southall 2013: 262-
266). 
 
The second sub period runs from 2009 (when the DMR in particular published the 
Mining Charter Impact Assessment) to the present. This is a period of taking stock of 
the success (or lack of) of the BEE policy implementation process, in particular, the 
MPRDA and Mining Charter. The issues that became central during this period were 
and still are on low compliance levels, fronting and limited returns accruing to BEE 
beneficiaries. Although the issue of measuring compliance is important in order to 
gauge the progress of the policy, those who tried to do so came up with different 




(£163billion) in 2009, the DMR indicated that the equity ownership target were low 
and reached only 9 per cent, instead of 15 per cent, as was expected. For the same 
period, KIO (2010) estimated BEE equity ownership at 5.27 per cent. This sparked a 
confrontation between the DMR and the South African Chamber of mines, which 
said that, actually, the white and foreign-owned companies had met their targets. 
However the above studies did not provide details of the nature of BEE deals that 




This thesis explores the source of disparities on compliance levels and found several 
reasons. These include the fact that most of these studies use market capitalisation of 
the JSE companies to estimate equity transferred to blacks. JSE data is preferred, 
because it is readily available, but there are some limitations of using such data. First, 
the data give a general view based on asset value which changes from day to day 
depending on how the markets perform. Second, those mining companies that are not 
part of the JSE are excluded. Third, the data does not reveal much on how individual 
white and foreign-owned companies have complied, which black partners they have 
taken, and what kind of BEE deals have been concluded. For these reasons, this 
study has gone further by exploring the actual BEE transactions entered into by 
individual white and foreign-owned companies with their black counterparts. To do 
this, the research used a sample of 72 companies that include JSE and non-JSE and 
covered companies operating in all mineral categories. It is argued here that this has 
given a more detailed picture on BEE deals concluded in the industry, identified the 
empowerment beneficiaries by name and type (whether they are consortiums, 
communities, groups or individuals or companies) and revealed more on strategies 
and conditions used in concluding deals. To explore black control of mining assets, 
the same sample was used to extract data for directors (in total 468) and managers 
(226) represented in the mining companies as indicated earlier. No other study 
known has covered this. The findings of this excise are revealed in chapter five of the 
thesis.  
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The literature also turned its focus on impediments that blacks experience, namely 
lack of funding and strategies used by white and foreign companies to fund deals and 
the overall impact on BEE beneficiaries. Most literature pointed to the fact that 
blacks lacked their own capital when they started entering into BEE deals (Levitt 
2005; Business Map 2005; Southall 2006, 2007; Engelbrecht 2007; Wendy and Bull 
2007; DME 2009b; Cargill 2010). Cargill indicates this handicap as was best 
captured by Laurie Dippenaar‟s statement that: 
 
“--trying to sell equity to those with no capital is like building a house from the fourth floor, miracle 
making indeed.” (Cargill 2010:47) 
 
In other words, without having their own capital, there was a weak base for blacks to 
progress in business. Southall (2007:74-75) says that the reasons are historical and 
are founded on the apartheid policies.  
 
It is black people‟s lack of own funds that in part explains the limited number of 
beneficiaries highlighted mostly in the first BEE phase (Business Map (2005:15). To 
enter the mining industry, blacks depend on financial assistance either from the state 
financial institutions, other private financial institutions (notably banks) or the 
vendors (white and foreign-owned companies). The vendors, however, do not just 
pick anybody but have often preferred those with proven business experience, have 
their mine assets and/or are politically connected. This was meant to safeguard their 
investments and to get more business opportunities from the government. Once the 
few who succeed in concluding BEE deals manage to build up enough returns and 
get more business experience, they continue to attract more finance and get easily 
accepted by other white and foreign-owned companies that are under pressure to 
conclude empowerment transactions.  
 
In the paucity of start-up capital or finance, especially from the private enterprise, 
government's financial institutions are called upon to shore up the BEE deals. As 
early as 2006, the Tiso Group News (2006:2) indicated that meeting the 26 per cent 




billion or £15billion (with the total value estimated at R760billion or £69billion at 
the time). South Africa‟s four big banks, the First Rand, Nedbank, Absa and 
Standard Bank combined together did not have the capacity to finance BEE deals of 
that amount. Much newer estimates by the DMR (2009b) and KIO (2010) are R 1.8 
trillion (or £163billion) and R 2 trillion (or £181billion), respectively. This means 
that, in order to meet the BEE targets of 26 per cent, one needs R 280 billion (or 
£25billion) or R 300 billion (or £27billionn), respectively, and this is difficult.  
 
Cargill (2010: 6-7) suggests that the government should intervene to mobilise funds. 
She takes us back to history and gives an example of how the apartheid regime under 
the National Party government mobilised savings to support its Afrikaner 
empowerment programme known as the Afrikaner Broederbond. Sanlam, an 
insurance company, was established in 1915 to fund the institutions with the motto 
“Born of the Volk to serve the Volk”. The word “volk”, is the Afrikaner version of 
the English word, „folk‟, referred to the Afrikaners who were the targeted 
beneficiaries. This is in contrast to the BEE policy era which has not been followed 
by a significant government effort to raise enough capital to help black business. The 
government still relies on its traditional public financial institutions
8
 and a growing 
number of private financial institutions in the midst of growing number of aspiring 
black entrepreneurs and shareholders in the mining industry. 
 
The government should 
find means to help blacks to source funds from the global markets. 
 
On strategies that white and foreign-owned companies use to fund BEE deals, the 
central issue is the accumulation of debts which the BEE beneficiaries are 
experiencing (Mbethe 2004; Pinnock and Buttler 2005; Levitt 2005, Bull 2007; 
Buttler 2007; Engelbrecht 2007; Botha 2008; DME 2009c; Cargill 2010; Daniels 
2010; Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyer (ND)). Two funding mechanisms specifically 
highlighted are third party and vendor financing. Third party financing involves 
borrowing from a third party, normally a bank. This requires security or collateral 
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which is provided in the form of shares, property or some form of liquid assets. The 
financier then provides funds at a certain rate of interest to cover for risks or the cost 
of capital (Bull 2007:141). Vendor finance involves the owner of the asset providing 
funding for the buyer to acquire assets in the vendor‟s own company.  
 
In the absence of collateral (and the government not offering them guarantee), blacks 
are forced to resort to the vendors (white and foreign-owned companies), who then 
become guarantors of the BEE beneficiaries and arrange loans. Often, vendors 
establish special purpose vehicles (SPVs) which are separate companies used for 
BEE equity transactions and allow black shareholders to be part of directorship (Bull 
2007:142). Thus, SPVs allow blacks to own shares and have control in white and 
foreign-owned companies against a loan that is guaranteed by the vendor. The 
practice in South Africa has been for the vendor to acquire some shares in the black-
owned company with which it has entered into a BEE deal. This is mainly to 
safeguard its interests. This system does not differ much from how the mining houses 
operated before the unbundling process (see section 2.2 of this thesis). 
 
According to Cargill (2010:36), the first SPVs were funded by willing financial 
institutions which banked on a good debt return, along with an equity upside (share 
appreciating in value). In this way, black investors would be allocated shares without 
having to put money down to pay for them in the first place in the expectation that 
they would be redeemed later. The ability of redeeming the shares depends on a 
firm‟s good performance. If the firm gets enhanced returns and pay dividends, the 
black shareholders use the dividends to repay the debts (redeem shares). However, if 
the market conditions deteriorate, the share value falls (the assets loses value) and no 
or limited dividends are paid. Black shareholders then lose the ability to pay interest 
and to redeem shares. Debts accumulate and equity ownership gets depleted. The 
financier takes the losses as well. To recover from debt, the BEE beneficiary may be 
forced to sell shares back to vendors and often at much lower prices. This is what 
happened to one such beneficiary, NAIL, in 1998 where Anglo America Corporation 
had to buy back its shares. This brought changes in the restructuring of the SPVs, 




ensure that they do not lose their BEE status and use lock-in clause that prevents 
buyer from selling shares for a specified period. This is permitted in the Mining 
Charter. In short, the lock-in clause has contributed to continued indebtedness of 
BEE investors. 
 
The SPV funding model is criticised by Gqubule (2006:120-121), Buttler (2007) and 
the DMR (2009c:18), who all indicate that, despite facilitating black control, the 
model is failing as a mechanism to transfer equity ownership to blacks. This is 
because actual ownership of mining assets is tied to loan agreements and a large 
portion of empowerment deals is paper wealth (Buttler 2007:19).  
 
Black people‟s lack of capital has not only limited their capacity to fully participate 
in equity ownership, but has also led to the problem of fronting and cronyism. 
Fronting occurs when a black person or company is invited to sign a BEE deal by a 
white or foreign-owned company. After signing a deal, the black–owned company 
collects “gifts” and then ceases to engage in day to day activities and disappears from 
the scene (Gothenburg University 2001:93). In return, a white or foreign-owned 
company gets an artificial black empowerment profile and is then able to produce 
evidence that it has a black partner. The term, „rent-a-blackie‟, is used to refer to this 
practice. Three main reasons explain why fronting occurs. First, empowerment is 
seen as a pure cost as it involves capital and where to invest and with who is based 
on returns anticipated and other business relationships. Secondly, there is pressure on 
the white and foreign-owned companies to be compliant, so they hunt for black 
people who can accept to mask them. Thirdly, it is hard to find professional black 
people and entrepreneurs. Fronting will therefore happen as long as companies can 
get away with it (ibid).
9
 Randal uses a phrase “white foes and black masks” to 
explain the issue of fronting, implying that black owners and managers are just hired 
for “their smiling faces to appear in corporate brochures” in order for the white 
companies to be seen as compliant but leaving blacks dis-empowered. At the end, 
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BEE policy compliance has been just a window dressing. It is this that tarnishes the 
BEE policy (Randal 1996:622). 
 
Another source of discomfort in this phase is meagre return or negative growth. This, 
together with the continued existence of fronting, resulted in calls for the amendment 
of the Acts. These issues are expanded upon in section 2.4 of this thesis. 
 
In addition to all the criticisms noted above, the South African government, as noted 
by Tangri and Southall (2008:700), has been hesitant, restricting itself beyond market 
forces, because it tried to balance the demands for de-racialization of the economy 
with the perceived need for domestic and foreign capital. While emphasizing the 
significance of transferring economic benefits to those once marginalised, the 
government has mainly advocated economic growth and the use of market friendly 
policies. The question that can be asked here is whether the transferring of equity 
from incumbent mining companies to new comers (blacks) can succeed under market 
forces?  
 
Cronyism or political patronage or „comrade capitalism‟ has been part of BEE deals 
according to many BEE critics (Duncan 1996; Hirsh 2005; Khela and Reddy 2007; 
Mbeki M 2007; Southall 2007; Mathe 2008; Cargill 2010). Cronies or „political 
comrades‟ are those who have strong connections to the ANC government. These 
include what they call the “Robben Islanders” that is, liberation struggle veterans 
who had been imprisoned on Robben Island; the ANC cadres that were in exile and; 
those who joined the corporate world before the official coming of the B-BBEE 
policy (Duncan 1996). These are the people who have benefited from business deals 
over and over again. Mathe (2008) refers to those beneficiaries who became rich 
from the process as „fat cats‟. To Khehla and Reddy (2007), cronyism has been 
enhanced by white-owned companies looking for bankable and connected blacks 
who are closely associated with the ANC. The aim has been to make these cadres 





Southall (2007:80) expected political patronage to arise due to the fact that the 
economy was controlled by white capitalism. He wrote: 
 
“Given the centrality of political leverage to the promotion of BEE and the structure of the South 
African economy black capitalism and black capitalists are likely to tend towards “cronyism” and 
“compradorism” as weberianism and patriotism.” 
 
Cargill (2010:93-95) says even the ANC itself has become one of the BEE 
beneficiaries. It has created its own investment arm, the Chancellor House, which 
benefits from state contracts. The ANC‟s investments are also mentioned by 
Southhall (2006a: 6), as indicated earlier and also said by Beresford (2015: 2-7), who 
states that the ANC party funds itself by creating business fronts and then use them 
to source state contracts. He defines crony capitalism as the use of connections to 
public authority to facilitate private capitalist accumulation. He distinguishes this 
from „spoils consumption‟ which he defines as the use of connections to public 
resources for private ends or the direct use and abuse of public office to consume and 
distribute the spoils of the state along private channels. He argues that crony 
capitalism should be seen as a process of class formation in post-colonial Africa and 
resembles the kind of capital accumulation one can witness in the economies of East 
Asian tigers, post-Soviet Russia and the oligarchic politics evident in Western 
countries where private capitalist lobbyists wield huge influence over public officials 
(ibid). The critical element here is not the actual practice of patronage but the manner 
in which this is harnessed for national development.  
 
Kelsall (2013:13), who refers to crony capitalism as „neo-patriamonialism‟ or 
„clientelism‟, has similar ideas. He argues that this should not be seen as an obstacle 
to development. In reference to Asian Tigers, he shows the importance of strong 
political leadership which is able to channel economic resources to their cronies and 
produce enough capital for national development. He says: 
 
“Key to explaining why some of these states performed better than the others was the 
way in which clientelism and rent seeking were organised. Specifically, almost all 
the better performing states had been able to centralise the management of economic 
rents and orient it to the long term, a feat which was achieved with the help of 
strong, visionary leaders, constrained democracy, top down client relations and 




Cronyism is explained by Booth and Mutebi (2012:381-2) as „developmental 
patriamonialism‟ and is seen as the key to Rwanda‟s success under Kagame. They 
say that developmental patriamonialism is attained “when the ruling elite acquires an 
interest in and capacity for, managing economic rents in a centralised way with a 
view of enlarging their own and others income in the long run.” They argue that 
developmental patriamonialism is more likely to be a bridge to achieving economic 
transformation and social development than the one suggested by orthodox advocates 
of good governance who believe in democratic leadership and are against corrupt 
practices. Explaining the same idea, Khan and Gray (2005:21) call this „primitive 
accumulation‟ They defined this as the non-market transfer of assets which emerge 
before a capitalist economy is advanced or developed (facing poor and limited 
resource markets and low productivity of productive assets) and the state has poor 
fiscal capacity. The non-market transfers include taxes, subsidies, compulsory 
purchase orders (or outright appropriations); zoning and planning permissions, 
privileged access of land and state price fixing. When the economies are not 
developed, such non-market transfers are based not on voluntary contracts negotiated 
by private individuals but are better done through political negotiations in order to 
allow privileged acquisition of assets by some individuals over others (Khan and 
Gray 2005:22). They say this is what made the Asian Tigers succeed. Their 
governments created strong institutions which enabled them to selectively allocate 
benefits to maximise economic returns for both its clients and the governments 
themselves (Khan and Gray 2005:15). The problem is that such acts trigger 
corruption which could be difficult to avoid.  
 
Although cronyism seems to be the norm in early stages capitalism, the bad part is 
that cronyism involves economic benefits and naturally that breeds rent seeking 
behaviour and corruption. Second, the ability of any political leadership to avoid 
meritocracy and appropriately choose competent and competitive clients who will 
ensure economic efficiency is questioned. Thirdly, when cryonic tendencies are 
interrogated in the society, animosities might result. Thus, it may be difficult for 




robust civil society to use cronyism for capital accumulation, because of internal 
resistance and external pressures to suppress cryonic tendencies.  
 
The BEE literature also covered the absence of government institutions to guide, 
oversee and evaluate the implementation process (Ryan 2009/2010; Acemoglu et al. 
2007 and Ponte, Roberts and Van Sittert 2006). Ponte, Roberts and Van Sittert 
(2006:49-50) point to the fact that the government has resorted to use of private 
consultants, auditors and certifying agencies to check whether or not white and 
foreign-owned companies are complying. These writers question the ability of 
private assessors to bear the responsibility for the policy scrutiny, as their aim is just 
to reap financial returns (ibid). This has resulted in the „managerialisation‟ of the 
BEE policy.  
 
The use of private consultants has limited the government‟s ability to gauge how the 
overall policy objectives are met, get proper and genuine feedback on problems 
being encountered which is important to finding solutions. To Ryan (2009/2010:3), 
private assessors may lack the motivation to hunt for companies that do not comply, 
may be loyal to those customers who pay them better and fail to scrutinise every item 
under compliance and just dish out compliance certificates in order to enhance their 
businesses. Acemoglu et al. (2007:2) say the danger of commercialising such 
important functions of the government is that, policy makers will not get a true 
picture of the level of compliance and problems encountered. They suggest that the 
government has to create its own institutions that would properly evaluate, identify 
problem, seek co-operation with all stake holders to find solutions and ensure that the 




The literature referred to above is not exhaustive in terms of challenges and problems 
faced by black entrepreneurs in the extractive industry. Studies done in other African 
countries pointed to many other challenges in addition to lack of finance. In Ghana, 
Campbell (2013: 145-147) argues that small scale and artisanal miners do not only 
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suffer in terms of lack of finance (as they rely on informal financial channels), but 
also in terms of technology, bureaucratic red tape in obtaining licenses and 
difficulties in accessing land in mineral rich areas. The government prefers to offer 
extensive incentives and large chunks of lands to large scale miners, and it is often 
not strange for the government to shed-off portions once allocated to artisanal and 
small scale miners to large scale miners. Spiegel (2015:545) also observes how 
licensing has been used in Zimbabwe against the small scale and artisanal miners in 
mineral rich areas such as the Great Dyke. Licensing has become a critical element in 
South Africa, because it is a point of entry for blacks in the mining sector.  
 
Based on the interviews that this study has conducted, it is clear that blacks entering 
in the mining industry face many challenges that limit their capacities of better 
exploiting the available opportunities. Of course, in addition to the list is lack of 
finance but they also face difficulties in accessing land in mineral rich areas, 
obtaining relevant data on mining ventures to be purchased. Another problem is the 
lack of clear government policy direction to guide relationship between communities 
and consortium shareholders who seem to know less on how BEE transactions are 
conducted and that depend on „lead partners.‟ These are those shareholders within 
the black society who seem to be more knowledgeable about shareholding and are 
political or business elites. Land ownership has been at the centre of the apartheid 
policy as explained in section 1.3 of this thesis. This has led to the government 
introducing policies to distribute land since 1994 (Hall 2010; Pringle 2013; Kloppers 
and Pienaar 2014).  
 
According to Hall (2010:15), the BEE policy is aimed at dealing with historical 
injustice by the de-racialization of capital, human settlements and security of tenure. 
Transferring land assets to the poor and the promotion of small scale holder 
agriculture is at the centre of poverty reduction. The problems of access to land 
might be less for old mining companies who had land concessions negotiated during 
the apartheid era and some communities like the Bafokeng Nation that owns large 
tracks of land from which platinum is mined. They have taken advantage of their 




owned mining companies like Impala Platinum and Anglo Platinum (Kgosi Leruo 
Molotlegi 2013; Mnwana 2014).  
 
Mining extraction activities involve land issues. The coming of the MPRDA meant 
that landowners ceased to own mineral resources under their land. Those that need to 
access minerals still have to negotiate with the land owners. This affects mainly 
black-owned companies in contrast to incumbent white-owned companies whose 
leases had been negotiated in the past. Moreover mining activities open up job and 
business opportunities in mine areas resulting in an influx of people. Increase in 
mineral activities has increased pressure on the land use (Rajak 2012) and has 
resulted in problems of encroachment and forced relocation (Farrell, Hamman and 
Mackres 2011). For example communities living close to Mohalagwena mine in the 
Limpopo Province had to be moved from their land to give way to mine expansion. It 
is questionable if the blacks entering in the mining industry are free from land access 
problems and have the ability to handle land issues. It was necessary for the study to 
explore further the challenges and problems encountered by mining companies in the 
process of BEE implementation. From the interviews conducted with executives of 
black-owned companies, blacks entering in the mining industry cannot easily access 
land in mineral rich areas. Interviews with government officials reveal that the 
government is downplaying this problem. However, land issues cannot be ignored by 
policy makers as these issues are at the centre of blacks accessing land in mineral 
rich areas, the relationship between mining companies and the communities who 
either own the land with mineral deposits or live closer to the mines. Chapter Seven 
of this thesis details the field-work findings on challenges that mining companies 
face in the industry.  
 
From the literature above, it can be deduced that the BEE policy is part of the South 
African government economic intervention program in its economy. This is the 
economy where, in the racially repressive past, laws were used against blacks. It is 
acknowledged here that the ANC government has succeeded in scraping the 
apartheid laws, managed to negotiate with the white capital to transfer some 




enforce the transfer of economic assets and the blacks‟ entry into all sectors of the 
economy including the mining industry which was one of the white capital‟s 
strongholds.  
 
As indicated in earlier there are six broad elements that the white and foreign-owned 
companies are obliged to comply under the MPRDA and the Mining Charter. These 
include equity ownership, management and control, skills development, employment 
equity, enterprise development and preferential procurement. This thesis limits itself 
to investigating equity ownership and management and control to blacks in the South 
Africa‟s mining industry. Previous studies (DMR 2009c, KIO 2010) concentrated 
much on estimating equity ownership using data on market capitalisation of mining 
companies listed in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). These studies did not 
cover much on issues of black control. As a result, blacks‟ control of mining industry 
is virtually unknown. Moreover the use of JSE data does not reveal much about 
compliance at company level to revel the mining deals that were concluded by white 
and foreign-owned companies and their black counterparts. Besides, not all mining 
companies are listed in the JSE. It is argued here that exploring mining deals reveal 
more on the nature of compliance that has taken place within mining companies. To 
transfer equity to blacks, mining asset transactions (mining deals) started to be 
concluded in early 1990s. In order to get a clearer picture on deals concluded before 
and after the new mining regulations, the study covers mining deal transactions 
between 1990 and 2012 in all mining categories (platinum, diamond, gold, coal and 
ferrous and non- ferrous).  
 
The literature also indicates that the entry of blacks in the industry has not been an 
easy ride. The lack capital, face difficulties in accessing land in mineral rich areas 
and export markets, and use poor technology. In addition, by virtue of having no 
previous experience in the mining industry as producers or owners, blacks lack 
knowledge on how to run mining ventures successfully. However, the ANC 
government has left black entrepreneurs to battle the white-racially biased market 
system. The first main argument that the study is making is that impediments that 




apartheid policies with new mineral regulations can never transfer mineral wealth 
from whites to blacks. The main suggestions the thesis is making is that the 
government of South Africa must deal with the barriers and challenges that black 
entrepreneurs face, selectively use incentives and other supporting mechanisms and 
promote the black investors to become strong players in the mining industry. Lessons 
should be drawn from similar policies elsewhere. From the USA‟s affirmative 
programs and Malaysia‟s economic empowerment programs the BEE policy makers 
should learn the importance of establishing institutions and supporting mechanisms. 
From Nigeria‟s indenisation programs they should learn the pitfalls from the 
implementation of the programs. The BEE policy makers in South Africa need also 
to draw lessons from Japan which selectively supported its local entrepreneurs, 
cooperated with the business groups until they were strong enough to break into 
world market. This is because the transfer of equity and attaining black control 
translates into promoting black entrepreneurs. 
 
The literature above also indicates blacks are entering the industry at the time when, 
ironically, it is still white dominated in many ways. The second main argument is 
that ownership structure determines control in the mining industry. The rationale of 
the argument is that the ownership structure is still concentrated in the white hands; 
has cross shareholding and; financial institutions and families have significant 
control of mining assets. The low voting shares are also used and stringent terms and 
conditions are applied in the mining deal transactions. The unbundling that has 
occurred in the early 1990s did little to change the ownership structure. It is thus 
argued that the structure and the conditions limit the possibilities of attaining 40 per 
cent black representations on the board and top management of mining companies. 
The targets may be reached if the government deals with the limitations, support 
black entrepreneurs as suggested earlier and also use enforcement mechanism to 
ensure compliance of the MPRDA and Mining Charter.  
 
The thesis adopts a political economic approach as it takes into account the historical 
perspectives of South Africa‟s social-economic and political realities. This enables 




MPRDA and the Mining Charter) have enabled the transfer of equity ownership, 
attainment of control and management to blacks. The thesis is informed by principal-
agent-theory (or simply agency theory) to analyse BEE equity ownership, control 
and management. The theory goes back to early debates on shareholders-managers 
relations. Berle and Means (1932) observed that the ownership of US firms had 
become separated from management and control. Because of the separation 
managerial objectives (firm size, growth) may differ from owners objectives (profit 
maximisation). This thesis uses Berle and Means‟ agency theory to explain 
ownership variables (company shareholding and mining assets), mining control 
(board characteristics) and the management (management characteristics) variables 
to examine compliance of the MPRDA and the Mining Charter. Explanation of the 
theory is expanded more in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
 
1.5 Objectives of the Study 
The objectives of this study are: 
 
1. To establish the extent to which the white and foreign-owned companies have 
complied with the MPRDA and the Mining Charter, particularly in terms of how 
much percentage of equity ownership has been transferred to blacks and how much 
management and control have been devolved. There are thus three main components 
to this objective: equity ownership, control (board representation) and management. 
These are central to the blacks‟ participation in the economy and the de-racialization 
of the economy in general.  
 
2.  To establish the extent to which the mining companies have qualified to be 
re-classified into black enterprises (where blacks own 50 plus 1 vote), black-
empowered enterprises (with blacks having 25 plus 1 vote), black women enterprises 
and community or broad based enterprises (where these groups have 1 to 100 per 
cent shareholding). From the Mining Charter, it was stated that this was a measure of 
accessing blacks‟ participation in the mining industry. This was necessary, taking the 
fact that, before 1990, there was no single black-owned or controlled mining 




of equity owned by blacks in the mining sector as required in the first objective but 
also to see what kind of black-owned companies had emerged.  
 
The two objectives were considered together, as they are interlinked. Three different 
mechanisms were used to pursue the above objectives. First, the market capitalisation 
of the JSE mining companies was used to estimate the equity owned by blacks. This 
data was captured on 12 July 2011. Second, using a sample of 72 mining companies, 
BEE deals entered into by individual white and foreign-owned companies in all 
mineral categories were traced. In addition, the black beneficiaries and the share 
exchanges were identified. Over 100 companies were covered. Thirdly, using the 
same sample data on black representation on the boards and senior management of 
these companies was gathered and 468 board members and 226 senior management 
members were identified. 
 
3.  To establish the different strategies used by white, foreign and black-owned 
companies to enter into BEE deals. This would help one to understand the dynamics 
of BEE deals in particular how the incumbents (white and foreign-owned companies) 
chose their BEE partners. 
 
4.  To establish forces which facilitate or hinder the implementation of the 
MPRDA and the Mining Charter in the mining industry. Literature on the 
implementation of B-BBEE policy has focussed on the lack of funding, the mode of 
funding of BEE deals and lack of government support as main obstacles to black 
participation in equity ownership. It was important to reveal more on these or other 
challenges and find out how these affected mining companies. It was with this 
knowledge that one could come up with suggestions on how to improve BEE 
implementation in the country. 
 
5.  To establish the role of the government in the implementation of the MPRDA 
and the Mining Charter and what do the mining companies expect from the 




government‟s intervention drive in its economy, it is only with this type of 
information that the government can adjust it implementation strategies. 
 
To get answers for the third, fourth and fifth objectives, readings on companies were 
undertaken and literature on BEE in South Africa was conducted. This was followed 
by interviews with executives of white, foreign and black-owned companies, relevant 
government departments and other stakeholder. The information gathered is 
presented in Chapter Five, Six and Seven. 
 
1.6 The Organisation of Chapters 
In addition to this introductory Chapter, the study is composed of seven other 
Chapters. Chapter two discusses the evolution and codification of the B-BBEE 
policy in South Africa. First, it traces the policy process in the mining industry under 
the Department of Minerals and Energy. Second, the research focuses on the rest of 
the economy under the Department of Trade and Industry. The aim is to establish the 
basics of the B-BBEE policy, and show stakeholders that were involved and 
highlight the policy changes that have taken place overtime. 
 
Chapter Three situates South Africa‟s B-BBEE policy in the broad context of 
government economic intervention. This Chapter examines, first, under what 
circumstances government economic intervention is justified under the free market 
system. Second, the Chapter considers the cases of government economic 
intervention in response to past economic imbalances created by previous policies. 
This is because the B-BBEE policy is a response to the racial economic imbalances 
created by the past apartheid policies. The focus here is on affirmative action in the 
USA, economic empowerment in Malaysia and indigenization in Nigeria. Special 
attention is paid to the institutions to implement the above policies, factors that 
contributed to their success, limitations and how the policy makers have dealt with 
problems and issues that emerged in the implementation process. Third, the Chapter 
analyses government economic intervention in support of rapid economic 
development and transformation as has been the case in East Asian countries in 




used incentives and other support mechanisms to earmark industries and companies 
which later managed to break into global markets. There is a lot for South Africa to 
learn from Japan‟s experience. 
 
Chapter four provides details on how data for this study was gathered and analysed. 
Data for Chapters Five and Six was obtained from publicly accessed documents that 
include company annual reports, business directories and various government 
documents. Data for Chapter Seven was collected by conducting interviews with 
mining company executives, management and officials of relevant government 
departments. The interview questions were grouped into themes which facilitated the 
subsequent analysis. The main themes covered were licensing, BEE partnership, 
BEE compliance, BEE funding, the role of the government and the future of BEE 
policy. 
 
Chapter Five analyses the extent of compliance with equity ownership. It first 
establishes how licensing has succeeded in enabling the entry of blacks in the mining 
industry by looking at the number of licenses issued to mining companies. To 
establish a general level of compliance and determine the percentage of the value of 
mining assets under black ownership data on market capitalisation of JSE mining 
companies (56 companies as of 11 July 2011) was used. Since market capitalisation 
gives a general view, the Chapter goes further and analyses the BEE mining deals 
concluded by the JSE listed and non-JSE mining companies in all the mining 
categories (ferrous and non-ferrous minerals, coal, platinum, gold, and diamond). 
Analysing these deals provides a more detailed picture of BEE compliance as it 
identifies which white and foreign-owned companies concluded deals and who were 
their black beneficiaries (individual persons, black-owned companies, consortiums, 
communities and Employee Share Ownership Programmes-ESOPs) and, most 
important, which mining assets were sold and which were kept as wholly owned. No 
other known study in South Africa has done this. 
 
Chapter Six discusses the extent to which white and foreign-owned companies have 




industry. Due to concentrated ownership and cross shareholding, the thesis takes a 
view that shareholding determines control. The Chapter starts by exploring literature 
on ownership and control in general and then relates this to South Africa‟s corporate 
structure. Then, data on 468 board members and 226 senior managers gathered on 
the same companies from secondary sources and is used to establish the degree of 
black representation. The preliminary argument is that black representation is 
considerable in companies that they hold majority shares.  
 
Chapter Seven explores the forces that facilitate or hinder the implementation of the 
MPRDA and the Mining Charter (objective four) and establishes the role of the 
government in the implementation of the MPRDA and the Mining Charter (objective 
five). Both objectives are met by drawing empirical evidence through interviews 
with policy makers (the DMR and DTI), the executives and managers of white, 
foreign and black-owned companies. It has emerged from the interviews that the 
major stumbling blocks to the implementation of the MPRDA and the Mining 
Charter has mainly been the lack of finance, difficulties in accessing land in mineral 
areas, lack of relevant information about mining assets blacks buy and limited 
government support. At the positive level, there has been the willingness of white 
and foreign-owned companies to create mechanisms to accommodate blacks and 
help them. It has come to light that some of the emerging black-owned companies 
have experienced growth. 
 
Chapter Eight summarises the general findings of the study and makes 
recommendations on how to improve the B-BBEE implementation process. The 
basic findings are that in terms of market capitalisation, the level of equity ownership 
is low and has not met the 15 per cent envisaged by 2009 and not even the 26 per 
cent for 2014. However the mining assets have also grown from R720 million in 
2002 to R 1.8 trillion in 2011. If we take the fact that blacks never existed in the 
industry, it can be said from the findings that the Mining Charter has made their 
entry into the industry possible. White and foreign-owned companies have a wide 
range of black partners. However, what has emerged from this study is that white and 




determining where, how and who should benefit from BEE. They have also 
influenced the nature and type of BEE companies through their funding systems and 
strategies used. It is these that account for the prevalence of SPVs and consortiums 
and conditions. The government on its part has been contented with just putting in 
place regulations calling for the participation of blacks in mining and believing that 
the free market system will take care of the implementation of the regulations. The 
lack of direct support from the government has made BEE entrants in the mining 






2 The Evolution of the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment 
Policy in South Africa 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Chapter One indicated that a changing political and economic landscape has 
influenced the structure of the mining industry. As it became clear that a black 
majority government would replace the apartheid regime and the economy would 
open to international competition, in the early 1990s, the white conglomerates started 
unbundling
11
 their assets. In the process of unbundling the conglomerates brought in 
a few blacks into South Africa‟s corporate world. The ANC government also used 
State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) to advance a few blacks to top management, and 
also used procurement facilities to give preferential treatment to black businesses. 
All these happened before there was a formal BEE policy. The first section of this 
chapter examines the unbundling process.  
 
Section 1.3 of this thesis discussed a series of apartheid laws that had limited black 
peoples‟ meaningful participation in the economy. From its 1955 Freedom Charter, 
the ANC‟s initial answer to apartheid was nationalisation. This route was abandoned 
as the party moved to take over political power. Instead, the ANC sought to intervene 
in its economy and put in policies that would empower blacks to participate in all 
sectors of the economy. Section two traces the changing nature of the ANC‟s 
economic policy. This helps to get a better understanding of how the BEE policy has 
evolved. 
 
The B-BEEE policy was not an outcome of one grand policy that came with South 
Africa‟s first democratic election in 1994. It took almost ten years before there was a 
full elaboration of the policy. The elaboration resulted in the MPRDA, the Mining 
Charter and B-BBEE Act which emerged from negotiations between the government, 
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white capital and other stake holders such as labour. For the government‟s 
perspective, the agenda in the negotiations was how the economy could adhere to 
market forces while dealing with economic imbalances between black and white 
races. By contrast, white capital was concerned about protecting its economic assets.  
 
The policy was elaborated upon through two parallel processes, the first being under 
the mining industry. The Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) and now the 
Department of Minerals (DMR) promulgated the MPRDA and the Mining Charter in 
2002. The second process was under the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
which produced the B-BBEE Act in 2003 which covered the rest of the economy. 
Section three focuses on the MPRDA and the Mining Charter while section four 
covers the B-BBEE Act and the Generic Score Card and Codes of Good Practice that 
guide the implementation of the B-BBEE Act. Some problems were picked up during 
the implementation of B-BBEE policy. This then necessitated policy amendments. 
The last section looks at subsequent amendments. 
 
2.2 Where are the Big Six? The Unbundling of the Conglomerates and 
the Incorporation of Blacks 
Section 1.3 of this thesis submitted that by 1992, the top six South African 
conglomerates accounted for 85 per cent of the market capitalization of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) (Halse 1982, Hirsh 2005). The conglomerates 
had various subsidiaries spread across many sectors of the economy. During the 
unbundling, conglomerates sold shares among themselves resulting in a pyramid 
structure and cross shareholding where one conglomerate owned a „cascading‟ series 
of other subsidiary companies. For example, if company A owns 51 per cent of 
voting stock in company B, and B in turn owns 51 per cent of company C, then A 
will have acquired control over C through its commitment to B. This results in 
company A owning a contributing share of 25 per cent of C‟s equity capital, (IDRC 
2004:2; Chabane et al., 2006). This implied that control could be attained through 
minority shareholding. A pyramid structure exists where a company has 50+1 share 
in another company or could derive 75 per cent or more of its attributable income 




companies own shares in each other‟s companies. Interlocking directorship was 
signified by a unique arrangement. According to this plan, one director sits on boards 
of at least six different companies spread across diverse sectors. Three per cent of the 





The same structure prevailed in the mining industry where the conglomerates (known 
as mine houses) developed over years. The mining houses were responsible for 
organising mining activities that could stand deep-level mining, attract large capital 
and be able to control world markets. This involved the amalgamation of small mines 
into large ones. The merger resulted in the pyramid structure and cross shareholding 
and control blocs (see and Kantor 1998). Names might have changed but, according 
to Feinstein (2005:104), by mid-1980, there were six giant mining houses which are 
also called conglomerates that controlled the JSE. These are the Rand Mines (34 per 
cent), Johannesburg Consolidated Investments Company (24 per cent), Anglo 
American (14 per cent), Gold Fields (11 per cent), Union Corporate (8 per cent) and 
General Mining Finance Corporations (5 per cent).  
 
The mining houses were responsible for acquiring capital, organizing local and 
foreign labour, consolidating small mines into large scale mines and conducting mine 
functions in-house. In-house functions means that one mining company had various 
sections, each performing a particular function such as geological surveys, 
exploration, engineering services, transportation, procurement of mine equipment, 
marketing and a central office for administrative functions. It was the mine houses 
that controlled the development of the new mines by sponsoring new mine projects. 
The procedure is that, upon a mining company declaring that it had a potential mine 
project, it would approach a mine house which would organise funding (including 
providing operating finance), sponsor the floating of its shares on the JSE, source 
capital equipment, higher level-skilled and low-level skilled labour even if it meant 
importing mine engineers and migrant labourers. As the organisers and providers of 
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funding, conglomerates kept some shares in the mining companies that they 
sponsored resulting in the few large companies having shareholding of mine assets in 
other mining companies spreading in almost all mining categories of the industry 
(Innes 1983:2). 
The strongest known conglomerate in South Africa was (and still is) Anglo 
American Plc. Its assets were spread in almost all economic sectors. In conjunction 
with the state at the time, Anglo American established the National Finance 
Corporation and had interest in other top banks in the country (Standard Bank and 
Nedbank) and had established Anglo American Life Insurance (1982) which 
increased its financial power (Innes 1983: 5-9). In the mining industry it had control 
of De Beers, JCI, Rustenburg Platinum, and Consolidated Gold Fields. The 
company‟s assets were diversified in all mining categories –diamonds, gold, coal, 
platinum and industrial metals. In other industries of the economy, the company had 
interest in top companies such as Barlows, South African Breweries, AECI, Tiger 
Oats (agricultural processing), Tongaat and Huletts (sugar). Alone, Anglo American 
held 52.5 per cent of the market capitalisation of the JSE by 1982.  
 
For many years, white conglomerates had close links with the apartheid regime, 
cemented by various incentives that they obtained. The incentives came in a form of 
the regime intervening directly by passing legislations that denied entry of blacks in 
the industry as owners, subjected blacks to low wage jobs, low skilled employment 
and even being replaced with migrant labour as indicated earlier. The government 
used immigration policy to import skilled labour. Most of the migrant labour came 
from neighbouring countries of Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and 
Swaziland. The migrant labour system is still the major feature of the industry. 
Discrimination laws had negatively affected the economy. The negative 
consequences came in terms of higher wage costs because of higher wages paid to 
white labour, locking blacks‟ potential and limiting supply of skilled labour. 
Continued discrimination resulted in internal political resistance, capital flight and 
world-wide economic sanctions. Over the years all these acted against the 
conglomerates‟ profits. It forced the conglomerates to start engaging with the ANC 




The conglomerates also started unbundling their ownership structures in order to 
prepare themselves to enter into the global economic playground and accommodate 
themselves in the new political dispensation. However, the unbundling was much on 
the way they performed their business functions and not much on how they 
controlled the mineral wealth world-wide and did not address racial economical 
inequities (Chabane et. al. 2006; Malherbe and Segal 2001; Kantor 1998). The 
unbundling process involved a number of measures:  
 
(a) Separating mining assets from non-mining assets and the creation of sector 
specific mining companies.  
(b) Contracting out specific functions that were once done in-house and creating 
separate companies.  
(c) Changing of the financing mechanism of mining companies and moving 
assets outside the country. Instead of mining houses directly organising 
funding or sponsoring companies to float shares on the JSE, they had to raise 
capital through international listing and the use of internal funds. For example 
in 1994, 23 per cent of mining capital came from retained earnings, which 
increased to 40 per cent by 1999.  
(d) Moving assets offshore (Malherbe and Segal 2001: 15, 30-43). 
 
Unbundling was necessary as the conglomerates had to ensure that their companies 
could stand the international competition after years of isolation and attract foreign 
capital. In the process of unbundling, conglomerates accommodated few blacks in 
their companies as a gesture to the coming democratic government that they are 
ready to share their wealth with blacks and that this can happen under capitalism. 
 
The unbundling of mining houses has implications for black-owned companies 
entering the mining industry, thus, the black companies cannot rely on the mining 
houses to grant them sponsorship to list on the JSE or get services once offered or 
benefit from functions once performed. They are left to fend for themselves under 
the free market forces which are more competitive now than when mining first began 




followed by shifting their primary listing and their headquarters abroad which helped 
them to access cheaper capital (Carmody 2000:263). 
 
It is important at this point to give a detailed account of the unbundling process. This 
is necessary, as unbundling traces the traditional big six mining companies, identifies 
those which fell off completely from the picture of the mining industry, those that 
changed their names, the subsidiaries they created, the assets they kept for 
themselves or sold to others and those disposed to blacks and to new foreign-owned 
companies. It is from the unbundling process that one can understand the strategies 
that the conglomerates used to accommodate blacks under the B-BBEE policy and 
follow the analysis in Chapters Five and Six.  
 
The unbundling process was kick-started by Barlow Rand. In 1993, the company 
unbundled its assets by splitting into three companies: Rand Gold Mines, Rand Coal 
and C G Smith (Industrial Holding) Company. The shares in each company were 
passed back to the original shareholders. In 1994, Rand Coal merged with Gencor‟s 
subsidiary Trans Natal Coal after buying out other shareholders and created a new 
company called Ingwe Limited. Ingwe was acquired by Billiton Plc in 1998 which 
later changed its structure and merged with BHP Billiton Australia and consolidated 
their coal assets and sold their less profitable and unsustainable mines to black-
owned companies. Among those that were sold include Malta Joint Venture and 
Malta Colliery, New Clydesdale and Arno Colliery that in 2001 were sold to 
Eyesizwe, which is a black-owned company. In 1997, Rand Gold was split into four: 
Harmony Gold Mining; Durban Roodepoort Deep Gold (DRDGold); Crown 
Consolidated Recoveries and Rand Gold Resources. Rand Gold Resources became 
an off-shore company (ANC 2012:78,123). Harmony Gold Mining and DRDGold 
later took on black investors as detailed in chapter five.  
 
The second company to be unbundled was Anglo American Corporation (AAC) 
which also owned De Beers Corporation Company. First in 1990, it split De Beers 
Corporation Company into two: De Beers AG (Centenary) and De Beers 




South African assets and registered in Switzerland. This was its strategy of moving 
some of its assets outside South Africa. DBCM Ltd was used to house all its South 
African assets. In 1993, Anglo American sold its South American, European and 
Australian operations including De Beers‟s operations to Minorco but remained a 
main shareholder. It should be noted here that Minorco was created by Anglo 
American in the 1980s at the height of sanctions (ANC 2012:75). Second, in 1995 
Anglo American Corporation split its assets into three: Amplats (to deal with 
platinum); Johnnies Industrial Corporation-JIC
13
 (to handle the non-mining assets) 
and Johannesburg Consolidated Investments-JCI.
14
 JIC was sold to a black-owned 
company – New Africa Investments Limited (NAIL) which collapsed during the 
Asian financial crisis in 1998 and its shares were sold back to Anglo. All the gold 
assets were placed under AngloGold Limited in 1998.
15
 Other assets were sold to 
Africa Mining Group, a consortium of black companies.
16
 Like NAIL, the African 
Mining Group accumulated heavy debts and was compelled to re-sell its assets back 
to Anglo American.  
 
The third company to be unbundled was General Mining and Finance Corporation 
(Gencor). In 1986, Gencor acquired Union Corporation which was controlled by 
                                                 
13
 Included in the JIC were South African Breweries shares (13.7 per cent), Premier shares (27.8 per 
cent), Toyota South Africa Marketing shares (26.4 per cent) and 43.2 per cent of Owni Media (ANC 
2012.91). 
14
 These included: in gold – H.J.Joel (51 per cent shares), Randfontein Estates (31 per cent shares), 
Western Areas (35 per cent shares) and Lindum Reefs (84 per cent shares); in coal – Tavistock (100 
per cent shares), United Carbon Products (58 per cent shares); in base metals – Consolidated 
Murchison (33 per cent shares); in chrome – Consolidated Metallurgical Industries; in mineral rights – 
41 per cent of Freddev, and 45 per cent of Barnex and; in platinum – Amplats (7 per cent) and 
Johnson Matthey (9 per cent) and Anglo Platinum (ANC 2012:91) 
15
 AngloGold again was involved in share exchanges with 7 other participating companies. These 
include: East Rand Gold and Uranium Company Limited (ERGO); Eastvaal Gold Holdings Limited 
(Eastvaal); Southvaal Holdings Limited (Southvaal); Free State Consolidated Gold Mines Limited 
(Freegold); Elandrand Gold Mining Company Limited (Elandsrand); H.J. Joel Gold Mining Company 
Limited (HJ Joel) and Western Deep-levels). AngloGold and AAC acquired in private transactions (a 
17 per cent shareholding in Driefontein Consolidated Limited –Driefontein and a 52 per cent of 
Eastern Gold Holdings Limited (Eastern Gold) (ANC 2012:92).  
16
 The members of the consortium included: Capital Alliance Holdings (CAH) led by Mzi Khumalo 
and controlled by the National Union of Mine workers, Mineworkers Social Investment Holdings and 
SACTWU Investments who together owned 63 per cent shares of AMG; Thebe Investments, Women 
Development Bank Investment Holdings and Consolidated Investment Holdings. The intrigues and 
scheming behind the AMG BEE deals is told by Barry Segeant, Brett Kebble: The Inside Story. Zebra 
Press, 2006. Of particular interest is chapter 18 of the book titled The Laughing Zulu that describe 





Rambradt and Sanlam (an insurance company) and which had mineral and other non-
mineral assets. In 1989 Gencor‟s mining assets were organised under General 
Mining Metals and Minerals (Genmin). Genmin had five divisions: Gold and Base 
Metals which were housed under Samancor; Platinum under Impala; Coal under 
Trans Natal and Minerals division. Gencor started preparing for its exit from the 
South Africa scene by disinvesting its non-mineral assets that included Engen (for 
oil), Genbel, Malbak and Sappi (timber). In 1994, Gencor bought the Royal Dutch 
Shell Mining and commodity trading assets and housed them under Billiton 
International. In 1997, it sold its base metals and non-gold interests including Alusaf 
(aluminium) and Richards Bay Minerals to Billiton International which then listed on 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE) as Billiton Plc. In the same year (1997), Gencor 
merged its gold assets into Gold Fields in which the Rambradt Company was a major 
shareholder and Anglo American owned 25 per cent shares. This resulted in the 
formation of Gold Fields South Africa (GFSA), a company that also listed on the 
London Stock Exchange (Virtual Metals Research and Consulting 2006:7). Further 
details on GFSA are provided in Chapter Five. 
 
The fourth group to unbundle, Anglovaal had diverse mineral and non-mineral assets 
and was controlled by the Menell and Hersov families. In 1999, Anglovaal separated 
its assets into two. Mining assets were placed under a new company-Avmin and its 
industrial assets remained under Anglovaal. The Avmin assets included: AvminCoal 
which had 100 per cent stake in Forzado and Dorsfontein mining and 30 per cent in 
Eloff Mining and Satum which controlled 50 per cent stake in Venetia diamond and 
Finch Diamond Mines. In the year 2000, Avmin sold its stake in the two diamond 
mines to De Beers. Anglo American Corporation bought Avmin‟s 50 per cent stake 
in Associated Manganese; 75 per cent stake in Nkomati Nickel; 13 per cent in 
Assmang Limited and 18 per cent of Assore. Avmin‟s gold assets under Avgold were 
incorporated into Target and ETC gold mines and platinum assets into the Two 
Rivers Platinum Project. In 2004, Avmin gold assets were merged into African 
Rainbow Minerals (ARM) gold assets. ARM, which is a black owned company, used 
its assets that it obtained in its merger with Avgold to acquire a 14 per cent 




strong foundation for ARM to become one of the diversified and successful black-
owned companies with Patrice Motsepe family trust as the main shareholder. 
 
The fifth and last group to be unbundled was Iskor, the state-owned mining 
company. The IDC which is a state financial institution had 16 per cent shares at the 
time, but together with other private financial institutions (Standard Bank, SA 
Mutual, Southern Life, and Sanlam) controlled 50 per cent of Iskor. In 1989, Iskor 
was broken into two companies; Iskor that retained the name and Kumba. Iskor 
concentrated on steel making while Kumba became a mining company. Iskor was 
later taken over by Arcelor Mittal while Kumba was acquired by Anglo American (a 
major shareholder with 66 per cent). In 2005, Kumba was broken into two; Kumba 
Iron Ore that remained with iron production and Exxaro Resources Ltd that took over 
the non-iron ore assets. Anglo American helped to create Exxaro as a BEE company 
but retained 23.7 per cent shareholding. Other minority shareholders have a total of 
20.2 per cent equity and 3 per cent was transferred to Exxaro EEPS (for its 
employees). Exxaro was listed on the JSE in 2006 and it has been used to bring in 
more black shareholders. Similar to ARM, Exxaro has grown to be a larger black-
owned company and the most diversified (ANC 2012:137-8). 
 
Outside the mining industry, the incorporation of blacks started with Sanlam, the 
second largest insurance company in South Africa. In 1993, Sanlam sold a 10 per 
cent stake in Metropolitan Life (MetLife) to Methold, a black consortium for R137 
million. The transaction was funded by IDC which then warehoused the shares. 
Warehousing means that shares are kept by the funder until they are fully paid for. In 
February 1994, Southern Life sold a 51 per cent shareholding in Africa Life to Real 
Africa Investments (RAI) another black consortium (Mbeki 2007:3; Gqubule 
2006:110-114; Southall 2006a:4). 
 
Few points are made about the unbundling process explained above. First, it is with 
regard to empowerment deals that have emerged. There have emerged individual 
companies like ARM and consortiums that brought together various individuals and 




larger black-owned companies and have remained the basic structure of black 
economic empowerment transactions to date. It is Anglo American Corporation that 
sold and bought many mining ventures during the unbundling. As we see in Chapter 
Five, it is the same company which has concluded many BEE deals. It can be safely 
said here that putting few blacks in the corporate world at this early stage was a way 
for the conglomerates to send a clear message to the ANC government that free 
market economy is a way forward for the economy and that blacks could be part of 
the free market economy. This, in return, was bound to thwart any attempt by the 
black elites at nationalisation. 
 
The second is the financing of BEE deals. Since blacks had no own funds, shares in 
white-owned companies could only be acquired through loans. These were mostly 
organised by the sellers themselves who also acted as guarantors to the banks. This 
implies that, from the beginning, BEE deals in mining started with loans. The 
repayment of these loans depended on dividends paid. When these were not 
forthcoming, especially during an economic downturn the BEE companies 
accumulated debts. For example NAIL and AMG had to sell back their equity to the 
original owners during the Asian crisis in 1997/1998 because of escalating debts. 
This indicates the importance of finance in keeping mining assets in the hands of 
blacks. Those who drafted the BEE policy had some knowledge of these 
impediments, as some of them were among the beneficiaries of early BEE deals. 
ANC members like Cyril Ramaphosa were part of the negotiations with the business 
and members of the BEE Commission, a committee that was involved in the 
formulation of the BEE policy. These elites were supposed to argue strongly on the 
importance of government providing finance and other supports.  
 
Third is the creation of special purpose vehicles (SPVs) which are separate 
companies used for BEE transactions. The SPVs also became a permanent feature of 






At this juncture, it is important to look at the ANC‟s policy trajectory in order to 
understand the evolution of the BEE policy.  
 
2.3 The Elaboration of BEE Policy  
ANC‟s economic policy since the 1955 Freedom Charter had been nationalisation. It 
states that: 
 
“--all peoples shall share in the country‟s wealth” -----; ---mineral wealth beneath 
the soil, the banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the 
people as a whole; -----and all people shall have equal rights to trade where they 
choose, to manufacture, and to enter all crafts and profession.” (ANC 1955: 82) 
 
As a way of transferring ownership to the people, nationalisation was reiterated at all 
subsequent ANC National Conferences (Morogoro 1969, Kabwe 1985, and Durban 
1991). Later, the ANC‟s stance on nationalisation appears to have been eroding. In 
1992 at the ANC‟s „Ready to Govern‟ conference in Kliptown, Johannesburg, 
Nelson Mandela produced an economic policy statement that was geared at the use 
of nationalisation and increase state ownership in some sectors of the economy, 
affirmative action at the work place and most importantly the use of equity 
ownership to empower the historically disadvantaged persons-blacks was used in the 
policy agenda. He stated that: 
 
“----The democratic state will therefore consider increasing the public sector in 
strategic areas through for example, nationalisation, purchasing a shareholding in 
companies, establishing new public corporations or joint ventures with the public 
sector--. Reducing the public sector in certain areas in ways that will enhance 
efficiency, advance affirmative action and empower the historically disadvantaged--
.” (ANC 1992:16) 
 
A further elaboration of the ANC‟s economic policy was presented in the 
Redistribution and Development Programme (RDP) document that was to act as 
ANC‟s election manifesto in 1994. The RDP represented an initial process of 
government intervention in the economy which was seen as crucial for the de-
racialisation of the economy. This is clearly captured by Mr Saki Macozoma, a 




“It became clear that unless a decisive intervention that would de-racialize
17
 the 
South African economy was made there would develop a contradiction in society. 
Black people would continue to exercise political power. White people would keep 
their economic dominance. The greatest causality of such a standoff was going to be 
South Africa Incorporated. Such a standoff would create a paralysis that would mean 
that South Africa would not move forward.” (Maxozoma
18
 2004: 61) 
 
The RDP policy focus was broad. These include to de-racialize the economy, 
restructure the economy and reduce conglomerates‟ control in the economy; reduce 
poverty and inequality; to improve social services (housing, clean water, electricity, 
telecommunication and health) to those previously disadvantaged (blacks); to 
allocate land to blacks for residential and other productive purposes and to 
incorporate blacks in all major sectors of the economy (trade, finance, agriculture, 
mining, and manufacturing) (see sections 4.4.2.7 and 4.4.6.3).  
 
The implementation of the RDP did not achieve much on reduction of conglomerate 
control in the economy and incorporating blacks in the economy per se, but mainly 
on providing social services to the poor. Thus, between 1994 and 2001, it was 
recorded that 1.1 million affordable houses for the poor were constructed; about 1.3 
million people had water within 200 meters; 1.75 million homes were electrified, 500 
new clinics were built, a community based public works provided 240,000 people 
with jobs and 3, 500 square kilometres of land were allocated to blacks (Tshitereke 
2012:167). Thus, the RDP‟s focus was much on redistribution and not economic 
growth. It was economic growth which was considered important to generate enough 
income to redistribute and to generate the much needed employment.  
 
In 1996, the RDP was replaced by the Growth, Employment and Reconstruction 
(GEAR) programme which focused on the reduction of fiscal deficit, inflation; the 
containment of wage demands; the maintenance of a stable exchange rate, the 
restructuring of state assets, the expansion of infrastructure programmes and 
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 It should be noted that the word “racialisation” is a typical UK English spelling but in most 
government policy documents, it is spelled “racialization” with a “z”, like in de-rationalize” as it 
appears here. Throughout the thesis I use the word with a “z” and not “s” unless in a quotation.  
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attraction of investments (Department of Finance 1996:1-2).
19
 De-racialization and 
restructuring of the economy and the incorporation of blacks in the rest of the 
economy was not abandoned, and were to be pursued through line ministries, in 
particular, the DME and the DTI.  
 
It took some time for these ministries to develop concrete economic empowerment 
policies. However, the term „black economic empowerment‟ had already become a 
buzzword in the townships. According to Gqubule (2006:2), the term can be traced 
back to 1988 and was used by Mr Mogale, the then chairman of the Foundation for 
African Businesses and Consumer Services (FABCOS). It implied the use of the 
large black populations to exploit the economies of scale in purchasing inputs and 
other merchandise in order to fight economic marginalisation by apartheid laws. The 
term resurfaced in 1990 at the national conference of the National African Federated 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (NAFCOC). It implied the call made NAFCOC 
for the JSE listed companies to include blacks as equity owners (shareholders), as 
part of the companies‟ board members, as beneficiaries of preferential procurement 
facilities and of senior management positions. NAFCOC proposed a 3-4-5-6 quota 
system to be used in order for blacks to benefit. A time frame was set to within ten 
years where all listed South African companies would have 30 per cent black 
members of boards, attain 40 per cent black equity ownership, where black suppliers 
would benefit from 50 per cent of all government procurement facility and constitute 
60 per cent of senior management (Gevisser 2007.584). 
 
The term was again used in 1993 at the Black Business Summit where a 
memorandum of understanding on black economic empowerment was signed by Tito 
Mboweni on behalf of the ANC (Gevisser 2007.586-587). At this point, the term 
came to mean the promotion of black participation in the formal economy although 
how this was to be done was not detailed. In the early 1990s when the South African 
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 For a detailed treatment of a transition from RDP to GEAR see Tshitereke (2012 96-134). As for a 
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Neo-liberalism in South Africa, NIEP Occasional Paper Series, No. 3, August; Padayachee V and 
Michie J. 1998. Three Years after Apartheid: Growth, Employment and Redistribution, Cambridge 
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conglomerates were involved in unbundling, the term economic empowerment was 
widely used to mean the incorporation of blacks in the corporate world. “Black 
empowerment deals” meant business deals concluded between conglomerates and 
their black counterparts.  
 
At the same time, the government also participated in empowerment activities in its 
effort to incorporate blacks in the main stream of the economy. Three measures were 
used by the government, first was using its procurement facilities to grant tenders to 
companies owned by blacks. In 2002, for example, Eskom, Denel and Transnet 
offered procurement contracts worth R9 billion to black-owned companies. Second 
the government used the four big SOEs namely Transnet, Denel, Telekom and 
Eskom and other important corporations to place blacks mostly connected to the 
ANC in top management positions. For example, Mafika Mkwanazi and Sizwe 
Nxasana were appointed to head Telkom, Saki Macozoma to head Transnet, Mvuleni 
Qhena the IDC, Mandla Gantshe DBSA and Khaya Ngqula SAA (Southhall 2006a: 
6). The third measure was the ANC itself having its own investment companies; 
some of these include Thebe Investment which had other subsidiaries like KKS Food 
Service, Maribo and Ucindo (ibid). These ANC investments as indicated earlier by 
Beresford (2015) and Cargill (2010), are used by the party to siphon from state 
business opportunities (see section 1,4 of this thesis). Thus, by the time of the first 
democratic elections in 1994, the term black economic empowerment had come to be 
associated with incorporation of blacks in the economy. It is this phase that was 
referred to as the first phase of BEE (see section 1.4 of the thesis). 
 
However, from the 1994 first democratic elections, it took quite some time before the 
government came up with a formal BEE policy. The delays in part have been 
attributed to government‟s initial focus on the elimination of apartheid laws and on 
reconciliation. President Mandela paid special attention to reconciliation which was 
seen as a vehicle for bringing peace and harmony between the people (Taylor 
2007:151-153). Thus, the policy process was not part of government‟s grand long-
term plan but arose from different processes; one under the DTI and another under 




industry and resulted in the MPRDA and Mining Charter in 2002. The DTI policy 
process resulted in the B-BBEE Act which came one year later, in 2003 covering 
economic empowerment for the whole economy. The following section details the 
policy process in the mining industry. 
 
2.4 The DME and the Elaboration of the BEE Policy for the Mining 
Industry 
The process of working out the new mining policy that would de-racialize the 
industry started in early 1995 following the publication of the ANC‟s Draft Minerals 
and Energy Policy Discussion Document in November 1994. The Department of 
Minerals and Energy (DME)
20
 appointed a working group on mining policy that 
comprised representatives from the department itself, the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Minerals and Energy Affairs and other experts. The working group 
received submissions from both the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the 
Chamber of Mines in August 1995
21
 before producing a document titled Draft 
Principles on which a Mining Policy for South Africa should be based in November 
1995. In their submissions, NUM called for the improvement of the living and 
working conditions of black workers in the mining industry, the improvement of 
safety conditions and an end to discriminations of any kind against black workers. 
The Chamber of Mines on its part insisted that the government should restrict its role 
to the provision of an enabling environment for the industry to prosper and leave the 
market mechanism to drive the economic empowerment in the mining industry.  
 
To carry forward the discussions on suggestions from the working group, a steering 
committee was formed by the DME. It included representatives from the old „big six‟ 
mining conglomerates under the umbrella of the Chamber of Mines,
22
 organized 
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labour represented by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM); the Parliamentary 
Portfolio Committee on Minerals and Energy; the Mineral and Energy Policy Centre 
(MEPC) and other experts. After two years of discussions and public consultations, 
the committee produced A Green Paper on South Africa‟s Minerals Policy in 
February 1998. This then served as a basis for more public comments on the future 
of the new mining policy. The outcome was the white paper titled White Paper: A 
Minerals and Mining Policy for South Africa published by the DME in October 
1998.  
 
While government‟s intentions and what was needed to be done were clearly spelt 
out in the White Paper, there were still wide divergences of opinions, in particular, 
between the government and the mining conglomerates. The White Paper, as much 
as possible, presented the views for and against various proposals including its views 
with respect of state ownership of mineral rights (section 1.3.3) and black 
participation in equity ownership, control and management (section 2.3.2). It is 
important to go into some details about the White Paper, in order to understand the 
thinking behind the MPRDA that followed. The main issues raised in the White 
Paper were: 
 
(1) The state‟s lack of exclusive mining rights.  
Under the 1991 Mining Law, there was a dual-system where mineral rights were 
owned by the state and private holders. The state owned minerals rights in various 
surveyed and un-surveyed state land including rural areas such as Namaqualand and 
Northern Cape. These rights were governed by the Rural Areas Act (1974). It also 
held mining rights in the trust areas on behalf of the communities. The trust areas 
include the Lebowa Minerals Trust which was established under the Lebowa 
Minerals Trust Act (1987) and the Ngonyama Trust under Kwa-Zulu Natal Trust Act 
(1994). Other mineral rights were held by the then self-governing states which were 
established by apartheid government under separate development rule. These include 
Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda and Ciskei (or known as TBVCs). It was estimated 
that mineral rights of the former TBVCs and trust areas represented 19 million 




Mineral rights in the rest of the country were privately owned and it was the white 
conglomerates that controlled most of the mining activities in the TBVCs and the rest 
of the economy (DME: 1998: White Paper on Mining section 1.3; Cawood and 
Minnitt 1998). The ANC government wanted to have „full and permanent 
sovereignty of mining right, emulating the system that existed in Australia and Chile 
where the state is the de facto owner of all mineral rights and uses licensing to 
prospective mining investors and obtain fees and royalties in return.
23
 To avoid the 
hoarding of mineral licenses, the state proposed the application of the “use-it or lose-
it” or in other words “use-it and keep-it” principle (DME: 1998: White Paper on 
Mining section 1.3.6.1).  
 
(2) The land and mineral rights ownership structure.  
Under the common law, ownership of land means the rights to the minerals in it. The 
owner of the land had the power to separate the two rights and was allowed to cede 
to another person or reserve them. The mineral and prospecting rights were tradable 
(sold or leased) and allowed the owner to collect loyalties. The system resulted in the 
acquisition and registration of rights by prospectors in expectation of selling. This 
allowed the hoarding of mineral rights which blocked entry of newcomers and 
especially small-scale miners and prevented mineral development in general.  
 
(3) The control of geological, geochemical and geophysical data by existing 
mining companies. 
Mining companies were protected by the Restrictions on Disclosure under Section 19 
of the Mineral Act (1991) which forced the state to keep the geological, geochemical 
and geophysical data provided by prospecting permit holders confidential for 15 
years. Governments in other countries, companies kept such information confidential 
for a shorter period in order to avoid duplication of exploration activities. The White 
Paper proposed that such data be kept for a shorter period in order to lower barriers 
to entry for prospective and especially aspiring black investors in the mining industry 
(DME: 1998: White Paper on Mining: section 1.1.4).  
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(4) Dominance by white conglomerates of the mining sector and the rest of the 
economy. 
The discussants of the White Paper recognised the economic imbalances that blacks 
faced. Disproportions included their having limited land ownership; not holding 
middle or senior management positions at the work places; having poor education, 
skills and entrepreneurial talents and having no capital (see the White Paper section 
2.1). The White Paper proposed measures to deal with some of disproportions. For 
example, in order for blacks to afford to own and control mineral resources, it was 
proposed that the IDC and DBSA (which are state institutions) should finance new 
and existing mining ventures owned by blacks. Since the mineral wealth was still 
under the conglomerates, they were required to show their commitments and exhibit 
a “rapid, visible and significant” transformation (ibid: sections 2 2; 2.4 and 2.3.1). In 
short, the White Paper proposed the government to pass legislations with the power 
to: 
 
i) Ensure security of tenure in respect of prospecting and mining operations; 
ii) Prevent hoarding of mineral rights and sterilisation of mineral resources; 
iii) Address past racial inequalities by ensuring that those previously 
excluded from participation in the mining industry gained access to 
mineral resources or benefit from the exploitation thereof; 
iv) Grant the state custodianship of the nation‟s mineral resources for the 
benefit of all; 
v) Bring about changes in the current system of mineral rights ownership 
with as little disruption to the mining industry as possible (White Paper 
1.3.2) and; 
vi) Take reasonable legislative and other measures, to foster conditions 
conducive to mining which will enable entrepreneurs to access mineral 
resources on an equitable basis. 
 
With regard to economic empowerment of blacks, this time there were much clearer 




economy in order to change equity ownership and management in the mining 
industry: 
 
i) The state to take a constructive interventionist role in altering the patterns 
of ownership in the industry and promoting black ownership at all levels. 
ii) White conglomerates to use Employee Share Ownership Participation 
Schemes (ESOPS) in order to promote ownership to broad participants.  
iii) Recognising that the mining industry had concentrated ownership and 
was heavily dominated by white capital and a small number of mining 
houses, the government was called upon to put policies in place that 
would de-racialized the mining industry and it was upon the 
conglomerates to demonstrate rapid, visible and significant 
transformation (White Paper 2.3.1). 
 
However, the suggestions made in the White Paper did not go without opposition. 
The biggest came from the Chamber of Mines (at the time represented the white-
owned major mining companies). The Chamber first argued that the state‟s demand 
of exclusive mineral rights was a form of “uncompensated expropriation,‟‟ of the 
white companies‟ mining rights which tampered with private ownership and was 
against capitalism. The retaining of mineral rights in private hands and even hoarding 
of licences helped mining companies in terms of asset valuations. Mineral assets are 
valued based on current and on-going flow of new projects (known as blue sky 
projects). The more licences a company may acquire the better chance it may have to 
obtain finance. This was the same for the geological, geochemical and geophysical 
data on minerals. As such, data was a product of individual mining companies‟ effort 
and thus could be bought and sold.  
 
Second, the Chamber saw no need to transfer equity to blacks because people of all 
races (including blacks) already had enough capital stakes in the mining sector 
through pension funds. Third, the Chamber said market forces were a better 




that sought to change ownership structure were likely to scare away foreign investors 
and lead to de-industrialisation (Chamber of Mines: 1998). 
 
It fell upon the government to negotiate with the conglomerates before developing a 
new mining policy that would accommodate the white conglomerates‟ demands. The 
challenge for the government then was how to accommodate all the three concerns: 
to attract foreign investments, adhere to the market forces and to increase black 
participation in the economy and in the mining industry, in particular. The section 
below concentrates on the policy evolution that led to the MPRDA.  
 
2.4.1 The Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act 
(MPRDA) 
The MPRDA was finally passed by parliament in 2002. It replaced the 1991 
Minerals 
 Act. Some of the objectives of the MPRDA are to:  
 
i) Recognise the internationally accepted right of the state to exercise 
sovereignty over all the mineral and petroleum resources within the 
republic; 
ii) Give effect to the principle of the state custodianship of all mineral 
resources within the Republic of South Africa; 
iii) Promote equitable access to the nation's mineral resources to all peoples 
of South Africa; 
iv) Substantially and meaningfully expand opportunities for the historically 
disadvantaged persons, including women to enter the mineral and 
petroleum industries and to benefit from the exploitation of the nation‟s 
mineral and petroleum resources; 
v) Promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of all 
South Africans;  
vi) Provide for security of tenure in respect of existing prospecting and 




vii) Ensure that holders of mining rights contribute towards the socio-
economic development of the areas in which they are operating (MPRDA 
2002 Chapter 2.2).  
 
The act states that mineral and petroleum resources are the common heritage of all 
the people of South Africa.  
 
This study‟s interests pertain to the second, the third, fourth and the sixth objectives. 
On the second objective which is related to custodianship, Cawood (2005:2) says that 
custodianship regulates access to mineral properties. The state‟s exercising of this 
custodianship ensures these resources benefit all South Africans, regardless of race, 
and also discourages the hoarding of mineral rights (the practice of owning mineral 
rights without the intention to mine and process them). State custodianship is 
exercised through the Minister of Mineral Resources who is then given powers to 
grant, issue, refuse, control, administer and manage any reconnaissance permission, 
prospecting rights, permission to remove, mining right, mining permit, retention 
permit, technical cooperation permit, exploration right and production right 
(MPRDA 2002:2.3(a)). 
 
In objectives three and four, the Act first calls upon the minister to “facilitate 
assistance to any historically disadvantaged persons (HIDSAs)
24
 to conduct 
prospecting and mining operations.” It is stated further that the minister may request 
any relevant state organ to assist the applicant concerned in the development of his or 
her prospecting or mining project (MPRDA 2002:2.12). In addition, the Act 
specifically calls for the transformation of the minerals industry. Section 100 of the 
Act calls upon the minister to ensure the attainment of government objectives 
concerned with redressing historical, social and economic inequalities, as stated in 
the constitution. The minister was required within six months from the date on which 
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 For the MPRDA “historically disadvantaged person means (a) any person, category of persons or 
community disadvantaged by unfair discrimination before the constitution took effect; (b) any 
association, a majority of whose members are persons contemplated in paragraph (a); (c) any juristic 
person other than an association, in which persons contemplated in paragraph (a) own and control a 





the act took effect develop a broad based socio-economic empowerment charter. The 
charter was to set the framework, targets and timetable for effecting the entry of 
historically disadvantaged South Africans into the mining industry and allow them to 
benefit from the exploitations of mining and mineral resources (MPRDA 2002:100). 
 
On objective six, in particular schedule II of the act, the aims are to:  
i) Ensure that the security of tenure is protected in respect of prospecting, 
exploration, mining and production operations; 
ii) Give the holder of an old order right an opportunity to comply with the 
act; 
iii) Promote equitable access to the nations‟ mineral resources (Schedule 
II.2). 
 
The holders of the old-order rights were given time (up to 2009) to apply for new-
order rights.
25
 However, one of the conditions in the conversion process was that the 
holders of rights had to accommodate HDSAs by expanding employment and other 
economic opportunities including offering a percentage of equity. The undertakings 
to effect such requirements were explained in section 2(d) and 2(f) and Schedule 
II.4g; 5f and 7k) of the act. In short white or foreign-owned companies‟ inclusion of 
blacks in their company structures as equity shareholder or business partners became 
one of the major considerations in the conversion of old-order rights to new-order 
rights. The licensing process became the major instrument to enforce the entry of 
blacks in the industry.  
 
The government needed an assurance that the conglomerates would commit 
themselves to the objectives of the MPRDA. The government demanded that the 
mining industry develop a charter within six months. The Broad-Based Social-
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 Old-order rights are those licenses that existed before the act and new order rights are those granted 
after the act. Mining rights are applicable where mining is taking place while prospecting rights are 
offered where an investor believes a specific area has mineral deposits (MPRDA schedule II.2). 
Prospecting rights are given for 5 years and renewed once for a period not exceeding 3 years. The 
mining rights are granted for a period of 30 years. To convert old order mining rights to new order 
mining rights , prospecting rights were given a transitional period of two years and mining rights five 




Economic Empowerment Charter for the South African Mining Industry (or referred 
to simply as the Mining Charter in the thesis) was indeed published within six 
months (gazetted on 11 October 2002) after the passing of MPRDA. The main 
aspects of the Mining Charter are briefly explained below.  
 
2.4.2 The Broad Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter for the 
South African Mining Industry 
As with the MPRDA, the Mining Charter was an outcome of extensive consultations 
and negotiations between the government, the mining companies represented by both 
the Chamber of Mines and the South Africa Mining Development Association-
SAMDA
26
 and labour. The Charter was considered under the requirements of section 
9 of the Constitution of South Africa on equality and unfair discrimination.
27
 In the 
preamble, the Charter refers to the history of South Africa which resulted in blacks, 
mining communities and women being excluded from participating in the main 
stream of the economy. The Charter goes on to repeat objective 2c and 2d of the 
MPRDA namely to: Promote equitable access to the nations mineral resources to all 
people of South Africa and substantially and meaningfully expand opportunities for 
HDSAs, including women, to enter into the mining and minerals industry and to 
benefit from the exploitation of the nations‟ mineral resources. To these two were 
added four other objectives. These are: 
i) Utilize the existing skills base for the empowerment of HDSAs 
ii) Expand the skills base of HDSAs in order to serve the community; 
iii) Promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of 
mining communities and the major sending areas: and 
iv) Promote beneficiation of mineral commodities (Mining Charter Section 
3). 
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 SAMDA represents mostly junior mining companies and most black-owned mining companies. 
27
 Section 9 of the South Africa constitution focuses on equality (9:1 and 2) and non-discrimination 




These objectives are to be understood within the context of transformation of the 
mining industry which is explained in section two of the Charter. Transformation 
involves assisting, providing, initiating and facilitating: 
i) HDSAs‟ ownership participation in existing or future mining, prospecting 
and beneficiation operations; 
ii) HDSAs‟ participation in or control of management of such operations; 
iii) Development of management, scientific, engineering or other skills for 
HDSA; 
iv) HDSAs‟ involvement of or participation in the procurement chains of 
operations; 
v) Having integrated socio-economic development for host communities, 
major labour sending areas and areas that due to unintended consequences 
of mining are becoming ghost towns by mobilizing all stakeholder 
resources. 
 
As indicated earlier, this thesis is limited to investigating equity ownership and 
participation in control and management. In section 4.7 of the Mining Charter, 
participation of HDSAs on equity ownership and has to take the two forms: active or 
passive involvement. Active involvement includes situations in which HDSA-
controlled companies have 50 per cent plus 1 vote, which includes having 
management and control; strategic joint ventures or partnership in which HDSA 
owns 25 per cent plus 1 vote and which will have joint management and control 
agreement; collective investments through Employee Share Option Programmes 
(ESOPs) and mining dedicated unit trusts which would allow HDSA participants to 
vote collectively. Passive involvement refers to share ownership of up to 100 per 
cent shares without any involvement in management.  
 
The Mining Charter set the target for HDSA equity ownership at 26 per cent in ten 
years (coincided with 2004). The Mining Score Card (discussed below) gives a 15 
per cent target for the first five years (coincided with 2009). As for HDSA 
participation in management and control, the Mining Charter calls upon mining 




the junior and senior management categories. The base line was set at 40 per cent 
HDSA participation in management within five years (section 4.2).  
 
As noted in section 2.2 above, the conglomerates had sold assets to blacks in the 
unbundling process. More assets continued to be sold to blacks at the time when the 
MPRDA and Mining Charter were being put in place. It was therefore in the interest 
of the conglomerates to ensure that their prior sales to blacks were recognised and 
hence the inclusion of the “continuous consequences principle” (Mining Charter 
section 4.7). This principle allows all previous deals that a white or foreign-owned 
company had concluded with a black company to be included in calculating 
credits/off sets in terms of market shares. This implies the value of deals that were 
concluded before the 2004 would be used in calculating the 15 and 26 per cent equity 
ownership targets. The market shares are as measured by „attributable units of 
production.‟ The term „attributable units‟ means that only the values of units of 
minerals that are related to white and foreign-owned companies‟ production in South 
African soil are considered in the calculations when determining black shareholding. 
The values of such companies‟ production elsewhere are excluded.  
 
The mining companies then agreed to transfer up to R100 billion value of mine 
assets, which was equivalent to 15 per cent of the JSE listed value of mining assets, 
within the first five years (by 2009) to HDSA. The transfer was to be done on a 
willing- seller-willing buyer basis, in a transparent manner and at a fair market value 
and provided the mining companies were not at risk (section 4.12). From Chapter 
One (see section 1.4 of this thesis) it was indicated that the national financial 
capacity was limited to meet R100 billion required for the BEE transactions. It was 
expected that the government would have sourced alternative funding. 
 
At first, the government did not establish any institution to monitor and evaluate 
progress. The government made an agreement with the mining companies for them 
to report on an annual basis on their progress towards achieving their commitments 
to BEE policy, as opposed to being evaluated by external auditors. Voluntary 




Score Card (explained later in the discussion), the policy documents did not say 
anything about offering certificates that show compliance with BEE policy. As 
indicated in chapter one (see section 1.4), critics have indicated the dangers of using 
private assessors that limit the government‟s ability to gauge the implementation 
process and get genuine feedback.  
 
The mining companies also agreed to voluntarily publish in their annual reports the 
BEE programs conducted at their companies and reveal how much progress they had 
achieved. To this effect, most of the mining companies publish annual reports and 
have a section on BEE where showcasing their BEE compliance status, blacks who 
have joined the management of these companies and other issues. According to Ntim 
and Soobaroyen (2012:124), it is the voluntary disclosures that provide the JSE listed 
companies‟ legitimacy on their operations and wins them government support. The 
mining companies and the government also agreed to participate in annual forums in 
order to share their experiences, identify problems, find solutions, arrive at joint 
decisions and plan further strategies for intervention (see section 4.14). The mining 
companies and the government agreed to review progress after five years (which 
coincided with 2009) to determine whether they have reached the 15 per cent or the 
26 per cent target equity transfer to blacks. The review was done not in 2009 but 
2010.The Charter was accompanied by the Mining Score Card which is discussed 
below. 
 
2.4.3 The Mining Scorecard  
The aim of the Score Card was to facilitate the application of the Mining Charter in 
terms of the MPRDA requirements for the conversion of all the old-order rights to 
new-order rights within five years conversion window which ended in 2009. The 
Score Card has ten categories: 
i) Human resources development under which the companies undertook to 
offer all employees to be functionally literate and numerate by 2005; 





iii) Employment equity that involved companies publishing their employment 
equity plans; 
iv) HDSA participation in management and women participation in mining 
and identifying talent for fast tracking transformation; 
v) Migrant labour which aimed at ensuring no discrimination against 
migrant labour; 
vi) Mining community and rural development which focused on engaging the 
local mining community; 
vii) Housing and living conditions that is aimed at improving the living 
conditions of mine workers; 
viii) Procurement which gives preferential treatment status to HDSA suppliers 
of capital goods, consumables and services; 
ix) Beneficiation which requires mining companies to establish their base 
line level of beneficiation in the county and; 
x) The transfer of equity ownership and establishment of joint ventures, 
(DME: 2002a categories (See Appendix 1).). 
 
It is critical to note here the fact that it was only the category on ownership and joint 
ventures that the 15 and 26 per cent targets applied (Appendix 10.1). As for the rest 
of the categories, no targets were indicated. The Score Card required complying 
companies just to answer a set of questions in yes or no format. For example, the 
companies were asked whether they had set plans in motion to attain the targets and 
were expected to answer “yes” or “no”, as opposed to specifying the targets met. 
There are a number of criticisms from KIO (2010:22-23). The first is the lack of 
details on how the white and foreign-owned companies have to comply on the 
categories indicated and the absence of numerical targets for indicators except for 
equity ownership. The second is the lack of a rigorous measurement system with 
clear definitions to significantly reduce the possibility of different interpretations by 
companies. The third is the failure to develop a robust system to monitor 
implementation and the lack of mechanism to independently verify the mining 





The KIO report goes further to note that mining companies are confusing the mere 
signing of a BEE transaction with the achievement of the ownership target. In other 
words deals are signed but compliance targets are low. KIO criticises the Charter and 
Mining Score Card “as a hopeless and inadequate tool for transformation of the 
economy” that is divided in racial segregations in many aspects. KIO also regards the 
demands of the Charter as “the relics of the past era.” For KIO the mining companies 
are using the Mining Charter as a convenient shield to avoid fundamental 
transformation of the mining sector. KIO therefore calls for the application of the B-
BBEE Score Card developed after the B-BBEE Act to apply to the mining sector as 
well (KIO 2010:22-23). 
 
I will return to some of these points after the discussion of the B-BBEE Act, the 
Generic Score Card and Codes of Good Practice. 
 
2.5 The DTI and the Elaboration of the BEE Policy for the Economy at 
Large  
In 1998, the DTI started the policy process that was to guide black economic 
empowerment for the rest of the economy. The DTI started the process after the 
Black Management Forum at its national conference in November 1997 in 
Stellenbosch had asked the government to clarify its BEE policy. This call was 
endorsed by the ANC national conference in Mafeking in December 1997. In 
response, the government established the Black Economic Empowerment 
Commission in May 1998. The commission was chaired by Cyril Ramaphosa who 
was the former Secretary General of the ANC but had left the government for 
business and included other ANC members with business experience like advocate 
Dikagang Moseneke, Zwelakhe Sisulu, Saki Macozoma and the late Dr Nthato 
Motlana (Southall 2006a). The BEE Commission was given the mandate of 
formulating an economic empowerment strategy for the government.  
 
The BEE Commission published its report in 2001 (henceforth referred to as BEE 
Com Report). The report called upon the government to pass legislations to guide 




people and reflect South Africa‟s populations. It also called for the creation of 
institutions, such as the National Empowerment Funding Agency (NEPFA), to drive 
the BEE strategy to finance black entrepreneurs. Other suggestions included the need 
to apply employment equity measures, provide training programmes, develop small 
businesses, establish business centres for blacks and increase access to financial 
services for blacks.  
 
In addition, the report prescribed preferential quotas to be used. Blacks were to 
benefit from 30 per cent of government procurement, 40 per cent of government 
incentives offered to the private sector, 50 per cent equity of state-owned enterprises 
being privatized, 25 per cent ownership and 40 per cent of directorship of the 
companies listed on the JSE, 30 per cent of productive land and 50 per cent of 
borrowed fund of the National Development Corporation. The targets specified 
above were to be achieved within a period of ten years (coinciding with 2014). When 
this information was leaked to the media, the conglomerates strongly opposed the 
suggestions, resulting in a sharp fall in the value of shares on the JSE (BEE Com: 
2001:8-9). 
 
After the release of the BEE Com. Report, the government mandated the DTI to 
formulate and co-ordinate the establishment of a B-BBEE Act. The DTI was then 
involved in extensive consultations and negotiations with various stake holders such 
as the President‟s Black Business and Big Business Working Group, the Trade and 
Industry Chamber for National Economic Development and the Labour Council. In 
March 2003, the DTI published government‟s position under the title: South Africa‟s 
Economic Transformation: A strategy for Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (DTI B-BBEE Strategy-2003 document). As indicated in the strategic 
document, the government intended to use various policy instruments to achieve 
black economic empowerment. These instruments included: legislation which 
involved the passing of the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act that 
would establish a general framework for black economic empowerment; regulations 
through a balanced Score Card to measure progress made in achieving BEE; the 




institutional support and a BEE Advisory  Council and the establishment of 
partnerships and charters and; financial support (DTI B-BBEE Strategy-2003 
document section 3.5).  
 
In April 2003, the Minister of Trade and Industry appointed an advisory committee 
to finalise the Broad -Based Black Economic Empowerment Bill. The final outcome 
was the „Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) Act (No. 53) 
passed by Parliament in September 2003 and signed by the President in January 
2004. It is from this juncture that the term B-BBEE became official.  
 
2.5.1 The Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (2003) 
The preamble to the B-BBEE Act states that the Act will be used to deal with the 
effect of the past racial policies that were used to prevent blacks to access production 
resources and skills and job opportunities in the economy as whole. The term “broad-
based” in the title of the act refers to a wide category of beneficiaries that are covered 
by the Act. These include women, workers, youth, people with disabilities, and 
people living in rural areas. The objectives of the Act are to:  
(1) Promote economic transformation in order to enable meaningful participation 
of black people in the economy; 
(2) Achieve a substantial change in racial composition of ownership and 
management structures and skilled occupations of existing and new 
enterprises;  
(3) Increase the extent to which communities, workers, co-operatives and other 
collective enterprises own and manage existing and new enterprises and 
increase their access to economic activities, infrastructure and skills; 
(4) Increase the extent by which black women own and manage existing and new 
enterprises, and increasing their access to economic activities, infrastructure 
and training skills; 
(5) Promote investment programmes; 
(6) Empower rural and local communities by enabling them benefit from equity 
ownership, access economic resources such as land, develop their skills and 




(7) Ensure finance is available and accessed for black economic empowerment 
initiatives (The B-BBEE Act, 2003:1-2). 
 
These are the same issues that were covered in the MPRDA and the Mining Charter, 
except that the two policy documents added those aspects that pertain to the mining 
industry. These include issues of housing for miners, safety of workers, and security 
of tenure as explained earlier. The Minister of Trade and Industry was instructed to 
publish A Generic Score Card and the Codes of Good Practice that would interpret 
and define broad based black economic empowerment, offer guidelines to companies 
which seek to do business with the government and specify measurable elements in 
order to gauge the success of the programme (B-BBEE Act section 9). These are 
detailed in the next section of this thesis. The Act also called for the establishment of 
Black Economic Empowerment Advisory Council. This institution (chaired by the 
President) was mandated to advice the government on B-BBEE policy issues and to 
review the implementation progress (Section 4). The advisory council was 
established in 2010 and is currently constituted by 20 people. These are: The 
President of the country as Chairman, the Minister of Trade and Industry (with the 
Director General as alternate member), the Minister of Labour, the Minister of 
Economic Development, the Minister of Women, Children and Disabled and 15 
other members. 
 
The Act further called for charters to be concluded between the government and 
stakeholders of each sector of the economy and Score Card to accompany the B-
BBEE Act. It should be noted that the Mining Charter was signed in 2002. Since 
then, other charters have been published. These include the Maritime and Transport 
Sector (2004); the Tourism Sector (2004); the Financial Sector (2007); the Integrated 
Transport Sector (2008); the Construction Sector (2008); the Forest Sector (2008); 





2.5.2 The B-BBEE Generic Score Card and Generic Codes of Good 
Practice 
The first draft of the Generic Score Card and Generic Codes of Good Practice was 
published in 2004. A revised version came out in 2005 and the final version was 
gazetted in 2007.
28
 The stated purpose of the Codes of Good Practice is to provide 
the principles and guidelines that assist and advise both the public and the private 
sectors in their implementation of the objectives of broad based BEE (Balshaw and 
Goldberg 2008:74). Thus, every organ of state and public entities (listed in the Public 
Finance Management Act) must apply the Codes of Good Practice in determining 
qualification criteria for the issuing of licences, concessions or other authorisation in 
respect of economic activity; developing and implementing a preferential 
procurement policy; developing criteria for entering into partnerships with the 
private sector and; determining criteria for the award of incentives, grants and 
investment schemes in support of broad based black economic empowerment (B-
BBEE Act 2003:Section 10). 
 
The Generic Score Card is used to measure the BEE status of an enterprise. This is 
based on specific elements with clear-cut indicators. These are weighted to provide a 
specific score. The elements are grouped into two: direct and indirect empowerment. 
Direct empowerment is further subdivided into equity ownership measured by a 
percentage of shares under black ownership and accounts for 20 per cent of total 
weighting; management and control is indicated by the percentage of black persons 
in executive management and board and accounts for 10 per cent of total weighting; 
human resources which includes employment equity and skills development each 
having 15 per cent weighting. Indirect empowerment is divided into preferential 
affirmative procurement, that is, procurement from black owned and empowered 
enterprises which is weighted at 20 per cent and enterprise development standing for 
investments in black owned and empowered enterprises accounting for 15 per cent 
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weighting. This leaves a 5 per cent weighting known as residual. What is counted 
under the residual is determined by a sector or enterprise and is tied to social 
economic development initiatives. These elements are used to measure the BEE 
status of an enterprise (See Appendix 10.3). 
 
In the 2004 and 2005 versions of the Generic Scorecard and Codes of Good Practice, 
all companies were required to comply with all the seven elements of the score card, 
but, in the final 2007 version companies are categorised according to their market 
capitalisation. The first category is micro enterprises (MEs), those with market 
capitalisation of less than R5million. The MEs are supposed to provide a certificate 
of proof of their market capitalisation from an auditor or accounting officer to be 
exempted from the Score Card. The second category is start-up enterprises (SUEs), 
those companies that have just been established. These are given one year grace 
period (of not complying with the Score Card), regardless of their market 
capitalisation. However, these companies must submit a qualifying small enterprises 
(QSE) proof when tendering for any government contract with the value of R5 
million but less than R35 million. The third category is qualifying small enterprises 
(QSEs), that is, companies with a turn-over of between R5million and R35million. 
These are allowed to select any four of the seven elements of B-BBEE for 
evaluation. The fourth category is made up of companies with a turnover of 
R35million and above. These companies have to comply with all the seven elements 
of the Generic Score Card (Scorecard 2007: Articles 4.5 and 6). The fifth category is 
the multi-national companies (MNCs).  
 
The MNCs that could not comply with the ownership component of the B-BBEE Act 
through the sale of shares to blacks were given the option to use what is referred to as 
“equity equivalents”. This was to be calculated against 2.5 per cent of the value of 
the multinationals‟ South African operations or against 4 per cent of the total revenue 
from the South African operations annually (DTI 2007c:1). A list of recommended 
forms of equity equivalents included Enterprise creation programmes, social 
economic development, economic development programmes, technology 




promotion of economic growth and employment creation (DTI 2007c:3). Such 
detailed explanations are missing in the Score Card for the Mining Charter, as 
discussed earlier.  
 
Balshaw and Goldberg (2008:107) have pointed out that the 2.5 per cent of the asset 
value of the multinationals business or the 4 per cent of total revenue from South 
African operations is rather too high when considering that these assets are 
substantial. Balshaw and Goldberg also argue that the multinationals may simply 
ignore this element of the Score Card or vote with their feet. 
 
In terms of monitoring compliance, the DTI established the South African National 
Accreditation System (SANAS) in order to accredit BEE rating agencies which are 
private companies (Score Card 2007: Article 10). The rating agencies are required to 
evaluate the white and foreign-owned companies and determine their level of 
compliance and their BEE status and offer them compliance certificates. In doing this 
task, the rating agencies have to refer to the requirements of not only the Generic 
Score card, the Codes of Good Practice, the sector charters and other relevant BEE 
policies. These agencies are expected to use the weighting system in the Generic 
Score card explained above to count the accumulation of percentages that a company 
obtained and use such percentages to determine the level of compliance that a 
company had reached. The overall aim is for a company to gain 100 per cent points 
in ten years‟ time. Within the ten year period, a company, however, has to obtain an 
annual compliance certificate in order to continue doing business in South Africa and 
to transact with the government and other organs of state.  
 
As noted in section 1.4 of this thesis, the use of rating agencies to check BEE 
compliance does not allow the government to have a proper and genuine feedback on 
what is taking place and thus identify problems and solutions in the implementation 
process (Ryan 2009/2010, Acemoglu et al., 2007 and Ponte, Roberts and van Sittert 
2006). The need for a state mechanism to enforce compliance was to top the agenda 





2.6 The BEE Policy Amendments 
The first BEE policy to be amended was the Mining Charter. The Charter had called 
for its own review after five years of its implementation (which fell in 2009) in order 
to find out problems and gaps and to suggest new strategies that will carry the 
economic empowerment forward. In preparation for the review, the DME (2009b) 
produced a Mining Charter Impact Assessment as the basis for review in early 2009. 
The South African Mineral Development Association also commissioned KIO 
Advisory Services for an independent study on the impact of the Mining Charter. 
The study was released in 2010 prior to the review of the Mining Charter under the 
title Management Control and Employment Equity in the Mining Industry. Details of 
these two reviews are provided in Chapter Five. They are mentioned here because of 
the impact these had on the Amended Mining Charter. The second policy amendment 
was for the B-BBEE Act starting in 2012 and the third amendment was for the 
MPRDA starting in 2013. Attention below is paid to the Amended Mining Charter 
and the Amended B-BBEE Act. The Amended MPRDA Act is not covered here, 
because it was passed by parliament after the completion of this study and had not 
yet been signed by the President. 
 
2.6.1 The Amended Mining Charter  
A Mining summit was convened in March 2010 to review progress on the 
implementation of the Mining Charter. The task to review the charter was given to 
the Mining Industries Development Growth and Employment Task Team 
(MIDGETT). It was to report to the mining summit scheduled for June 2010. The 
summit produced a Stakeholder Declaration on 30 June 2010 which was more of 
intent rather than a working document. The summit proposed amendments to the 
Mining Charter and these were incorporated in the Amended Mining Charter that 




The Amended Mining Charter kept the ownership targets the same, that is, 26 per 
cent, to be achieved by March 2015. This ownership target could be offset against 
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the value of beneficiation a mining company engages in but this should not exceed 
11 per cent (section 2.3). The term beneficiation is defined as “the transformation of 
a mineral (or a combination of minerals) to a higher value product which can either 
be consumed locally or exported.” The importance of beneficiation to the South 
African economy was highlighted in the DMR document The Beneficiation Strategy 
for the Minerals Industry of South Africa produced in 2011. According to Mr Carel 
de Jager,
30
 the most pressing issues to a typical mining company are to extract 
minerals from the ground and process them to a level that they can be stored and 
transported to the market. The issues of beneficiation are beyond the activities of 
miners and depend on other technologies, expertise and consumption attributes of an 
economy. In terms of management and control, the Amended Mining Charter called 
upon every mining company to achieve a minimum of 40 per cent HDSA 
demographic representation at Executive Management (Board) level, Senior 
Management (EXCO) level, core and critical skills, middle management and junior 
management by 2014. 
 
The Amended Mining Charter provided clearer definitions of important terms. The 
two definitions that are of interest to this study are effective ownership and 
meaningful economic participation. Effective ownership is defined as the meaningful 
participation of HDSAs in the ownership, voting rights, economic interest and 
management control of mining entities. Meaningful economic participation was to 
include the following attributes: 
(a) BEE transactions being concluded with clearly identifiable beneficiaries in 
the form of BEE entrepreneurs, workers (including ESOPs) and communities; 
(b) Having some cash flow to the BEE partners throughout the term of the 
investment; 
(c) BEE having full shareholder rights such as those of full participation at 
annual general meetings and voting rights, regardless of the legal form of the 
instruments used (Amended Mining Charter 2010:iv). These definitions are 
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important, as they bring more clarity on the white and foreign-owned companies‟ 
compliance with equity transfer to blacks.  
 
Another change in the Amended Mining Charter was the requirement for every 
mining company to report annually its level of compliance with the Mining Charter 
to the DMR. The DMR has to monitor and evaluate such compliance (section 2.9). 
Non-compliance has to be penalized in line with section 98 and 99 of the MPRDA 
Act. 
 
A revision of the Mining Charter was accompanied with the revision of the Mining 
Scorecard. The main difference between the old Mining Scorecard and the new one 
is that specific targets are now set and replace the yes and no questions for each 
element as indicated in appendix 10.1. These elements were more or less in line with 
the Generic Score Card of the B-BBEE Act. 
 
The thesis has few concerns with the above amendments. The first relates to finance 
accruing to BEE partners regardless of the performance of the mining company. 
Paying BEE partners might be difficult in cases of new ventures where no financial 
returns are yet to be realised. A case in point is the Kgalagadi Manganese (though the 
company is not in my sample), a joint venture between Kalahari Resources and 
Arcelor Mittal. Its Chairwoman Daphne Mashile-Nkosi, started Kalahari Resources 
in 2001, got a licence to mine in 2005, and sank her first shaft in 2008. Until 2015, 
she says she has not seen a cent from manganese but still has to incur running costs 
and pay debts. She only expects cash flows in 2018 (See Sunday Times 4/10/2015: 
9). The questions that arise then are how to ensure a return to BEE partners? Are 
partnerships between black-owned companies supposed to have the same treatments? 
In short, what is questioned is the practicability of funding BEE partners regardless 
of the performance of the company. These, however, are questions beyond the thesis. 
 
The second concern about the Mining Charter is on the 40 per cent top management 
and senior management components aimed at ensuring that blacks have some control 




the mining industry, board membership and senior management positions do not 
guarantee control because crucial decisions on investments could be made by the 
major shareholders. For example, Anglo American as the major shareholder of Anglo 
Platinum and Kumba still controls investment decisions; a number of blacks on the 
board of the two companies might have little influence. The same might be with the 
foreign-owned companies. This point is further discussed in Chapter Six that focuses 
on BEE policy and management and control in the mining industry. 
 
2.6.2 The Amendment of the B-BBEE Act (2003) 
The B-BBEE Amendment Bill was submitted to parliament in December 2012. It 
was approved by parliament as Act 46 of 2013, gazetted on 27 of January 2014 and 
became effective on 24 November 2014. The Act was amended to include a clear 
definition of fronting and the institution of penalties for the same. From BEE 
literature (see section 1.4 of this thesis), fronting, while not properly defined as a 
punishable offence, is identified as one of the major problems (Gothenburg 
University 2001; Randal 1996). 
 
In the Amended B-BBEE Act, fronting is defined as a transaction, arrangement or 
other act or conduct that directly or indirectly undermines or frustrates the 
achievement of the B-BBEE Act or the implementation of the provisions of the Act. 
This transgression involves, among other things: the conclusion of a legal 
relationship with a black person so the dominant order‟s enterprise achieves a certain 
level of broad-based black economic empowerment compliance without granting that 
black person the economic benefits that would reasonably be expected to be 
associated with the status or position held by that black person (section 1e of Act 46 
of 2013). „When arrested and convicted for fronting, the culprit is suspended for 10 
years from transacting with any organ of state or public entity‟ (section 8 of Act 46 
0f 2013). The amendment also called for was the establishment of the Broad-Based 
Black Economic Empowerment Commission.
31
 The Commission is given wide 
ranging powers under section 13F. These include the overseeing, supervising and 
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promoting adherence to the act; receiving complaints of B-BBEE and investigating 
such complaints; receiving reports on BEE compliance from all the spheres of 
government, public entities and organs of state and from all JSE listed companies in 
their compliance with the B-BBEE Act (Section 139). Because the commission was 
constituted in June 2015, it is too early to make any meaningful comments on its 
operation and effectiveness. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
At its inception, South Africa‟s BEE policy was a product of continuous negotiations 
between the ANC government, white capital and labour. These negotiations were 
carried out under different banners starting with the DME for the mining sector and 
ending with the DTI for the economy at large. There were also negotiations for 
establishing sector transformation charters called for by the MPRDA and the B-
BBEE Act. As a result different industries have concluded charters that prescribe 
their commitment to the empowerment blacks. The policy thus represents a 
compromise between the ANC government which had given up its long standing 
policy of nationalisation, and white capital which understood the need for some form 
of expanded black participation. The process of negotiations has been long and 
frustrating to those who expected faster transformation. 
 
While the MPRDA, Mining Charter, The B-BBEE Act, the Generic Score Card and 
Codes of Good Practice provide the broad policy framework, they were short on the 
implementation details. For example, the Mining Charter does not specify targets 
apart from those that concern equity ownership, control and managements. The 
Generic Score Card has targets and weighting for all seven elements (equity 
ownership, affirmative employment and skills development, management and 
control, procurement and enterprise development). Just like the Mining Charter, the 
Mining Score Card has targets only for equity ownership and board representation, 
and does not state that mining companies are supposed to have a compliance 
certificate. Instead, this Card stipulates that companies are supposed to present a 
report to the DMR. The Mining Score Card‟s silence on the implementation details 




gritty of how to implement the policy. The white and foreign-owned companies 
became responsible for deciding which partners to choose, which assets to sell, what 
conditions to attach and how to organise the funding. From the start, the government 
did not create monitoring and evaluation institutions for its BEE policy. Apart from 
the recognition of limited financial capacity at national level, the government relies 
much on its traditional financial institutions (the IDC and DBSA) and few others, 
and has not put in place extra measures to source funds. It is expected that the 
constitution of the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Commission will 
establish better measures to help the implementation process. 
 
The BEE policy represents efforts by government to intervene in the economy in 
favour of those who have been disadvantaged by apartheid. To succeed in pushing 
forward the BEE agenda, the policy-makers need to learn from the experiences of 
other governments that have intervened in their economies to correct the past wrongs 
or to support the entrepreneurial class to bring about economic growth. It is for this 





3 Government Economic Intervention and Economic Empowerment 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter links South Africa‟s B-BBEE policy to the general debate on the ANC 
government‟s attempts to redress the negative impact of the apartheid government‟s 
discriminatory policies and to open preferential opportunities for the historically-
disadvantaged peoples. The reasons as to why the government intervened and 
developed the BEE policy were highlighted in section 1.4 above. Chapter Two has 
explained the change in the ANC‟s move from intervening through nationalisation in 
order to change the overwhelming control of the economy by the white capital and 
introduce the BEE policy to empower blacks. In the mining industry, the government 
is using licensing as a regulatory instrument to enforce entry of blacks. As indicated 
in Section 1.4 of the thesis, it was indicated that blacks entering in the mining 
industry face various limitations; these include lack of funds, problems in accessing 
land in mineral rich areas and difficulties in accessing data on mineral ventures they 
purchase. The equity transfer to blacks is left entirely to the market forces and blacks 
depend on capital markets and mostly white companies to provide them funds and 
offer collateral. There is limited government support. It was argued that the 
government need to deal with the limitations blacks in the mining industry face.  
 
This chapter starts by highlighting circumstances under which the free market system 
allows government intervention to deal with market imperfections or also known as 
market friendly intervention or functional intervention mechanisms. As indicated by 
Todaro (1971) and Lall (1996) economies worldwide cannot avoid such 
interventions. Iheduru (2004) Capps (2012) and Lynch (2012) in Chapter One of this 
thesis talked about apartheid policies creating market failures that have led to 
skewedness of skills, employment opportunities, land ownership and the country‟s 
capital in favour of whites. It is argued in chapter one that there is hence the need for 





However, there are other justifications for government intervention. Intervention has 
also been justified in terms of dealing with past injustices of racism and 
discriminations, colonial legacies, social injustices or any other forms of 
discriminations for reasons that have resulted in economic imbalances on a segment 
of a country‟s population. It is important to highlight the fact that there are 
precedents; namely, the USA, Malaysia and Nigeria. The USA affirmative action 
policy (Tomasson, Crosby and Herzberger 1996) was initially aimed at its black 
population, but later expanded to other minority groups. The similarity between 
affirmative action in the USA and BEE policy, is that both aim at countering racial 
discrimination policies that had denied opportunities to blacks. The USA did not go 
to the extent of transferring equity to its black population but much on affirmative 
action at the workplace and expanding education and business opportunities. 
Malaysia also dealt with racial imbalances and demanded the transfer of equity 
ownership, control and management to those who were previously disadvantaged, 
the Bumiputeras (Lall 1996:155-157; Simpson 2005). Nigeria‟s indigenisation policy 
sought to promote local entrepreneurs in the face of continued external domination of 
the economy (Kohl 2004:354; Uche 2011:12). Although the three cases somehow 
differ in the manner they operated and the outcome, each sheds light in a unique way 
on government intervention in the economy. There is a need for South Africa‟s BEE 
policy-makers to learn from these precedents.  
 
Critical in the implementation programs in the USA, Malaysia and Nigeria was going 
beyond the legislative removal of racial policies and establishing institutions to 
oversee the implementation of the policies and using other supporting mechanisms. 
Nigeria experienced both open and covert opposition from foreign companies and 
international pressure on the government from the IMF and the World Bank and 
hence failed to achieve indigenous control of the economy (Leslie 1976, Wilson III 
1990, Kohl 2004, Andreason 2008, Uche 2011). Even the USA could not cushion 
itself from oppositions. Section 3.3 below provides snapshots of the three cases. 
 
The study had to go beyond economic empowerment experiences. Section four of the 




government economic intervention. It pays particular attention to Japan which is a 
typical free market economy that used intrusive and selective intervention. Its 
success has been associated with government control of financial resources; the use 
of incentives to selective industries and firms and grooming of entrepreneurs (Lall 
1996; Wade 2004). The last section looks at case of Japan‟s intrusive and selective 
intervention.  
 
3.2 Government Economic Intervention: Market Friendly Measures 
This section focuses on government‟s economic intervention in the free market 
system pursued for correcting market failures. Two basic economic principles 
underpin the working of the free market system. The first is the assumption that self-
interested individuals should be left free to make their economic decisions. This idea 
goes back to Adam Smith (1723-1790) who argued that: 
 
“When each person makes the best economic choices possible, that choice leads, as 
if by an invisible hand to the best economic outcome for the society as a whole. This 
best social outcome arises not because people pay attention to the needs of others 
but from self-interest.” (Parkins 1990:22) 
 
The second is the self-regulating nature of the market as mainly driven by the price 
system. The use of price system combined with a competitive environment 
determines what goods are efficiently produced and in what quantities (Mohr and 
Fourie 1995:29-44, Stiglitz 1996:2-31). The working of the price system requires 
limited government interference in the economic life of individuals. The government 
should therefore be concerned with the protection of property rights, the maintenance 
of law and order and the provision of limited number of goods and services. 
Underlying these two principles are a set of assumptions. These, according to Collard 
(1972), are that: individuals strive to maximise utility and make decisions based on 
rational expectations; firms maximise profits; there exists a large number of buyers 
and sellers in the market; firms produce homogeneous products and experience no 
barriers to entry or exit; there is free factor mobility; availability of perfect 





If these assumptions are met, the market is assumed to reach Pareto optimum 
allocation of resources or Pareto efficiency (Stiglitz 1988:65). If the assumptions are 
not met, or are just absent or violated by economic players, perfect competition may 
not be realised and market failures will occur, ultimately generating inefficiencies in 
the economy (Lipsey 1989:399-402; Stiglitz 1996:159). Thus, the main failures are: 
the failure of the market to ensure competition; to produce public goods; to provide 
incomplete, complementary and missing markets; to deal with externalities and 
exuberant irrational pessimism; to deal with information asymmetry, to equitably 
distribute income, and not to have the capability to adjust the economy back to 
equilibrium when there are demand and supply shocks. The government has at its 
disposal numerous policy measures to deal with the mentioned market failures. 
These are further discussed below, albeit in abstract terms, as the aim here is to have 
a general understanding and not to immerse in the theoretical jungle. 
 
Competition may be affected by the existence of monopolies, oligopolies and cartels. 
Firms in such industry structures may experience economies of scale that enable 
them to earn abnormal profits, engage in uncompetitive behaviours such as collusion 
and price fixing and employ other restrictive measures. These may act as barriers for 
new firms to enter in the industry. The government then is justified to intervene to 
restore competition by passing anti-trust laws and regulate monopolies‟ behaviour 
and break their powers in order to move the markets closer to competitive levels. The 
government may even resort to nationalisation, an issue that always creates 
controversy among economists (Stiglitz 1993:400-516, 1996:161, 2010:31; Tangri 
1999:27; Samuleson and Nordhaus 1989:43-44).  
 
As noted in Section 1.3, the history of South Africa‟s economy was characterised by 
monopolies and conglomerates which had and are still having high concentration 
levels. Thus, when the ANC came to power in 1994, the economy was dominated by 
six conglomerates that were owned by white capital, a situation which still exists. 
From its 1955 Freedom Charter, the ANC government aimed to nationalise 
monopolistic industries and break the concentrated nature of the economy but moved 




including blacks, to freely exploit the country‟s economic opportunities. This has 
become the main objective of the BEE policy (Kantoor 1998, Randall 2000, Chabane 
et. al.‟ 2006). The relevant question that this thesis seeks to answer then is will the 
incorporation of blacks in the economy in the midst of such conglomerates‟ structure 
succeed? 
 
Government intervention is also justified when the free market mechanisms fail to 
provide public goods, missing and complementary markets and deal with gaps 
arising from exuberant irrational pessimisms. Pure public goods are those that the 
exclusion principal cannot be easily applied (e.g., national defence, street lights) and 
those goods that have huge cost outlays (highways, railways, harbours, airlines, 
utilities such as water and electricity and telephone and postal services). The 
marginal costs for additional users on such goods and services are almost zero, 
implying more production of such goods can benefit many people without added 
costs. The private sector may not adequately provide quasi-public goods (health 
services, insurance, credit, education facilities, libraries and parks). Quasi-public 
goods render positive benefits to the society. The intervention measures involve the 
government itself providing them, funding their production or using incentives to 
induce the private sector to provide them (Stiglitz 1988:179-181). In the South 
African context, one needs to note the skewed nature of the provision of public 
services. Mbeki talks of two different economic worlds existing in South Africa, with 
the whites living in a rich and prosperous world and blacks in impoverished world 
with limited basic services (Mbeki 1998:71-72). 
 
Incomplete markets are those that cannot be adequately produced by the private 
sector (such as insurance and financial markets). The private sector may choose one 
product which is profitable and leave the other. Missing markets are those that are 
not easily produced by the private sector (e.g., health and employees insurance, loan 
funds). Complementary markets are those that operate together (e.g., markets for cars 
and tyres). The markets may fail to deal with gaps arising from exuberant irrational 
pessimism that occurs when private firms produce too much of one thing or too little 




or health; private banks take more risk than required or buffer themselves from 
taking too much risk; firms invest too little in Research and Development (R&D) or 
protect their findings (e.g. through patents) for profit maximisation purposes 
(Stiglitz: 1988: 76-77). This is the reason behind governments (especially at early 
development phase) establishing banks, insurance, pension funds and offering other 
services that the private sector does not provide or is lagging behind with.  
 
Firm activities may produce externalities. These are costs or benefits that affect third 
parties or people not intended for. For example, firms may not volunteer to refrain 
from producing goods and services that produce negative externalities (e.g., 
pollution) if the firms‟ costs increase. Also, companies may not afford to spend more 
on goods and services that produce positive externalities such as quasi-public goods 
explained above. The policy options for the government to intervene in such cases 
include increasing taxes, charges and fines or using regulations to discourage the 
production of goods or services with negative costs to the economy. Alternatively, 
the government may provide subsidies and other incentives to induce private firms to 
produce those with positive benefits, (Lipsey 1989:400; Stiglitz 1988: 217; Mohir 
and Fourie 1995:454). 
 
Markets may experience information asymmetry. This occurs when one party in a 
market transaction has more or better information than the other. The disparity 
creates an imbalance of power in a transaction and can lead to adverse selection and 
moral hazards. Adverse selection occurs when an ignorant party lacks important 
information on the performance of the transaction, while moral hazard occurs when 
one party changes his or her behaviour and goes against agreements of the contract. 
The policy options for the government include: providing information to the public 
(e.g., information on dangers of drugs, cigarettes and alcohol and on benefits of 
certain activities such as inoculation) or use regulations that enforce disclosures. 
Disclosure forces firms to divulge information which otherwise they would have 
chosen to keep if it could be to their advantage. For example, important information 
concerning the value of stocks, and shareholder‟s dividends which are important for 




would have opted to hide such information or exaggerate their share value in order to 
trap less informed shareholders (Stiglitz 1996:159). The issue of information 
asymmetry is relevant between whites and blacks operating in the mining industry 
and came out clearly from the interviews carried out for this study as revealed in 
Chapter Seven. 
 
Free markets fail to equitably distribute income. The neo-classical economists 
assume that income distribution occurs naturally when owners of factors of 





However, there is a general agreement that resource ownership, wealth and income 
in free markets are unequal. As indicated by Samuelson and Nordhaus (1989:751): 
 
 “--perfect competition under laissez-faire could lead to massive inequality, to 
malnourished children who grow up to produce malnourished children to the 
perpetuation of inequality of income and wealth for generation after generation.”  
 
Intervention then is justified for distributive justice purposes. These are wide issues 
that involve balancing economic opportunities, income and wealth issues that are 
partly guided by political decisions. Policy options for the government include using 
progressive taxation and economic empowerment and affirmative action programs. 
The BEE policy falls in this category. The problem, as indicated by Stiglitz (1993, 
2010; 1996:693), is that justifications of government economic interventions for 
distributive justice purposes lack a model to emulate. This is because reasons that 
may call for such interventions and how a particular government deals with them and 
the outcomes may differ. This can be seen from the cases dealt with in section 3.3 
below. 
 
Economic activities in free market system are prone to periodic episodes of business 
up-swings (economic booms) and down-swings (economic recessions), resulting in 
unemployment and inflation. Until the 1930s, these disturbances were taken as 
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temporary and it was expected that, eventually, counter forces will restore the 
economy to its equilibrium or full employment. The 1930s great depression shattered 
this, forcing governments to intervene. This was championed by Keynes (1936) who 
called upon governments to introduce demand management measures in particular 
expansionary fiscal policies in order to move the economies from low demand 
(recession) to higher levels of demand to help the economy to gain its equilibrium 
(Brue 1994:441). These became acceptable government policy until the early 1970s. 
 
As a result of the 1973 world oil crisis and growing government budget deficits, 
there was a swing against government economic intervention and a call for de-
regulation and privatization. This coincided with the imposition of structural 
adjustment programmes in African and Latin American countries in the 1980s (Sachs 
1989; Gregory and Stuart 1995; Campbell 2009 and 2013). According to Gregory 
and Stuart (1995:100), from the mid-1980s a call for limited government worldwide 
was a result of concerns about escalating expenditure and prolonged government 
deficits. Countries like the UK, Canada, Australia and the USA propagated limiting 
the role of the state in the economy. The 1998 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 
global crisis have resulted in governments reverting back to intervening in order to 
mitigate the negative impact of the crisis (Tanzi 2011:6-9).  
 
What the examples stated above point to, is the fact that government intervention in 
the free market system cannot be avoided but only the intensity of the intervention 
changes from time to time. The aim of market enhancing measures, as indicated by 
Todaro (1971:1-3), is not to fight the markets but to support them in order to restore 
a situation that could not have been possible under the free market mechanism. Table 
3.1 summarises the types of market failures and the instruments used by government 









Table 3.1: Summary of Market Failures and Major Instruments to Deal with them 
Type of Market 
Failure 
Examples Instruments Recommended 
Economic 
Inefficiency 
(1)Monopoly Antitrust Laws, Price Regulations 
(2)Negative Externalities Anti-pollution regulations 
(3)Positive Externalities Subsidize worthwhile activities 
(3)Missing markets Government Provision( e.g., banks) 
(6) Market irrationality Government Provision 
   
Economic 
Instability 
1)High Unemployment, Monetary policies, Fiscal Policies 
(2) Low Economic Growth 
(3) Inflation, 
   
Social-Economic 
Inequalities 
(1) Unacceptable level of 
income inequality 
(1)Progressive Taxation, Food stumps, Welfare 
programmes 
2) wealth inequality (2) Balancing wealth creation initiatives  
(3) inequality of economic 
opportunity 
(3) economic empowerment/affirmative action 
(4) Inequality in social 
services 
4) Selective government provision to those 
affected 
Source: Adapted from Samuelson and Nordhaus 1989:47 with additions from Lipsey 
(1989); Stiglitz (2010) 
 
Not mentioned in the above measures is the quest for modern democracies to ensure 
a civil service that is free from rent seeking and corruption; that uphold democracy 
and capably supervise the delivery of a limited set of public services (Tangri 1999:4). 
These few examples simply indicate that government intervention is part and parcel 
of any government and changing circumstances always call for new measures. 
 
Despite the continued practice of government economic intervention for enhancing 
of free market mechanism, there still remains open opposition to the practices. 
Opponents point to the existence of government failures, caused by the inability of 
the policy makers to obtain appropriate information which is necessary to enable 
policy makers to rank the electorates‟ individual choices. Policy makers may also fail 
to formulate policies that will benefit or satisfy the general public and may have 
limited capacity to oversee the implementation process or lack well-defined 
measures to gauge the successes (Lipsey 1989; Tanzi 2011:73). The policy makers 
may also fail to meet the policy objectives, or policies may benefit wrong and 
unintended beneficiaries. These include interest groups, politicians and government 
employees who are actually already better off. Benefitting wrong beneficiaries 




regulations work or not, there are always possibilities of calling upon other sets of 
new regulations to deal with the consequences. To Von Misses (1998:3), the chain 
will go on and on and will be hard to break. We see below some of these criticisms in 
the cases where government intervention is justified in response to dealing with 
economic imbalances. The following sections deals with such cases. 
 
3.3 Government Economic Intervention in Response to Economic 
Injustices: Lessons from elsewhere  
As noted earlier, post-apartheid South Africa‟s economic empowerment policies 
have its precedents elsewhere. Such policies have been in response to slavery, past 
discriminatory legislations; colonial or national policies that neglected a segment of 
the country‟s population or geographical location or gender; cultural reasons (such as 
caste system) or just a bad outcome of past and ineffective policies. Different names 
have been used to explain such policies; „affirmative action‟ (USA), „economic 
empowerment‟ (Malaysia) and „indigenisation‟ (Nigeria and other African 
countries). Below the thesis examines the experiences of these countries.  
 
3.3.1 Affirmative Action in the USA 
Affirmative action in the USA
33
 did not emerge as a single grand plan but develop 
gradually as the federal government under pressure from human rights movements 
moved to open employment and other opportunities for minorities in the public 
institutions. The term, minority, initially referred to Afro-Americans or Negro-
Americans or simply blacks. These are people who had arrived in the USA as slaves 
from the African continent. The term was later extended to include people with 
Hispanic and Asian origins and other minority groups.  
 
As indicated by Tomasson, Crosby and Herzberger (1996), the elimination of slavery 
did not wipe out segregation and discrimination against blacks. These were deprived 
of political, social and economic freedoms resulting in the uprising by black human 
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rights movements in the 1960s. It is in response to these demonstrations that 
President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10925 in March 1961 that declared 
affirmative action policies to be used. Affirmative action therefore: 
 
“---prohibited discrimination in government employment and contract programs, 
and it required its federal contractors to take affirmative action to ensure that 
applicants are employed and that employees are treated during the employment 
without regard to their race, creed, colour or national origin.” (Tomasson, Crosby 
and Herzberger 1996: 126)  
 
The policies allowed blacks to use public facilities, benefit from public jobs, federal 
contracts and with time these were expanded to other areas. Under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act (1961) section 703(a), discriminatory employment practices were 
made unlawful and employers were instructed not to:  
 
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his[sic] compensation, terms, conditions or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual‟s race, colour, religion, sex, or 
national origin.” (Tomasson, Crosby and Herzberger 1996:130)  
 
When President Kennedy died the course of affirmative action was taken over by 
President Johnson. He recognised the need of dealing with past discriminations that 
went beyond the elimination of discriminatory laws to include preferential support 
for blacks. He stated that:  
 
“Freedom is not enough….You do not take a person who for years had been hobbled 
by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, 
“You are free to compete with all the others” and still justly believe you have been 
completely fair.” (Tomasson, Crosby and Herzberger 1996:132)  
 
Thus, in 1965, the government passed the Small Business Act. Section 8A of the act 
included minority-set-aside clauses which called upon receivers of federal funds for 
government related construction contracts to reserve a portion of government 
contracts they received to firms owned by minorities. The Act also demanded that 
every contractor who received government contract to the value of US$50,000 and 




included the overall labour pool and quota analysis of how much were women and 
other members of minorities and the timetable for achieving affirmative action 
targets. 
 
In 1969, the Philadelphia plan (also known as the Philadelphia Order) under 
president Nixon required federal contractors in specific skilled trades to devote 
percentages of the dollar value of federal contracts to African Americans. In 1971 the 
Office of Minorities Business Enterprises (OMBE) was created to provide support to 
minority business enterprises. This included technical and management assistance 
and the creation of demonstration projects to give minorities, hands-on experience 
(Executive Order 11625 of 1971). At the same time, the department of labour was 
called upon to ensure that every government contractor issued an “evaluation of 
utilisation report” that indicated numerical number of minority group representation 
in various job categories (ibid). In 1973 the Rehabilitation Act was passed. This 
required all federal agencies, public bodies and institutions such as universities, 
hospitals, police forces, to ensure that all races were equally represented. An Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was created to enforce the Act 
(Tomasson, Crosby and Herzberger 1996:12-19). In short, there was a use of various 
presidential orders and acts. Other orders were applicable to various states that this 
study‟s capacity does not allow to comprehensively discuss.  
 
The implementation of affirmative action in the USA faced overt and covert 
resistance from those who were required to comply. This resulted in minorities 
experiencing difficulties in getting jobs, business opportunities and placements at 
higher learning institutions. With regard to jobs, white-owned companies tried to 
protect their business interests and claimed that minority companies lacked 
appropriate skills and that the nature of jobs in some industries such as construction 
depended much on performance and trust which was easier with the old partners or 
ones with good referrals. White-owned companies therefore requested for waivers 




take their cases to courts (Sowel 2004).
34
 The minorities had to get help from 
government institutions or organisations established to foster the courses of 
minorities. These include the Minority Business Leagues which negotiated contracts 
on the minorities‟ behalf. The leagues, however, did not choose everybody but 
employed meritocracy and at the end chose those with reputation, competence and 
reliability. This was tough for starters (George and West 1996).  
 
The court cases that started in 1996 limited the application of affirmative action 
policy in the USA. The California Civil Rights Initiative succeeded in obtaining a 
court order that outlawed the use of race and gender as a determining factor for 
admission to state colleges and universities, public employment and the allocation of 
state contracts on the grounds that affirmative action violated the Civil Rights Act 
(Tomasson, Crosby and Herzberger 1996: vii). This led to the spread of court 
challenges against affirmative actions in other states including Washington, 
Michigan, Nebraska, Arizona, Connecticut, New Hampshire and Oklahoma all of 
which were successful. This does not imply that the policies were completely 
scrapped but rather limited in their application. 
 
One of the opponents of affirmative action was Sowel (2004), a professor of 
economics and an intent follower of liberal ideologies. He argued that affirmative 
action policies were against the principles of capitalism which is an engine of 
opportunities in the USA. He also argued that he was unable to support affirmative 
action, as he deemed it to be anti-capital and to be creating racism and economic 
imbalances. To accept affirmative action was like undermining the principles of 
market economy that the USA profess to uphold. Open and free market principles do 
not recognize race or gender, but espouse private ownership of property, strive for 
improvement of efficiency and profit maximisation. Thus, Sowel continues, it did not 
matter even if white businesses hired blacks at lower wages and increased profit, as 
this would be capitalism. What matters to Sowel is how those hired perform. Sowel 
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feels that blacks received low pay because they enrol for inferior careers which paid 
less and those at universities published less and there were few that held PhDs. 
Blacks in business failed because they lacked finance, had limited business 
knowledge and experience, poor financial management, were unreliable partners, 
lacked an entrepreneurial spirit, did not want to take business risks and join the 
formal economy but prefer to work in the underground economy “out of the back of 
their pick-ups” (Sowel 2004: 18, 85-87).  
 
Sowel continues to argue that affirmative action policy created a mentality of 
dependency and reinforced unproductive psychology that left whites with „an 
exaggerated superiority‟ and blacks with „exaggerated inferiority‟ where to the 
whites, any black who held a reputable position did not really deserve it. He further 
thinks that helping blacks through affirmative action sends a message that blacks 
were not capable to emerge out of their situation based on their own merits. He feels 
that affirmative action employees are being judged lowly, which by itself was 
demeaning to minorities (Sowel 2004: 86-87). Referring to education in particular, 
Drake and Holsworth (1996) says that the policy resulted in a mismatch effect where 
incapable and unprepared minority students who were accepted in highly demanding 
education institutions dropped out, a situation that lowered the bar (especially in law 
profession) and denied those who strive for excellence to achieve their dreams.  
 
To Sowel, the policies failed as a tool for dealing with race inequalities, did not 
benefit those, the very poor and disadvantaged, who really needed it. Instead, the 
middle and upper class groups who already had better education and better job 
opportunities grabbed more openings unjustifiably. He says affirmative action 
policies did not sort out discrimination either, but resulted in “reverse discrimination 
that replaces racism and sexism” against the white race and created discriminations 
even among minority groups themselves. The argument, according to Sowel 
(2004:19), is that affirmative action gave rise to other unintended consequences that 
included corruption, rampant fronting and abuse of power by bureaucrats (ibid). In 
conclusion, Sowel‟s solution to deal with outcome of race discrimination in the USA 




Some of the criticisms against affirmative action in the USA recall those that have 
been raised in South Africa against the BEE policy. These include: fronting, 
cronyism, political patronage, betrayal of the poor people and the exacerbation of 
inequality among blacks (see the discussions by Randall 1996; Gothenburg 
University 2001; Gqubule 2006; FNB 2008; Mathe 2008 and Cargill 2010 in Chapter 
One of this thesis).  
 
It is remarkable that affirmative action in the USA was championed by the 
Presidents, in particular, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon. These realised that a mere 
ending of discrimination through legal enactments and decrees was not enough to 
allow blacks to compete successfully in the open market. The presidential leadership 
created supporting institutions like the Office of Minorities Business Enterprises and 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to monitor implementation and 
offer support to minorities. It is these institutions that were trusted to ensure that 
companies and public institutions developed concrete affirmative action plans and 
made follow up on these plans. It is these actions that ensured compliance.  
 
It is important to note the opposition and resistance to affirmative action by those 
that once benefitted- in particular the white businesses. What is critical is that public 
support decreased with time. While there was enough public support in the 60s and 
70s, a time that the office bearers of the country (Presidents) supported the policy 
and responded to pressures from the civil society. By the early 1990s, the political 
environment had changed and hence limited\political support. There were endless 
court cases calling for the end to the policies. The call for scraping of the policies is 
an indication that such policies could not be sustained indefinitely. 
 
Despite affirmative action losing its appeal, other scholars like Tomasson, Crosby 
and Herzberger (1996) said the challenge that still remained in the USA was looking 
for a colour blind or alternative policy to affirmative action. This was because 
minorities still could not be fully integrated in the society. These critics argued that 
minorities still resided in areas with poor housing and poor quality of services 




that blacks face may affect their chances of performing better in schools and going 
into elite schools and then having better jobs in the future. The limited economic 
opportunities that minorities face does not call for the use of the ability to pay 
principle as this principle may still leave many out of the picture in terms of 
affording better housing and education. The ability to pay principle which is one of 
the strong tenets of market principles argue that a buyer is to afford a market price of 
goods and services produced. Tomasson, Crosby and Herzberger (1996) continue to 
say that even the use of incentives may also leave some unattended. These are 
challenges that policy makers in South Africa have to keep in mind as it implements 
its black economic empowerment. 
 
3.3.2 Economic Empowerment in Malaysia 
Earlier, this Chapter argued that scholars in South Africa have looked at Malaysia‟s 
empowerment policy as a model. It is important for the study to explore Malaysia‟s 
route to empowerment, in order to draw lessons from the country. Malaysia‟s 
economic policy sought to address economic imbalances that evolved slowly over 
time and affected the indigenous Malays, also known as Bumiputeras (whose literal 
translation is sons of the soil). This thesis uses the terms Bumiputeras or indigenous 
Malays interchangeably.  
 
In May 1969, riots erupted in Malaysia immediately after the elections. The 
Bumiputeras demanded greater participation in the economy. They constituted 60 per 
cent of the population while the remaining 40 per cent, (referred to as non-Malays), 
was made up of the Chinese who had been brought in to work in the mines; the 
Indians who came to labour in the sugar and coffee farms and; white settlers of the 
former colonial masters – the Portuguese, Dutch and British. The indigenous Malays 
became marginalised as the country developed and moved towards independence. By 
the 1950s, 80 per cent of them were living in rural areas, having poor education and 
housing, depending mostly on subsistence agriculture growing mainly rice (paddy). 
Around 49 per cent of them were living below the poverty line and formed the bulk 
of the unskilled labour reserve and the few were employed by the army (Sundhir 




the economy and being marginalised was not actually the outcome of racial laws but 
rather economic circumstances that left them out of the picture of the main stream 
economy. 
 
In an effort to change their predicament, both the first and second Bumiputera 
Economic Congresses in 1965 and 1968 had called for the reorganisation of the 
economic system. Nothing much was done and it is this lack of response from those 
who were in power that fuelled the May 1969 riots. The government was forced to 
review its economic policy and came up with the National economic policy (NEP) 
that became operational in 1971. 
 
Lall (1996:154) divides Malaysia‟s economic intervention programme into two 
phases. The first started with the NEP and covered the period 1971-1985, which 
focused on improving the economic situation of the Bumiputeras to enable them to 
participate more in the economy (economic empowerment) than before. This does 
not mean NEP initiatives stopped in 1985, but, rather, it changed its focus to dealing 
with hurdles experienced. The second phase started with the New Development 
Policy (NDP) which included an industrial Master Plan (1986-1995) and was part of 
its „look east‟ policy which tried to imitate the New Industrialised Countries (NIC‟s) 
economic model of selective industrialisation. The main government‟s focus in the 
second phase was to provide critical economic factors for industrial development in 
sectors that were seen important for the country‟s growth (Lall 1996:155-157; 
Simpson 2005). Of interest to this study are the economic intervention programmes 
that were pursued by NEP.  
 
NEP was premised on government‟s direct involvement in the national economic 
development process and the creation of a rapidly expanding economy that would 
allow an increase in the Malays‟ share of the modern sector without causing an 
absolute decline in non-Malays participation, a program referred to as the expanding 
pie theory (Mandla 2006:14). The policy became an intrinsic part of the country‟s 
long-term planning which was conducted in a series of national development plans 




ownership and growing participation of Bumiputeras in the economy through a series 
of economic empowerment programs. To empower the Bumiputeras, NEP had three 
main aspects: equity ownership, affirmative employment and enterprise 
development. It was necessary to increase government ownership. Subsequently; 
there was a rapid growth in state-owned companies, state agencies and statutory 
bodies. These reached 700 by mid 1980s and 1,000 by the end of the 1980s. They 
were spread across all economic sectors such as water, telecommunication, palm oil, 
aviation, agriculture and fishing
35
. The state-owned enterprises were used not only 
for Bumiputeras to get employment and managerial expertise but also for them to 
buy equity.  
 
Equity ownership required the non-Malay companies to transfer up to 30 per cent of 
their equity to Bumiputeras by 1990. The target was to have a 30:40:30 ownership 
spread. This would translate into 30 per cent equity in Malay hands, 40 per cent in 
non-Malay, principally Chinese and 30 per cent for foreigners. Initially, the 
enterprises with less than Malaysian dollar (M$) 0,25million equity were excluded 
from the policy (Mandla 2006:28). Although the targets differ, the B-BBEE Act 
(2003) the MPRDA and the Mining Charter that directs economic empowerment is 
South Africa, have adopted some of these elements. The policy makers had to deal 
with other impediments that limited the participation of Bumiputeras in the economy. 
These include Bumiputeras‟ lack of finance, low skills, poor education and limited 
entrepreneurial talents. 
 
A series of legislations and programmes were instituted to support the programs. In 
1975, for example, government passed the Industrial Coordination Act. The Act was 
crucial in controlling the growth of the manufacturing sector and making sure that 
the manufacturing companies complied with the selling of 30 per cent equity to 
Bumiputeras. The government used licencing to enforce compliance. The Minister of 
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Industry was given powers to refuse the licensing of any company if it did not have a 
significant shareholding or employment of the Malays. The government also created 
the National Equity Corporation (Permodelan Nationale Berhad – PNB) as a state 
holding company or trust company that was used to buy shares and warehouse them 
on behalf of the Bumiputeras until they had the funds to do so (Cargill 2010:72; 
Mandla 2006:31). This was an essential vehicle of share transfer to ordinary Malays 
who were allowed to buy stocks at lower prices (at a discount) than other investors. 
Banks and other creditors advanced credit for purchasing of the shares. The 
government established financial institutions such as the People‟s Trust Council 
(MARA), Credit Guarantee Corporation (CGC) and Bank Bumiputera to offer 
financial support to aspiring Bumiputera businesses and those who sought to buy 
shares. In its first attempt, the PNB bought 660 million shares (equivalent to 
Malaysian $ 1,5bn) and by 1990 it held shares in 162 companies, 107 of which were 
publicly listed. About 44 per cent of qualified population benefited from the share 
scheme (Mandla 2006:31).  
 
The government used its procurement facility to give preferences, especially to the 
SMEs owned by Bumiputeras to finance them. A number of state agencies were 
created to facilitate the creation of enterprises owned by Bumiputeras and supported 
them and ensured their growth. The support came in terms of providing Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs with technical skills and management expertise and other supports. 
This led to the mushrooming of small scale business that used simple technologies 
such as wood-works, textiles, simple engineering works, assembling, packaging and 
food processing ventures (Lall 1996:151-155).  
 
Recognising the limited and poor education among the Bumiputeras, the government 
embarked on restructuring the whole education system - from primary school to 
university by changing the language of instruction at school and established a quota 
system for school and university placements. Thus: 55 per cent of university entrance 
positions and 4 out of 5 scholarships were reserved for Bumiputeras and quota 
admission of 3:1 (3 Bumiputeras to 1 non-Bumiputera) was introduced in public 




barriers that the indigenous Malay faced. The restructuring of the education system 
helped to improve Bumiputeras‟ education and paved way for affirmative 
employment. It was expected that the rapid education expansion and the education 
quotas would facilitate the implementation of the 4:1 (4 Bumiputeras to 1 non-
Bumiputera) employment formula that the government suggested. In the effort to 
reduce poverty and close the gap in social services, the state embarked on the rapid 
expansion of social services: housing, health, education and public utilities. A target 
was set to reduce absolute poverty from 49.3 per cent of the population in 1970 to 
16.7 per cent in 1990 (Mandla 2006:31; Jesudason 1990:52).  
 
In its twenty years of government intervention (1971-1991), NEP recorded some 
success and a few are noted here. First, was raising Malay ownership from 2.4 per 
cent by 1970 to 20-21 per cent in 1990. Second was maintaining a growth rate of 
around 8 per cent per year with the exception of the 1985 – 1986 economic 
recessions. Third was significantly increasing university enrolment for Bumiputeras. 
This was made possible by the use of Malay as a language of instruction and the 
quotas system in enrolment and in offering of scholarships. Fourth, rural poverty was 
brought down from 68.3 per cent in 1970 to 46.1 in 1980 to 21, 9 per cent in 1990. 
Poverty alleviation programmes involved other policies, including the distribution of 
land where by 1985 1.7million hectares of land were developed for the settlement of 
224,700 families under the Federal Development Agency. Lastly, employment for 
Malays in the public sector increased. By 1990 non-Bumiputeras accounted for only 
15 per cent of public employees. In manufacturing, Bumiputeras‟ employment 
increased six fold from 22,000 to over 1, 3 million between 1970 and 1990 (Jomo 
ND).  
 
However, there have been a number of criticisms of NEP and its implementation. 
The most remarkable ground for opposition accused NEP of corruption, patronage 
and cronyism. It has also been noted that cronyism was rampant and trust agencies 
were used for the benefit of the few as a result of NEP. Both Jomo (ND) and Cargill 
(2010:78) say that cronies, that is, those close to the political elites, benefited from 




privatized assets (at cheaper rate), state contracts, ministerial appointments, 
executive roles in state agencies and were allocated stocks in state-owned enterprises 
at a price well below market prices (Jomo ND:6). When cronies faced bankruptcy, 
the government bailed them out. For example, during the 1985/86 Malaysian 
economic crisis and the 1997/98 Asian crisis, the state protected certain firms from 
bankruptcy and gave them more loans. Not all Bumiputeras benefited, and this 
resulted in the growth of income inequality within the Bumiputeras. To Cargill 
(2010:78), the empowerment policy in Malaysia failed to create a genuine productive 
Malay business class, as those who entered either joined the large businesses that 
were established by previous regime or were just supported by the regime to survive 
in business.  
 
Lall (1996:162) and Cargill (2010:68) mention the occurrence of fronting practices 
known as „Ali Baba Practice.‟ Fronting occurred as the „Alis‟, pseudonym used to 
refer to the Bumiputeras who mostly are elites and hold leadership positions in the 
party and the Babas which refers to the non-Bumiputeras, exchanged papers of 
business transactions. The „Alis‟ used their ancestry of being Bumiputeras to obtain 
licenses and then sold them to the „Babas‟ in the foyers of luxury hotels and ceased 
to have something to do with the companies. This implied that the Bumiputeras did 
not control the business per se but allowed themselves to be bribed out of the day to 
day activities and making decisions on the companies they created. Fronting resulted 
in the economy continuing to be controlled by the MNC (58.9 per cent by the mid-
1990s).  
 
Despite the weaknesses outlined above, a combination of factors account for 
Malaysia‟s success. First and foremost was the creation of institutions and 
mechanisms to support the implementation of the national empowerment policy. 
Second was the linking of empowerment to rapid economic growth, the „expanding 
pie‟ model which in a way helped to assimilate the Bumiputeras. For most of this 
period, the economy grew at 8 per cent per annum. The third concerned harnessing 
the NEP policy to alleviate poverty, so as to improve the lives of rural dwellers and 




Regrettably, the emergence of fronting and rise in corruption and patronage remains 
a sore point. Patronage as noted in section 1.4, represent a form of primitive 
accumulation and class formation and is wide spread in developing countries 
(Beresford 2015, Kelsall 2013, Booth and Mutebi 2012). 
 
3.3.3 Indigenisation in Nigeria  
Indigenisation refers to an empowerment process in which the government uses 
preferential policies to promote the participation of citizens (indigenous people) in 
their economy. This may involve restricting areas or economic activities to citizens 
or requiring foreign owned companies to sell percentages of their equity to citizens 
(Wilson 111 2008:401).
36
 The difference between BEE policy and indigenisation is 
the fact that whites who are required to sell equity to blacks are also citizens and 
regard themselves as indigenous. 
 
The quest for indigenous Nigerians to play an increasing role in the economic 
landscape of the country started with the government requiring the foreign-owned 
companies to cut the number of expatriate staff and hire and train Nigerians. The 
program was known as Nigerianisation. It aimed at ensuring that Nigerians manage 
and have control of foreign-owned companies. This program used quota allocation 
and to that effect, the Expatriate Quota Allocation Board was established in 1966/67 
to enforce Nigerianisation but the country‟s civil war disrupted its implementation 
(Kohl 2004:352). The board was ineffective in ensuring foreign-owned companies 
comply and in the end its implementation depended on moral-suasion (Rimlinger 
1972:1).  
 
The civil war in which the federal government fought to keep Biafra that had 
declared independence from the federation (1965-1972) enhanced a sense of 
nationalism among the citizens resulting in the call for greater citizen participation in 
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the economy (Kohl (2004:353). Immediately at the end of the civil war in 1972, the 
military government passed the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree policy 
commonly known as Nigeria indigenisation strategy. This took two forms: ownership 
of industrial assets by the government; and private ownership and control of foreign-
controlled firms by indigenous Nigerians.  
 
Ownership of industrial assets involved government ownership and private 
ownership of industries. Certain businesses were reserved to be exploited by 
indigenous Nigerians. In order for the Nigerians to attain control of businesses, it was 
important to increase the employment of Nigerians in skilled and decision making 
positions. This was to be accomplished while maintaining an inflow of foreign 
capital and skills (Rimlinger 1972:1). In particular, the decree compelled foreign-
owned businesses in a large number of specified activities to transfer equity (wholly 
or in part) to Nigerians, to maximize local retention of profits and to raise the level of 
intermediate goods production. The policy demanded the reservation of certain 
enterprises (schedule 1) exclusively to indigenous Nigerians or associations.
37
 
Foreigners were barred from ownership of enterprises whose share capital did not 
exceed £200,000 or the turnover of less than £500,000 per year. If the above limits 
were exceeded, then, foreign ownership was limited to 60 per cent with the rest 
either owned by the government or indigenous people. Thirty three such enterprises 
were listed as schedule 2.
38
 The decree came into force on the 31
st
 of March, 1974, 
but the foreign-owned companies were given up to April 1 1975 to comply with the 
decree - only one year (Uche 2011:7, Rimlinger 1972:1).  
 
In 1977, the government made amendments to the Nigerian Enterprises Decree, 
expanding the schedule 1 activities where Nigerian enterprises were to have 100 per 
cent equity ownership. The decree split the schedule 2 enterprises by creating 
schedule three enterprises. In schedule 2 enterprises, Nigerians were to own 60 per 
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cent equity and in schedule three enterprises, 40 per cent. The time to comply this 
time was even shorter as the businesses were given up to December 31, 1978 to 
comply (Iwuagwu 2009:161; Uche 2011:17).  
 
In both the 1972 and 1977 decrees, the government still demanded the inclusion of 
Nigerians on the boards and top management of foreign owned enterprises. 
According to Adejugbe (1984:588), placing Nigerians at the top of foreign 
companies had little effect on Nigerians having control of these companies, as the 
loyalty of such workers lied primarily with the firm they served. This made the 
government fail to assess the extent of control in practice.  
 
To increase state ownership, the federal government established a number of state-
owned industries and acquired majority shareholding in enterprises that were 
designated as the commanding heights of the economy – insurance, oil refining, 
automobile assembling and iron and steel. One of the largest state-owned industries 
is the National Oil Corporation. In its effort to control financial resources to support 
the indigenisation program, the government established the Nigerian Industrial 
Development Bank and the Bank of Commerce and Industry. In line with the decree 
passed in 1972, the government acquired 40 per cent equity in all the banks operating 
in the country increasing to 60 per cent by 1977 (Adejugbe 1984:580). The central 
Bank of Nigeria had to take into consideration the objectives of the indigenisation 
into account when formulating its credit control regulations. The regulations 
prescribed that specific percentage of commercial bank loans made to each industry 
were to be allocated to indigenous enterprises (Rimlinger 1972:6). The bank policy 
enabled a number of Nigerians to enter into the reserved industries as funding for 
these was made available by the banks that had now fallen under the control of the 
government. 
 
The federal government established institutions to enforcement compliance. Some of 
these include the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board and Industrial Development 
Centres. Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board had a function of administering the 




Centres. These centres were established in various states of the country to help 
indigenous Nigerians with technical, managerial skills and offer loans. The central 
government took over the financing, management and administration of the centres 
in the states in order to promote SMEs.  
 
The implementation of Nigeria‟s indigenisation policy did not pass without 
opposition and problems. Open and covert resistance used different devices to 
subvert the implementation of policy. Devices used included foreign-owned 
companies seeking exemptions from complying and bribing government officials for 
their enterprises to be classified as compliant. Other companies engaged in fronting. 
Fronting involved prominent Nigerians, referred to as the „alhajis‟, who used their 
names to obtain licenses but instead of participating in business they collected money 
and other rewards from their foreign business counterparts and had nothing to do 
with the running of the companies (Kohl 2004:354; Uche 2011:12). Similar problems 
occurred in Malaysia in the form of the Ali Baba practice and now South Africa is 
experiencing what is called „rent-a-blackie practice‟, as indicated in Section 1.4 of 
this thesis. Some foreign-owned companies resorted to paying out dividends to their 
own companies that exceeded 100 per cent net earnings and repatriated all their 
profits. Sabotage and resistance to the Indigenisation policy also involved foreign 
business owners plundering their businesses and declaring bankruptcy. Others wound 
up their businesses after selling shares to indigenous Nigerians (sometimes to 
fictitious Nigerians). In short, the implementation process lacked transparency and 
was beset by patronage and the government‟s lack of capacity to enforce compliance 
and to curb the subversive devices used (Adejugbe 1984:287-290; Uche 2011:18).  
 
As we have seen in Chapter Two of this thesis, the issue of dividends has already 
started to feature in South Africa‟s implementation of the BEE policy. This is one of 
the challenges that have forced the amendment of the Charter which requires white 
and foreign-owned companies to pay black-owned companies dividends without 





Problems that had occurred were similar to those that happened in the USA. The 
indigenisation program in Nigeria benefited those whom the policy was not 
intended– the non-indigenous Nigerians. Although the definition of Nigerians in the 
policy documents distinguished clearly between black indigenous Nigerians and 
other black foreigners who resided in the country, both Adejugbe (1984:589-590) 
and Uche (2011:8) said that, in some instances, the non-indigenous blacks who 
sounded like Nigerians, including those from neighbouring countries, claimed 
benefits conferred on indigenous Nigerians.  
 
Another problem was unpreparedness on the part of the government in terms of 
strengthening of local human capital capacity. Although the federal state established 
Industrial Development Centres across states, these helped to groom small and 
medium scale entrepreneurs. According to (Kohl 2004:351-357), it was expected that 
the federal government would establish business or engineering schools or putting 
pressure on foreign firms to train locals who would take up roles at higher levels. 
This was limited. It is imperative to bear in mind the short time frame given for 
compliance, that is, only three years for the 1972 Nigeria Enterprises Promotion 
Decree and less than two years for the 1977 Nigeria Enterprises Decree. This might 
have contributed to lack of unpreparedness. 
 
Nigeria‟s indigenisation policy was less robust after 1986 when the World Bank and 
IMF forced Nigeria to adapt the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). Thus the 
1989 industrial policy under SAP allowed foreign companies to own up to 100 per 
cent of all new businesses. Instead of indigenisation, the country‟s policy focus was 
now more on attracting foreign direct investments (Uche 2011:20). 
 
What can be said from Nigeria‟s experience is that the South African government 
need to take cognisance of the factors that limited the success of the indigenisation 
policy in Nigeria. The government in particular should take into consideration the 
resistance by foreign-owned companies, the lack of proper planning and inadequate 




higher level management, lack of mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement of the 
policies and the absence of penalties for non-compliance.  
 
3.4 Government Intervention and Economic Growth and 
Transformation  
Governments everywhere have gone beyond intervening in their economies with the 
purpose of dealing with market failures. Wilson (1994: 264) reminds us that in their 
process of development, countries in Europe had extensive public ownership, created 
highly protected industrial regimes and used incentives to support their industries. 
Along the way they made mistakes, wasted resources, created injustices but 
experienced economic advancement as evident today. Equally, the Newly 
Industrialised Countries (NICs)
39
 which are typical market economies have 
intrusively and selectively intervened in their economies to achieve rapid industrial 
growth and economic transformation.  
 
Government economic intervention as it was pursued in the NICs challenged the 
orthodox neo-classical position of limited government in the economy and sparked a 
debate on how to explain the rapid industrialisation that the NICs countries 
experienced. The World Bank‟s (1993) East Asian Miracle Study attributed these 
countries‟ successes to certain policies that the NICs countries pursued such as 
providing incentives between domestic and foreign investors, pursuing market 
friendly policies, ensuring macroeconomic stability, trade liberalisation and 
improving skills development (education). Lall (1996:109) and Wade (2004) while 
accepting the fact that these countries adhered to free market principles and pursued 
functional intervention policies argued that the NICs organised their markets and 
pursued “selective and targeted” or “intrusive intervention measures.” While 
functional intervention involves dealing with the market failures, selective or 
intrusive intervention involves identifying certain industries that are considered 
important in the economy and hand-picking firms that performed better and 
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supporting them over a long period of time to ensure that they grow and stand 
international competition.  
 
Kohl (2004:9) and Kaplan (1972:13-14) have referred to NICs economic intervention 
as “pervasive intervention” or “sponsored capitalism”, and also say that pursuing 
intervention of this sort is not anti-market or anti-capitalist but essentially geared at 
economic transformation and growth. According to Wade (2004:24-26), the NICs‟ 
successes are associated with the state having central authority that gave it enough 
autonomy to maintain a relatively high degree of political order and to influence 
resource allocation in line with long-term national interest. The central authority 
enabled the NICs governments to govern the market by using incentives, controls 
and punishments of selected firms without much challenges from other factions of 
the economy. Labour and civil society could not challenge the central authorities 
because of the states established coalitions with businesses that guaranteed the 
businesses their survival and prosperity. In return, the businesses supported the 
authoritarian regimes to stay in power. The relations were cemented by the quest for 
both parties (the central government and the business) to build strong capitalist states 
that could counter socialist or communist tendencies that developed around other 
countries of the region like Russia and China. Critical also was the fact that 
government economic intervention programmes in these countries were part of their 
grand industrial programmes and long-term economic plans (Kohl 2004:9; Wade 
2004:306; Rhee 2004; Schneider 2008). 
). This is better exemplified by Japan whose experience is briefly discussed below. 
 
3.4.1 Economic Intervention in Japan 
At the centre of Japan‟s development was the elaboration of a national long-term 
economic plan. This was spearheaded by public institutions mainly the Economic 
Planning Agency (EPA) which brought together business people, experts from 
universities and research institutions (including among others economists, engineers 
and physicists) and the press (Kaplan 1972:13). The plans indicated government‟s 
broad economic objectives, pinpointed industry priority areas, elaborated industry-




mechanisms available and indicated strategies to be followed in order to achieve the 
broad objectives. In the 1950s, the industry priority areas were iron and steel, coal, 
ship building, and electric power. These were considered necessary to deal with the 
destructions caused by the Second World War. In the 1960s, the attention shifted to 
aerospace and electronics and later to heavy industries in order to support domestic 
consumption and promote exports (Chalmers 1982).  
 
The government used extensive incentives (carrots) and coercive enforcements 
(sticks) in the implementation of its plans. In the priority areas, MITI for example 
provided incentives to the best performing firms. These were supported by the 
government offering capital and funds for operational costs, government loans, tax 
concessions, subsidies, liberal depreciation allowances, bailing the firms out at times 
of recessions by writing off their debts and even helping them to acquire foreign 
technology. Acquisition of foreign technology was done by government agencies 
which negotiated patent licenses with foreign companies. The government offered 
selected domestic industries tariff and quota protections and used its licencing 
powers to support mergers and acquisitions in order to build large corporations to 
compete internationally. These measures benefitted top vehicle producers like 




Rhee (1994:36) and Hughes (1988:145) looked at other factors that explain Japan‟s 
success in its intervention drive. They say most important factor is it‟s the control of 
financial institutions. Before the mid-1980s, the government of Japan had control 
over the Japan Development Bank, the Export–Import Bank (EXIM) and the Small 
Business Finance Corporation. The Ministry of Finance had close ties with the 
Central Bank of Japan which controlled other private banks. The banks were coerced 
to support the national industrial policy and fund industrial projects in priority areas. 
In return, the banks were bailed out when they faced bankruptcy. 
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system, technical advancement and high level engineering knowhow, less unionised labour, lifetime 




Another factor that contributed to Japan‟s success was the establishment of strong 
collaboration mechanisms between the government and business groups (Rhee 
1994:36, 37; Hughes 1988:145-6). This included the creation of elaborate 
consultative machineries to allow government and business to exchange ideas and 
reach agreements on best strategies to be followed in changed situations. Charters 
were widely used to commit the industries to comply with government demands. The 
collaboration was administered by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI). For example the Electronic Industry Deliberation Council and the Bureau of 
Heavy Industry were directed within MITI which made it easier to support the 
companies involved in the earmarked priority areas and engage with different 
stakeholders. The authors above continue to say that the collaboration between the 
government of Japan‟s and the businesses was also strengthened by the intermingling 
of business people and bureaucrats where, upon retirement, business personalities 
entered the bureaucracy or served in government advisory committees and the 
bureaucrats entered into business or joined business associations.  
 
It is the same firms that previously received support that later demanded limited 
government‟s role in their affairs when further government intervention was 
considered detrimental to firm growth. The firms then started calling for economic 
liberalisation in order for them to join the world markets. Liberalisation of the car 
industry for example did not happen overnight, but, it took years of intense debate 
between the cabinet, the bureaucrats, political parties and the business before the 
government relaxed its grip of the car industry. Even after the 1971 economic 
liberalisation, the government demanded co-ownership between domestic and 
foreign car companies (Rhee 1994:18, 36-37). 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
At the centre of this chapter is the argument that government economic intervention 
is inevitable. It has been applied to support the free market system in what has been 
referred to as functional intervention (Lall 2004). World-wide, governments cannot 
avoid such kinds of intervention. Government economic intervention has also been 




Countries, in particular Japan. This was to bring about rapid industrial growth and 
transformation. ANC government intervention under the BEE policy, apart from 
addressing the market failures resulting from years of discriminatory apartheid 
policies, sought also to transform the economy by promoting the rise of an 
entrepreneurial black business class. This was the vision of political leaders like 
Thabo Mbeki, as indicated in Chapter One. If South Africa wants to have a black 
entrepreneurial class who would benefit from equity transfer, be partners with the 
white and foreign-owned mining companies, or even on their own, then it is argued 
in this study that South Africa should go beyond functional intervention and apply 
selective or intrusive intervention and support its black entrepreneurs similar to what 
Japan did. Such measures are not to be perceived as anti-capitalist or anti free market 
system. 
 
From empirical findings of this study, (Chapter Seven), blacks face various barriers 
and limitations of which the policy makers are aware. There is a call not only from 
the leaders of black-owned companies but also the white and foreign-owned 
companies for government to offer its support and groom black entrepreneurs. Thus, 
it is not enough for the government to introduce new regulations without promoting 
and supporting the black entrepreneurs. 
 
The experience of affirmative action in the USA, economic empowerment in 
Malaysia and indigenisation in Nigeria makes it clear that the success of economic 
empowerment measures depended on support from the political leadership, the 
establishment of enforcement institutions and putting in place supporting 
mechanisms for the intended beneficiaries. In the case of the USA, it was through 
presidential decrees that affirmative action was pushed forward. Strong political 
leadership and the establishment of institutions were crucial also in Malaysia 
enabling it to accelerate the empowerment drive. Although not related to economic 
empowerment, in Japan, it is government leadership that took the long term view of 





There is an indication from the cases above of a tendency to resist government 
economic intervention that is aimed at correcting or minimising the impact of past 
injustices or discrimination. This was clearly demonstrated in the USA, where 
intervention was portrayed as anti-capitalist. Critics, like Sowel (2004), proposed that 
blacks in the USA should be left to survive through price mechanism. This is despite 
white businesses having benefited from racial inequities and subverting the 
implementation of affirmative action. Likewise, in Nigeria, foreign-owned 
companies used all kind of tricks to avoid complying with the indigenisation decrees. 
The creation of institutions was critical for enforcement of policies and for creating 
support mechanisms. These were critical in the USA, where the Office of Minorities 
Business Enterprises and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission were 
important in enforcing the policies, providing preferential support mechanisms. In 
Malaysia, a number of state institutions were established to support the Bumiputeras 
in terms of skills and business and managerial expertise. The case of Nigeria is also 
instructive as both the Expatriate Quota Allocation Board and the Nigeria Enterprises 
Promotion Commission lacked both the power and capacity to enforce the policies. 
The creation of enforcement institutions was thus critical in the implementation of 
economic empowerment in these countries.  
This has been different in the BEE implementation process. South Africa has decided 
to depend on the private companies to assess compliance (see section 1.4, Chapter 
One). The government has finally established Black Economic Empowerment 
Commission to monitor compliance. The commission only became operational in 
2015-11 year after the BEE policies came into force. So far, the implementation is 
driven by the white and foreign-owned companies. As a result it is these companies 
that are at liberty to choose how and where to implement equity transfers, as we see 
in Chapter Five of this thesis. It was argued in Chapter One that it is not enough for 
the government of South Africa to remove apartheid policies and introduce 
regulations and expect blacks to succeed. Unless the government changes the manner 
in which it has chosen to implement its BEE policy and offer blacks support, success 





All the governments discussed above used their financial control to ensure 
compliance and offer support to beneficiaries. In the USA, it was the contractors‟ 
dependence on government contracts that became crucial in the enforcement of the 
policy set aside. In Malaysia, the government created special banks and financial 
institutions to offer loans to Bumiputeras and special institutions to buy and 
warehouse shareholding until the Bumiputeras were ready to participate in buying 
them. In Nigeria, the government did not only create new banks but also acquired 
shares in all existing banks. It is this that made it possible for the government to 
enforce provision of loans to indigenous citizens. The control of financial institutions 
was also the backbone of Japan‟s success. It is this that enabled the government to 
apply the carrot and stick policies to enforce compliance with government‟s overall 
plans. To have a long lasting effect, Japan had centralized planning and collaboration 
between the political leaders and the business people. 
 
The lack of funding has been identified by analysts on BEE in South Africa as the 
main constraint to black economic empowerment as blacks lacked own capital 
(Southall 2006, 2007; Cargill 2010). In fact the White Paper on Mining in 1998 (see 
Section 2.4) had proposed that the IDC and DBSA (as government financial 
institutions) should finance new and existing mining ventures owned by blacks. The 
BEE Commission in 2001 called for the creation of the National Empowerment 
Funding Agency (NEPFA) to drive the BEE strategy to finance black entrepreneurs. 
In its earlier suggestion the commission had also called for the allocation of 50 per 
cent of borrowed funds from the IDC to be allocated to blacks (see Section 2.5). The 
limited funding from the government and its financial institutions has forced blacks 
to be totally dependent on the largesse of white and foreign-owned mining 
companies. This has limited the pace of black economic empowerment in the mining 
sector that is capital intensive. Cargill (2010:6-7) thus calls upon the government to 
mobilize extra funding for BEE funding. 
 
Policies to deal with economic imbalances need to have a long term view. In the case 
of Malaysia, economic empowerment formed part of a broader national economic 




policies. Policies that seek to restructure the economy have to have a long-term 
vision. In the case of Japan, transformation was a result of elaborate national 
development goals and part of national planning. The elaboration of the BEE policy 
in South Africa has not only been piece meal, with the DME dealing with the mining 
sector and the DTI with the rest of the economy and has not been integrated into the 
broader national development goals. It thus looks like an appendage or stand-alone 
policy with little linkage to other broad long-term national goals. BEE does not 
feature much in the National Development Plan and in Accelerated and Shared 
Growth for South Africa (AsgiSA).
41
 Also, the cooperation between the government 
and business is minimal. As we have seen from Chapter Two, the cooperation with 
the business community was strong at the BEE policy formulation process stage. By 
contrast, in the implementation stage, the black entrepreneurs are left to fend for 
themselves under the forces of the free market mechanism. The government in South 
Africa must learn how to cooperate with the business community and offer support to 
black entrepreneurs until they can stand on their own. 
 
The analysis of empowerment policies in the USA, Malaysia and Nigeria has 
highlighted some of the negative consequences of these policies. These include 
fronting, cronyism, political patronage and the policies benefiting those for whom 
they were not intended to. Fronting was rampant in both Malaysia and Nigeria as this 
was used to subvert compliance. The issues of fronting in South Africa have been 
raised by critics (Khehla and Reddy 2006; Mbeki 2007; Gqubule 2006, Duncan 
1996; Cargill 2010) and it is the critics that have been the motivation behind the 
amendment of the B-BBEE Act where punishable offences were introduced. 
Cronyism and political patronage in developing countries have been justified by 
Khan and Gray (2005), Booth and Mutebi (2012) and Kelsall (2013) as a form of 
primitive accumulation in the early stages of capitalism in developing countries. 
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 AsgiSA was launched in 2006 and aims to tackle constraints that limit economic growth. These 
include limited government capacity, volatility of the Rand (the country‟s currency), infrastructure, 
skills shortages, uncompetitive industrial and service sector and inequality and marginalisation of 
blacks. Likewise the National Development Plan 2030 which is a long term government‟s economic 
strategy has not so fat touched on the issues of mining finance or any support for black-owned 
companies. Its focus is on resolving energy crisis, job creation, education, health, fighting crime, rural 




While cronyism and political patronage might be a reality, in the new South Africa, 
they might represent a major threat to equal opportunity for all which the ANC 





4 Research Design and Methodology  
 
4.1 Introduction  
As indicated in Chapter One, this study is broad. It involves issues of equity 
ownership, control and management and has five objectives. This Chapter details the 
methodology followed to meet the study objectives. Objectives one and two deal 
with the extent to which white and foreign-owned companies have complied with the 
equity transfer and devolution of control and management to blacks as demanded by 
the MPRDA and the Mining Charter. These two objectives were met together 
through mixed approaches of qualitative and quantitative methods. Secondary data 
from various sources was used to establish the level of compliance on equity 
ownership, control and management by white and foreign-owned companies. This 
was done by exploring three variables: mining ownership (company shareholding 
and mining assets), mining control (board characteristics) and management 
(management characteristics). To meet objectives three (establish the different 
strategies used by white, foreign and black-owned companies to enter into BEE 
deals); four (what facilitates or hinders the BEE implementation process) and five 
(the role of government in the implementation of the B-BBEE policy), the study used 
qualitative method, in particular questionnaires and structured interviews to gather 
primary data.  
 
The chapter starts by highlighting the main considerations made in the research 
process. This details the methodological choices and the use of a research assistant. 
Section two focuses on the selection of the sample for the study. Section three details 
the data collection process paying special attention to the secondary and primary 
data. Section four explains how both the secondary and primary data was analysed. 
Section five deals with the challenges encountered and how these were dealt with 





4.2 The Research Process: Considerations and Methods  
In trying to meet the study objectives, the following considerations were made. The 
first was to employ a mixed method approach; the second was to use a research 
assistant and third was to use a sample. These approaches will be explained 
separately. According to Bryman (2001), mixed methods involve a mix of qualitative 
and quantitative methods or even a mix of qualitative methods (Hennink et al., 2010, 
Denzin and Lincoln 2011). Hennink et al., (2010:8) mention four methods that are 
commonly used in qualitative method: observation, group discussions, 
document/content analysis and in-depth interviews. For the qualitative method, 
questionnaires and structured interviews are used. Elaboration on how these methods 
were used in this study follows later.  
 
The second consideration was on using a research assistant. The kind of assistant 
needed is what Molony and Hammett (2007:295) refer to as researcher-research 
assistant as opposed to an informant (the one who is a source of information). The 
main reason for opting for a research assistant was that the mining industry is not a 
place I had worked in before; the study is not associated to any project with a 
government or a mining company and therefore personal connections in the industry 
are limited. Experience from conducting a study in the South African environment
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taught me that while South Africans are not averse to foreign nationals per se, they 
do not easily open up to them unless they know them or are introduced by people 
that they know. They also appreciate a greeting in their local languages and take it as 
a sign of respect. My little understanding of Tswana (learnt in my ten years stay in 
Botswana) enabled me to understand Sotho and Zulu and little knowledge of 
Afrikaans language acquired during my Masters‟ at the University of Stellenbosch 
enabled me to cope with greetings. Greetings in local languages are important to 
open up for conversations but not to get into peoples‟ circles. It was important 
therefore to get a research assistant, who is a South African citizen, could talk both 
Afrikaans and other local languages, has a good personality, higher academic 
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 The title of the study is A National Study on Unemployed Science, Engineering and Technology 
Graduates: a Report Submitted to the Department of Science and Technology (2006). I participated in 




qualifications and could help me to have acquaintances in the mining industry in the 
hope of easing access to interviewees.  
 
The search for an assistant started by tracing names of those involved in research on 
BEE policy issues while reading literature for this thesis. Clues were obtained by 
checking acknowledgement pages and text where a research assistant was mentioned. 
The names mentioned and the roles that they played in the studies that they 
conducted were jotted and telephone calls were made to the places that they worked. 
It was realised that some had moved away, some had changed jobs but few 
answered. I decided to contact Mr Nkosinathi Ngwenya as he met the requirements 
needed for the study. He worked as a research assistant at KIO a company that 
conducted several studies in the mining industry and some of which were contracted 
out by the DMR and for SAMDA (an association of junior mining companies). Upon 
interviewing him for a research assistant role, it was found out that he has a Master‟s 
degree in financial management and could understand issues of shareholding; he 
could speak many of the local languages including Afrikaans; had connections to the 
JSE and knew a number of executives and managers in white, foreign and black-
owned companies or their secretaries and could trace them to the clubs they visit or 
knew a friend who knew somebody who could make contacts. By being connected to 
SAMDA, he was familiar with what was going around in terms of conferences and 
seminars related to mining and BEE policy issues. His connections proved valuable 
to meet more people.  
 
Since he did not work permanently for me, we agreed on the mode of payment which 
was calculated based on remuneration paid to a research assistant with a master‟s 
degree qualifications working at the University of Pretoria at 2009-2010 salary 
scheme. The payments were to done at the end of a particular month that he worked. 
A contract agreement specifying his roles and the monies to be paid was drawn up 
and which he signed. Later I felt guilty for making him to sign a contract because he 
was honest and reliable, but it was a right thing to do in order for our agreements to 





There are various roles that are expected from assistants. According to Mackenzie 
(2015) and Molony and Hammett (2007:293), the roles include to: locate, obtain, and 
summarise background literature and create bibliographies; locate informants, 
arrange interviews and translate; conduct interviews and observations and manage 
focus groups; edit and code data, enter and organise data and even act as a cultural 
tour guide if one is conducting a research in unfamiliar environment. Mr Ngwenya 
helped me to look for relevant literature, booked interviews, introduced me to 
relevant people, informed me about conferences related to BEE policy and mining 
issues that were taking place and often organised for me to participate. Often he 
accompanied me during interviews and he conducted two interviews, the first time I 
was down with flue and in the second had to attend a seminar that I secured 
unexpectedly. Overtime, I got used to some of the people in his circles which helped 
me in this study in many ways.  
 
4.3 Study Sample  
In order to obtain empirical support of this study, a third consideration that was made 
is to use a sample. A sample is a partial data or a subset of the whole population that 
is used to make generalization in a study. A study population is any group that shares 
a set of common characteristics or traits (Black 1999:111), such as a group of people, 
houses, records, legislators (Nachimias and Nachimias 1992: 171). In the context of 
this study, population refers to all mining companies operating in South Africa from 
which a sample is selected. The list of the mining companies was derived from mine 
directories obtained from the DME (see section 4.4.1 below). In other words, not all 
mining companies were studied. A purposive or judgement sampling method was 
used. Marshall (1996:523) explains this as a technique in which a researcher actively 
selects the most productive sample to answer the research question based on the 
researcher‟s practical knowledge of the research area and the available literature in 
order to search for evidence from the field. Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2003: 
193) say that purposive sampling is suitable when sourcing data from multiple 
sources and can be guided by the criteria a researcher uses. This study used multiple 




The sample used in this study was chosen based on four main criteria. The first 
criterion was to include dominant companies as these account for over 80 per cent of 
mining market capitalisation of mining industry. Data on these companies is easily 
available from their annual reports and websites and considered reliable. Other 
studies (see the DMR 2009b and KIO 2010) used such data. The starting point was to 
use the JSE companies. I had been following up the changes in market capitalisation 
of these companies since 2007. The JSE data was captured on 12 July 2011 where 
there were 56 JSE listed mining companies. Due to the fact that some of the 
dominant white and foreign-owned mining companies were not listed on the JSE, the 
following non-JSE listed companies were added to the sample: Xstrata and Total 
Coal- major coal and ferrochrome producers; De Beers Consolidated Mining and 
Petras Diamonds-main diamond producer and Richards Bay Minerals -mineral sands 
producer.  
 
The second criterion was to ensure representation of all mining categories (platinum, 
gold, diamonds, coal, ferrous and non-ferrous minerals and mineral sands). 
Fortunately, most JSE companies are spread in all these mining categories with the 
exception of diamonds and hence the inclusion of De Beers and Petras which were 
major companies. The third criterion was to include junior companies. This was 
because most new foreign-owned companies fall in this category and are supposed to 
comply. Most of these are listed on the JSE. The fourth criterion was to include BEE 
companies (those owned by blacks), as the BEE policy is intended to benefit this 
group. It was therefore important to get their feedback on the BEE policy and its 
implementation. Ten of the BEE companies were among the 56 JSE companies 
mentioned earlier. Few non- JSE BEE companies which were business partners of 
the white and foreign–owned companies were added to the sample. These include, 
Mvelaphanda Resources, Sedibeng mining, Mmakau Mining, Matjoli Resources, 
Gubevu Platinum, BSC Resources, Shanduka Resources, Savannah Consortium, 
Panohalo Holdings, Ngazana Consortium and the Moepi Group. In total the sample 
included 72 mining companies (see Appendix 10.7) with 52 white and foreign-
owned companies and 20 black owned companies. It is this sample that was used to 




foreign-owned companies, board and management compositions and to conduct 
interviews.  
 
4.4 Data Collection 
The data collection exercise started in 2008 with the collection of secondary data; 
primary data started in 2009 and ended 2012. 
4.4.1 Secondary Data  
Blaikie (2000: 28 and 184) and Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2003:190-191) 
describe secondary data as that generated by another researcher and may serve a 
different purpose than that of the current researcher. Included in these are books, 
government reports, census, official statistics, articles (from newspapers, journal and 
magazines), conference papers, and study reports (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 
2003:190).  
 
Secondary data was used to estimate the extent of white and foreign-owned 
companies‟ compliance with equity ownership, management and control. The first 
set of data was on market capitalisation of mining companies listed on the JSE as 
captured on the 12
th
 of July 2011 which was used to estimate the percentage of black 
equity ownership. The JSE figures are reliable because companies have to comply 
with the country‟s financial regulations. Other studies have used the JSE figures to 
estimate black equity ownership (Empowerdex 2004, the DMR 2009b and KIO 
2010). While KIO‟s 2010 study used 25 JSE listed mining companies which 
represented 85 per cent of the market capitalization of the JSE listed mining 
companies, this study used all the 56 JSE listed mining companies to estimate the 
value of equity owned by blacks.  
 
As already stated in Chapter One, the use of JSE data to estimate equity transferred 
to blacks has limitations for the following reasons. (1) There are constant changes in 
shareholding as shares change hands. (2) Not all mining companies are listed on the 
JSE. (3) The value of shareholding owned by non-black shareholders (white South 




data. It is hard to subtract such shares because it is hard to trace changes as the 
modern world makes it possible for anyone to buy or sell shares from a listed 
company anywhere in the world and anytime. (4) Different mining valuations 
techniques are used when concluding deals. These limitations are further explained 
in section 5.3. 
 
Because of the above limitations, I decided to explore the actual mining deals 
concluded by white and foreign-owned companies with their black counterparts. This 
would help one to understand the pattern of black equity shareholding that has 
emerged and to find an explanation of the level of black management and control of 
both the JSE and non- JSE listed mining companies. To do this I had to embark on an 
extensive search of data. The starting point was a visit to the DTI and DME in 
2008
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. Luckily there were a couple of my former students working at these places. 
These were instrumental in introducing me to relevant people. At the DTI, I was 
introduced to those who were dealing with BEE policy issues. I was provided with 
directories of all companies registered in the country including mining companies. It 
was not possible from the directories to distinguish between operational and non-
operational companies (shelf companies). Therefore directories could not be useful 
for my study purposes. At the DME‟s Directorate of Mineral Economics I was 
provided with two directories. One listed all mining companies in operation (1274), 
(see DME: 2007e). The other titled Operating and Developing Black Economic 
Empowerment Companies in the Mining Sector, listed black-owned companies (see 
DME 2008b). The list of black-owned companies was updated in 2010 (see DMR 
2010c). There was an assurance from those who provided data that almost all 
companies on the directories were active and operational. Apart from the directories, 
over 70 reports and documents were provided. These covered all mineral categories 
(platinum, gold, diamonds, coal, ferrous and non-ferrous minerals and mineral 
sands). Although the general directory listed 1274 mining companies, over 600 of the 
companies were micro and small scale companies which were difficult to trace as 
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they published no annual reports. It was decided to concentrate on major (or large 
scale) mining companies which published annual reports.  
 
It is from the mine directories that a sample used in the study were drawn and used to 
collect data on three variables: mining ownership (company shareholding and mining 
assets), mining control (board characteristics) and the management (management 
characteristics). Data analysis on these variables is elaborated in section 4.5 below. 
The data kept on growing and updated in the course of the study. In total over 100 
mining companies were explored for ownership variables, data for 468 board 
members and 226 of members of top management was collect.  
 
To update and improve data, other sources were used. These include: annual reports 
of the mining companies; Research Channel Africa 
(http://www.researchchannel.co.za); Investec (http://www.investec.co.za); 
Empowerdex (http://www.empowerdex.co.za); Ernest and Young 
(http://www.ernestyoung.co.za); government departments 
(http://www.gov.za/issues); KPGM (www. kmpg.com.za); Financial mail 
(http://www.thepaperboy.com/newspaper.cfm; Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(http://www.JSE.co.za); and the Business Map (that was involved in helping 
companies enter into BEE deals) which when it closed down its activities, its data 
was kept at Wits University) and published journal articles.  
 
4.4.2 Primary Data 
The empirical work for this study was carried out by collecting primary data. 
Primary data is defined by Sarantakos (1998:139-164) as that which is collected by a 
researcher for the purpose of a research being done. Primary data provides a 
researcher with control on its production and use. As indicated earlier, the collection 
of primary data for this study involved the use of qualitative method and in particular 
a survey. Phellas, Bloch and Seale (2011) mentioned three methods of survey: 




and structured interviews (formal and informal interviews). Below I start with 
questionnaires.  
 
4.4.2.1 Questionnaire Approach 
Questionnaires were used to seek information from the management of the DBSA, 
IDC and NEF, the three public financial institutions as it involved only few 
questions. This was to get data on the BEE deals that they funded and to identity any 
problems with regards to funding of BEE deals in the mining industry. Phellas, Bloch 
and Seale (2011:184-185) say questionnaires are suitable when there are few and 
structured questions and respondents need more time to find data which cannot be 
immediately available. Although Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2003:280-281) 
state that questionnaires are considered less costly to administer compared to 
interviews. The research did not benefit from any cost-cutting advantages of posting 
the questionnaires, as they had to be handed to the respondents, due to frequent post 
office strikes at the time of the study. In all cases, the answers to the questionnaire 
had to be fetched later, as some questions needed compiling data from financial 
records. However it took over six months of waiting and constant phone calls and 
being referred from one person to another. At the end, interview appointments had to 
be booked in the hope that face to face contacts might help to obtain the required 
data. There was however very little data provided.  
 
4.4.2.2 The Interview and its Process 
The study used both formal and informal interviews to collect primary data. 
Interviews according to Fontana and Frey (1994) involve verbal interchange (of 
words) between the interviewer (a researcher) with an interviewee, (or also referred 
to as informant or respondent) with the purposes of understanding the latter‟s 
experiences and perspectives. In both formal and informal settings, I revealed myself 
openly as a researcher, told people where I worked and even gave them my business 
cards. As indicated earlier, interviews with a number of people were made during the 




in broad areas of research. Insights were established, while frustrations and 
stumbling blocks experienced by those in BEE deals were noted.  
 
Interviews were conducted with Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), Chief Operating 
Officers (COOs) and Managing Directors (MDs) of mining companies operating in 
South Africa, government officials (namely the DMR and DTI), officials of financial 
institutions, members of academia and civil society groups. In cases where the 
executive of mining companies were residing outside South Africa, those in charge 
of the South African operations were contacted. These officers were selected 
purposively for their knowledge about their organisations, as their experiences were 
expected to provide accurate account of policy implementation in their companies. 
By nature of their activities, these are elites. Elites are defined by Cycyota and 
Harrison (2006:133) and Welch et.al, 2002:612-613) as a group in society considered 
to be superior because of their power, talent and privileges. The elites include top 
echelons of firm or organisation executives, directors, top and middle managers and 
top government officials. In the business community, the elites include 
representatives of corporate headquarters, management in subsidiary companies and 
industry associations. Elites are considered important sources of firm level-
information and can function as key informants to a research. Interviewing elites 
poses various challenges; these are explained in section 4.6 below.  
 
Informal interviews happened in various conferences, symposiums and seminars
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that were attended or just by being introduced to someone in the circles of people 
that I came to know along the way. These include: blacks who own mining 
companies or aspiring to get into the industry; leaders of mining associations 
(namely SAMDA), SAWIMA and other researchers. informal interviews were 
conducted with the following were made: Prof Brian Kantoor, who has written 
extensively on the South Africa‟s conglomerates structure (see Kantoor 1998), Mr 
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Clive Knobe, a lecturer in the Department of Mine Engineering at the University of 
Pretoria, Mr Musa Budeda, a PHD student in the Department of Mine Engineering at 
the University of Pretoria, Mr A. Magomezulu of the Department of Mining and 
Energy (this was before the division of the department into two – the Department of 
Energy and the Department of Mineral Resources) and other officials who wanted to 
remain anonymous.  
 
Structured interviews were used for formal interviews. This interview method uses 
questions with the same wording and sequence for every respondent but the 
respondents are at liberty to add their own definitions and other explanations 
(Sarantakos 1998: 139-164; Nachimias and Nachimias 1992: 224-225). Sarantakos 
(1998: 139-164) say that structured interviews provide flexibility and offer a 
researcher a better chance of obtaining valid and reliable data relevant to the research 
objectives. Three sets of interview questions were prepared: first, for the government 
officials at the DMR (Appendix 10.4), second for the executives of white and 
foreign-owned mining companies (Appendix 10.5), and third for executives of black-
owned mining companies (Appendix 10.6).  
The formal interviews started in mid-2010 and continued up to the beginning of 
2012. Interviews with top executives of mining companies were conducted first and 
then interviews with officials at the DMR followed. This was to use feedback that 
received from the mining companies to get responses from the government officials. 
Interview appointments were made quite in advance to ensure availability of 
respondents. I expected that I could secure an interview appointment in a month or 
two, however many of these appointments had to be rescheduled over and over again 
and some never materialised. This challenge is elaborated upon in section 4.6.  
 
Interviews were administered face-to-face. This approach creates an opportunity for 
interviewer to elaborate further on complex questions and be able to pick up non-
verbal clues which help to judge the relevance of the questions and change the course 
if necessary (Phellas, Bloch and Seale 2011:182). Face to face interviews also offer 




are asked and to probe for detailed answers (Legard R., Keegan K and Ward K. 
2003). 
 
The interviews were conducted in English language but kick-started the interview by 
greeting my interviewees in their local languages. Participation in the research was 
done on an entirely voluntary basis and anonymity and confidentiality of individual 
respondents were respected. This was necessary as BEE issues have become 
sensitive with political connotations. Nachimias and Nachimias (1992:86) explain 
anonymity as a case where a respondent (interviewee) does not want to be identified 
in a research report, while confidentiality refers to cases where a respondent does not 
want to be revealed as a source of data. Adhering to confidentiality and anonymity is 
necessary for a researcher to receive consent from those who volunteer to give data. 
This can be done by concealing or changing the names, gender, occupation, or 
position of respondents, using pseudonyms and excluding visual materials from 
research reports (Patton 2002; Thompson and Perry 2004). Concealing identity of 
respondents prevents those who read the published research product to associate the 
respondent as the source of the data. Not identifying respondents is necessary in 
order to avoid the ramifications to the respondent once the published work is 
presented to audiences that the respondent has associations with as indicated by 
Crow and Wiles (2008).  
 
To elicit consent from the interviewees, each respondent had to sign a consent form 
before any formal interview. The motives of the research were also explained. 
Respondents were given a choice on whether or not to be recorded or to have their 
names revealed. They were given an option to stop the interview at any stage or even 
decline any questions they felt uncomfortable to answer. In writing up this thesis, the 
term „respondent‟, was used to conceal the names of the interviewees who wanted to 
remain anonymous. Few anonymity and confidentiality challenges in the course of 
the interview were encountered (see section 4.6).  
 
While the initial lists of interviewee were drawn prior to the fieldwork process, in the 




to the interviewer‟s attention and were also interviewed. Drawing more respondents 
beyond those in the sample resembles what Babbie and Mouton (1998:167) and 
Penrod et al., (2003) refer to as snowballing. This is a process by which in the course 
of collecting data, located respondents suggest other people to be interviewed. In this 
study there were few cases that a respondent referred me to another to answer certain 
questions. The main reason was that not all questions in the interview schedule could 
be answered by the same person. For example issues about finance were referred to 
other people in the same company or in companies that perform such functions. In 
total 35 executives from 27 companies were interviewed (16 executives from 13 
white and foreign-owned companies and 19 executives from 14 black-owned 
companies). It is the responses from these executives that form the basis for chapter 
seven that focuses on objectives three, four and five. The list of those interviewed 
and the dates are indicated in Appendix 10.7.  
 
4.5 Data Analysis  
There are two main groups of data that are analysed in the study – secondary and 
primary data. The secondary data is further explained into three sub-groups. The first 
sub-group is on JSE market capitalisation which was already obtained in an excel 
spread sheet. This was analysed into histograms (see figure 1.2 and 1.3 in chapter 
five). The second sub-group is on BEE deals concluded by individual white and 
foreign-owned companies with their black counterparts. This data was recorded into 
excel spread sheets. Under each mine category, (platinum, gold, diamonds, coal and 
mineral sand). As indicated earlier, three main variables were identified: mining 
ownership (company shareholding and mining assets), mining control (board 
characteristics) and management (management characteristics) variables. The first 
excel spread sheet recorded ownership variables: name of a company, contact details, 
physical location mine ventures, race (white or foreign-owned), subsidiary, name of 
mine venture and projects), activities (extraction, processing, marketing) and 
shareholding (white, foreign and black). Other ownership variables are: nature and 
type of companies (business partners, individual company, consortium, community 




company level, subsidiary, mine venture or mine project). The second excel spread 
sheet recoded mining control variables. These include: percentage of shareholding; 
board characteristics (nationality, race, size, gender) and board composition 
(executive or non-executive); voting rights (preferred shares, common shares, none 
or low voting shares) and conditions of sales (lock-in clauses).The third excel spread 
sheet recorded data on management variable. The variable includes management 
characteristics (nationality, race, size, gender). These variables were captured in a 
similar manner as those of mine control.  
 
The analysis helped to reveal more about BEE equity ownership transfer, identify 
which white and foreign-owned companies have transferred shares to blacks, in what 
mine ventures or projects, the type of deals concluded and the BEE beneficiaries. 
This information was used to classify mining companies into black enterprises, 
black-empowered enterprises, black woman enterprises or community or broad-
based enterprises. It was also possible to get details on black representation on the 
boards and top management of mining companies as a means of explaining black 
control. This is rich and a more detailed analysis which provide a meaningful 
account of the extent of equity ownership transferred and control and management 
attained by blacks than estimations done by using market capitalisation of mining 
companies listed in the JSE. This data is used in Chapters Five and Six. No other 
study known on South Africa‟s BEE policy has provided such details.  
 
The second group of data is the primary data that was obtained from interviews. The 
interviews were initially written manually in a notebook and typed immediately after 
the interviews. The second stage was thematic analysis. Braun and Clarke (2006:6-
10) explain thematic analysis as a “method for identifying, analysing, and reporting 
patterns (themes) within data.” It involves the building of the data into related sub-
categories which helps to answer particular study objectives. It helps one to be well 
familiar with the data and ease the writing process (Hardy and Bryman 2004).  
 
A deductive (top-down approach) was used for thematic analysis. The deductive 




her theoretical or analytical variables of the study (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 
2003:378-381). The deductive approach is different from inductive approach 
(bottom-up approach) that uses themes that are not pre-determined and are derived 
from collected data. The themes used are related to the interview questions. The 
questions are guided by the literature and study objectives. These are: 
 
1. Licensing. Licensing was critical for white and foreign companies as they had 
to convert their old-order rights to the new-order rights as mandated by the 
MPRDA (2002). They were given five years (until 2009) to complete the 
conversion. Failure to do so meant that their old-order rights would revert to 
the state. For BEE companies, licensing was to act as a point of entry into the 
mining sector and the MPRDA indicated that they should get preference in 
the issuing of new licenses. The DMR on its part was expected to use 
licensing as a tool in the implementation process. It was crucial to know how 
the licensing process was used to transform the mining industry. 
2. BEE compliance. White and foreign owned companies were required to 
transfer equity to blacks. The Mining Charter and the Amended Mining 
Charter set specific compliance targets. Black equity ownership was set at 15 
per cent black equity ownership in 2009 and 26 per cent by 2014. 
Management and control targets were set at 40 per cent black representation 
on the board of directors and senior management of white and foreign-owned 
companies even if blacks do not hold shares in such companies. It was 
important to find out from the mining companies themselves if these targets 
had been met and which problems had been encountered in the process.  
3. BEE partnerships. White and foreign-owned companies were required to take 
on blacks as business partners. This is a central entry point for blacks to 
participate in extractive activity. It was necessary for the study to identify 
how the partnerships were forged and which problems had been encountered. 
4. BEE funding. One crucial element that emerged from the literature on BEE in 
South Africa was blacks‟ lack of own funding to buy shares from white and 




Southhall 2007). It was important to find out how the funding problem 
manifested itself and how it was being resolved.  
5. The role of the government. The B-BBEE policy was an outcome of 
deliberate government efforts to intervene in its economy. The 
implementation of the Mining Charter was expected to take place under the 
free market forces. This implies that the government had or was expected to 
have no specific roles in the implementation process. It was important to find 
out what expectations the mining companies had on the roles of the 
government in the implementation process.  
6. The Future of BEE. The Mining Charter is silent on what happens after 2014 
(revised date 2015) when 26 per cent target of equity ownership transferred to 
black people was expected to have been met. From the literature, most BEE 
transactions were concluded with this date in mind, although in some, mining 
transactions have used the „lock-in clauses‟ that goes beyond the 2014 cut-off 
date. It was therefore important to raise the issue of what is likely to happen 
after 2014.  
 
4.6 Research Limitation and Challenges 
This study is limited to three aspects of B-BBEE policy; equity ownership, 
management and control in the mining industry. The Mining Charter, the Score Card 
for the Mining Charter and the Generic Scorecard cover other elements including 
affirmative employment, skills development; enterprise development and preferential 
procurement (see Appendices 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3). These elements are not covered 
by this study. The second limitation is that the estimates of equity compliance by the 
white and foreign-owned companies are limited to the market capitalisation of 
mining companies listed on the JSE with a cut-off date of 12 July 2011.The study is 
not a total representation of equity ownership held by blacks in all mining companies 
in the country. A further limitation is that the analysis of BEE deals concluded by 
individual mining companies (Chapter Five) and board and management 
representation (Chapter Six) are based on company reports and other sources used as 
indicated earlier in this chapter. The interviews analysis (Chapter Seven) is based on 




assessment of the extent of equity and control transferred to blacks under the B-
BBEE policy. Instead, these results offer a general understanding of the extent of 
equity ownership transferred to blacks and black control and management of mining 
companies.  
 
The interview process was not free from challenges. The first is in line with the 
general expectation from elite interviews. Collecting data from elites poses various 
challenges including gaining access, managing the power asymmetry between 
interviewer and interviewee, assessing the openness of elites and providing feedback. 
The manner in which these became challenges is expanded here.  
 
Welch et al., (2002:612-613) state that gaining access to elites poses difficulties due 
to their busy schedules. Based on the study that they conducted on business elites 
said that in some cases it took up to two years of constant phoning and rescheduling 
meetings and networking to interview two executives in major manufacturing 
companies. They advise researchers to build social networks. These are connections 
through professional organisation, ties legitimized through previous personal 
connections and referrals from executive‟s colleagues and influential sponsors if one 
works with a project within an institution or a firm (Welch et al., 2002:614). This 
study encountered similar problems where some appointments were rescheduled over 
and over again and others never materialised and in some cases those at the top 
referred me to their deputies. Mr Ngwenya, this researcher‟s assistant, was very 
instrumental in securing most of the appointments as he knew people in the mining 
industry. Cycyota and Harrison (2006:138) say that reaching executives to respond 
about themselves and their firms requires such ties rather than a researcher doing this 
unaided or in his or her own unsolicited contacts and mailing to organisations.  
 
Power asymmetry was experienced and, at certain times, I felt being patronised. 
Power asymmetry occurs when the elite respondents, who are experts in their fields, 
tend to dominate the interview and the researcher (or interviewer), leading to a 
feeling of being “patronised” on his/her part and of a „hostage syndrome.‟ These are 




demonstration of power. If the interview is conducted in the interviewee/informant‟s 
own territory, there is also a danger for an interviewer to be put into the position of a 
„supplicant‟ as he or she may feel so humble to obtain an interview space that he or 
she may refrain from asking critical questions (Welch et al., 2002:612-613). Power 
asymmetry occurred a few times, when executives being experts in their own field 
used jargons to explain issues of funding, shareholding structure and mineral 
extraction. What led to a breakthrough were the pre-interview preparations made in 
the form of reading about such issues and asking experts like mine engineers. I felt 
patronised when some black-owned companies (names withheld) used the interview 
to pour out their grievances about lack of government support and other problems 
they face as if expecting the interviewer to rush to the relevant government 
departments and report on their behalf. In such situations their grievances were 
patiently noted down and the conversation jolted back to the interview questions. 
When questions about low compliance were posed to white and foreign-owned 
company respondents, few of them became defensive. Feeling supplicant, it was 
better to refrain from further probing in order to get answers for other questions in 
the interview schedule. 
 
There was limited openness as some respondents could not reveal certain data 
claiming that they were bounded by company policies. For example, financial 
companies that I approached (NEF, IDC and DBSA) could not reveal data on the 
value of funds offered to BEE companies on the grounds that they have to protect 
their client‟s interest. Few BEE companies held information about company debts 
claiming that it was for strategic reasons. Obtaining such information could have 
shed more light on BEE funding support offered by state financial institutions. This 
is again in line with what Welch et al., (2002:612-615) said that although elites are 
regarded as experts in their own field, a problem of assessing the openness of elites 
may occur as they are bound by organisational policies not to reveal more 
information than that in the press statements or annual reports. This makes the 





The second challenge was related to delays. At the DME/DMR, a number of things 
changed over time. In 2009, the ministerial structure was split into two; - issues on 
minerals fell under DMR and that of energy to a completely new Department of 
Energy. It took up to mid-2010 before the DMR moved and settled to its new offices 
and accepted visitors. This time coincided with growing criticisms about the DMR‟s 
mishandling of the conversions of old-order rights to new-order rights and the award 
of new licences. There was a six months moratorium placed on the issuing of any 
mining licences in order to give time to the DMR to sort out its internal problems 
(Pretoria News 27/8/2010). There were pending court cases challenging the DMR‟s 
license awards. The Department became defensive at this period and it was 
consequently a very sensitive time for carrying out interviews. Officials at the DMR 
did not easily accept to be interviewed. One interview was booked at the end of 2009 
in order to obtain some clarifications on certain policy clauses, but it was only at the 
end of 2012 that an interview was secured. By the time, one director that was initially 
earmarked for interview had moved out, and that meant interviewing a completely 
new director.  
 
Other delays were made worse by what Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2003:121) 
refers to as gate keepers and brokers. These include secretaries, personal assistants 
and public relations officers. Some of these demanded up to date letters of reference 
from the institution that I study –University of Edinburgh of not more than 7 days old 
which was impossible because of logistics. Others gate keepers did not pass on the 
message to remind their bosses that the appointments were due. Mining workers‟ 
strikes also caused some delays. On two occasions, the interviews were cancelled, 
because the workers were on strike and it was impossible to enter the premises. One 
official was kind enough to fit the interview during lunch hour, far from the office 
premise. In another occasion the official allowed the interview to be conducted at his 
home. Such offers were greatly appreciated. Delays were also caused by the nature of 
the interview questions. Some questions in the interview schedule could not be 
answered by one single respondent but referred to different people. This happened at 






The methods chosen to carry out this research were preferred as they offered 
flexibility in dealing with complexities of the study focus. The use of structured 
interview enabled an in-depth collection of data, while thematic analysis helped the 
study not to diverge from boundaries of its objectives. The research environment, in 
particular interviewing elites and conducting a research a less familiar industry was 
challenging. To overcome this challenge depended much on the ability of a 
researcher to get acquaintances in order to access the elites. The solution became 
having a versatile research assistant who is local and understands people in the 
mining industry who helped to access respondents and other important people in the 
mining industry. 
 
Despite all the challenges, the data collection in general was an enjoyable experience 
that enabled me to meet many people and left a lasting memory. When I pass in 
South Africa‟s mining areas, or listen to the TV or talk to colleagues, I feel that I 
know better about issues of BEE policy, equity ownership and control and the 





5 The B-BBEE and Changes in Ownership in South Africa’s Mining 
Industry  
 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides study findings to part of objective one of the study. Objective 
one seeks to explore the extent of equity transferred to blacks and blacks‟ attainment 
of control and management in mining companies. The analysis of control and 
management is covered in Chapter Six. In this chapter the concentration is on equity 
transfer. As government used licensing to facilitate the entry of blacks in mining, this 
chapter starts by looking at the licenses issued in the industry. The transfer of mining 
ownership to blacks is done by exploring ownership variables (company 
shareholding and mining assets) which were mentioned in section 4.5 of the previous 
chapter. The estimation transfer of mining ownership is done in two ways. First is by 
estimating equity transferred to blacks by using market capitalisation of JSE listed 
companies. This is covered in section two. But as it has been continuously argued in 
this thesis that exploring the actual mining deals concluded by individual white and 
foreign-owned companies provides a more insightful picture of how the transfer of 
equity has taken place and which mining assets have been transferred to blacks, who 
are the actual beneficiaries, the strategies used, conditions attached to the 
transactions and the voting rights offered. All mining categories (PGM, Gold, 
Diamonds, Coal, Ferrous and non-Ferrous metals) have been covered. Looking at 
deals concluded also explains objective three of the study (strategies used to enter 
into BEE deals). This is covered in section three. It was anticipated by the Mining 
Charter that equity transfer to blacks would lead to black-enterprises and black 
empowered enterprises. Section four looks at this reclassification.  
 
5.2 Licensing as a Vehicle for Entry of Blacks in the Mining Industry 
Licensing has been one of the government economic intervention tools used to 
enforce the entry of blacks into the mining industry under the BEE policy. The use of 




embarked on empowerment. Licensing was used in Malaysia to enable the 
indigenous Malays to enter into business and in Nigeria for indigenous people to 
exploit business opportunities in areas that the government had reserved (Lall 1996; 
Uche 2011). South Africa has followed the same route. As indicated earlier, first the 
MPRDA tied the conversion of old-order rights to new order-rights by the white and 
foreign-owned companies that existed at the time and the new ones that entered the 
industry to the incorporation of blacks in their companies. In other words, a white or 
foreign-owned company would renew its licences or obtain new licences upon 
proving that it has a black shareholder or business partner and conferred to a black 
shareholder some percentage of shareholding. Second, the MPRDA called upon the 
Minister of Minerals to give preference to blacks in the issuing of new licences (see 
section 2.4.1 of this thesis). Functions of registering a company in the country fall 
under the jurisdictions of the DTI, but it is the DMR that approves the licenses for a 
company operating in the mining industry. It is involved in the conversion of old-
order rights to new-order rights and approving of new licenses. Upon vising the 
DMR‟s resource centre (2012) a data on licences
45
 issued up to the end of 2012 was 
provided. The analysis below is based on the data provided.  
 
However, Mr Tladi, the official who provided data on licences at the DMR‟s 
resource centre indicated that the data provided is not comprehensive due to the fact 
that submissions of licences take place in all the nine provinces of the country. By 
the time of finalising the writing of this thesis (2013), the DMR had not completed 
the process of collecting such data in one place. The data, therefore, is not an 
indicative of the changes that have taken place. Table 5.1 below shows the number 
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Table 5.1: Number of Different Licenses Given to Mining Companies by 2012 




Mining Rights Prospecting 
Rights 
Total 
HDSA Controlled: 50% + 1 
vote 
1274 650 4446 6370 
HDSA Partnership 25%+1 
Partnership: 25% + 1 vote  
1329 1072 2724 5125 
Broad-Based Ownership:  396 305 738 1439 
None 1071 829 1389 3289 
Total 4070 2856 9297 16223 
Source: The DMR 2013 
 
As evident in the table above, there were, in total, 16223 licenses issued by 2012. 
These include: 6370 licences that were offered to black enterprises (50+1 shares) by 
2012. Prospecting permits accounted for 69.8 per cent (4446 permits); mining 
permits 20 per cent (1274) and mining rights 10 per cent (650); black empowered 
entities (25+1 shares) received 5215 licenses. These are licences offered under 
business partnership arrangement. Again, here, the majority of licences 52 per cent 
(2724) are of prospecting permits, mining permits are 25 per cent (1329) and mining 
rights 21 per cent (1072). Worthy of noting here are permits given to broad based 
groups. These generally include communities, women groups, youth groups, disabled 
persons and other civil society organisations. They received 1439 licenses divided 
into 396 mining permits, 304 mining rights and 738 prospecting permits. This simply 
shows that some of the communities are involved in mineral activities. Although this 
list does not indicate the number of licenses offered to women, the Department of 
Finance (2011:697) indicated that between 2007 and 2010, 92 mining rights were 
awarded to women-led mining companies. It should be noted that mining companies 
normally have multiple licences depending on the activities that the company is 
involved in. This means there could be discrepancies between the number of 
companies operating and the licences offered.  
 
An indication of the growing entry of blacks in the mining industry is further given 
by the BEE directories which researchers at the DMR have been compiling. The 
2007 and 2010 issues that have been published by the DMR shows that BEE 
companies have grown from 69 in 2007 to 112 in 2010 (DME 2007 and DME 





Figure 5.1: Number of Black-owned Companies by Commodities 
 
Source: Created from the DME 2010d 
 
The pie chart above indicates the uneven distribution of BEE companies‟ entry in the 
various mining categories. They are concentrated in coal (21), followed by PGMs 
(17). It is with the above in mind that one should look at where and how the white 
and foreign owned companies have complied with the MPRDA and the Mining 
Charter.  
 
5.3 Estimating BEE Equity Ownership in the Mining Industry Using 
JSE Data  
This section estimated equity ownership transferred to HDSAs (blacks) using market 
capitalisation. The Mining Charter explained three ways of black equity ownership in 
the mining industry. First, it is through acquiring majority shareholding where blacks 
have 50+1 share; the second is through joint ventures where blacks have 25+1 share 
and the third through trusts. Trusts include consortiums, communities and ESOP 
schemes. These are referred to as broad-based investors. Broad-based investors can 
own up to 100 per cent equity without being involved in management (see section 2 
of the Mining Charter). The value of equity ownership transferred to blacks is 
considered in terms of attributable units of South African production controlled by 
blacks. The aim of the Mining Charter was to transfer 15 per cent equity by 2009, 
reaching 26 per cent by 2014. These targets applied to the industry as a whole (the 




aggregate) and to individual mining companies (each individual mining company 
separately).  
 
As indicated in Chapter One (section 1.4), the third phase of the BEE policy involved 
estimating how much equity have the white and foreign–owned companies 
transferred to blacks and how much control and management is under blacks. In 
order to estimate the percentage that is owned by blacks in line with the demands of 
the Mining Charter, studies have used data on market capitalisation of mining 
companies listed on the JSE (Empowerdex 2004, 2009; DMR 2009c; KIO 2010). 
Market capitalisation (also referred to simply as market cap) is a total value of the 
firm‟s outstanding shares multiplied by the market price at a time of closing business 
on a particular day.
46
 In 2004 and again in 2009, Empowerdex, a company which 
evaluates and has been giving reports on compliance levels, made a summary of the 
value of BEE transactions in the mining industry. In its 2009 study, it revealed that 
between 2004 and 2008
47
, there were a total of 115 reported BEE transactions valued 
at around R102 billion (£6.8 billion).
48
 These transactions were divided into three 
categories. The first category involved BEE entities acquiring equity stakes in white 
and foreign-owned mining companies. Such transactions accounted for 70 per cent of 
all the transactions. The second category involved joint ventures between black-
owned companies and white and foreign-owned companies, these represented 11.3 
per cent of all the transactions. In the last category were the BEE companies that sold 
their equity stake or mining assets, due to debts either to other BEE companies or to 
their white and foreign partners (Empowerdex 2009:3). BEE transactions were 
concentrated within five HDSA controlled companies (Royal Bafokeng, Mvela 
Resources, Exxaro, Incwala Resources, ARM and Pamodzi) which all accounted for 
more than half of the value of all the transactions (R59billion or £3.9billion). Some 
of Pamodzi‟s assets were liquidated due to excessive debts. Two mining companies 
(Anglo Platinum and Impala Platinum) accounted for almost half of all the 
transactions (R47billion or £3.1billion). The transactions were concentrated in three 
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 For example, if a company like ARM has 1bn outstanding shares and the price of each share is R10. 
The market cap then will be R10 billion.  
47
 Empowerdex indicates that it used only media reports of the transactions. 
48
 This is equivalent to 19 per cent of all the BEE deals concluded by the JSE listed companies during 




mining categories: platinum, which accounted for 33 transactions valued at R53.9 
billion (£ 3.5billion); coal with 26 transactions at the value of R26.5billion 
(£1.7billion) and; gold where there were 18 transactions to the tune of R11.2billion 
(£733million).  
 
The DMR, in its Impact Assessment Report in 2009 and using market capitalisation 
of the JSE listed mining companies, indicated that BEE ownership in the mining 
industry had, at best, reached 9 per cent by 2009 and not the anticipated 15 per cent 
(DMR 2009b:17). The value of the assets in the South Africa‟s mining industry had 
grown tremendously from R760billion (£69billion) at the time of the adoption of the 
Mining Charter in 2002, to around R2trillion (£181billion) in 2009 as indicated in 
Chapter One (see section 1.4). KIO‟s study (2010) also used the market capitalisation 
measure based on the top 25 JSE mining companies (of 2009) to estimate equity 
shareholding owned by blacks. The top 25 companies represented 85 per cent of 
market capitalisation of the JSE whose value stood at R1.8trillion (£163billion). 
KIO‟s study findings indicated that BEE equity ownership of black-owned 
companies stood at R97billion (£8.8billion) which was equivalent to 5.27 per cent.  
 
As indicated in Chapter Four, this study also used market capitalisation data for the 
entire JSE listed mining companies. There were 56 as per 12 July 2011 with the 
value not much differing from the 25 companies that KIO used and stood at 
R1.8trillion (£163billion) at the time, (see Appendix 10.8). The analysis of these 56 





Figure 5.2: Market Capitalisation of the JSE Mining Companies by Value 
 
Source: the JSE 2011 
 
Black-owned companies (or also known as HDSAs) accounted for roughly 
R143billion (£13billion) or only 7.4 per cent. This is a far cry from the 15 and 26 per 
cent that the Charter anticipated. Among the 56 JSE listed mining companies, ten 
were BEE companies (in which blacks had 50+1 per cent votes).
49
 Some of these 
companies (Wesizwe and Northam) have lost their BEE status as we will see later in 
Chapter Five. BEE ownership of the JSE listed mining companies is very small in 
terms of percentages as indicated in Figure 5.3. 
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 These include Exxaro Resources, African Rainbow Minerals, Northam Platinum, Royal Bafokeng 
Platinum, Merafe Resources, Optimum Coal Holdings, Wesizwe Platinum, Anoorag Resources and 




Figure 5.3: Market Capitalisation of the JSE Mining Companies by Percentage 
 
Source: the JSE 2011 
 
Two companies dominated equity that HDSAs own on the JSE. These were Exxaro 
Resources and Africa Rainbow Minerals which, together, account for 72.5 per cent 
or R104 billion (£9.4billion). Another 10 per cent was under the control of the Royal 
Bafokeng Nation, namely the Royal Bafokeng Platinum, Merafe Resources and 
South African Coal Holdings. In other words, shareholding controlled by HDSAs is 
highly concentrated.  
 
The estimation on equity owned by HDSAs indicated above is in stark contrast to 
those by the Chamber of Mines (2010) that indicated that its members had already 
achieved 15 per cent target. An attempt was made to investigate why there were 
different compliance levels and found out several reasons. The first is associated with 
lack of clarity on the term BEE equity ownership. In its calculations, in the 2009 
report, the DMR indicated that it used economic interest to estimate equity 
transferred and voting rights to explain black control as required by the Mining 
Charter (DMR 2009c:22-.24). Later the DMR introduced the idea of net value, that 
is, shares that are fully paid for (also referred to as debt free shares). It is the different 
methods used (either net value or economic value) that causes the differences in the 
estimations of the equity transferred to HDSAs. The Chamber of Mines disagrees to 
use the net value and interprets BEE equity ownership under HDSAs only in terms of 
economic interest, that is, equity transferred to BEE companies regardless of their 




The question whether equity calculations should include net value or not is the issue 
that has not yet been cleared even in the amended Mining Charter (section 2.6.1) and 
beyond this thesis‟s control. As indicated in Chapter One (section 1.4), blacks lack 
own funds and BEE deals depended on debt financing. The payment of the debts or 
redeeming of shares depended on dividends paid. This implies for HDSAs to become 
debt-free depends much on the growth of a company and dividends paid. The 
problem that may arise is that, it may take time for a new HDSA- owned company 
(or any other new mining company) to realise returns. This study gives an example 
of Kgalagadi Manganese, a company that was established in 2005, is expects to reap 
returns in 2018, 13 years since the acquiring acquisition of the mining license. It is 
questionable that black-owned companies will be debt free. 
 
The second reason for differences in estimating equity shareholding under black 
control stems from complications made by the “continuing consequences principle” 
allowed in the Mining Charter (see section 4.7). In cases where BEE companies sold 
their shares or were liquidated (e.g., during the financial crisis in the late 1990s), the 
white and foreign-owned companies that had transferred equity to blacks kept their 
compliance points.
50
 The Chamber of Mines recognises such deals but the DMR 
requires those companies which lost BEE partners to take new ones to compensate 
for the loss.  
 
The third reason for differences is associated to different mining valuations 
techniques used when concluding deals. According to Mr Clive Knobe, a lecturer at 
Department of Mining Engineering at the University of Pretoria, who previously was 
a mine director at Rand Mines whom I had inform interviews several times, mineral 
assets are sometimes valued using the mine‟s expected life span and sometimes 
anticipated mineral quantities in the soil mixed with other measures.  
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 Big companies like Anglo American had transferred large amounts of shares before the Mining 
Charter came into effect. Anglo American was allowed to convert its old order licences to new order 
licences under the Continuing Consequences principle. Thus when Anglo Gold Ashanti was 




The fourth is related to limitations of using JSE data. There are various issues here. 
The first is that the value of market capitalisation of black-owned companies listed 
on JSE does not exclude the value of shareholding that is owned by white South 
Africans and foreigners in such companies. It would have been right to subtract the 
value of such shareholding in order to get what KIO (2010) calls the effective value 
of black ownership. This would be a difficult excise taking in mind that people buy 
or sell shares anytime and anywhere using online facilities. The second is that, what 
a company owns might constantly change in value as shares change hands and 
company share values change. In short there are many factors that may explain 
changes in the value of shares a company holds at one particular time. The changes 
in share value may call for a constant up-dating of data. Third, not all mining 
companies are listed on the JSE. The best examples of these are Shanduka, a BEE 
Company and Xstrata, a foreign-owned company. Both have extensive mining 
interests in South Africa. Using JSE data therefore omits such companies. These are 
problems that the government has to take into consideration when developing a 
better way of estimating the value of mine assets owned by blacks in the country. 
Unless these problems are resolved, there will be continued disputes on the actual 
percentage of equity transferred to blacks. 
 
As indicated earlier it is for these reasons that the study explores mining deals that 
are concluded between individual white and foreign-owned companies with their 
black counterparts. The section below concentrates on BEE mining deals that have 
been concluded between white and foreign-owned companies with their black 
counterparts.  
 
5.4 Inside the BEE Honey Pot: Mining Deals in the Various Mineral 
Commodities  
This section used secondary data to investigate the mining deals that white and 
foreign-owned companies have concluded with their black counterparts. The section 
reveals percentage of shareholding transferred to blacks, mining assets that blacks 
benefited, strategies used to transfer the mine assets and conditions attached to 




study sample. The study sample includes all the 56 JSE listed mining companies (see 
Appendix 8) and those companies that are not JSE listed. The discussions in this 
chapter are guided by the mine categorisation used by the DMR (and previously the 
DME). In most of its reports, the DMR categorises mineral commodities into the 
following: (1) Precious metals and minerals, (2) Energy Commodities, (3) Non-
Ferrous Metals, (4) Ferrous Metals, (5) Industrial Metals, (6) Aggregate and Sand 
and (7) Processed Minerals. The precious metals and minerals embrace Platinum 
Group Metals (PGMs), Gold and Diamond. All three are discussed. The energy 
commodities category comprises coal, natural gas, crude petroleum and uranium. 
Only coal is considered in this study, as natural gas and petroleum are governed by 
the Liquid Fuels Charter. There are a small number of companies operating in the 
ferrous, non- ferrous and industrial metals (DMR 2009a, 2010g, 2011a). Aggregate 
and Sand category comprises numerous mostly micro and small scale enterprises. 
These are not explored in this study, because it is difficult to obtain data as most of 
these companies do not produce annual reports and their nature of activities involves 
processing minerals and manufacturing. Because of these reasons, the section is 
referred to as “other minerals”. What follows below is a category by category 
analysis of BEE deals concluded by individual white and foreign-owned companies 
with their black counterparts, starting with the Platinum Group Metals. 
 
5.4.1 BEE Deals in the Platinum Group Metals (PGMs) 
The PGM sector has become the most important mining sector following the fall in 
gold production and export (DMR 2009c). The sector is dominated by three major 
companies; Anglo Platinum, Impala Platinum and Lonmin. Anglo Platinum is a 
subsidiary of Anglo American Plc., the world largest producer of PGMs (accounted 
for 40 per cent of world newly mined platinum in 2009). Table 5.2 shows BEE deals 
that were concluded by individual white and foreign–owned companies in the PGMs, 
their BEE partners, percentages exchanged and the mines involved. Most of the BEE 
deals in the sector have been concluded by Anglo Platinum a subsidiary of Anglo 
American Plc. As noted in section 2.2, Anglo Platinum was formed in 1995 from the 
assets owned by Amplats. Amplats was part of JCI and after the unbundling of JCI; 




Platinum is a holding company for Anglo American Plc‟s platinum‟s interests. Anglo 





Overtime Anglo Platinum concluded several BEE deals, the first BEE transaction 
was with the Royal Bafokeng Resources in 1997.
52
 This started as a 50-50 joint 
venture over the Royal Bafokeng Platinum Mine (RBPM), but later Royal Bafokeng 
held 67 and Anglo Platinum 33 per cent shareholding (Anglo Platinum 2010). Both 
Royal Bafokeng and Anglo Platinum created Lisinfo 23 Pty Ltd that was listed on 
the JSE. But Anglo Platinum took a 25 per cent interest in Lisinfo (Anglo Platinum 
2011; Royal Bafokeng Holdings 2011). Anglo Platinum‟s second BEE transaction 
was with the Bakgatla Ba Kgafela Traditional Community over the Union Mine. 
Anglo Platinum offered 15 per cent equity to the community. The third transaction 
was with the African Rainbow Minerals Consortium (ARMC), a subsidiary of 
African Rainbow Minerals (ARM)
53
 in which the Mapindima and Matimatjaji 
communities owned 17.5 per cent, in 1999. This is a 50-50 joint venture with Anglo 
Platinum over the Madikwa Platinum Mine. The ARM acts as a lead partner of 
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 Based on the 2008 DME records, Anglo Platinum has three wholly-owned mines: Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines (with Frank, Townlands and Paardekraal shafts); The East Mine composed of the 
Turffontein, Bleskop and Brakspruit shafts and; the Waterval Mine (the Amandelbult Section and the 
Potgietersrust Platinums). Other wholly-owned ventures include a smelting refinery at Rusternburg 
that treats concentrates from its wholly-owned operations and from its joint ventures and other third 
parties. Its wholly-owned projects included Twickenham and Hackney farms (DMR 2010g). 
52
Royal Bafokeng Resources is an investment arm of the Royal Bafokeng Nation which owns 1200 
square kilometres of land which hosts the Bushveld Igneous Complex in the Western Limb. 
53
 ARM is a company started by Patrice Motsepe. The main investors are: African Rainbow Minerals 
and Exploration Investments (Motsepe family investment company) 41.26 per cent; ARM Broad 
Based Economic Empowerment Trust 13.45 per cent; Black Rock Inc. 10.61 per cent; Public 
Investment Corporation 5.16 per cent, Fidelity Investments 4.17 per cent and Allan Grey Investment 




Table 5.2: BEE Deals Concluded in PGMs 












Royal Bafokeng Community 67 Royal Bafokeng 
Platinum Mine 
 Bakgatla Ba Kgafela Community 15 Union Mine 
 African Rainbow 
Consortiums 
Joint venture 50-50 Modikwa 
Platinum Mine 
 Pelewani Investment SPV+Consortiu
m 
51 Bokoni 
 Mvelapanda Resources HOLDCO 10.63 Booysendal/North
am Project 




Royal Bafokeng Nation Community 
Trust 
13.4 Company level 
 ARM Joint venture 55 Two River mines 
 Marula, Makau+Thubase Community 
Trust and 
companies 
27 Marula Platinum 
Mine 









18 and 26  Western and 




Savannah Consort Consortium 26 AQSA Company 
Level 
 Imbani platinum Joint venture 26 Blue Ridge mine 





















15 Smokey Hills 
Platinum 
Source: Compiled from Company Annual Reports and other Company Sources 
 
Anglo Platinum‟s fourth BEE transaction involved what was then known as Lebowa 
Platinum which was owned by Amplats but taken over by Pelewani Investments 
through a BEE deal. This deal receives special attention here because of its 
complicated nature. For this transaction, Anglo Platinum started a special purpose 
vehicle (SPV) in 2004 known as Pelewani Investments on which blacks acquired 51 




cent. Pelewani Investments thus qualified as a black-owned company.
54
 As a black-
owned company Pelewani Investments could enter into BEE deals. To do this 
Pelewani Investments created the Pelewani Trust which acquired 56 per cent shares 
in Anoorag (a Canadian company) with the remaining 43.75 being publicly held. 
Pelewani Investments acquisition of 56 per cent shares in Anoorag, made Anoorag
55
 
qualify as a black-owned company. Then, Anoorag, through another of its fully 
owned company, the Plateau Resources, acquired 51 per cent of Bokoni Platinum 
Holdings (Bokoni Holdco). Rustenburg Platinum Mines (which is a subsidiary of 
Anglo Platinum) then purchased the remaining 49 per cent. Bokoni Holdco then 
acquired 100 per cent shares in Bokoni Platinum Mines which included the 
Boikgantsho, Kwanda and Ga Phasha Projects. 
 
It is important to note the conditions attached to the Pelewani - Anoorag deal. In the 
deal specifications documents, it is indicated that Plateau Resources‟ 51 per cent 
shareholding in Anoorag cannot be traded until 1 January 2015, as part of a lock-in 
clauses allowed by the Mining Charter to prevent BEE shareholding to be diluted. 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines provided vendor finance facility which included a cash 
component and share component to the tune of R1.1billion (£100million) and an 
operating cash flow shortfall facility (OCSF) of R750million (£68million) (Anoorag 
2011). This basically means Bokoni Mines operates on a debt financing underwritten 
by the Rustenburg Platinum Mines and any profits made are used to service the debt, 
leaving nothing for the BEE investors.  
 
The fifth BEE transaction was with Mvelapanda Resources. The company was once 
jointly owned by Mvelapanda Holdings (20 per cent) and Afripalm Resources
56
 (31 
per cent) and minorities (49 per cent). What happened is that Mvelapanda Resources 
and Anglo Platinum each held 22 per cent shareholding in Northam (which in turn 
owned 100 per cent of Northam Mine). Anglo Platinum and Mvelapanda Resources 
jointly held 50 per cent each in the Booysendal project. By swapping contingent 
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 This is referred to in the MPRDA and Mining Charter as Black Enterprise. The two terms are used 
interchangeably in this study. 
55
 Anoorag has changed its name to Atlatsa Resources Corporation. 
56
 Afripalm Resources is a black-owned consortium made of Phalali Trust (42.9 per cent), Unipalm 




properties and for cash consideration, Anglo Platinum relinquished its Booysendal 
interests to Mvelapanda Resources. After getting Booysendal, Mvelapanda placed 
the entire project under Northam to obtain a higher percentage of Northam 
shareholding. At the end of the transactions, Mvelapanda Resources had a 63 per 
cent shareholding in Northam and Anglo Platinum remained with 11 per cent shares. 
This automatically transformed Northam into a black-owned company, giving extra 
BEE ownership credits to Anglo Platinum. This indicates some of the strategies used 
in concluding BEE deals. In the interview conducted with Mr Lewis (CEO of 
Northam) for this study, he said that negotiating such transactions can take up to 
three years and it is not uncommon to update the terms of contracts if it is necessary. 
 
Mvela Resources did not have enough capital to expand the Northam Mine or to 
exploit the Booysendal project but could not exit from the deal. The problem laid in 
the deal agreement. In this deal, Mvela Resources and Afripalm Resources rights to 
dispose of their shares in Northam were restricted. This formed part of a lock-in 
agreement allowed under the Mining Charter. Selling their shares would have 
reduced Northam‟s black empowerment credentials. Likewise, the voting rights in 
Mvela Resources could not be changed, except in the specific instances allowed in 
the agreement and with the consent of the Minister of Mineral Resources. 
 
In the interview with Sipho Mofokeng, (CEO of Mvela Resources), he indicated that 
the lock-in clauses in the deal agreement affected his company, as it blocked Mvela 
Resources decision to exit. It was only after Mvela Resources was accused of 
operating a pyramid that the Minister of Mineral Resources granted permission for 
Mvela Resources to be unbundled. The ruling was based on the fact that Mvela 
Resources controlled over 50 per cent of Northam and derived 75 per cent of its 
attributable income from Northam. This made Mvela Resources a pyramid which is 
unlawful in South Africa. Northam then decided to acquire the entire issued ordinary 
share capital of Mvela Resources through the issuing of new Northam shares to 
Mvela Resources ordinary shareholders. The transaction then allowed Northam to 
acquire a percentage of Mvela Resources‟ interests in Trans Hex (20.3 per cent), in 




shares in Gold Fields. The final outcome, however, has been that Northam
57
 ceased 
to be a black-owned company as Afripalm
58
 and Mvela Holdings remained with 10.6 
per cent and 11.5 per cent shareholding, respectively, or 22 per cent for both 
(Northam 2011 and Northam Circular to shareholders 2011:74).  
 
The sixth transaction was with Wesizwe Platinum, created in 2003 and listed on the 
JSE in 2005. Wesizwe was controlled by the Bakubung Ba Ratheo Community. In 
2007, the community had 25.7 per cent shareholding. The other shareholders were: 
Lincoln Ngculu (5.7), Thuthukile Sikweiya (5.7) and Vunani Capital (6.6). Wesizwe 
then acquired African Wide Mineral Exploration through which it gained 26 per cent 
of the Western Bushveld Joint Venture with Anglo Platinum. In a series of 
transactions, Wesizwe Platinum gained control of the Frischgewaagd-leding project 
which, after working out a bankable feasibility study, enabled Wesizwe to sign a new 
agreement with the Jinchuan Group from China in 2008.  
 
The final outcome was that Jinchuan acquired 45 per cent shareholding in Wesizwe 
for US$200,368,292, provided a debt facility for US$650 million and provided the 
management of the mine now known as Bakubung Platinum Mine. A special purpose 
vehicle (Micawber 809) was created to house the shares that were unpaid for 
equivalent to US$26,631,705. Anglo Platinum, through its Rustenburg Platinum 
Mines, still retained 13.01 per cent equity in Wesizwe Platinum (Wesizwe Platinum 
2011). Wesizwe Platinum still owns 100 per cent shares of Africa Wide which, in 
turn, owns 26 per cent of Maseve, 74 per cent owned by the Platinum Group Metals. 
(ibid: 2011). From the interview conducted with the CEO of Wesizwe, Mr Arthur 
Mashiatshidi for this study, he noted that the company lost its black-ownership status 
as its empowerment credentials were reduced to a mere 16.33 per cent shares and 
also lost control of the company to the Jinchuan Group, which subsequently took 
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 The other main shareholders of Northam are: Eurasian Natural Resources (ENRNV) 13.3 per cent, 
Public Investment Corporation (PIC) 6.1 per cent, Sanlam 4.6 per cent and Coronation 4.1 per cent. 
58
 Afripalm is controlled by Lazarus Zim who was in 2005 voted African business leader of the year. 
Things, however, have changed and Afripalm was forced to sell its shares in Northam to the Public 
Investment Company to pay its outstanding debts to Nedbank in 2012. He had to relinquish his 
chairmanship of the Northam Board. At the height of his career he was reported to be on the board of 




over management of the company. Wesizwe‟s case is a good example of how BEE 
(HDSA) companies are limited in terms of making strategic decisions to get out of 
debt if there are no other strings attached to the deal (i.e., lock in clauses). Getting 
out of debt means selling shares, and this naturally puts a company in danger of BEE 
shareholding dilution. This explains the challenge of sustaining BEE equity 
ownership.  
 
Impala Platinum is the second largest PGM producer. It was formed in 1968 as 
Bishopsgale Platinum and changed to its current name in 1978. It has mining interest 
in South Africa and Zimbabwe. Its main mining interests in South Africa include the 
Impala Mine north of Rustenburg (with 14 shaft systems), the Marula Mine around 
Sekhukhuneland in Limpopo province and fully owned refining operations in 
Springs-Gauteng. Impala has concluded deals with black-owned companies at both 
the main company and mine levels. At the main company level, Impala Platinum‟s 
BEE partner is the Royal Bafokeng Resources which owns 13.4 per cent of Impala 
Platinum. This was expected to replace the royalty it used to pay to the Bafokeng 
Nation whose community owned the mineral rights and the land where Impala 
operates. The second BEE transaction is at a mine level involving a joint venture at 
its Two Rivers Mine where ARM owns 55 per cent of the joint venture. Impala 
Platinum‟s third BEE transaction is over the Marula Platinum Mine where it has 
three BEE partners: the Marula Community with 9 per cent shares, Makau Mining 
company with 9 per cent and Tubatse Platinum 9 per cent. Impala Platinum‟s fourth 
transaction is also at mine level. This is also a joint venture with Inkosi Platinum (51) 
(Impala Platinum 2010, 2011).  
 
Lonmin Platinum holds a third position as a platinum producer. It is a subsidiary of 
Lonmin International Plc., a UK-based company that originally started as Lonhro 
Plc. in 1909. In the 1990s, Lonhro Africa Plc. separated from its London based 
mother-company, changing to its current name in 1999 after disposing off all its non-
mining business assets. In 2004, Lonmin created a black-owned company known as 
Incwala Resources in which it retained 23.56 per cent shares with the IDC, a state 




(52.88 per cent) were taken up by a consortium of black companies and groups. 
Included in the consortium were: South African Women in Mining Investment 
Holdings,
59
 Dema Capital, Andisa Capital, Vantage Capital, Bapo Ba Mohale 
Community and Lonmin Employees Trust. Incwala resources then acquired 18 per 
cent shares in Western and Eastern Platinum and 26 per cent shares in Akanani 
Platinum Project, formerly owned by Afri Ore. Lonmin paid R3.9billion 
(£278million) and Incwala R900mn (£64million) in 2007 for the Akanani Project. 
Incwala Resources, however, was not able to service its debts and members of the 
consortium were looking for a way out of the business deal. To maintain its BEE 
status, Lonmin had to find another black-owned company to take over Incwala‟s 
shares. It thus organised a takeover by Shanduka Resources
60
 of the Incwala 
Resources BEE shares. This is a good testimony on why the few BEE companies that 
are well established in the field keep on getting more deals. In 2011, Lonmin 
provided a vendor loan to Shanduka of R2.5billion (£227million) for five years. To 
cover for this loan, Lonmin placed 10million shares worth 5 per cent of its current 
issued shares with institutional investors. This allowed Shanduka to acquire 50.3 per 
cent shares in Incwala (Lonmin 2011). On 16 August 2012, Lonmin was plunged 
into turmoil when 34 striking workers at its Marikana mine were gunned down by 
the police. Cyril Ramaphosa, the main shareholder of Shanduka Resources which 
had taken over the BEE shares in Incwala, was fingered for influencing government 
decision on the killing of Marikana strikers (Sunday Times 19/8/2012). He has 
however been cleared by the Fanlam Commission created to investigate the 
Marikana massacres (Bruce 2015).  
 
It is interesting to note that from the beginning of entering South Africa‟s mining 
terrain, the new comers (the junior foreign platinum mining companies) have taken 
on BEE partners and offered them 26 per cent shareholding. One of these is Aquarius 
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 This is an investment arm of the South African Women in Mining Association created in 1999 with 
the aim of assisting companies owned and or managed by women to obtain mineral rights. 
60
 Shanduka Resources is a subsidiary of Shanduka Holdings that is controlled by the Ramaphosa 
Family Trust. Other shareholders include Management and staff, J Motlatsi and others, Community 
Trusts, Litha Strategic Investments and institutional investors. Shanduka‟s interests in the mining 
sector include: 30 per cent equity in Kangra Coal, 26 per cent equity in Pan African Resources, 50.1 





Platinum International that operates through its South African subsidiary -Aquarius 
Platinum South Africa (AQSA). It offered 26 per cent equity to a consortium of 
black groups known as Savannah Consortium, which is chaired by Zwelake 
Mankazana. It also has a joint venture with Imbani Platinum on the Blue Ridge Mine 
and at Zondernaim project with the Bakgage Mining Holding, a community-
controlled company that owns 26 per cent (Aquarius 2010). Eastern Platinum also 
created a South African subsidiary, Barplats Investments and gave 26 per cent 
shareholding in the subsidiary to Gubevu Consortium Investment Holdings. 
Gubevu‟s lead partner is the former South African Minister of Justice, Penuel 
Maduna (Eastern Platinum 2010). 
 
Platmin Ltd (Canada) operates in South Africa through its subsidiary Boyton 
Investmennts. Boyton‟s BEE partner is the Moepi group which was offered 27 per 
cent shares. The controlling shareholders of the Moepi group are the Bakgatla Ba 
Kgafela, a community shareholder (50.1 per cent), and the second is a foreign-owned 
consortium called Pallinghurst Investor Consortium (PIC South Africa) with a 49.9 
per cent. Other of its partners are Ridgewood Investments (from Mauritius), which 
controls 17.6 per cent, Dutch Investments which manages10.9 per cent, Bakgatla 
who possess 8.1 per cent and Investec Bank, which owns 3.7 per cent (Platmin 
2010). Platmin Australia operates the Smokey Hills Platinum Mine in which it holds 
80 per cent equity. The remaining equity is owned by local communities around the 
mine (5 per cent) and Corridor Mining, a fully owned subsidiary of the Limpopo 
Economic Development Enterprises (15 per cent). This is a unique shareholding 
where a government unit owns BEE shares. This is, however, similar to the ANC‟s 
“Chancellor House” which benefits from government contacts just like any BEE 
company as indicated by Cargill (2010 93-95).  
 
Few things can be summed up from platinum mining deals that were concluded. First 
is the emergence of community shareholders. All white and foreign-owned platinum 
companies have communities as shareholders. Many communities established 
company trusts and have taken equity in the white and foreign-owned mining 




located around the mining sites. As indicated in chapter one by Cargill (2010), in 
order for these communities to benefit from their shareholding, they need to have 
well established and permanent administrative structures that are capable of 
negotiating with the mining companies and oversee the community investments. 
Those communities without strong administrative structures depend on what are 
called „lead partners‟ to take care of their business interests and act as a bridge to 
white and foreign-owned companies. This came out strongly in the interviews 
conducted with the executives of BEE companies for this study and is expanded 
upon in Chapter Seven.  
 
The second is that those BEE companies which benefited in the early mining deals 
have a better chance to grow and attract more investments and capital. An example is 
Shanduka. As explained above, Shanduka took over the BEE shares of Incwala 
Resources. The findings here conform to what the executives from white and 
foreign-owned companies said during the interviews. The executives prefer 
companies that already have deals in the sector. This may explain why the same 
companies are picked again and again. Critics like Khehla and Reddy (2007) and 
Moeketsi Mbeki (2007) in their criticisms of the implementation of policy that has 
created a few „fat cats‟ or „black moguls‟ as they call them fail to see the connection 
between preferences of white and foreign-owned companies for those blacks who 
have mining assets. It is this preference which results in the same black beneficiaries 
benefiting from BEE deals over and over again. The third is the danger of dilution of 
BEE shareholding and loss of control that BEE beneficiaries face when they cannot 
fully pay for their shares or are forced to sell their shareholding. As already argued, 
Incwala Resources, Mvela Resources and Wesizwe were forced to sell their shares in 
order to get out of debts and seek partners with financial muscles in order to bring 
projects into operation. In the process, the three companies lost or diluted their BEE 
shareholding. The selling of BEE shares point to the challenge of sustaining the 
equity targets demanded in the Mining Charter.  
 
Fourth is how certain clauses of the policy affect BEE shareholding and its 




example, allows white and foreign-owned companies to keep their compliance points 
despite having lost partners. This tends to exaggerate the actual equity owned by 
blacks and may explain the varied and conflicting results in the studies that sought to 
estimate the equity transferred to blacks. One also needs to note the lock-in clauses 
which, while not part of the Mining Charter, are used by the white and foreign-
owned companies in their contractual arrangements to safeguard their BEE status. 
These make it difficult for BEE shareholders to sell their shares and get out of debts, 
as it can only happen with the consent of the white and foreign-owned company 
partners.  
 
5.4.2 BEE Deals in Diamond  
The structure of the diamond industry has changed significantly. This is an industry 
that the De Beers Consolidated Mines (DBCM)
61
 and the Anglo American 
Corporation
62
 had controlled for many years. In Southern Africa, the two companies 
controlled mining assets extending up to Namibia, the then South West Africa, and to 
Botswana. Diamonds are associated with the Oppenheimer family who slowly 
purchased De Beer‟s shares and joined the De Beers board of directors in 1926. By 
merging with its own diamond assets, the De Beers Consolidated Mines (DBCM) 
was formed and ultimately came to control the production and selling of diamond 
globally through the Central Selling Organisation. DBCM increased its control of 
diamond production in South Africa in 2000 when it bought from Avmin the Venetia 
Diamond and Finch Diamond mines. At that point, DBCM accounted for almost 90 
per cent up of the country‟s entire diamond production. DBCM‟s dominance is 
getting diminished as a new foreign-owned diamond company, Petras Diamonds, has 
emerged, and continues to grow. DBCM has been disposing some of its mines in the 
country to Petras. Both DBCM and Petras are not listed on the JSE, despite their 
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 The company was formed after Cecil Rhodes and Barnato amalgamated De Beers and Kimberley 
Central on 13 July 1888 in an effort to control the South Africa‟s diamonds industry and managed to 
maintain this control for over 200 years. The Oppenheimer family established Anglo American 
Corporation in 1917 and later Consolidated Diamond Mines (CDM) in 1920 in South West Africa 
(Gregory 1962). 
62
 Anglo American success was attributed to financial support from both British and American capital. 
The American capital was put up by J.P. Morgan and Company and Newmont Mining Company at the 
early stages. Mining consulting engineers played a big role in convincing funders on viable 




substantial control of diamond assets in the country. JSE would have been an easier 
facility for blacks who would like to buy shares in these companies. Table 5.3 below 
indicates the BEE deals concluded in the diamond sector. 
 
Table 5.3: BEE Deals Concluded in Diamond  










DBCM Ponahalo Investments Consortiums, SPV, 
ESOP 
26 Company level 
Petras Sedibeng Mining Company 26 Kimberley 
Underground Mines 
 Sedibeng Mining and 
Bokoni Properties 
Company 17.65 and 7.65 Sedibeng Mine  
 Sedibeng Mining Company 26 Starting the mine 
     
 Re Teng Diamonds Company 30 Koffieforntein 
Mine 
 Thembinkosi Mining 
Investment and ESOP  
ESOP/company  14 and 12 Cullinan Mine 
 Senaka Diamonds Company 26 Finch mine 
TransHex Mvela Resources Company 20.3 Company level 




Zico and African 
Vanguard Resources 
Company 26 each (52) Company level 
Source: Compiled from Company Annual Reports and other company Sources 
 
DBCM‟s route to BEE compliance started with creating a SPV to house shareholding 
from a consortium known as Ponahalo Investments. Ponahalo Investments is 
controlled by Ponahalo Holdings which has 50 per cent equity.
63
 The other 
shareholders are: The Equal Allocation Trust, an ESOP created for the benefit of 
current employees and identified pensioners of De Beers Group (35 per cent), and 
another ESOP – Key Employee Trust for the benefits of key employees of the De 
Beers Group (15 per cent) (The Competition Tribunal 2006). Ponahalo Investments 
then acquired 26 shareholding of DBCM (DBCM 2009, 2010, 2011).  
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 Ponahalo Holdings itself is constituted by a consortium that includes: E M Dipico, former premier 
of Northern Cape province (18 per cent), Peotona Capital (16 per cent), B Peterson (13 per cent), M 
Mashishi (8 per cent), The Women‟s Trust (17.5 per cent), The Disabled Persons Trust (10 per cent) 




Petras Diamonds, founded by Adonis Pouroulis in 1997 with headquarters in Jersey 
UK,
64
 has become one of the main foreign-owned diamond companies in the new 
South Africa. It acquired three fissure mines: Helam, Star and Sedibeng, from Crown 
Resources and other underground kimberlite pipes (Finch, Koffiefontein and 
Kimberley Underground) from DBCM and the Cullinan Diamonds Mine.
65
 DBCM 
was running Koffiefontein at a loss, but Petras bought it in December 2006, for 
R82mn that covered rehabilitation, and hence managed to turn Koffiefontein to a 
profitable operation. Again in 2008, Petras organised a consortium of foreign 
investors and bought Cullinan Diamond Mine for R 1 billion cash (£700 million) 
and, in the same year, acquired from De Beers the Kimberley Underground. In 2010 
Petras acquired Finch Diamond mine.  
 
In contrast to DBCM, Petras chose to have BEE partners at the mine level. At the 
Kimberley Underground Mines, Petras chose Sedibeng Mining as its BEE partner 
and offered 26 per cent shareholding. At Kimberley, Sedibeng Mining was offered 
17.85 per cent shareholding and Bokoni Properties 7.65 per cent shareholding. At 
Star Mine, Sedibeng Mining was offered 26 per cent shareholding. Petras second 
BEE partner is Re Teng Diamonds. This was offered 30 per cent shareholding at 
Koffiefontein Mine. At the Cullinan Mine, Petras has two BEE partners; the 
Thembinkosi Mining Investments which it offered 14 per cent shareholding and an 
ESOP-Petras Diamonds Employee Trust with 12 per cent shareholding. At Finch 
Diamond Mine, Petras‟ BEE partner is Senakha Diamonds with 26 per cent 
shareholding (Petras Diamonds 2010, 2011).  
 
One should note here are the two different approaches to BEE deals used by the two 
major companies. The DBCM (which is part of Anglo American) used the SPV route 
to create a BEE consortium to which 26 per cent was transferred. This is similar to 
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 Its main shareholders are Al Rajhi Holdings (18.1 per cent), Saad Investment Company Ltd (17.3 
per cent), JP Morgan Asset Management UK Ltd (9.3), Capital Group Investments (7.1per cent), 
Scottish Widows Investment Partnerships (6.2 per cent), Black Rock Investments (5.4 per cent) and 
Directors (4 per cent) (Petras 2010). 
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 Cullinan mines started in 1902 but it was previously known as Premier Diamond mine, established 
in 1880s under its former chairman Sir Thomas Cullinan. In 1905, Thomas Cullinan presented the 
Cullinan (largest cut diamond in the world -539.29 carat-106.04g) to King Edward VII. Its diamonds 




the SPVs created by Anglo Platinum. The SPVs are preferred by white and foreign-
owned companies, because they buffer these companies from the risk associated to 
having black-owned companies as partners. Petras, on the other hand, opted for 
partnership at the mine or operational level. The opinion of Mr Knobe, a lecturer at 
the University of Pretoria (informal respondent of the study) said, using a SPV to 
transfer deals and offering deals at the mine level, is common practice in mining 
asset transaction as it allows a BEE partner to be part of the management team of the 
mining company that conducts extraction activities. Since a SPV has nothing to do 
with the production process, a black shareholder may have a representation at the 
holding company board. 
 
As in the PGMs sector, all the foreign junior diamond producers have BEE partners. 
Trans Hex‟s BEE partner first was Mvela Resources (but now Northam
66
) with 20.3 
per cent shares. Rockwell Diamond Inc. (based in UK)
67
 operates through its 
subsidiary Rockwell Diamonds Inc. (South Africa). Its BEE partners are ZICO and 
African Vanguard Resources, each holding 26 per cent. The two companies are 
controlled by the trade union investment company of the South African Railways and 
Harbours Workers Union (SARHWU). 
 
5.4.3 BEE Deals in Gold  
In Chapter One, it was noted that the importance of gold in the economy has been 
declining, and that the sector had attracted foreign capital. According to the DME 
(2008a), there were five major gold mining companies in 2008.
68
 These were 
AngloGold Ashanti, Gold Fields, Harmony, DRDGold and Western Gold. The five 
contributed up to 90 per cent of gold produced in the country. As in PGM and 
diamonds, the end of apartheid has attracted a number of completely new junior 
foreign companies into the field. These included Gold One International Limited 
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 See treatment of Northam under Anglo Platinum above. 
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 It has a joint venture with Steinmetz Diamond Group which crafted a pink –brown diamond (35,60) 
carats cut from 179.60 carat stone– Steinmetz Forevermark Jubilee Pink to mark Her Majesty Queen 
Elizabeth II‟s 60 years to the throne- 1952-2012 (see various company Annual Reports).  
68
 This section benefited much from data from Virtual Metals Research and Consulting Limited, 2006, 
Gold in South Africa, Chapter 2, Pgs. 25 – 45; and Department of Minerals and Energy, Operating 




(GDO), Simmer & Jack Mines Limited (SIM), Village Main Reef Gold Mining Co 
Limited (VIL) and Witwatersrand Consolidated Gold Resources Limited (WGR). 
Table 5.4 shows the BEE deals in the gold sector. 
 
Table 5.4: BEE Deals Concluded in Gold. 












Bokamoso Trust ESOP 1.9 Company level 
 Izingwe Holdings Consortium 0.7 Company Level 
GFIMSA See Figure 6:1 and 6:2 Consortium, ESOP, 
Individual and JVC 
10 South Deep 
Harmony ARMGold but now ARM Company 14 Company level 
 Pamodzi Gold  Company Assets Orkney 
DRD Gold EMO Khumo Gold SPV 
Pty 




Xelekwa Investment Company 21.74 Company 
Central 
Rand Gold 
Puma Gold Investment  Company 26 Exploration and 
Recovery 
Wits Gold Tranter Kismet Invest./ 
Continental African Gold/ 
Wits Golds Women Trust  
Consortium 26 Company 
Gold one Micawber Pty    
Village 
main Reef 
Sun Platinum Holdings/ 
Ncholo Trust 
Consortium 9.1 and 6.69k Company level 
Source: Compiled from Company Annual Reports and other Company Sources.  
 
AngloGold Ashanti Limited (ANG) is the largest gold producer in South Africa. It 
was formed on April 26, 2004, when AngloGold Limited (AngloGold)
69
 and Ashanti 
Gold Fields Limited (Ashanti which controlled gold production in Ghana)
70
 
combined their assets. In South Africa, AngloGold Ashanti‟s operations include 
those that were under AngloGold, but later, added more acquisitions (refer to section 
2.2.2). In August 2005, the DMR granted AngloGold Ashanti new order mining 
rights based on transactions carried out by Anglo Gold between 1998 and 2002. This 
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 AngloGold was formed on 29 June 1998 through the consolidation of Anglo American Corporation 
of South Africa Limited (AAC) and its associated companies into a single global gold company.  
70
 Ashanti owned 100 per cent of Anmercosa Mining (West Africa) Limited (Anmin West Africa) and 
several other mines in Ghana and other countries. By 2010 Anglo-Gold Ashanti had 21 operations 
spread in 10 countries (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Namibia, South Africa, 
Tanzania and the United State) covering various mineral categories. The company has acquired in 
OroAfrica, one of the largest world-class gold manufacturers which is connected to other world class 





was allowed under the continuous consequences principle. Anglo Gold had 
concluded various mining deals before the new mining regulations. These mining 
deals included: the January 1998 sale of No.1 Shaft of the Vaal River Operations to 
ARM Gold Limited (ARM Gold). The contract agreement allowed ARM to benefit 
40 per cent of all revenues, costs and capital expenditure and the rest to AngloGold; 
the 2002 sale of No. 2 shaft -Vaal River Operations to ARM for 10million (£90,000); 
the April 2002 sale of the Free State assets through a joint venture called Freegold 
for R2.523million (£22,000) to the same ARM Gold; the October 2002 disposal of its 
wholly-owned subsidiary- the Stone and Allied Industries- a stone crushing venture 
in Orange Free State to its management and black entrepreneurs for R5million 
(£45,000). The transactions of Orange Free State assets were divided into R1.4 
million (£12,000) equity and R3.6 million (£32,000) in loans. A 10 per cent of the 
assets were transferred to Masakhisane Limited, a black-owned company established 
in terms of Small Scale and Medium Enterprises Development Initiative (AngloGold 
Ashanti 2012). These earlier transactions have effectively limited BEE deals done 
under AngloGold Ashanti when the Mining Charter became official.  
 
Since 2005, AngloGold Ashanti has concluded only two BEE deals. The first was an 
ESOP under the Bokamoso Trust in 2006, involving 30,000 employees, of whom 
91.5 per cent were regarded as HDSA persons. The deal specifications indicated that 
each of the non-managerial employees was allocated 30 free shares and 90 on loan at 
a 10 per cent discount. About 3.8 million shares were issued with a total value of 
R1.8billion, which represented 1.9 per cent of the company‟s share capital in 2006. 
The shares were to be vested equally in each year for five years starting from 2009 
and ending in 2014. This deal involved negotiations between the National Union of 
Mine Workers (NUM), Solidarity and the United Association of South Africa 
(UASA) with AngloGold Ashanti. It should be borne in mind that NUM was vocal at 
the time of policy formulation negotiations, despite that its policy demands were 
much on improving workers‟ conditions of work, safety and housing (NUM 1995). 
At the implementation stage, NUM seems to be less vocal in terms of pushing more 
demands on acquisition of equity. NUM‟s position has come under challenge with 




Union (AMCU), which was at the centre stage of the Marikana strikes that ended up 
in killings in August 2012.  
  
AngloGold Ashanti‟s second deal was with Izingwe Holdings (Pty) Limited, a BEE 
consortium organised and chaired by Sipho Pityana (another ANC member) which 
acquired 1.4 million shares 2006. The two deals amounted to 2.6 per cent equity or 6 
per cent production attributable to the company‟s South African operation. While the 
two deals were different, the management of Izingwe was expected to co-operate 
with the management of the ESOP created under the Bokamoso Trust, the chief 
executive of which became part of the nine people elected to the board of trustees to 
manage the Bokamoso Trust (Anglo Gold Ashanti 2007). Pityana was made a lead 
partner and was invited to the company‟s board. Lead partners are expected to serve 
as points of communication between the complying companies and black-owned 
companies in particular consortium and community partners. In return, lead partners 
are offered a larger amount of shareholding. This has been a norm in BEE deals in 
the mining industry. In the interviews conducted by this study with the executives of 
BEE companies, some executives were not happy to act as lead partners for 
communities.  
 
Gold Fields International Limited (GFI) is the second largest producer of gold in the 
country.
71
 The company is a multinational operating in South Africa and Ghana and 
has multiple listing. It has three subsidiaries in South Africa two of which are 
wholly-owned (100 per cent). These are Gold Field I Mining South Africa 
(GFIMSA), Gold Field Operations Limited (GFO) and the third is Gold Field I Joint 
Venture Holdings (Propriety) Limited (GFIJVH). GFI has three operating gold 
mines; Kloof Driefontein Complex (KDC) situated in West Wits Line Gold Field; 
Beatrix (in Free State gold field) and South Deep (West Rand Gold Field). GFIMSA 
owns 100 per cent of KDC which is its most productive mine and Beatrix Gold 
Mines (Gold Fields 2009, 2010, 2012).  
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 Previously it was known as Consolidated Gold Fields of South Africa Limited (CGFSA), founded 
in 1887 by Cecil Rhodes and Charles Rudd, heavily funded by British capital. At the height of world-
wide economic sanctions, CGFSA Limited minimised its activities in South Africa and was acquired 




Gold Fields‟ journey to be BEE compliant started in 2004 when it concluded a 
mining equity deal at company level with Mvela Gold, which acquired 15 per cent of 
GFIMSA‟s ordinary shares for R4.139billion (£372million). Mvela Gold is part of 
Mvela Resources, a subsidiary of Mvelaphanda Holdings, a BEE company owned by 
ANC stalwart Tokyo Sexwale. Mvela Gold‟s shares were then exchanged for Gold 
Fields‟ shares, and thus gave Mvela Gold a 15 per cent HDSA ownership interest in 
GFIMSA. Since then, Mvela Gold has disposed 1.8million Gold Fields shares, and 
hence reducing its shareholding in Gold Fields to 3 per cent (Gold Fields 2010). This 
was because Mvela Gold could no longer manage to service its debts,
72
 another 
testimony that BEE debts are becoming a major concern. Debts have resulted in 
either liquidation, as in the case of Pamodzi Gold, or being taken over by another 
black-owned company, as in the case of Incwala by Shanduka (discussed under 
Lonmin above).  
 
In 2010, GFIMSA entered into a special BEE deal over South Deep, which was 
50:50, owned by its subsidiaries GFO and GFIJVH. The interview conducted with 
Mr Peter Turner (Executive Vice President, South African region) in the course of 
this study provided insights on why and how the BEE deals were structured. It was 
necessary to share some of these details here in order to understand the complexities 
of ownership structures that have accompanied BEE deals. It further provided a 
glimpse of how white and foreign-owned companies restructure voting rights to 
retain control of their core assets.  
 
Gold Fields‟ ownership structure in South Africa was much simpler before 
concluding its South Deep BEE deal. However, after the deals, Gold Fields‟ 
ownership structure became more complicated. This is indicated in figure 5.4 
showing the structure before the BEE deals, and in figure 5.5, highlighting the status 
after the BEE deals. 
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 According to a Sunday Times report (2 July, 2010) Mvela Resources had a debt of R4billion 
(£363million). It hoped to sell its Gold Fields shares for R5.5billion (£500million) to pay the debt and 
to use the remainder to develop the Booysendal Platinum Project under Northam. However, its sale of 
11 million fetched only R1.86billion (£145million). It was therefore forced to sell its Northam shares 




Figure 5.4: The Structure of Gold Fields Limited before BEE Transactions 
 
Source: GFIMSA Annual Reports 
 
As indicated in the figure 5.4, Gold Fields Limited owned 100 percent of GFMSA 
(its South African subsidiary. GFMSA then owned 100 percent of GFO and 
GFIJVH. However GFMSA‟s structure became more complicated after the deal. In 
the South Deep deal, GFMSA first step was to establish a holding company – under 
GFIJVH named NEWCO to accommodate the BEE companies. GFMSA acquired 
100 per cent of NEWCO‟s A-shares which were equivalent to 90 per cent of the total 
company‟s equity. A-shares carry voting rights. The second step was to organise a 
BEE consortium – Invictus. The consortium has a wide list of other groups including 
Gold Fields Limited 
GFIMSA 100%
GFO 100% GFI JVH 100%







 (53 per cent), Turncard Trading 118 (9 per cent),
74
 
Zungezile Investment Holdings (11 per cent), Gregorian Trading 66 (5 per cent), 
Salmon Rock Investments (9 per cent), South Deep Education Trust (1 per cent) and 
Winter Robin Investments (13 per cent). The new ownership structure is shown in 
figure 5.5. 
 
Figure 5.5: The Structure of Gold Fields Limited (GFIM SA after BEE Transactions 
 
Source GFIMSA Annual Report 2010 
 
Invictus acquired 90 per cent of NEWCO‟s B-shares (which was equivalent to 9 per 
cent) of NEWCOs total equity. B-shares are similar to N-Shares and carry low voting 
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 Rich Cove Investment as the lead partner in the Invictus consortium is entitled to 3 board members 
out of the 4 board members. The other members of the consortium must agree on the fourth board 
member. 
74
 Tunncard Trading is connected to Baleka Mbethe, the chairman of the ANC until 2014, former vice 
president (in 2009) and speaker of the National Assembly (2004 – 2009 and re-elected in May 2014). 
The media in South Africa have taken the shareholding awarded to Mbethe‟s company worthy more 
than R25million (£242,000) as corruption (Mail and Guardian 6 to 12 September 2013, Sunday Times 
17, 31 March 2013).  
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rights. South Deep Education Trust
75
 then acquired 10 per cent of NEWCO‟s B-
shares which made 1 per cent of the total NEWCO shares. Invictus and Southern 
Deep Community shares were donated by GFO and GFIJVH. The transaction finally 
cost R1billion (£72million). This was calculated using latest life of mine plant for 
South Deep at gold price of R300 (£27) and a discount rate of 6 per cent (Gold Fields 
2010:3 - BEE deals). Gold Fields also established an ESOP –the Thusano Share 
Trust to which was allocated 12,578,616 shares. These were equivalent to an 
effective 10.75 per cent indirect interest (with no control) in GFIMSA. From the 
specifications of the deal, an ESOP member will retain his/her benefits after leaving 
employment and the benefits are transferable to his/her nominated or appointed 
beneficiary. Although equity ownership transfer intends to benefit black citizens, in 
particular, HDSAs, the ESOP does not exclude migrant workers. This is because they 
were the backbone of the mining labour force during apartheid. These are 
accommodated under the non-discrimination clause of the Mining Charter (Gold 
Fields Circular to Shareholders 2010.20).  
 
It is important to note some of the justification for the selection of BEE participants 
in the deal and the voting rights conferred. In GFI‟s circular to shareholders, (Gold 
Fields Circular to Shareholders 2010:17) it was stated that:  
 
“The company had regard to the DMR‟s request for broad based empowerment and 
the need to include Historically Disadvantaged Persons from other provinces in 
South Africa and not only Gauteng. The company wanted to identify people who had 
contributed to the successful and peaceful transition to democracy in South Africa 
which transition ultimately rebounded to the benefit of all the company‟s 
stakeholders including shareholders and who had not been beneficiaries of BEE 
deals to date.” 
 
Such statements indicate how white and foreign-owned companies hunt for political 
connectivity when structuring BEE deals (See Khela and Reddy views in section 1.4 
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 According to Gold Fields Circular to shareholders, the trust was established to benefit HDSA 
individuals in: (a) communities forming part of the Westonaria Local Municipality Area, being: 
Bekkersdal, Glenharvie, Hillshaven, Leeudoorn, Libanon, Simunye, Venterspost, Wagterskop, 
Waterpan, Westonaria, Zuurbekom and Thunasang Informal Settlement; (b) communities which do 
not form part of the Westonaria Local Municipality Area but are impacted by South Deep, being: 
Poortje, Jackfontein, Cardoville and farms in the vicinity and, (c) other communities that the trustee 
may identify that substantially meant the criteria used to identify the aforementioned communities 




of this the thesis). It is equally important to note the expected roles of these BEE 
companies that are selected. In the same circular, the company states that:  
 
“The BEE Participants will provide guidance to Gold Fields and assist the company 
in engaging with the stakeholders particularly local, regional and national 
government departments. They will assist the company in its interaction with South 
African mine communities and labour and help the company to roll out its Social and 
Labour Plans which the company has agreed with the DMR. In addition with the roll 
out of the South Deep Education Trust and the South Deep Community Trust to 
ensure that these projects are successful and deliver value to Historically 
Disadvantaged Persons in need of support and empowerment.” (ibid) 
 
From the above, Goldfields expects BEE companies and the lead partners to even 
identify other HDSA persons that need empowerment deals and support them. For 
example, lead partners like Jerome Braums and Paul Helepi, leaders of Rich Cove 
Investment Pityana of Izingwe, are expected to organise other blacks who could 
benefit from BEE deals. The dangers that could arise here are the building up of 
groups of BEE beneficiaries with family or friendship ties.  
 
Invictus and the Community Trust are entitled to immediate full voting rights. The 
dividends are paid in phases spreading over 20 years starting from 30 July 2010. The 
deal also allows Gold Fields to retain full control, as it is entitled to appoint four of 
the five members of the Board. The fifth member automatically comes from Rich 
Cove Investment, as the principal shareholder of Invictus. This is one board member 
against four. One wonders how a single board member representing the BEE 
shareholders can influence the other four. The existence of dual voting rights in line 
with either A or B shares makes it virtually impossible for blacks who are holders of 
B shares to have control of the company. Control is also limited in cases of a 
consortium arrangement that brings together individuals and groups from diverse 
backgrounds, as it makes it difficult to develop a common strategy vis-a- vis the 
white or foreign partner.  
 
Another matter is with regard to how dividends are distributed. It is stated in the deal 
agreement that when the dividends are received, the South Deep Education Trust is 




shareholders. Also important to note is the fact that the B-shares are bound by a 30 
year lock-in date. In that time period, the Invictus consortium will not be permitted to 
dispose of any B-shares without the prior written consent of the A-share 
shareholders.
76
 The consent can be withheld for any reason whatsoever. This puts 
into question the ability of BEE shareholders to get out of debt, as already mooted. 
The agreement further stipulates that: 
 
“--a B-shareholder who wishes to dispose of its B-shares must first offer all its B-
shares and not some to Gold Fields, and only if the offer is not accepted by Gold 
Fields in respect of all its B-shares may the B shareholder dispose of the remaining 
B-shares to a third party at a price not lower and on terms not more favourable than 
the price at and terms on which Gold Fields was entitled to purchase them. No B-
share may be encumbered unless Gold Fields agrees thereto.” (Gold Fields 2010:3 
BEE deals)  
 
Gold Fields‟ demand to have a first option to buy back its shares without allowing 
the transfer of the same to other black shareholders indicates the company‟s intention 
to ensure it gets its assets back, just in case black shareholders fail to redeem their 
shares or decide to get out of BEE deals. If this becomes the norm, it is not hard to 
envisage a situation where the economy moves back to white control, as blacks fail 
to retain their shares.  
 
Harmony is the third largest gold producer in the country and started operating in 
1950 under the same name. Over the years, the company has become a multinational 
company with its operations extending to Australia and Papua New Guinea. 
Harmony‟s significant BEE deal was its merger with ARMgold and Avmin to 
acquire Avgold in August 2003. ARMGold was a subsidiary of Patrice Mosepe‟s 
ARM. It was indicated in section 2.2 of this thesis that Avmin was created from the 
unbundling of Anglovaal. The merger with ARMGold involved 64 million shares 
that were exchanged at the ratio of 2 Harmony shares for every 3 ARMGold shares. 
It should also be borne in mind that once the merger was complete, ARMGold 
disappeared from the scene after its mother company, ARM, had acquired 14 per 
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 The thirty years lock-in period corresponds to the expected life of the mine. This basically means 





cent of Harmony. Harmony had another deal with Pamodzi Gold for the sale of the 
Orkney mines. This deal was signed in September 2006 but materialized in February 
2008 –two years. The two year period is a testimony that a conclusion of a mining 
deal might take time to materialise. Thus most of the five year (2009) or ten year 
period (2014) that white and foreign-owned companies are given to comply would be 
spent in signing deals or paper work.  
 
Later in 2009, Pamodzi became inundated with debts and was liquidated. Harmony 
then bought back its Free State Mines for R405million (£36million) from the 
liquidators (Pretoria News - Business Day 23 February 2010). Pamodzi‟s Orkney and 
East Rand operations were taken over by Aurora Empowerment systems whose 
chairman was Kulubuse Zuma, the nephew of President Jacob Zuma, and the CEO 
Zodwa Mandela, a relative of former President Nelson Mandela (Pretoria News – 
Business Day 19 December 2012; Harmony Gold 2010, 2011, 2012). Here, we see 
how immediate relatives of the ANC stalwarts benefit from BEE deals. This may be 
an indication that BEE deals were and are still the monopoly of the black nationalist 
elites, as no system was created to separate the ruling party from the state.  
 
DRDGold (formed in 1992) has operations in Australia and Papua New Guinea. It 
has two subsidiaries in South Africa, the Ergo Mining Operations Proprietary 
Limited (EMO) and a treatment plant on Eastern Witwatersrand that it fully owns 
(100 per cent) and an exploration company -East Rand Proprietary Mines Limited 
(ERPM), extension 1 and 2 at Central Rand Gold Field. It also has other operations 
such as Brakpan plant, Knights City Deep and Crown Section. Some of these mine 
ventures are involved in treatment of old mining dumps. DRDGold has a BEE 
partner at EMO known as Khumo Gold SPV Pty Ltd. Khumo Gold is part of Khumo 
Bathong Holdings (Pty) Ltd,
77
 an investment owned by the Ncholo family. Khumo 
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 Khumo Bathong started in 1998 as Skyprops but changed to its current name. The phrase “khumo 
bathong” means “wealth to the people” in Setswana. It is owned by Dr Paseka Ncholo, previously a 
senior lecturer at the University of Western Cape Law Faculty and was also involved in pre-
democratic election negotiations. He later became an advisor to the Minister for Public Services and 
Administration. His other partners are his family members including Advocates Palesa Sedibe Ncholo 





Gold was offered 4 794 889 shares (worthy R68million or £5.9million) which made 
20 per cent shareholding. DRDGold also has an ESOP scheme (DRDSA 
Empowerment Trust) which owns 6 per cent equity (DRDGold 2010, 2011, 2012). 
 
Central Rand Gold (from Netherland -Antilles NV), owns 74 per cent of its South 
African subsidiary - Central Rand Gold South Africa (Pty) Ltd. Central Rand Gold 
received its new order mining licences and new order prospecting rights (7) for its 
Main Reef areas. It has been acquiring more mine assets from other companies 
operating in the area, turning some of them into successful ventures. From its annual 
company report, Central Rand Gold produced 4,777 ounces of gold in 2011 and 
8,246 in the first 6 months of 2012. Central Rand Gold‟s BEE partner, Puma Gold 
Investments, owns the remainder 26 per cent (Central Rand Gold 2010, 2011, 2012). 
 
Wits Gold, established in 2003, has received 14 New Order Prospecting Rights. It 
offered a total of 26 per cent shares to its BEE partners: -the Tranter Kismet 
Investments, Continental Africa Gold Resources and Wits Golds Women Trust (Wits 
Gold 2011, 2012). Simmer & Jack has Xelekwa Investment Holdings as its BEE 
partner with 21.74 per cent shareholding. Gold One International has Micawber 400 
Pty Ltd as its BEE partner (Gold One International 2011). The village Main Reef 
Gold Mining is controlled by Umbono Financial Services that has 46.5 per cent 
shareholding and its BEE partners are Sun Platinum Holdings that has 9.1 per cent 
shares and Ncholo Trust (owned by Ncholo family) with 6.69 per cent shares 
(Village Main Reef 2011, 2012). 
 
5.4.4 BEE Deals in Coal 
It should be recalled that Anglo American Plc has extensive assets in the PGM, Gold, 
and Diamond sectors. It has also a strong presence in coal, as shown in Table 5.5. 
Most of the BEE transactions in the coal sector have been concluded mainly by 
Anglo American Plc and BHP Billiton through their subsidiary companies that were 
created after the unbundling process. The BEE mining deals concluded by Anglo 





Table 5.5: BEE Deals Concluded in Coal 












Check diagram 6:3     
BHP Billiton 
SA 
Eyesizwe Company 100 Malta mine 
 Kuyasa Mining Company 100 Ikhwezi, Delmas 
 Optimum Coal Consortium 100 Optimum Colliery 
 Riversdale Mining/ 
Siyanda Resources/Aka 
Resources 
Consortium/ESOP 51 Koornfontein 
Xstrata Coal ARM Coal Company 20.2 Boschmans/Witcon
s-sold mine 
 ARM Coal Company 26 GGV Large Pit 
Sasol Eyesizwe Coal Company 100 Glisa Colliery 
Coal of Africa Unidentified  26 Vele projects 
Source: Compiled from Company Annual Reports and other Company Sources.  
 
Figure 5.6: Anglo American Plc. and its BEE Deals in Coal 
  
Source: Created from Anglo American Coal Shareholding Structure 2011. 
 
As indicated in figure 5.6, Anglo America Plc. has two subsidiaries in coal, Anglo 
Coal and Anglo Inyosi. Anglo Coal is 100 per cent owned by Anglo American Plc. It 
has several coal mines in South Africa.
78
 What Anglo American did in the PGM 
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Anglo Coal alone has 11 collieries, including Bank, Goedehoop, Greensude, Isibonelo, Landau, 
Mafube, and Kleinkopje collieries in the Witbank area, Kriel, New Denmark Colliery in the Highveld 
area New Vaal Colliery in Sasolburg, Vereeniging area and MacWest project which is an extension of 




sector, was replicated in the coal sector. Anglo American first created separate 
companies that hosted its BEE deals. These are Eyesizwe Coal, Exxaro Resources 
and Anglo Inyosi. In 1999, Anglo American Plc. and BHP Billiton created a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV) known as NewCoal. This was used to place Anglo American 
acquisitions from Gold Fields and some of its own assets that it wanted to dispose, as 
well as the assets that BHP Billiton wanted to dispose. The main assets that were 
placed under NewCoal were Matla joint venture and Matla colliery, Gilsa colliery, 
New Clydesdale colliery, Arnot colliery and other reserves owned by Gold Fields 
Coal (ANC 2012:124-125). Under its CEO, Sipho Nkosi, Eyesizwe coal
79
 was 
chosen among three companies short-listed from 55 bidders. In 2001, New Coal 
assets were sold to Eyesizwe. This followed a maze of transactions. Eyesizwe 
Mining acquired 66 per cent of NewCoal with Anglo American Plc. having 11 per 
cent and Ingwe Coal (a BHP Billiton subsidiary) 9 per cent and 4 per cent went to 
Price Water House Coopers. Eyesizwe then listed on the JSE in 2001 (Anglo 
American Plc: 2002). 
 
The second transaction was done in 2005 when Anglo American Plc created a 
holding company known as Main Street 333 (Pty). Eyesizwe SPV acquired 54 per 
cent of the holding company, IDC (15.3 per cent), TISO SPV (9.7 per cent), 
Eyabantu (9.7 per cent) and BEE Women SPV (11.2 per cent). The holding company 
was used to acquire 53.1 per cent shares of Exxaro Resources Ltd. Exxaro was 
created by Anglo American Plc.to acquire the Kumba non-iron ore assets that had 
been unbundled from Iscor. Anglo American Plc. retained 23.7 per cent in Exxaro 
and the other shares went to minorities (20.2 per cent) and to Exxaro Employees – 
ESOP (3 per cent) (Fauconnier and Mathur 2008). Exxaro‟s coal division has two 
subsidiaries Exxaro Coal (Pty) Ltd and Exxaro Coal Mpumalanga
80
 (Exxaro: 2010, 
2011, and 2012), as already stated. 
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 Eyesizwe Coal is part of Eyesizwe Holdings a consortium established in 1999 by Sipho Nkosi. 
Other members include Vicent Mtambo, Kholu Motsoene, Daphne Mashile-Nkosi and Mxolisi 
Ncqobo. 
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 Exxaro Coal (Pty) Ltd operates the Grootlegeluke Mine, Tshikondeni Mine, Mafube Coal JV, 
Inyanda Mine and Exxaro reductants around Thohoyandou in Limpopo Province. Exxaro Coal 
Mpumalanga operates the original Eyesizwe Coal Mines -Matla mine, New Clydesdale mine, Arnot 






Anglo America‟s third major BEE transaction involved the creation of Anglo Inyosi 
which pooled together some of Anglo Coal‟s mines and projects (including Kriel 
colliery, Elders, Zondergasfontein, New Largo, Phola Coal Plant and Heiderberg 
projects). Anglo Inyosi was also used to house a consortium of BEE partners owning 
27 per cent shares. Members of this consortium are the Lithemba Consortium with 
33 per cent shareholding, Pamodzi Coal also with 33 per cent shareholding and 
Women Development Bank Holdings (WDBH) with 19 per cent shareholding and a 
Community Trust. It is noted here that the BEE consortiums that took shares from 
Anglo Inyosi are themselves made up of a series of other consortiums. For example, 
the Lithemba consortium is composed of Lithemba Amalahle Mining (40 per cent), 
Initiative South Africa Resources- a women‟s group (16 per cent), two individuals 
acting as lead partners- Sibongile Modise and Yoliswa Balfour (15 per cent), other 
Business Associations (11 per cent), WOESA which is a women group (5 per cent), 
Mining Partners (8 per cent) and Girl Guides (5 per cent). Pamodzi Coal is owned by 
Pamodzi Investment Holdings (51 per cent), Impala Coal (13 per cent), Broad Based 
Groupings (13 per cent), Pamodzi Coal staff (9 per cent), Mzana Women Investment 
Club that includes the Soweto Business Executive Council and the Takalani Home 
for Mentally Disabled (9 per cent) and Rorisang (2.5 per cent). Others with 
unspecified shareholding include Imbambi Coal and Leeuw Mining (Anglo Inyosi 
2010, 2011). Here we see broad beneficiaries featuring in Anglo‟s BEE transactions 
to include: women, disabled, youth, and communities. This is an indication that 
complying companies pay a special attention in the BEE policy demand of their 
transactions to be broad-based.  
 
Another large producer of coal is BHP Billiton Limited with headquarters both in 
Australia and in UK.
81
 In South Africa‟s coal sector, BHP Billiton Limited is 
represented by its subsidiary, BHP Billiton Energy South Africa (Becsa). Before 
January 2007, Becsa was known as Ingwe Colliery Ltd. Becsa operates four coal 
mines in the Witbank coal fields; Middleburg Coalfields in which Xstrata Plc. has 16 
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 The company has diversified mineral interests including: aluminium, copper, energy coal, iron ore, 
manganese, metallurgical coal, nickel, uranium, oil and gas. The directors from the two offices run a 




per cent, Khutala Mine, Klipspruit Colliery, and Wolverkrans Colliery. Becsa has 
four wholly-owned processing plants located near Middleburgh and Witbank. Becsa 
used to operate the Douglas mine but its mine reserves were merged with the 
Middleburgh mine and operations rationalised under Douglass--Middelburg 
Optimisation (DMO) Project
82
 (BHP Billiton 2010, 2011, 2012). 
 
In its effort to be BEE compliant, Becsa first sold Ikhwezi mine to Kuyasa mining, 
which is a black-owned company, in 1995, before the B-BBEE policy became 
effective. Later in 2002 it sold to the same group Delmas mine. It was indicated 
above that in 1999, in cooperation with Anglo American Plc, BHP Billiton 
established Eyesizwe and NewCoal. The two companies were used to transfer equity 
ownership to blacks. In 2005, Becsa sold 26 per cent equity in its Zululand 
Anthracite Colliery to Riversdale Mining Limited. In 2007, Becsa sold 51 per cent 
equity in Koornfontein to Siyanda Resources and Aka Resources, both black-owned. 
Again in 2008 Becsa sold its wholly-owned Optimum collieries to Optimum Coal 
Holdings, a group of BEE companies and other non-BEE shareholders. The BEE 
group includes Monkge Coal Investments (5.28 per cent), Micsan Investments (7.55 
per cent), Mobu Resources (2.26 per cent), Kwini Mining Investments (10.33 per 
cent), Employee Trust (9.93 per cent), Community Trust (9.93 per cent) and Warrior 
Coal (15.9 per cent) which, together, owned 61 per cent. The non-BEE shareholders 
are AMCI (11.91 per cent), Mercuria Energy (4.51 per cent). Mercuria Energy owns 
48 per cent shares of Kwini Investment. There is also 17.54 per cent offered to the 
public and 4.07 per cent to individuals (Optimum Coal 2010). In the same year 
(2008) Becsa continued to sell and disposed-off its Koornfontein Mines (19.2 per 
cent), Sentula Mining (49.99 per cent) and Inkwali Resources (4 per cent). All these 
were bought by Optimum Coal in 2010; the Koornfontein Employee Trust and 
Optimum Employee Benefit Trust who were Becsa‟s BEE partners became part of 
Optimum Coal. Optimum Coal then registered on the JSE (Optimum Coal 2010).
 83.
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The problem that occurred while collecting data about Becsa is the way it refers to its assets, it lists a 
number of its potential coal mines as „projects‟ when they are actually operating mines and its 
exploration projects and deposits at an earlier stage as „miscellaneous‟. 
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 Optimum Coal has been taken over by Xstrata Glencore (through its subsidiary Purito BV and Cyril 





Another main company involved in coal is Xstrata Plc.,
84
 a company that emerged 
from the unbundling process and previously was known as Sudelektra Holdings. 
Xstrata is not listed on the JSE but in other listings abroad. In the South Africa‟s coal 
industry, Xstrata Plc operates through its - subsidiary Xstrata Coal South Africa 
(Xstrata Coal), and which has become a major coal producer. Xstrata Coal South 
Africa has several collieries around Witbank and iMpunzi.
85
 Xstrata Coal‟s main 
BEE partner is ARM Coal. Xstrata Coal‟s deals with ARM were concluded both at 
the company and at mine levels. At company level, Xstrata transferred 20 per cent of 
equity to ARM and at the mine level; ARM Coal was offered a 26 per cent at GGV 
Large pit (part of Goedgevonden) 20.2 per cent at Boschmans and another 20.2 per 
cent at Witcons done in August 2009 (Xstrata 2010).  
 
Sasol Mining (Pty) Ltd is another important company in the coal sector. The 
company is not part of the JSE. Sasol Mining‟s importance in the mining industry is 
as a producer and one of the main domestic buyers of coal. It is a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Sasol Limited, is a major petrochemical company.
86
 Sasol Limited 
produces about a fifth of the country‟s coal output and fully owns most of its 
collieries concentrated around Secunda.
87
 Almost the entire production from Sasol 
Mining is used by its parent company for coal fuel production and buys extra coal 
from other producers to meet its needs. Its procurement policy has been a big boost 
for domestic coal producers, including some of the BEE companies. Sasol Mining‟s 
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 This is an Anglo-Swiss Mining company founded in 1926, based in Zurich and London. Until 2002 
it was known as Sudelektra. It has interests in 20 countries and is involved in alloys, coal, copper, 
nickel, zinc, and in technical expertise. World-wide it controls the export of thermal coal which is 
used to produce electricity. Xstrata merged with Glencore in December 2012 to form Glencore Xstrata 
which was listed on the JSE in November 2013 (Sunday Times 22 December 2013).  
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 Xstrata Coal collieries are Goedegevonden (which include GGV Large pits and Goedegevonden 
surface operation); Tweefontein North (TWF large pits, 1-Seam and 2-Seam, Boschmans, Boschmans 
Dump 1, Witcons and Central Plant); Tweefonten South (South Witbank); iMpunzi Division (iMpunzi 
East, iMpunzi South, iMpunzi North and iMpunzi Mini pits) and ATC (ATC dump1, 2, ATCOM 1 
ATCOM and ATC and other projects (Zonnebloem project) (DME2009a, DMR 2010d).  
86
 Its major shareholders include Government Employee Pension Fund (13.1 per cent) and IDC (8.3). 
Other shareholders include a number of fund managers: PIC Equities (9.9), Allan Gray Investment 
Council (8.3), Coronation Fund Managers (4.3), Investec Asset Management (4.1), Old Mutual Asset 
Managers (2.6), Black Rock Incorporated (2.6), The Vanguard Group Incorporated (2.4) and Sanlam 
Investment Management (2.3) (Sasol 2010). 
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 Around Secunda it has Sigma mine Bosjesspruit, Brandspruit, Middelbult, Twistdraai, Syferfontein 
and Twistdraai colliery in Highveld coalfield, Thubelisha and Impumelelo. Others include plants -




BEE compliance involves the deal concluded at Glisa colliery with Eyesizwe Coal (a 
BEE company). In 2008, Sasol Mining was involved in the Inzalo shareholding 
scheme in which shares were sold to HDSAs. To attract HDSAs the company had to 
advertise wildly and shares were transacted countrywide through the South African 
Post Offices (Sasol 2010, 2011, 2012).  
 
As in other mineral categories, foreign companies are having extensive exploration 
and mining ventures in the coal sector. These are companies that have entered in the 
country after the end of economic sanctions against South Africa‟s apartheid regime. 
Most have complied with the Mining Charter by offering 26 per cent to HDSA 
companies upon obtaining their licenses. These include Coal of Africa, Total Coal 
International (Paris), Anker Holdings B.V (from Netherlands), Sudor Coal, Total 
Energy Service (Hong Kong) and Kangra coal. Coal of Africa retained 100 per cent 
ownership of its Mooiplaats coal project situated in the Ermelo coalfields but offered 
26 per cent at Vele coking coal project located in the Limpopo Province retaining 74 
per cent. Total Coal has a 50:50 partnership with Mmakau Mining, a company 
associated with Bridgette Radebe (the wife of Jeff Radebe, the Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development and a sister to Patrice Motsepe who owns ARM). 
Kangra Coal offered 30 per cent shareholding to Shanduka Resources a company 
associated to Cyril Ramaphosa (DMR2010d).  
 
It should be noted here that the coal industry has attracted more black-owned 
companies and mostly of micro and small scales than any other category in the 
mining industry. These use simple technologies, operate independently (do not have 
white or foreign partners), and are not listed on the JSE. Being not on the JSE 
exacerbates the problems of estimating mineral assets which are under the ownership 
and control of blacks, as indicated earlier. Based on data compiled by the 
DME/DMR, BEE companies operating in coal have grown from 2 in 2002 to 33 in 








Table 5.6: Some Black-owned Companies Operating in Coal 
Black-owned Company Controlled Collieries 
Kuyasa Mine Ikwezi, Delmas Coal- 
Leew Mining and Exploration Leew Vaalkrantz 
Mashala Resources Wesselton and Geluk Mines, Ermelo, Msukaligwa 
Northern Coal Mimosa mine Polmaise Colliery-Witbank 
Riversdale Holdings Zululand Anttracite at Nongoma 
Sumo Coal Kpermyn Colliery 
Sacmh Pty Ilanga and Umlabu Colliery 
Slater Coal  Oaviemore and Mgdalena 
Shanduka Coal  Graspan and Side Minera, Rietfontein Mine 
Siyanda Resources Koofontein mines and Gloria section 
Stuart Coal  Weltevreden–Delmas 
Source: Compiled from the DMR List of BEE Companies  
 
Some of the factors that have facilitated the increased entry of black-owned 
companies in the industry include high domestic demand for coal. The domestic 
users of coal include: Eskom (over 40 per cent) to power electricity plants, Sasol (20 
per cent) for producing petrol-chemicals, general industries (8 per cent); 
metallurgical activities (4 per cent) and merchants (4 per cent) (DME: 2009a). 
Another factor is the technology used in coal mining. Most coal mining is carried out 
from open cast mines (53 per cent), bore-and- pillar (40 per cent), stopping (4 per 
cent) and long-wall mining (3 per cent). It is the open cast mining that has attracted 
many BEE companies, because of the simple technology used. Moreover, coal export 
trade is a very lucrative business; for example in 2007, the 182.8mt sold domestically 
fetched R19.7billion (£1.4billion) while the 67,7mt exported fetched R24.4billion 
(£1.7billion).  
 
Although few black-owned companies have managed to enter the export market, 
according to the DMR (2009a), one major concern of the BEE coal producers has 
been the entry into the export market. The Richards Bay Coal Terminal (RBCT) 
created in 1973 to facilitate coal export is still controlled by the main white and 
foreign-owned companies. In 2007 BHP controlled 37 per cent of RBCT, Anglo 
Coal 27 per cent, Xstrata 29 per cent and Kangra Coal 2 per cent. Total Coal and 
Sasol later joined the group. These are the companies that also control the washing 
facilities and other logistic services necessary for coal exportation. As late comers, 




in partnership with the old RBCT owners. Eyesizwe and Exxaro Coal, for example, 
automatically benefited from coal export.  
The DME/DMR has been instrumental in helping the BEE companies brake into the 
export market. In August 2002, the DME/DMR called for a coal export forum to 
negotiate an export quarter for the BEE companies. Immediately, a Coal Industry 
Task Team was created that resulted in an initial offer of 1mn tonnes to BEE 
exporters. Through further negotiations, the quarter increased to 4mt in 2006/2007. 
Despite all these changes, the coal export trade is still controlled by the main miners, 
while a chain of small producers compete for the offered allocation (DME 2007c). 
Apart from these efforts, blacks entering in coal experience problems in getting 
access to export coal market as their doing so depends much on facilities that are 
owned by white and foreign-owned companies. This came out in interviews 
conducted by this study with directors of mining companies.  
 
5.4.5 BEE Deals in other Mineral Commodities  
There are a large number of minerals under this category, most of which are involved 
in dimension stones, colliery and other semi- processed mineral activities. Micro and 
small scale companies are not bound by the BEE policy. The study attempted to limit 
itself to ferrous and non- ferrous minerals
88
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 Ferrous minerals include: chrome, iron ore, vanadium, ferro- alloys, manganese and silicon/ferro 
silico and Non-ferrous minerals include Aluminium, Alumino-Silicate minerals, Antimony Cobalt, 
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As in the other mineral categories, Anglo American Plc. dominates here. It operates 
through a number of subsidiaries. In iron ore, its subsidiary is Kumba which operates 
the Thabazimbi and the Sishen Iron Ore mines.
89
 Its BEE partner here is Exxaro, 
which has already been discussed in section 5.4.4. Exxaro owns 26 per cent shares in 
the two mines (Kumba Iron Ore 2011, 2012). Anglo American Plc. and BHP 
Billiton, also jointly owned Samancor, which later split into two: Samancor Chrome 
and Samancor Manganese. Samancor Chrome was in 2005 sold to Kermas South 
Africa but in 2006, Kermas sold 32.4 per cent to International Mineral Resources 
(IMR), a company which later completely bought out Kermas in 2009.
90
 Its BEE 
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 Note that Sishen iron ore fields had become a point of contention after Mittal failed to renew its old 
order rights over the fields. The DME awarded the rights to a BEE company-Imperial Crown Trading 
289 controlled by President Zuma‟s friends (the Gupta Family) and relatives. Kumba Iron Ore then 
challenged this in court. Kumba won the case against the DME after a series of appeals (Pretoria 
News – Business Day 21 August 2010). 
90
 Samancor Chrome owns Western chrome which operates Millsell, Elandsdrift and four sections of 
Elandskraal situated in Waterval and Mooinooi. Some of the Elandskraal sections are closed Its other 




partner is Batho Barena consortium with 28 per cent shares. The shares were bought 
at a company level. Batho Barena consortium is led by Enlobo Holdings (14 per 
cent), Samancor Workers Trust (5.6 per cent), Sibilo Investments Local 
Communities (4.2 per cent) and Nanka Investments -a women group (4.2 per cent) 
(ANC 2012 156). Samancor Manganese has a wide range of ventures that include 
mining extraction and processing plants.
91
 In 2010, Samancor Manganese sold 26 per 
cent to a black consortium composed of Ntsimbintle (9 per cent), NCAB (7 per cent), 
IZIKO (5 per cent) and the HMM Education Trust (5 per cent). However, 
Ntsimbintle is also a consortium made up of Safika Resources, Nkonjane, the 
Kgalagadi Development trust, the Natural Resource Agreement Fund, the Retrenched 
Workers Association, the Northern Cape business men and women groups. The 
women groups include Wiphold, Northen Cape Women in Mining and Hotazel 
Women Association.  
 
Anglo American Plc. owned 74 per cent of Black Mountain Mine with Exxaro as its 
main BEE partner. Later, Anglo American Plc sold the mine to Vedata Resources,
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but Exxaro was retained as the BEE partner under Vedata. The Black Mountain mine 
produces lead and zinc. Anglo American with Rio Tinto also owns the Palabora 
Mining Company (PMC) which produces copper, iron ore, phosphate rock and 
sulphur (major ingredients in making fertilizer). To accommodate BEE partners, 
Anglo American and Rio Tinto in cooperation created Palabora Copper as a 
subsidiary of Palabora Mining Company (PMC). They used Palabora Copper to 
transfer 26 per cent shareholding to BEE partners. These include: A Community 
Trust incorporating the Makushane, Selwane, Maseke, Mashishimale and Majeje 
tribes, which together acquired 10 per cent shares; the Palabora Copper Employee 
Trust which acquired another 10 per cent and; The Negota Consortium (chaired by 
                                                                                                                                          
closed), Montrose section - Mpumalanga (sold to Madwika Mining). Other producing areas include 
Tweefontein sections, Lannex Section (1and 2) in Grootboom farms.  
91
It owns Wessels, Mamatwan and Gemco Mines, Its alloy plants include – Metal Alloys Temco, 
Elgen, Metrec and Manganese Metal Company. It produces ferro alloys through Batchlako 
Ferrochrome that operates Palmiet Ferrochrome in Krugersdorp (mothballed), Ferro Metals, 
Poschrome JV, and Chrometals JV in Burgersdoorp - Middleburg, Tubatse Ferrochrome at Steelpoort, 
Metalloys Advelly Pty JV at Meyerton and Manganese Metal Company with operations in 
Krugersdorp and Nelspruit.  
92
 Vedata Resources Plc. is listed on the London Stock Exchange and its portfolio included copper, 




George Negota, a former director of Palabora Mining) owns the remaining 6 per cent 
shares. Again, here we see another example of a broad based deal that includes 
groups of tribes (Palabora Mining Company 2010). 
 
Xstrata is a main producer of ferrochrome. Xstrata owns two furnaces located in 
Rustenburg. Its main BEE partner is Merafe Resources with a 20.5 per cent 
shareholding. This partnership involves a Pooling and Sharing Venture (PSV).
93
 
Merafe is owned by Royal Bafokeng (31 per cent shareholding), IDC (23 per cent), 
Allan Gray (14 per cent) with other minorities (23 per cent). Xstrata‟s second BEE 
partner is the Bakwena ba Mogopa, another community shareholder which has 26 per 
cent. The third is Idwala Magnetite, a subsidiary of Idwala Industrial holdings 
controlled by Tiso Group (Xstrata 2010).  
 
Assore is another company that is engaged in the production of manganese, chrome 
and other related minerals. Assore‟s shareholders include Dresteel Investment who 
holds 52.43 per cent and minorities have 21.50 shareholding. The remaining shares 
were acquired by its two BEE, partners Bokamoso Trust and Shanduka Resources, in 
a rather complex maze of shareholding. Assore and its BEE partner each created 
main street companies. Assore created two; Main Street 350 and Main Street 460. 
Assore fully owns Main Street 460 but used Main Street 350 to conclude BEE deals. 
Assore offered its BEE partner, the Bokomoso Trust, 51 per cent, leaving Assore 
with 49 per cent. Likewise, Shanduka Resources created Main Street 343 that it fully 
owns. It used this to acquire 11.79 per cent in Assore. An indication of how black-
owned companies like Shanduka try to catch up with strategies used by the 
incumbent companies. At its Cato Ridge Alloys JV, Assore partnered with 
Mizishuma Ferro-alloy Company and Sumitomo Corporation, all from Japan. The 
company‟s main BEE partner is ARM in a 50:50 joint venture in a company they 
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 In a PSV a group of mine owners would pool together their mineral- ores at one smelter to exploit 
plant capacity. Merafe was initially entitled to 11per cent of EBITDA. In 2005 this increased to 17% 
in 2005 and to 20.5 per cent in July 2006. Xstrata Western operations use Rustenburg smelters, 
Wonderkop smelters and the Boshoek smelters. These source their ores from the PSV‟s mines that 
include Krondaal, Waterval, Wonderkop, Boshoek and Horizon. The Lydenburg smelter and Project 
lion smelter located in Steelpoort source their PSV‟s ore from the Thorncliffe and Helena mines 




created called Assmang. Assmang is engaged in the production of manganese. 
Assore also produces chrome through Dzarsriver Chrome and Machachadorp Works, 
iron ore through Cato Ridge Works and alloys through Cato Ridge Alloys JV 
(Assore 2010).  
 
BHP Billiton Plc. is involved in several ventures in this mineral category. It is the 
main producer of aluminium through its subsidiary - the BHP Billiton Aluminium 
South Africa Ltd. Its main producers are Hillside Aluminium and Bayside 
Aluminium and the Zimco Group Pty Ltd which controls the Zimco Aluminium 
Company Pty Ltd based in Germiston.
94
 BHP Billiton Plc. and Rio Tinto Plc. jointly 
own Richards Bay Minerals (RBM) that produces Titanium and Zircon.
95
 The RBM 
operations are undertaken by two companies: Tinsand Pty Ltd Mine which 
undertakes the dune mining and mineral separation operations and Richards Bay Iron 
and Titanium Pty Ltd that undertakes the smelting and beneficiation process. RBM‟s 
BEE partners fall into two groups: The first is a community trust that incorporates 
the Sokhulu, Mbonambi, Mkwanazi and Dube communities. The second group is the 
Blue Horizon Investments, a consortium composed of seven investor groups. In total, 
the two groups were offered 26 per cent shares in Richards Bay Minerals (Richards 
Bay Minerals 2011, 2012).  
 
Mineral sands mining has attracted new investors, among these are Mineral 
Resources Commodities and Southern Mining Corporation. The Mineral Resources 
Commodities is an Australian listed company and operates in South Africa through 
Trans-World Energy and Mineral Resources (TEM). TEM‟s BEE partner is the 
Xolobeni Empowerment Company (Xolco). Southern Mining Corporation acquired 
mining rights in the Bothaville heavy mineral occurrence. Its major partners are 
communities around the area.  
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 Aluminium processing is not covered by the mining charter as it involves manufacturing processes. 
There are many secondary producers and semi manufacturers of other semi-processed minerals of 
alumino – silicate, andalusite, cyanided and sillimanite. Some of these minerals are used in refractory 
activities (mainly steel production).  
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 Zircon is used in refractories as foundry sand moulds. It is also used as a corrosion resistant metal in 
nuclear reactors and chemical processing equipment, glazes in pottery, ceramics and TV glass. Until 
2006 zircon beneficiation did not take place in South Africa at all. Geratech then developed the 




5.5 Black-Enterprises and Black-Empowered Companies 
From the analyses of compliance by individual companies presented above and based 
on the 72 companies in the sample, it is possible to answer the second objective of 
the thesis; that‟s, to establish the extent to which mining companies have qualified to 
be re-classified into black enterprises (50+1 vote), black-empowered enterprises 




Out of the 72 companies in the sample, there are 21 companies (29 per cent) that are 
black enterprises (with 50+1 vote), 10 of which are BEE empowered companies 
(25+1 vote) (see appendix10.7). Those with 50+1 vote include African Rainbow 
Minerals and Exxaro Resources. The two are most diversified and control over 72.5 
per cent of blacks assets on the JSE. Others include Royal Bafokeng Platinum, 
Merafe Resources and South African Coal Holdings. These according to Berle and 
Means (1932) are companies with majority shareholding and are expected to exert 
control in their companies. They are also expected to have high black representation 
on the boards and senior management. This collaborated by the findings of Chapter 
Six of this thesis which explored black representation in the board of directors of 
mining companies.  
 
Foreign-owned companies dominate the mining industry. While these include the old 
and well known ones such as Anglo American and BHP Billiton, they also include 
numerous completely new ones which operate through their subsidiaries. Upon 
obtaining their licenses, most foreign-owned companies transferred 26 per cent 
shareholding to blacks. Some of the black-owned companies that have become 
shareholders in foreign-owned companies include Savanna Consortium, Imbani 
Platinum, Sedibeng Mining, ReTeng Diamond, Senaka Diamonds, Puma Gold 
Investments, and Palabora Copper. Berle and Means regards as minority 
shareholders. With the 26 per cent shareholding by black-owned companies, it is 
expected that there would be some form of black representation on the board of the 
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 It is cautioned here that the control structure might have changed, this is scenario therefore 




foreign-owned companies relative to the size of the BEE shareholding. This has not 
been the case, as shown in Chapter Six. 
 
It was also the demand of the Mining Charter and the B-BBEE Act that beneficiaries 
should be of a broad-based nature. This means that, through ESOPs), women, 
communities where mining takes place, the youth in the country in general and the 
disabled should benefit. ESOPS have benefited from the industry. Lonmin, Petras, 
Anglo-Gold Ashanti, Samancor Manganese and Optimum Coal all have concluded 
deals with ESOPS. With regard to women enterprises, the Mining Score Card called 
for 10 per cent participation by women in the mining industry. From the analysis of 
compliance at individual mining companies, there are few women groups and 
individuals who have joined the mining industry. Many are part of consortiums 
which have benefited from shares offered by white and foreign-owned companies. 
For example: Bridgette Radebe (the wife of Jeff Radebe, the Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development) heads Mmakau Mining; Baleka Mbete (Speaker of the 
National Assembly) is part of Turncard Trading consortium; Sibongile Modise (wife 
of former Minister of Defence) and Yoliswa Balfour (wife of former Minister of 
Sports and Culture) are lead partners in Lithemba consortium. One need to note here 
the political connections of the women beneficiaries identified above. This represents 
an example of cronyism in the BEE deals. Women groups form part of BEE 
consortiums. Other women groups include: The Women Development Bank 
Holdings (WDBH), South African Women in Mining Association (SAWIMA) and 
„Initiative South African Women in Resources‟. There are also a series of women 
trusts that have become beneficiaries. For example, Ponahalo Holdings created a 
women Trust to which was allocated 17.5 per cent equity and there is a Wits Gold 
Women Trust.  
 
The analysis above has revealed that communities (through their trusts) have in 
general become some of the main features of BEE deals in the industry. The most 
prominent one is the Royal Bafokeng Nation which controls three JSE registered 
companies: Royal Bafokeng Platinum, Merafe Resources and South African Coal 




that had 27 per cent of Wesizwe platinum before it sold out shares to the Jinchuan 
Company and Bakgatla Ba Kgafela. There are also a number of broad based groups 
that form part of consortiums that have bought shares in the mining companies. Their 
shares range between one and ten per cent. These are dependent on lead partners who 
join the board of the white and foreign-owned companies. From the data presented 
above, this research could not establish significant number of youth and disabled 
groups benefitting from BEE. Lastly, N shares, or shares with low or no voting 
rights, have also been used in BEE deals. The deal between Gold Fields Limited with 
its BEE partners, Invictus, in South Deep, has been shown above.  
 
White and foreign-owned companies have taken BEE partners at different levels but 
most are at main company level, and others are at operational (mine level) and 
project level as can be seen from the various tables in this chapter. Being at company 
level, blacks are expected to benefit from attaining control. This is not happening 
much as we see in Chapter Six that black representation in white and foreign-owned 
companies is low. The discussion above has also shown that there are white and 
foreign-owned companies have a choice on where to transfer equity ownership to 
blacks. They leave to themselves the most lucrative mines where they operate 
without BEE partners. This is the case with Anglo Platinum that, apart from having 
many BEE partners, still operates its most profitable platinum mines with no BEE 
partners. Anglo Coal operates its whole-owned coal mines, leaving its subsidiary 
Anglo- Inyosi to deal with BEE partners. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
To conclude, from the above study findings is that, in principle, white and foreign-
owned companies have complied with the MPRDA and Mining Charter in terms of 
selling shares to blacks and making them business partners. The numbers of BEE 
deals and participants have grown considerably, in contrast to Gqubule‟s (2006) 
criticism that the majority of blacks have become spectators who celebrate the 





Using market capitalisation of JSE listed companies (2011), estimates of equity 
shareholding transferred to blacks done by this study show that the compliance levels 
have remained low at 7.4 per cent (of R1.8trillion or £160billion) of the JSE. This is 
in line with the findings by the DMR (2009c) that put compliance at 9 per cent of 
R2trillion (£181billion) and KIO (2010) at 5.27 of R1.8trillion (£160billion). There 
has also been a growth of mining assets from R760billion (£69billion) envisaged at 
the time of signing the Mining Charter to R2trillion (£181billion). This study has 
explained limitations of using JSE data to estimate equity transferred to blacks, (see 
Chapter Four). To deal with the limitations, the study has explored mining deals 
concluded in all mineral categories by individual companies. The investigation 
revealed over 100 mining companies which include white and foreign-owned 
companies and black-owned companies and shareholder of different kinds. These 
include community shareholders, consortiums and ESOPs who are involved in BEE 
deals. The largest numbers of BEE deals across all mining categories, however, have 
been concluded by two companies: Anglo American and BHP Billiton. It is the same 
two companies that were driving the unbundling process. It seems the unbundling 
has strengthened their mineral assets.  
 
White and foreign-owned companies had the freedom to choose which mining 
ventures to keep for themselves (100 per cent owned) and which to sell to blacks. 
This enabled the foreign-owned companies to retain the most lucrative mining assets 
for themselves. From the interviews conducted for this study with executives of 
black-owned companies, among the complaints were that white and foreign owned 
companies sold to them marginal mines (which were coming to the end of their 
operations) or projects that were difficult to operate because of lack of 
infrastructures. This has grossly affected their ability to make profits from their 
newly acquired assets. Many white and foreign-owned companies opted to conclude 
deals at mine level; this may limit their influence in the decisions made by the main 
companies.  
 
Black partners cannot easily meet their financial obligations and are forced to sell 




out of debt and raise capital to sustain some of their assets. This dilutes black 
shareholding and sheds their control to sellers. Pamodzi Gold, a black-owned 
company which was liquidated had to sell back some of its mines to the original 
seller (Harmony). Wesizwe sold part of its equity to Jinchuan in order to fund it 
Bakubung mine project. Incwala had to sell to Shanduka in order decrease debts. It is 
likely that without financial support from the government, many existing deals are 
likely to revert to the original sellers.  
 
White and foreign-owned companies have resorted to creating separate companies to 
host black shareholders- SPVs and HOLDCOs and imposed conditions on their black 
partners. For example, Anglo American and BHP Billiton helped to create Eyesizwe 
and Exxaro. Different companies are used to minimise blacks‟ meaningful roles in 
the white and foreign-owned parent companies. Gold Fields represents an example of 
the conditions that white and foreign-owned companies impose on the BEE 
companies when transferring equity ownership. Invictus, its partner in South Deep 
mine was required not to dispose its shares to a third party but only to Gold Fields 
itself. In addition, Goldfields used lock-in requirements to ensure Invictus stays in 
the BEE deal. The idea is to hold on the assets, in the event Invictus wants to opt out 
of the original mining empowerment deal for whatever reasons. 
 
The study has also focused on community shareholding, a matter that shows that 
mining companies are no longer able to by-pass the communities that occupy the 
same land as the one being mined. White and foreign-owned resorted to creating 
trusts to which shares are allocated and where payments are made for broad 
community development projects. For example Richards Bay Minerals, Assore and 
Palabora Mining have all created trusts for the communities that they transferred 
equity. The creating of community trusts has merged with corporate social 
responsibility that every mining company has to the communities in which it 
operates, as indicated by Busacca (2013) and Rajak (2012).  
 
In the absence of strong and permanent administrative structures, community and 




percentage of shareholding than the rest in the BEE deal. Lead partners are expected 
to be go-betweens of the white and foreign-owned companies and communities or 
consortium shareholders. By having go-betweens, white and foreign-owned 
companies indicate that they do not want to directly involve themselves with 
communities and consortiums and are telling black business counterparts who seem 
to have a better understanding of BEE shareholding issues to „sort out their brothers‟ 
problems. From interviews conducted by this study, lead partners are complaining 
that they are shouldering more responsibilities to administer BEE deals where 
communities are involved. Directors of white and foreign-owned companies want the 
government to offer directions on how the relationship at community shareholders 
should be conducted.  
 
White and foreign-owned companies prefer well-established black-owned companies 
and much better if these are also having political connections as partners. Because of 
this questionable practice, well-established black companies have benefited over and 
over again from white and foreign-owned companies. For example ARM, Shanduka 
and Mvelapanda have continuously benefitted from a number of BEE deals. In 
addition the well-established black-owned companies take over shares of other 
black-owned companies that are facing debts or being liquidated. For example, 
Shanduka took over shares from Incwala another BEE company. A preference for 
black shareholders has been influenced by political connectivity. For example, 
Kulubuse Zuma (the nephew of President Jacob Zuma) and Zondiya Mandela (a 
relative of former President Nelson Mandela have acquired states. Others include 
women who are connected to high profile politicians or the ANC party. These 
include Sibongile Modise (wife of former Minister of Defence), Yoliswa Balfour 
(wife of former Minister of Sports and Culture), Baleka Mbethe (Speaker of the 
National Assembly) and Bridgette Radebe (wife of Jeff Radebe, the Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development and a sister to Patrice Motsepe who owns 
ARM). Bridgette Radebe is apparently, the sister of Cyril Ramaphosa‟s wife. 
Ramaphosa is the current Deputy President and, seemingly, bound for the throne. In 









This Chapter gives study findings on the extent to which blacks have attained 
management and control in the mining industry which is part of objective one of this 
study. The part on equity ownership was explained in Chapter Five. This part of the 
objective is met by explaining variables related to mining control (board 
characteristics) and the management (management characteristics) that were 
mentioned in Chapter Four (section 4.5). The 2002 Mining Charter prescribes to 
white and foreign-owned companies to establish a baseline target of 40 per cent 
HDSAs‟ participation in management by 2009. The Amended Mining Charter and 
the New Mining Score Card in 2010 made a clarification on the target and called 
specifically for 40 per cent black representation on the board of directors and senior 
management of white and foreign-owned companies. By having black directors as 
part of white and foreign-owned companies, the government wants to ensure that 
blacks participate in the management and control of mining companies, irrespective 
of shareholding.  
 
The general understanding of the BEE policy makers was that the control of 
companies lies in the hands of the boards and senior management as the main 
decision makers. This understanding is premised on the classical theory of the 
separation between ownership and control, as argued by Berle and Means (1932). 
Based on their study of 200 companies in the non-financial sector in the US, Berle 
and Means concluded that modern companies or firms have dispersed ownership 
resulting in management control. The first section of this Chapter explores the issue 
of corporate control from the general literature as a background to the treatment of 
management and control under the BEE policy.  
 
The literature on corporate structure analysed in the first section of this chapter 




country-specific and influenced by the laws of the country, ownership structures and 
other control patterns. Section two thus concentrates on South Africa‟s old 
ownership and control structure that existed before the coming of the new regulatory 
framework. As indicated in Chapter Two (section 2.3), before the unbundling, South 
Africa‟s corporate structure had high concentration levels, cross shareholding and 
interlocking directorship. Understanding the past ownership structure enables one to 
contextualise the Mining Charter‟s call for management and control. Section three 
explains the post –democratic corporate structure in South Africa. It is revealed that, 
despite all the changes after the unbundling of the conglomerates and the entry of 
new foreign companies, the old ownership structure still persists. Sections four and 
five present the findings of the study and examine the level of black representation 
on the board of directors and top management of mining companies. The analysis is 
based on data collected on 468 board members and 226 senior managers in various 
mining companies used in the sample.  
 
6.2 Control of Corporations 
The term corporation is defined by Cauley, (1968:31-32) as a business owned by 
three or more stockholders (or shareholders or security holders). A corporation 
comes into existence by the process of obtaining a charter from the government to 
own stocks in a corporation. He uses the terms like corporation; firm; company and 
enterprise interchangeably. These terms have also used in similar manner in this 
thesis.  
 
The debate on corporate control has been greatly influenced by Berle and Means 
(1932). This thesis discusses issues of equity ownership and control and management 
from an economic view of agency theory. The agency theory was brought up by 
Means (1930, 1931) and Berle and Means (1932) who stated that before the 
development of modern firms or corporations, the power to control originally resided 






Based on their study on 200 large non-financial companies listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange, Berle and Means (1932) concluded that the development of large 
modern corporations has given rise to dispersed ownership structures and a 
separation between those who own (shareholders) and those who control the 
corporations (managers). Modern corporations could, therefore, be considered as 
management controlled and not owner controlled. The control of firms by managers 
leads to an agency problem between the owners (also referred to as principles) and 
managers (or agents) because of the divergent objectives between the two groups. 
While the owners‟ main objective is to maximise profits, the managers might have 
other motives such as larger firm size, stronger market power, more sales, high 
growth levels to get prestige, higher salaries and other perks (Roshan 2009). It is this 
separation that increases costs to monitor managers in firms. The interest of this 
thesis is not to explore the effects of the separation between ownership and control 
such as costs to the firm but to use the Berle and Means theory to explain whether 
South African firms are owner controlled or manager controlled and use this to 
analyse attainment of black control and management. 
 
In her earlier work, Means (1931:70) defines ownership as having economic interests 
that commit capital resources in a corporation or company with an expectation to 
maximise returns. The main criterion that Berle and Means used to assess the 
relationship between ownership and control was the percentage of shareholding 
owned by different individuals and groups in a company. Chapter Five explored 
shareholding of mining companies (white, foreign and black-owned) to understand 
shareholding that is under the control of blacks. 
 
Control is having power to make important decisions on how the resources in the 
corporation are used. The question then becomes who have the power to make such 
decisions in a corporation. Berle and Means (1932:70) and Means (1931: 72) 
identified five major types of control; namely, almost complete ownership (when a 
firm owns 80 per cent shares); majority control (50 per cent); minority control (20-50 
per cent), management control (5 per cent) and control through legal device without 




USA had no controlling shareholders in terms of having 20 per cent shareholding and 
above. According to the Mining Charter, blacks can attain control by acquiring 
majority shareholding where blacks have 50+1 share and through joint ventures 
where blacks have 25+1 share. The first and the second are regarded as active 
owners. The Mining Charter however anticipates a situation which other 
shareholders to own up to 100 shares but might not participate in the decisions of the 
company or passive shareholders. Broad-based groups (communities and 
consortiums) might be passive shareholders. 
 
Contemporary studies have focused on identifying whether Berle and Means‟ 
characteristics of management control are prevalent elsewhere (Blair 1995). The 
discussions have been around variables such as percentage of shareholding that 
allows control; composition of board, voting rights, board size, appointment of the 
board and performance of functions of the board. In contrast to Berle and Means‟ 20 
per cent cut-off threshold for minority control, it was accepted that even a 
shareholding of between 5 and 10 per cent would allow owners to have control, 
provided no other shareholder(s) had similar or higher percentages (Mizruchi 
2005:11). Leech (2002:18) put these levels at 4 to 25 per cent shareholding, provided 
there was no other shareholder who had a higher shareholding. Thus, for Cubbin and 
Leech (1983:351) and Salter (2003:40), a minority shareholder (a single individual 
shareholder or even institutional investor such as banks, insurance companies or 
pension funds) may have control in companies provided they have a larger 
shareholding than the rest or the remaining shares are held by widely dispersed 
shareholders who cannot change the voting outcome. In other words, the voting 
power of the largest shareholder becomes important in determining the power to 
control a firm.  
 
Studies have also established that ownership control (and not management control) is 
strong in corporate structures where there is family ownership, block-holder 
ownership, cross ownership and pyramid structures (La Porta et al., 1999; Bebchuk, 
Kraakman; Trintis 2000; Holderness 2003; Belkhir 2005, Mohd et al., 2008; Dhaya, 




shareholders tend to have control in companies they fund in order to protect their 
investments (Belkhir2005:4; Mohd et al., 2008:100-101). Financial institutional 
shareholders include banks and non-banking institutions like pension funds, 
insurance companies, unit trusts and investment companies. In order for such 
institutions to participate in decision making of the companies that they fund they 
acquire controlling shares or ensure they have representation on the board. Bebchuk, 
Kraakman and Trintis (2000:295) mention structures that will by nature allow control 
to be concentrated; these are pyramid structures and cross ownership, but also the 
voting powers that shares carry. Where pyramid structures and cross ownership exist; 
a company may exercise control with a small fraction of equity ownership in a 
number of firms.  
 
Control also depends on the voting rights that shares carry. The dual-class equity 
structures, allows ownership to be exchanged through a mixture of two types of 
shares: those that carry high voting rights (for example A-shares) and those that carry 
low or no voting rights (for example B shares). For example low-vote class of 
common stock may be entitled to one vote per share, and a high-vote class of 
common stock entitled to several votes per share. Generally companies that use a 
dual system trade low-voting shares to the public in the IPOs while offering founders 
and early investors, high-voting shares. The shareholders who hold low voting 
shares, have no or limited control in the affairs of the corporation (Glover and 
Thamodaran 2013:1-2).  
 
Leech (2002:17-22) supports Berle and Means‟ thesis that in dispersed shareholding 
structure, control of a company does not lie in shareholders, but in the board of 
directors and senior managers. Thus, one major development in modern corporations 
is the emergence of institutions of hired professional directors and top managers who 
direct the operations of a corporation. The problem that may arise is who has the 
power to select directors. He continues to say that the decisive powers lie with the 
individuals or groups of shareholders who have more per cent of shareholding than 




or those who are able to use their voting power to influence the choices Leech 
(2002:17-22).  
 
Other critics like Baurmol (1959), Salter (2003), Daily, Dalton and Cannella (2003), 
Mizruchi (2005), Desender (2009) and Styn and Stainbank (2013) paid their attention 
on who at the firm level have the power to appoint the board of directors, the overall 
issues of corporate governance, the main functions of the board (both internal and 
external directors) and other variables that influence the structure of the board. The 
variables include not only the shareholding structure but also other endogenous 
attributes of the firm such as the constitution of the board, the size and age of firm, 
the voting rights that the shares carry and the laws and regulatory frameworks that 
guide issues of corporate governance in a country. It is not possible to discuss all 
these attributes here.  
 
Desender (2009:11), Styn and Stainbank (2013:322) and Baurmol (1959) highlight 
how the composition of the board is important to explain control. The constitution is 
explained in terms of internal and external members of the board or executive and 
non-executive members. These may have different powers in major decisions of the 
company. Internal executive board members are directly linked to the company and 
are in many instances subordinate to the CEO. External board members (or 
independent directors) may be associates of the firm (suppliers, bankers, lawyers, 
accountants, trusted allies and simple friends) who have no direct association with 
the firm. The question then becomes who between the two groups is in a better 
position to make important decisions of the firm.  
 
Salter (2003:40-41) says that it is the internal board members (and managers) who 
are in a better position to exert control over firms. This, according to Salter, is 
because the internal board members have specific knowledge that helps them to 
make strategic decisions better than external board members. However, Baurmol 
(1959) and Mizruchi (2005:4, 17) say that, although it is regarded that the internal 
directors and managers have the power to build or destroy firms, the external 




reputations and losing remunerations. Melinda and Ryan (2006:508) say that 
independent directors (or external directors) are likely to be free of conflict of 
interest, especially when ownership is dispersed. By contrast, when ownership is 
concentrated with cross shareholding and interlocking directorship, both internal and 
external directors may not be free of conflict of interests. This is because the two 
categories of directors all sit on the same board or may often meet in different boards 
that they serve and are likely to build a team-work. In such cases, the board 
members‟ ability to protect the interests of minority shareholders becomes 
questionable.  
 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992); Patro and Zhao (2003); Boone et al., (2005); Audra et al., 
(2005) and He and Sommer (2006) looked at the size of the board. Audra et al., 
(2005) define board size as total number of directors on the board including the CEO 
and Chairman. The authors say that the size of the board is influenced by a number 
of factors. These factors include: a firm‟s geographical locations, the volume of 
activities, the age of the firm and changing nature of the firm‟s objectives. All these 
factors determine the composition of the board and their functions. For example, the 
bigger the firm, the more extensive is the firm‟s activities, the larger will be the 
board size. He and Sommer (2006:9) say the decisions to employ an extra board 
member depend on the expectations of internal and external; or executive and non-
executive members on benefits a new member is likely to bring to the firm. Benefits 
include important knowledge to make successful mergers and acquisitions or prevent 
a merger and financial connections. If there no or few expected benefits, there will be 
less desire to add more new members. Who fills the vacancies on the board is 
therefore a product of negotiations between current directors and CEOs on what they 
expect from the new member.  
 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992:65) looked at the trends in the growth of the board size in 
various countries. Their findings indicate that from the 1930s to the mid-2000s, 
board sizes of large corporations have not been expanding. In general, the board size 
reached a median of 11 in 1935, picked up to 15 in the 1960s and fell back to 11 by 




seven and ten). Beyond this size, it becomes difficult for a member to express ideas 
and some may even shirk attending meetings.  
 
Control of organisations is also discussed on the basis of how board members carry 
their responsibilities. As Mizruchi (2005:26-27) says, being a member of the board 
or executive does not automatically give one the power to have control in the firm, as 
it depends on the extent to which one participates in the actual decision making 
processes. For example, how many times a member attends board meetings, gets 
involved in decision making forums, confronts the management about poor policy 
decisions, or makes other constructive contributions concerning company issues. 
Inadequate contribution and commitment will reduce the board member to rubber-
stamping the suggestions made by other members and the CEO.  
The discussions above are important to understand South Africa‟s corporate structure 
in general and explain the peculiarities of South Africa‟s corporate structure. 
Questions that the above discussions may help to explain are: Is it feasible to attain 
40 per cent black representation in the directorship of white and foreign-owned 
companies (regardless of their shareholding in these companies) as demanded by the 
Mining Charter? Will blacks get enough voting power to gain control? Will the white 
and foreign-owned companies increase their board sizes just to accommodate blacks? 
Some of these questions are explored in the next section that discusses the past 
ownership and control structures in South Africa before moving to the study 
findings.  
 
6.3 Past Corporate Ownership and Control Structures in South Africa 
Corporate ownership and control in South Africa is different from the pattern that 
was identified by Berle and Means for the United States. Halse (1982), Barr and 
Kantor (1995), Kantor (1998), Malherbe and Segal (2001), Judin (2003) and 
Chabane et al., (2006) have all pointed to high concentrated ownership levels, 
pyramid structures, cross shareholding, family ownership, institutional ownership, 
interlocking directorship and the use of dual shareholding structure, in particular, low 





Looking at the corporate structure in the post-apartheid South Africa, Kantor, 
(1998:70) says that like in the past most shareholders on the JSE are not active 
participants but are contented to receive dividends and capital gains with little or 
nothing to do in the companies in which they hold shares. By being inactive 
participants they delegate control to management. This case is similar to that of 
dispersed shareholding where firms are controlled by managers. Marherbe and Segal 
(2001:44-47), who also looked at the changes in the country‟s corporate structure by 
early 2000s, indicated that some elements of the old structure mentioned above still 
remain. Post-apartheid ownership transfers also use dual share structures. As we have 
seen in the analysis of BEE mining deals in Chapter Five of the study, the use of low 
voting (N-shares or B-shares) is still being used even in BEE transactions.  
 
One has therefore to take into consideration the existing corporate structure in South 
Africa when discussing the call for black management and control of white and 
foreign-owned companies. The argument that there is a separation of ownership and 
control as stated by Berle and Means, may not strictly apply in the South African 
situation. 
 
Thus, it is argued in this thesis that equity ownership determines control. The 
following two sections outline the study findings on the extent of black 
representation on the board and management of white and foreign-owned companies 
in the mining industry. This is done by exploring mining control variables (board 
characteristics) and management (characteristics). To capture this reality, the thesis 
has used the term “control what you own” in the next section below, in order to 
highlight the mining ownership variables and the mining control variables in order 
explain black representation in the boards of white, foreign and black-owned mine 
industries, respectively.  
 
6.4 Control what you own: Are Blacks on the Mining Companies’ 
Control Wheel?  
The MPRDA is silent on issues of control and management. These are stated in the 




active participation of shareholders. This is related to economic interests or equity 
ownership that blacks may acquire. The Charter states that a 50+1 vote gives the 
owner control of the company, in terms of appointing board members and 
management. Where blacks have a 25+1 vote (as in strategic joint venture or 
partnership) the black shareholder are expected to participate in the management of 
the company and have representation on the board. The second is the expectation of 
the Mining Charter that black representation on the boards and top management of 
all mining companies would have reached 40 per cent by 2014 irrespective of the 
size of shares owned by blacks. This appears under the affirmative employment 
requirement of the Charter. The original Charter called for 40 per cent HDSA 
participation at all levels of management within five years (Mining Charter 4.2). The 
Amended Mining Charter of 2010, and in particular the New Mining Score Card, 
specifically clarified this point by indicating that the 40 per cent HDSA is based on 
black representation on the board of directors (top management) and executive 
management (senior management) by 2014. It states that: 
 
“In order to create conducive environment to ensure diversity as well as 
participation of HDSA at all decision making positions and core occupational 
categories in the mining industry, every mining company must achieve a minimum of 
40 per cent HDSA demographic representation by 2014. This should include 
executive management (board) and senior management (EXCO).” (Amended Mining 
Charter section 2.4) 
 
The Mining Score Card called for 10 per cent women participation in mining which 
includes representation on the board and senior management. It was necessary 
therefore for the study to explore black representation on the board of directors and 
senior management of mining companies. Blacks can also participate in equity 
shareholding as passive shareholders (without participating in management or having 
direct control of their assets) where they may own up to 100 per cent shares (see the 
Mining Charter, section 4.7). The call for 40 per cent black representation on the 
board of white and foreign-owned companies regardless their shareholding is 
expected to give blacks control of mining assets. The 40 per cent call for black 
management assumes the existence of management control in mining companies and 




behalf of shareholders. Berle and Means (1932:70) called this type of control as 
control through legal device. 
 
It is important at this juncture to explain the existing ownership structures from the 
findings of this study and explain their direct impact on realisation of the demands of 
the Amended Mining Charter. This analysis is guided by mining control and 
management variables mentioned in Chapter Four section 4.5 and repeated here. 
Mining control variables include: percentage of shareholding; board characteristics 
(nationality, race, size, gender) and board composition (executive or non-executive); 
voting rights (preferred shares, common shares, none or low voting shares) and 
conditions of sales (lock-in clauses). Management variable include management 
characteristics (nationality, race, size, gender). Below I explain them in the context 
of the findings of this study. 
 
Section 5.5 of this study provided a detailed account of mining assets, projects and 
percentage of shareholding that black-owned companies control in the mining 
industry. It is indicated in the section that the implementation of the MPRDA and the 
Mining Charter has resulted in the emergency of black-owned companies (those with 
50+1 share). Such black-owned companies are likely to have higher black 
representation on the board and management of the companies that they invest in. 
There have also emerged black empowered companies (those with 25+1 share), these 
are expected to have some black representation on the board and management.  
 
This section explores more on attributes that explain blacks‟ control of mining assets. 
The first includes the existence of family ownership which has remained part of the 
South African mining scene. Examples of companies with significant family 
ownership include Assore, which is controlled by the Sacco family through Oresteel 
Investments that own 52.43 per cent equity; Keaton Energy holdings where the 
family directors (the Salter and Glad) own 40 per cent equity; Wescoal Holdings in 
which family directors control 28 per cent equity and Platfields in which the family 
has 22.96 per cent equity. The Oppenheimer family, that controlled the diamond 




American in July 2012, remaining with around 5 per cent. This is an amount that 
falls in Leech‟s (2002:18) levels of 4 to 25 per cent shareholding (provided there is 
no other shareholder who has a higher shareholding), as explained earlier. It is 
interesting to note that even black-owned companies have joined this trend. The best 
examples are the African Rainbow Minerals and Exploration Investments (Pty) 
(ARM) and Shanduka Resources (subsidiary of Shanduka Holdings). ARM was 
founded by Patrice Motsepe. The Motsepe family controls 41.17 per cent of ARM 
(ARM 2011). Shanduka was founded by Cyril Ramaphosa, who is currently the Vice 
President of South Africa. Although it is understood that Cyril Ramaphosa has 
relinquished the chairmanship of his companies after going back to politics as a 
deputy president of the country, the Ramaphosa Family Trust still has a significant 
control. There are many black-owned companies like these in which the founders and 
families have significant shareholdings, allowing control assets as most have 
percentage thresholds that surpass those envisaged by Leech (4-25 per cent) and 
Berle and Means (20 per cent). Thus, South Africa‟s ownership structure is in line 
with Desender‟s (2009) contention that those with more shareholding have a better 
chance of controlling their enterprises. 
 
The second attribute is foreign-owned companies‟ shareholding. This has grown after 
the lifting of sanctions against the apartheid regime and allowing of the external 
listing of the old conglomerates (see section of 2.2 of the thesis). The two major 
foreign-owned mining companies such Anglo American and BHP Billiton all have 
external primary listings. Before the unbundling process, two companies were part of 
the local mining giants, now they have become foreign-owned companies and 
operate through local subsidiaries and holding companies. For example, Anglo 
American operates through Anglo Platinum, Anglo Coal and Kumba. The end of 
apartheid has also seen the return of companies such as Xstrata (known before as 
Sudelektra) that had gone abroad during the anti-apartheid economic sanctions. 
There has also been a host of completely new entrants, mostly junior mining 
companies. These, as noted in chapter five, have created local subsidiaries to which 
BEE partners have acquired shares. Foreign shareholding has also penetrated the 




Consolidated Resources shares are in foreign hands; 58 per cent of Harmony Gold 
mining shares are foreign and 44.7 per cent of Randgold and Exploration are held by 
foreign banks. (Harmony 2010 and Wits Consolidated Resources 2011). Irrespective 
of black representation on these companies, foreign ownership of mining companies 
takes control away from the local boards and CEOs as they cannot bypass decisions 
made by the main companies whose headquarters are base out of South Africa.  
 
Foreign companies have in some instances taken over the black-owned companies in 
terms of shareholding and the management. The best example is Wesizwe, discussed 
in Chapter Five where a Chinese company has acquired 49 per cent shareholding and 
taken over the management of the company (Wesizwe: 2012). Northam has lost its 
BEE status because Mvelaphanda Resources has sold some of its shares to Eurasian 
Natural Resources. The critical factor is that blacks lack own funds and at times are 
unable to redeem even the shares allocated to them. This reduces their ability to 
acquire shareholding to affect control.  
It is noted here that foreign-owned companies have shares in their BEE partner 
companies and shareholders. Chapter Five showed cases of Anglo American Plc in 
Exxaro and Anoorag and of Lonmin in Incwala. Thus foreign ownership is likely to 
have an impact on how black management and control is exercised, as decisions, in 
particular those pertaining to the allocation of firm resources, are likely to be made 
by foreign owners, leaving little room to blacks to control. This is the situation that in 
the past led to cross shareholding, as indicated in section 2.2 of this thesis.  
 
The third attribute pertains to shareholding controlled by financial institutions. 
Financial institutions have high shareholding in mining companies. This is indicated 
by Laubscher (2011:2), an economist for the Sanlam Group, who said that, by 2010, 
42 per cent of listed mining shares were owned by South African institutions. This is 
confirmed by this study which reveals that a number of companies in South Africa 
are under the control of financial institutions. These include: Impala Platinum, which 
(apart from shareholding by the Royal Bafokeng Holdings at 15 per cent equity) is 
almost wholly-owned by financial institutions. Banks own 40.1 per cent equity; 




equity (Impala Platinum 2011). Likewise, Petmin‟s 39 per cent equity is owned by 
institutional shareholders who include PSG Palladin, Investec, Coro Capital, GEPF 
Equity, Metlife, Black Rock, Old Mutual, First Rand Bank, Sanlam and 
SBSA/Stanlib. Its management owns 19 per cent of equity with the remaining 28 per 
cent equity owned by a BEE consortium (Petmin 2010, 2011). Village Main‟s 91 per 
cent of equity is under financial institutions. The institutions include Umbono 
Financial Services with 46.52 per cent equity (Village Main 2010). Likewise, Trans 
Hex Group which, apart from its 20.3 per cent ownership by Northam (which took 
over from Mvelaphanda), is mainly controlled by financial institutions with 30 per 
cent equity. These include Nedbank, Standard, PIC, Old Mutual, Allan Gray and 
Investment Solutions (Trans Hex 2010, 2011). In Randgold and Exploration, foreign 
banks own 44.77 per cent equity; mutual funds 14.62 per cent equity and pension 
funds own 8.89 per cent equity (Randgold 2011). The last in this group is Simmer 
and Jack Minerals in which the banks own 37 per cent equity and mutual funds own 
9 per cent equity (Simmer and Jack 2011). Financial Institutions are likely to 
influence the decisions of companies in which they have high shareholding. 
The fourth attribute is the voting rights. These are rights that give a shareholder the 
right to vote on important matters of the corporation policy and choice of the board 
of directors. As indicated earlier BEE mining deals use low voting shares which are 
referred to as N-shares. N-shares are treated the same as ordinary shares in terms of 
dividend pay-out, even though, they are usually traded at a discount. Over time the 
JSE later declined to list companies with overwhelming N-shares or pyramid 
structures. This led to the diminishing use of N-shares from 16 per cent of the JSE in 
1996 to 10 per cent in 2000. Most N-shares were converted into ordinary shares but 
the use of N-shares has not entirely been scrapped (Stayn and Stainbank 2013:323). 
Chapter Five showed the example of Gold Fields which concluded deals with 
Invictus under the N-share agreement. As a matter of fact, Invictus is a consortium 
which can be regarded as a passive shareholder, as N-shares limit the extent by 
which blacks attain control in the companies in Invictus. In discussing black 
representation on the board of directors and senior management of mining 





6.4.1 Black Representation on the Board of Directors 
Data collected for the analysis of this section is based on companies in the sample of 
72 companies used for the study. Data on mining control variables was collected for 
21 foreign companies, 18 white companies and 9 BEE enterprises (or black-owned 
companies). A total of 468 board members were identified and classified into: 
executives and non-executives directors; white and black males and white and black 
females). 
 
The findings on black representation on the board of mining companies are presented 
in Table 6.1 below, which shows board membership in white, foreign and BEE 
companies. It divides members of the board into executive and non-executive and 
then classifies them into: white males, white females, black males and black females.  
 
Table 6.1: Board Membership in Mining Companies 
Type of 
Company 
Executives   Total  Non—
Ex 
Executive  Total Total  
WM WF BM BF Executive WM WF BM BF Non-Ex Board 
            
Foreign  45 0 5 0 50 111 4 29 5 148 198 
            
White 34 9 8 2 53 59 7 36 9 111 164 
            
BEE 16 4 17 5 42 21 8 26 9 64 106 
Total 95 13 30 7 145 191 19 91 23 323 468 
KEY: WM= White Male, WF= White Female, BM= Black Male, BF =Black Female 
Source: Compiled from Various Mining Companies’ Annual Reports. 
 
There are differences of size (number and percentage) between the three categories 
of foreign, white and BEE companies. Within the foreign-owned companies, the 
percentage of blacks on the board is equivalent to 19.6 per cent. This falls to 10 per 
cent if one looks at only executive membership. This is because most foreign-owned 
companies had only 1 or 2 executive directors in the country. The board size for 
foreign companies was between 8 and 13, with the exceptions being Central Rand 
Gold (4) and Jubilee Platinum (5). Black board members were concentrated in 





The board size of white-owned companies ranged from 6 to 15. Black representation 
on the board of white companies stood at 31.1 per cent overall, but fell to 18.8 per 
cent on executive board membership. Black executive board membership is 
concentrated in one company, Keaton Energy, which has 4 out of the 10 executive 
members. Non-executive board membership is also concentrated in three companies 
– Impala Platinum (6), Harmony (5) and Gold Fields (5). Blacks own 15 per cent 
equity in each of these companies. This questions how much such companies may 
accommodate a 40 per cent black representation as required by the Charter. 
 
The picture is different in the size boards of black-owned companies. Black 
representation on the board of black-owned companies accounts for 53.7 per cent (57 
out of 106). Again, this is an indication that there is a direct link between ownership 
and control as the control what you own pattern reveals itself here. Board size ranged 
between 8 and 13. The exception is ARM with 17 board members and a top 
management steering committee of 24 members. The possible explanations for this 
large size may have to do with the need to have representation from the diverse 
mining operations that the company has, as this is the most diversified black mining 
company. Second, it may be that ARM is also a lead partner of other consortiums 
and that it has to take on board other members of the various consortiums that it 
partners with. Nevertheless, there is still a very high white presence on the boards of 
black companies (46.3). This is because both foreign and white companies have 
shares in the black-owned companies as indicated earlier.  
 
Black women representation on the board of mining companies is limited. In the case 
of foreign companies, women (both white and black) accounted for only 4.5 per cent. 
All these are in non-executive positions. In the case of white companies, women 
representation accounts for 16.4 per cent. Black women representation is just 6.7 per 
cent. There is, however, a good representation of women as executive directors (20.7 
per cent), but most of them are white women. Women representation on the board of 
BEE companies stands at 24.5 per cent, with black women representation standing at 




fact that women groups form part of the consortiums that have become shareholders 
of these companies. In other words, women are also shareholders in BEE companies. 
 
Figure 6.1 provides a combined picture of the size of black representation on the 
boards of all mining companies (white, foreign and black-owned companies). Blacks 
accounted for 32.3 per cent (151 out of 468) of all board members. When this is 
broken into executive and non-executive board members, black representation was 
25.5 per cent (37 out 145) for executives 35.29 per cent (114 out of 323) for non-
executives. 
 
Figure 6.1: Black Representation on the Board of Mining Companies 
 
Source: Compiled from Various Mining Companies’ Annual Reports.  
Key: M= Males; F=Female 
 
Two things need to be stated here. First, the impact of control in firms depends on 
board members‟ attendance of board meetings. This was indicated by Mizruchi 
(2005:26-27) who stated that unless a board member participates in the board 
meetings, he/she would have no impact on the board decisions. In light of this, the 
study paid attention to another variable of control; the attendance of board members. 
Almost all company annual reports reviewed had a special section on board 
attendance, and these indicated that board members attended meetings. There is an 





The second is the board size for mining companies. The average board size is ten 
people, with the lowest end standing at six members and the highest end at 15 
members. This is line with He and Sommer (2006:9) who put global average board 
size standing at 11 members. The percentages demanded by the Charter seem to be a 
one-size-fits-all approach where every company is expected to achieve 40 per cent 
black representation. It is not surprising therefore, that black representation is low, 
and as some white and foreign-owned companies have small sized boards. The small 
size of boards may limit the chances of mining companies to expand numbers of 
black directors.  
 
6.4.2 Blacks in the Top Management of Mining Companies 
While there was almost complete data on the board of directors for the companies in 
the study sample, data on top management was limited. Data was available for only 
11 of the foreign-owned companies, 8 of the white-owned companies and 6 BEE 
Enterprises. A total of 226 members of top management were identified. These were 
then grouped into gender and race (white males, white females, black males and 
black females) and size. This is summarized in Table 6.2.  
 
Table 6.2: Top Management of Mining Companies 
Type of  Top Management   Total  
Company WM WF BM BF  
Foreign  78 1 14 4 97 
White 57 1 12 3 73 
BEE 31 5 15 5 56 
Total 166 7 41 12 226 
Source: Compiled from Various Mining Companies’ Annual Reports. 
KEY: WM= White Male, WF= White Female, BM= Black Male, BF =Black Female  
 
According to table 6.2, blacks in the top management of foreign companies 
represented 18.5 per cent (18 out of 97). Anglo American Plc hired most of the black 
managers. This was concentrated in two of its subsidiaries; Kumba (4) and Anglo 
Platinum (5) and its joint subsidiary with Rio Tinto – Palabora Mining (4). The three 




companies. Women (1 white woman and 4 black women out of 97 in the group) in 
the top management of foreign companies represented 5.2 per cent.  
 
The size of black representation in the top management of white-owned companies 
was 20.5 per cent (15 out of 73). Women representation was 5.4 per cent (1 white 
woman and 3 black women). This representation was only in 2 companies, Impala 
Platinum (2) and Harmony (2). Women representation in top management is in sharp 
contrast to women representation on the board, which stood at 16.4 per cent and 
there are more blacks (12) than white (7). There are still some white companies 
without black people in top management (Assore, Petmin and Simmer and Jack). 
This is an indication that such companies have not responded to the call of having 
blacks as part of management.  
 
Black representation in the top management of BEE companies stood at 35.7 per cent 
(20 out of 56). This contrasts sharply with the 53.7 representation on the board of 
black companies. Women representation at the top management of these companies 
stood at 17.8 per cent (equally divided between black and white (5 for each). Again, 
this is in sharp contrast to the 24.7 per cent women representation on the board of 
BEE companies indicated earlier. Overall, white (male and female) representation on 
top management stands at 76.54 per-cent (173 out of 226), while blacks (women and 
men) constitute 23.45 per cent (53 out of 226). Women accounted for only 8.4 per 
cent (12 blacks and 7 whites).Thus, black women represented only 5.3 per cent. This 





Figure 6.2: Black Representation in Senior Management of Mining Companies  
 
Source: Compiled from Various Mining Companies’ Annual Reports. Key: M= Males; 
F=Female 
 
The above analysis shows that black representation in management in white-owned 
companies is limited and there are still companies without black people in top 
management. From the interviews that were conducted by this study, part of the 
explanation can be found in the limited number of qualified and experienced black 
managers coupled with the continued suspicion of their perceived inability to provide 
leadership. Finding the reasons for such tendencies is however beyond the scope of 
this study. 
 
The analysis of the data above gives only an indicative pattern of what is happening 
at this level. The pattern is almost similar to that of the black representation in board 
membership discussed above.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to establish the extent to which blacks have attained 
management and control in the mining industry. Three conclusions are made in this 
chapter. The first is that, although the study started from the premise of Berle and 
Means‟ separation of ownership and control, it has been shown that their theory has 
limited application to South Africa with its history of high levels of ownership 




use of low voting shares. Despite the unbundling, this study found out that some of 
the elements of the old shareholding structures still remain. Thus, financial 
institutions control over 40 per cent of JSE mining equity. There is also the existence 
of family ownership even within black-owned enterprises. For example, 40 per cent 
of the shareholding of ARM, a black-owned company, is by the Motsepe family. 
Such high percentage thresholds under the family simply indicate that the Motsepe 
family has a better chance to appoint directors and hence have more influence on 
controlling the affairs of their enterprises. 
 
Second, as argued in this study, the ownership structure determines control. This 
corroborates the „control what you own‟ pattern explained earlier. It follows that 
larger shareholders have a greater number of board members and top management 
officials. Thus, white and foreign-owned companies have more white and foreign 
directors, respectively. This should not be surprising, given the small size of black 
equity in these companies. There is higher black representation in the BEE 
companies (where blacks have a 50 +1). Black representation is only likely to grow 
with the growth of black shareholding. 
 
Thirdly, it is apparent from the findings from this chapter that black representation in 
the white and foreign-owned companies remains low, and in some instances it does 
not even exist. This puts into question the possibility of achieving a 40 per cent black 









This chapter addresses the fourth and fifth objectives of this study. The fourth 
objective seeks to establish the forces that facilitate or hinder the B-BBEE policy 
implementation process in the mining industry. Since the B-BBEE policy forms the 
core of the government‟s intervention programme in its free market economy, the 
fifth objective seeks to establish the government‟s role in the implementation 
process. To answer these objectives, interviews with the executives of white, foreign 
and black-owned mining companies and officials at the DMR, a government 
department that was responsible for formulating the MPRDA and the Mining Charter 
where conducted. Three sets of interview questions were used for these interviews: 
for the executives of white and foreign-owned companies; for executives of black-
owned companies and; for the DMR officials (Appendices 10.4, 10.5 and 10.6). The 
names of people interviewed, their affiliations and the dates when they were 
interviewed is provided in Appendix 10.7 
 
The interview questions were grouped into six themes: Licensing of Mining 
Companies; B.BBEE policy compliance; Business partnership; BEE funding; the 
role of government in the implementation of the B-BBEE policy and the future of the 
B-BBEE policy (see section 4.4.2.2 for the details on the themes). What follows is 
the analysis of the responses obtained from the interviews. Given the nature of the 
responses, the analysis quotes reports verbatim, rather than giving percentages.  
 
7.2 Licensing of the Mining Companies 
Executives of white and foreign- owned companies were asked to indicate whether 
or not they had converted all their old-order rights and acquired new licenses 
(Question 4). They were also asked to indicate the problems encountered in the 




any problems faced in obtaining licences (Q3) and to share experiences on access to 
land for which licences and access to geological information had been obtained (Q4).  
 
The DMR officials were asked for records of licenses granted to white, foreign and 
black-owned companies since 2004 (Q1.1); to indicate whether any white or foreign-
owned company had been denied a licence because of not having black partners 
(Q1.2); to indicate problems experienced in the licensing process (Q1.3); to comment 
on the practice of blacks selling their prospecting and exploration licences to white 
and foreign companies (Q1.4) and; to indicate what type of assistance if any was 
given to black companies in accessing land for which they had obtained licenses, in 
accessing relevant geological data and any other supports (Q2). 
 
White and foreign-owned companies‟ executives interviewed indicated that they had 
already converted their old-order rights to new-order rights and acquired new 
licences for new operations. The main problems raised by the company executives 
with regard to the licensing process were: delays in the processing of licenses; 
incompetence of the DMR staff while issuing the licenses; corruption; lack of 
fairness in the conversion process and; lack of coordination between the government 
departments that are associated with the licensing process.  
 
All the executives with the exception of Mr Lewis (Northam) and Mr Briggs and Mr 
Mashego-Mashego (Harmony) indicated that there were delays in the processing of 
licenses. Such delays tend to increase costs and put a company‟s decisions in limbo. 
Mr Mahomed Sedat (BHP Billiton) gave an example of how delays in providing a 
license to his company‟s iron ore projects in Brazil partly caused by land access 
problems raised overall costs of production to over US$2billion a year. He could not, 
however, provide a direct example for the company‟s South African operations. 
These delays, according to Mr Mashego-Mashego (Harmony), are caused by the 
mining companies‟ resorting to employing consultants to manage applications 
submitted to the DMR while the DMR and other government departments prefer 





“We did not experience problems with licensing with our deal with ARM because of 
the status of Patrice Motsepe who has close relationship with the government.” 
 
The implication is that the manner in which a company chooses who should be its 
black partner is related to the ability of that partner to handle relations with the 
government and the benefits that can be obtained. As also shown, the applications 
from those companies that have connections with well-connected blacks are treated 
with urgency. This points out to two sides of the story on who initiates cronyism. On 
the one hand, the ANC itself wants to install and anoint its own people and, on the 
other hand, the white and foreign-owned companies also hunt for well politically 
connected black people. In that case the two groups benefit.  
 
Another common complaint by executives of white and foreign-owned companies 
concerns the incompetence of the DMR staff in the processing of license 
applications. Both Mr Mark Cutifani (AngloGold Ashanti) and Mr Sedat (BHP 
Billiton) complained that the staffs at DMR were responsible for many mistakes in 
the issuing of licenses. Common mistakes included mismatch of demarcations of 
mining areas and wrong or missing mining codes. The executives suggested that the 
DMR should deploy extra human resources to cut down on delays and train its 
workers to minimise unnecessary mistakes in the issuing of licenses.  
 
Most of executives indicated the existence of corrupt practices at the DMR during 
the licensing process but none was prepared to provide explicit examples of corrupt 
practices or mention those involved. This indicates the difficulties that a researcher 
may experience in obtaining data on issues of corruption.  
 
Responding to the charge of unfair and unethical practice Mr Mahomed Sedat (BHP 
Billiton) said that his company had difficulties in converting some of its old-order 
rights in coal to new-order rights. He said that the company had expected to convert 
all of the licenses on the basis of the „continuing consequences principle and offsets‟ 
that is allowed by the Mining Charter and that recognize previous deals. Sedat also 
noted that his company helped in the creation of BEE companies, some in 




black-owned companies. Mr Sedat said, while Anglo American Plc was allowed to 
convert its old-order licenses using the same principle, BHP Billiton‟s licences were 
not allowed to do the same. Sedat regarded his company‟s failure to convert some of 
its old-order rights to new order rights as application of double standards by the 
DMR.  
 
There was also a complaint by white and foreign-owned companies on the lack of 
coordination between government departments dealing with the mining companies. 
For example, Paul Dunne (Impala Platinum) insisted that his company had no 
problems with the DMR, but found it tedious to go through various government 
departments: Water Affairs for water licences, Environmental Affairs for 
environmental approval and Labour for social labour plans. He suggested the 
establishment of a „one stop shop‟ for all the necessary approvals related to mining.  
 
The BEE companies executives also pointed to: the existence of long delays in 
processing numerous documents needed for license applications; the incompetence 
of the DMR staff and; and the long and tiresome negotiations with land owners 
(including communities) for land access. Mr Carl Kekana (Mmakau Mining
97
) 
complained that it took considerable time (no exact time was mentioned) for the 
DMR to issue the licenses. The respondent at African Spirit Holdings (name and job 
title withheld) was much more specific and indicated that he had to wait 12 months 
for an answer to some of the applications. In relation to the incompetence of DMR 
staff, Mr Mike Tekere (Optimum Coal) and Mr Mangisi Gule (ARM Coal) 
complained that there were at times gross mistakes in the form of mismatch of 
mining codes and incorrect demarcations. This caused a lot of inconveniences and 
further delays. 
 
Mr Sipho Mofokeng (Mvelapanda Resources) and Mr Clyde Johnson (Sedibeng 
Mining) responding to any assistance given to black companies in accessing land, 
they both explained that, before licenses are issued, the applicant has to show that the 
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company has access to the land for which a license was being applied for. This in 
practice meant showing proof that access to the land will not be a problem and thus 
negotiations on land access have to be completed before the license related to the 
particular area is issued. Mr Clyde Johnson said, white farmers demand payments. 
Although no actual estimates were given, he indicated that it was “huge sums of 
money.” He continued to say: “For tribal or communal land there are always long 
negotiations with the leaders and members of the communities. At times the 
negotiations involve the relocation of current settlers which are not only time 
consuming but also costly and has often led to delays in operationalizing mine 
projects.”  
 
It should be noted, however, that BEE companies that simply became partners of 
white companies or those that acquired mining operations or projects straight from 
existing white-owned companies had no land access problems, because land 
ownership rights or agreements were already in place. This was pointed out by Carl 
Kekana (Mmakau Mining), Bongani Mashishu (BSC Resources) and the respondent 
of African Spirit Holdings.  
 
From informal conversations with small scale miners at the symposium organized by 
the Limpopo Government Department of Treasury on the 11
th
 of November 2011, 
executives from three companies that attended the conference (names withheld) said 
that it took almost three years of negotiations with the communities to gain access to 
land where mineral deposits were. One of the respondents indicated that the process 
involved the signing of many consent forms. One of the executives and her team 
showed their anger on lack of transparent in accessing land. The executive said: 
 
“We are wondering how flashy ladies from Gauteng got access to the mines that 
were just next to our homesteads and under our chieftainship while we have been 
talking to the local authorities about our intention to mine coal there for years.”  
 
Problems of land access to blacks boil to imbalances of land ownership created 
during the time of apartheid. This still disadvantages blacks. There are three types of 




white farmers, tribal or communal ownership in which the land is controlled by the 
tribal leaders or the community and state owned land. It would have been fair for this 
study to explore more on views of these land owners in order to reveal what kind of 
problems land owners also experienced in allowing blacks to access land. This was 
not done in this study because of time and space, a limitation that is acknowledged 
here. 
 
Executives from BEE companies were also asked about access to geological 
information and other relevant mining data. All the BEE company executives with 
the exception of BSC Resources indicated that they purchased such data from the 
Council for Geosciences. Experience of collecting data for this study indicates that it 
takes time and money to get data. The Council for Geosciences was approached for 
an up-to-date map on active mines in 2010 but only received a response in 2012 from 
Ms Mashudu Matshiva, a person dealing with geological survey data, who said that 
the map was only available in electronic format in larger scales. The process of 
printing them in readable format was not complete. BEE companies resort to 
purchase such data from other exploration and mining companies. This was indicated 
by Mr Lazarus (the CEO of Sephaku Holdings) and Mr Rowan Smith (Shanduka 
Resources). The respondent at Africa Spirit Holdings and Mr Carl Kekana (CEO 
Mmakau Mining) said they had to employ independent geologists. Dr Paul Jourdan, 
an independent analyst and former CEO of MINTEK had a different story; he said in 
the mining for change conference (6-7 September, 2010 in Sandton) that white and 
foreign-owned companies obtained geological data from government offices in South 
Africa cheaply and used their experts to change some facts and sell the data at a 
price, a trade that has been going on for some time.  
 
Black executives indicated that they lack expertise in the mining field and cannot get 
important data that is crucial in making decisions in the investments they join. It is 
only Mr Bongani Mashishu (BSC Resources) who indicated that he and other 
company founders are mineral resources experts who had previously worked in the 





At the DMR, apart from seeking answers to questions Q1.1, Q1.2, Q1.3, Q1.4 and 
Q2), It was also important to seek data on mining licences approved especially from 
2004 when the MPRDA and Mining Charter became official, and clarity on issues 
raised by executives of mining companies such as delays in the issuing of licenses, 
mistakes in some of the licenses issued and the possibility of creating a „one stop 
shop‟ where all BEE mining issues and problems were to be dealt with.  
 
Mr Tladi, who provided data on licences (used in table 5.1 of the thesis), could not 
ascertain whether any white and foreign-owned companies had been refused any 
licenses because of lack of BEE partners (question Q1.1). When the case of BHP 
Billiton not converting all its old-order rights in coal was mentioned, Mr Tladi said 
that the BHP Billiton‟s case was well known at the DMR office and was a 
complicated case that would require more background information for someone to 
understand. He was not prepared to explain more on the case.  
 
Question 1.4 sought to get an answer on why BEE companies are selling their 
prospecting and exploration licenses to white and foreign-owned companies instead 
of participating in the extraction (actual mining) activities themselves? Mr Tladi 
(DMR) said that the Department was aware of such activities as any transferring of 
licences has to be approved by the Department. He continued to say that, when the 
selling of licences takes place, the common reason advanced by black-owned 
companies was the limited financial capacity to engage in the mining extraction 
activities. For him, the DMR has not yet decided on how to deal with the re-sale of 
licences by BEE companies. It was necessary to probe further on the re-selling of 
licences. 
 
Mr Knobe, a lecturer at the University of Pretoria, was approached for more insights 
on selling licences. He said that the practice of selling licenses related to mine 
projects was a common practice by mining companies in South Africa. A mining 
company may develop a project and then sell in order to raise capital needed for 




licences to a property developer getting land, sub- dividing it and re-selling it. He 
said that such strategies could be utilised by BEE companies as well.  
 
Commenting on assistance given by the government or any other public institutions 
to BEE mining companies, both Mr Tladi and another respondent at the DMR who 
wished to remain anonymous both indicated that the DMR was involved in giving 
clarity on policy issues. The anonymous respondent also said that it did not help 
aspiring BEE mining companies with practical issues such as access to land or 
geological data, or finding partners. He gave an example of land issues. These fall 
under the competency of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reforms 
and he in particular insisted that the mining companies (including BEE companies) 
had to negotiate with local authorities or private farmers on their own. Mr Tladi in 
particular stated that: 
 
“It is their land and the central government has little to do with it. The private 
property principles must be upheld. Local chiefs or village headmen or private 
individuals know all the negotiations that go with mining companies with regard to 
land. BEE companies have to cope within the existing land market structures.”  
 
He further said that the Department was aware of cases where some villagers had 
complained about how their chiefs negotiated secretly with the mining companies 
who mined in the areas under the chiefs‟ control and obtained money (huge sums) 
and other perks and gifts like cars, and are offered contracts for catering and cleaning 
services at the mines. He also said that there were also cases of chiefs using 
intimidation when communities refused to accept long-term land leases or made 
inquiries about benefits obtained from mining deals. He then continued to say: 
 
“Although these issues are discussed in different caucuses of the Department, so far 
no mining license applicant has raised alarming land issues with the Department.”  
 
It seems that what he said in his first statement involved corruption on the part of the 
chiefs. It also appeared that he was going to call for government action to be taken 




chiefs. These conducts by the chiefs should raise concern from the national 
government.  
 
Mr Tladi indicated that no help was extended to the BEE companies in obtaining 
geological and other relevant mining information. He noted that BEE companies can 
obtain such information from the Council for Geoscience, normally at a fee.  
 
The delays in the issuing of licenses as noted by the executives of mining companies 
was caused by two factors according to Mr Tladi: The lack of personnel both at the 
departmental level (headquarters) and regional offices to carry out the necessary 
functions such as expeditious inspections and; The failure of the submitted 
applications to meet all the requirements for the licenses leading to demands for 
resubmission of applications. He explained that before approving of any mining 
licenses, officials at the Department were obligated to physically inspect the 
locations for which licenses had been applied and ensure that they corresponded to 
the descriptions presented in the licence application documents and that the mine 
codes were correct and in line with the rules and regulations operating in the 
industry. He continued to say that at the beginning of the licensing conversion 
process, applications were received in large numbers (over 50 applications a month) 
and it was not easy for a few people in the department to service all the locations in 
any given month. Long delays could therefore not be avoided. The mistakes in the 
licenses were because of limited personnel and pressure to complete the licensing 
process and even the mining companies not indicating their demarcations properly.  
 
Responding to the suggestion of having a „one stop shop‟ put forward by Mr Paul 
Dunne (Impala Platinum) Mr Tladi said that it was impossible for two basic reasons: 
First, the DMR lacked enough personnel and financial capacity to deal with all the 
related issues. Second, other matters fall within the competency of other government 
departments such as the DTI (for investment promotion), Department of Finance (for 
costs of government personnel), Department of Rural Development and Land 




DMR to handle functions performed by other departments as it would be a 
duplication of functions. 
 
7.3 B-BBEE Policy Compliance 
To address compliance by white and foreign-owned companies on equity ownership, 
control and management transfer to blacks in the mining industry, three issues were 
raised here with the executives of the white and foreign-owned mining companies. 
First, was on equity and executives were asked whether their companies had reached 
the 15 per cent ownership target in 2009 and whether they were likely to meet the 26 
per cent targets in 2014 (Q8.1 and 8.3). The executives were also asked to indicate 
how they calculated the compliance levels (8.2). Second, was on management and 
executives were asked whether their companies had attained the 40 per cent black 
representation on the board of directors and senior management (Q8.4). Third, the 
executives were asked to indicate the obstacles encountered in meeting the targets 
(Q8.5, 8.6, 8.7). The DMR was asked to explain the disparity between its equity 
compliance figures with those of the mining companies (Q3.1), to provide reasons 
for low BEE compliance (Q3.3, 3.4) and to indicate measures put in place to enforce 
and improve compliance (Q3.5).  
 
All the white and foreign-owned companies‟ executives interviewed indicated that 
they had already reached the 15 per cent HDSA ownership target for 2009 and were 
sure that they would reach the 26 per cent target in 2014. As for how they calculated 
the 15 per cent equity target, Chris Griffith (Anglo American), Paul Dunne (Impala 
Platinum) and Holland (Harmony) all said that one had to check the kind of the deal 
and what it sought to achieve. The executives mentioned mining deals involving 
among other things: equity transfer (which took various forms including the sale of 
shares/equity); the donation of free shares; the selling of mine ventures or projects 
and entering into joint ventures. There were no details on how they reached the 15 
per cent equity figure. To answer this question one needs to look at the history of 
compliance at an individual company and to trace the changes in equity ownership 
that have taken place. Mr Chris Griffith (Anglo American) said that “One had to look 




actually purchased. These were complex issues and needed a lot of research work 
from our side before a proper answer can be given.”  
 
The disparities in compliance levels arise because of the complexities of estimating 
the targets. Mr Hollard (Gold Fields) said that the methods used in the estimations of 
the targets might differ from one deal to another because it depended on the methods 
used in evaluating the assets where the deal was concluded. He also said that a deal 
might be concluded at a mine level, at a subsidiary level or at the main company 
level. He also noted that such issues were complex. At such situations I felt 
vulnerable to information asymmetry that existed between me and experts in the field 
and wished I had more time to go deep on such issues. Mr Hollard (Gold Fields) 
further said: 
 
“When it comes to calculating equity targets, the government‟s focus (is) on equity 
transferred to blacks (and) ignores the costs incurred by the company in terms of 
helping to create BEE companies and other transaction costs such as administration 
of the communities and groups that have to be partners and other requirements, 
giving them loans and guaranteeing them with financial institutions.”  
 
Mr Hollard insisted that some of these costs could not be easily translated in 
monetary terms as part of the equity value. He said: 
 
“For the government, what matters is equity transferred. What about other 
requirements of the Charter that we meet? To a miner, calculations of deal value are 
not a worrisome issue, but whether the buyer fulfils the funding obligations. What 
about if buyers do not pay for their shares or sell shares? When a BEE partner sells 
or is liquidated, technically all the calculations have no meaning since it causes BEE 
equity ownership dilution. The government needs to remember such issues and not to 
punish compliant companies to look for another BEE partner to compensate for the 





What he argued for corresponded to Mr Cory (Assore) who had said that his 
company had to cover increasing transaction costs in the process of transferring 
shares to communities. These included communication and hosting meetings and 
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 When I asked for further clarifications, he mentioned a case of Mvelapanda Resources when it sold 




transport costs. Mr Cory said that it takes time and commitment of company 
resources that apparently some of the costs were hard to quantify and were not 
considered to be part of the value of equity transferred to blacks. He further noted 
that the government considers only the value of shares or mining ventures sold to 
black-owned companies and does not take into consideration the fact that those who 
transfer assets incur costs in organising BEE deals and also meet other requirements 
of the Mining Charter.  
 
What Mr Cory said in terms of costs in organising deals made me remember 
Telecom, MTN, SASOL and South African Breweries (SARB) at the time these 
companies offered BEE shares. In order to attract black shareholders the companies 
advertised widely in the media and the post offices in the country were used as points 
of purchase for the shares for easy accessibility to the mass of people who wanted. 
Shares in mining companies are mostly sold at the JSE (for those mining companies 
listed). It seems from what the executives are saying here is that they get problems in 
attracting or getting hold of prospective black beneficiaries.  
 
Informal discussions were made with Mr Musa Budeda, a PHD candidate in the 
Department of Mine Engineering who is familiar with the estimation of mining 
assets. Mr Budeda said that there are different ways of mine asset estimations. At the 
mine level, estimations are based on mine reserves (that need to be up-dated 
regularly as extraction activities proceed). Estimations are also based on the latest 
life span of the mine. At a company level estimations use company asset value (a 
company may have diverse assets). For those companies that are listed in a stock 
market, market capitalisation can be used. Mr Budeda suggested that governments in 
mineral rich countries should use multi-disciplinary experts to estimate the mineral 
assets if they want to negotiate mining deals with multinational or large mining 
companies. 
 
Responding to the question of what helped the white and foreign-owned companies 
to meet the equity targets (by 2009), Mr Mahomed Sadat (BHP Billiton) said that the 




above compliance levels. Mr Cory (Assore) indicated the success of the company 
was because it had few, but strong partners such ARM and Shanduka. Mr Paul 
Dunne (Impala Platinum) indicated that his company had diligently chosen partners 
who were resilient and had cultivated lasting business relationships. He meant in 
particular its relationship with the Royal Bafokeng Resources which had become a 
large BEE company. For Paul Dunne what matters is to have partners ready to stay in 
business and sustain their shareholding. For Mr Graham Briggs (Harmony) and Ms 
Juanita Meijsen (Total Coal), successful compliance was because they had made 
deals with partners who were already active in the sector.  
 
All the interviewed executives from white and foreign-owned companies did not 
explicitly answer the question on attaining the management and control targets of 40 
per cent black representation on the board and senior management. The evasiveness 
is shown in Mr Johan Dippenaar (Petras Diamonds) statement:  
 
“One cannot just wake up in the morning and say I am going to have this percentage 
of blacks in my management. It is a process that depends on growth and other needs 
of the company. After all, this is a new requirement that was added around 2010.”  
 
Although he did not elaborate, what he was talking about is related to the 
determinants of the board size which, as indicated earlier, depends on many other 
factors (see section 6.3 of this thesis on the discussions by He and Sommer (2006:9) 
and Leech (2003:17-22)). It is these factors that will determine how many blacks can 
be taken on as board members or top managers. 
 
The discrepancy between the compliance level figures of the DMR and the Chamber 
of Mines is according to the official at the DMR who works in the office concerned 
with special studies (name withheld) caused by the Chamber of Mines. Whenever the 
DMR wants to do its compliance calculations, it asks for statistics from the Chamber 
of Mines. Using the same statistics, the Chamber gets different percentages and the 
DMR gets different percentages. When the Chamber is asked about the differences, it 
does not provide any good explanation. The explanation for the low compliance with 




“There is reluctance on the part of white and foreign-owned companies to take on 
board BEE companies as business partners. This is basically because blacks do not 
have financial back up and hence are unable to buy stocks, hire labour, purchase 
machinery or make contributions to mine rehabilitation. They refuse to enter into 
partnership with BEE companies.” 
 
The official continued to say that one needed to take into consideration the fact that 
mining companies thrived for profit maximisation and that this prevented them from 
accommodating BEE partners. The respondent further stated that:  
 
“Historically, old mining companies have been used to having the whole cake for 
themselves. They still want to hold onto the control of their mining assets and do not 
want to share it with the new comers especially the black companies. This is natural 
and is compared to a family situation where the only few children in the family were 
used to having all things to themselves and suddenly a new batch of children is 
supposed to be accommodated. The resistance to share with new comers will always 
occur and as a parent you have to balance the different interests.” 
 
The official‟s views were conflicting. While first acknowledging the limitations that 
blacks face in exploiting opportunities offered by the policy, he still supported the 
profit motives of white and foreign-owned companies. But profit maximisation is a 
motive of any firm in a free market except for non-profit entities. It would be logical 
for the official to associate low compliance with the main limitations that blacks 
face, including not having capital to exploit opportunities in the industry and lack of 
direct government support. When asked about his personal opinion on debts that 
black-owned companies face and the low compliance levels reached in the midst of 
increasing value of mining assets and whether the equity targets should be increased, 
the official said that:  
 
“I am aware that most BEE companies are still in debt and some have even been 
liquidated but there is no government strategy to resolve this. On my personal view, 
the government was actually too ambitious to start with 15 per cent. I think may be 
the starting point would have been like 5 per cent. Then, we would have seen how 
compliance behaved at that level and how it could go up from there. The 15 per cent 
in five years was rather ambitious.”  
 
The above statement is a suggestion from the official that the government should 




participate more as owners in a situation where mining assets had expanded. There 
was, however, no further explanation given on the better ways to meet the targets, 
apart from lowering targets. One wonders whether the solution lay in the lowering of 
equity targets or in increased funding and other supports to the BEE companies. 
 
Responding on the low compliance with management and control targets of the 
Mining Charter, the same official stated that: 
 
“Equity and control go hand in hand because the equity owners want an assurance 
that their assets are being well managed. As long as the black equity is low, there is 
likely to be less management and control by blacks.”  
 
The official further said that it was difficult for the government to actually ascertain 
if black board members and senior executives participated in the decision making 
process in the white and foreign-owned companies. This was because managers 
become part of the companies they serve and received attractive packages that 
ensured loyalty. The managers were unlikely to reveal what was taking place within 
these companies in terms of their actual involvement. He insisted that the 
government had no control of such matters. 
 
Responding to the question on measures that the DMR had put in place to enforce 
compliance, the official said that, the first job of the government was to ensure that 
policies were put in place. The actual enforcement of compliance was a continuous 
exercise. There were many instances where the government had directly confronted 
those companies that did not comply on issues of equity, better housing for the 
miners and negative impact of mining activities on communities. He gave an 
example of how Gold Fields‟ BEE partner, Mvelapanda Resources, sold its shares. 
He said that the government had to sit with Gold Fields to reach an agreement with 
them to find new BEE partners (resulting in the Invictus BEE deal at South Deep). 
 
7.4 BEE Business Partnership 
BEE business partnership is discussed separately because of its importance. 




get a BEE partner for every mining operation (Q6.1); what attracted them to their 
BEE partners (Q6.2) and what problems they experienced with their BEE business 
partners (Q6.3). Executives from BEE companies were also asked to indicate their 
various partners (Q5); what attracted them to their partners (Q6) and to indicate 
problems experienced in the partnerships (Q7). The BEE business partners were 
further asked to share their experiences in concluding the BEE deals (Q8). Officials 
from the DMR were asked whether the department was involved in the creation of 
partnerships between white, foreign-owned and BEE companies (Q2.3). They were 
also asked to comment on the problems being faced by the BEE companies and to 
indicate possible solutions (Q4). 
 
Executives of white and foreign-owned companies were asked whether they had to 
get BEE partners for every mine operation or project. Most of those interviewed 
indicated that their obtaining of new licenses or even renewing old-order rights to 
new-order rights were not based on having a BEE partner for every mining operation 
in the country. Their compliance took different forms which included: (1) selling 
shareholding, (2) selling mine assets, (3) creating joint ventures, (4) creating BEE 
companies, (5) developing black entrepreneurs in terms of giving them different 
contracts and (6) offering them procurement facilities. Most of these were discussed 
in Chapter Five and, therefore, there was no need to detail them here.  
 
The question on what attracted white and foreign-owned companies to their partners 
enlisted various responses. Among these were the following: 
1. Ability to act as lead partners and organise communities. (Some of the 
common statements were: knowing their way around communities, ability to 
lead communities and ability to provide guidelines to communities) 
2. Operating within the mining areas. (This was used as a justification for 
community partnerships). 
3. Having own assets. (This was with respect to BEE companies that had mining 
licenses). 




5. Political connections. Statements like the good will that the partner brings, 
the partner‟s contribution to peaceful democracy and, the partners‟ 
understanding South Africa‟s political and social environment are used to 
express the partners political connectivity. 
 
One needs to note that most BEE partnerships are organised into consortiums that 
bring together various participants. These become shareholders in white and foreign-
owned companies. There is a tendency in consortiums for individuals or companies 
(with a larger share allocations) to act as the lead partners. The lead partners act as 
coordinators and go-betweens of the consortiums and the white and foreign partners. 
It should not be surprising that lead partners are complaining of shouldering too 
many responsibilities. This was picked up from executives that act as lead partners in 
the interview. Lead partners were important for Richards Bay Minerals, Gold Fields 
and Aquarius. According to Mr Jabu Khubela of Richard Bay Minerals, the company 
expected Imbowu consortium that controlled 55 per cent of the Horizon Investment 
Consortium to assist in the management of the communities that acquired shares in 
the company. Mr Hollard (Gold Fields) had the same expectations of Core Lock 
Investments controlled by Jerome Braum and Paul Helepi as lead partners in Invictus 
to help manage the South Deep communities and, in particular, the community trust 
created on their behalf. This was also the position of Mkululi Dube (Aquarius) who 
expected Zwelake Mankazana as lead partner of Savannah Consortium to mobilize 
community support. 
 
One has to take note of the existence of communities that actually own the land on 
which mining takes place. Mining companies used to pay loyalty to the communities 
for mining. With the coming of the MPRDA and the Mining Charter, mining 
companies are required to benefit communities within the mining areas. Instead of 
loyalties, the companies are now required to offer shares. Companies like Anglo 
Platinum; Impala Platinum and Aquarius Platinum all obtained their licences by 
transferring their royalties into shares to communities in the mining areas that the 
companies have operations. More detailed accounts of mining companies which have 




Mr Paul Dunne (Impala Platinum) was forthright about taking in communities as 
shareholders. He stated that the continued operations of the company depended on 
taking on the Bafokeng Nation (the owners of the land) as BEE partners. He 
continued to say: “I just want to remind you that our company has been in the area 
before the coming of the Mining Charter. There are other arrangements to benefit the 
community in place. When the B-BBEE policy was drafted and came into effect, this 
relationship was translated into shareholding”. Godfrey Gomwe (Anglo American) 
also indicated that Anglo Platinum‟s partnership with the Bafokeng Nation was 
based on their ownership of the land. He went in detail about the history of his 
company‟s operations in the areas owned by the tribe which dates so many years 
back in the country‟s history of mining. When the BEE policy came, the company 
had to enter into the negotiations with the Royal Bafokeng team and the DME. He 
continued to say that the Bafokeng Nation‟s team employed various experts. He 
hailed Bafokeng Nation‟s strong and competent administrative structure as a main 
reason for the existing strong partnership.  
 
Other companies have offered shares to communities within the mining areas that 
they operate and, hence, created community trusts. Mr Khubela (Richards Bay 
Minerals) said: We had no choice but to include communities in the BEE deals. It is 
the communities that welcomed us in their land. Our company had to ensure that the 
deal agreement suited us both”. He offered details of the deals and said Richards Bay 
Minerals offered the communities free shares and made once off payments of 
R17.5million (£1.35million) to each of its community partners around the mine 
(Sokhulu, Mbonambi, Mkwanazi and Dube). The amounts were placed in individual 
community public benefit trusts. Then, later, each community was to receive R3 
million (£230,000) annually for social projects. The arrangements enabled the RBM 
to get a stamp of approval from the communities and to comply with the MPRDA 
and the Mining Charter.   
 
Interest fell on understanding how Richards Bay Minerals and communities came to 
an agreement that both parties understood well and would suite each one of them as 




could not communicate in English? (This was found out during my two days stay in 
the area and interacting with some community leaders.). When this was raised with 
Mr Khubela he responded that the community was represented by “knowledgeable 
people.” When asked whether the said „knowledgeable people‟ understood issues of 
shareholding and negotiation skills to match the expertise of the company 
negotiators, Mr Khubela conceded that there was a power imbalance between the 
company negotiators representatives of the communities. BEE deals were therefore 
concluded within such limitations. He then excused himself and pulled out some 
pictures from one of the files and showed a photo (Figure 7.1) depicting one of the 
transactions that showed the Dube community representatives receiving their once 
off endowment.  
 
Figure 7.1: The Dube Community Representatives Receiving a Once-off Endowment of 
R17, 5 million from RBM 
 
Source: RBM  
 
After the interview, an informal conversation with one of the community leaders 
(who wanted to stay anonymous) around the small shops in the vicinity of the mine 
neighbourhood was held. He said that although he had participated in meetings, the 
specifications and agreements in the deals between the company and the 
communities, the money and other benefits obtained were not well communicated to 




community at the grassroots level do not agree on what community projects should 
be established with the funds from Richards Bay Minerals. What is taking place in 
the case of Richards Bay Minerals is more of an investment in social projects in the 
communities in which it operates as a means of limiting conflicts between the 
communities and the company. This confirms what Rajak (2012) and Busacca (2013) 
say that BEE deals with communities can be seen as corporate social responsibility 
(CSR).  
 
The BEE companies with own assets attracted white and foreign-owned companies 
more easily than those with no assets. Mr Graham Briggs (Harmony) stated that the 
company‟s partnership with ARM was mainly because it had its own gold assets, 
which helped to increase Harmony‟s gold pipeline and increased commitment into 
company partnerships. Mr Cory (Assore) also indicated that it had entered into 
partnership with ARM in Assmang because of the same reasons. 
 
Having concluded previous deals or having experience in the mining sector was an 
influential factor in Gold Fields‟ choice of Mvelapanda Resources as partner. Mr 
Peter Turner of Gold Fields pointed to the fact that its choice of partners had been 
based on a competitive bid but conceded that Mvelapanda Resource‟s was chosen 
because it had experience in the industry from its previous deals and shared the 
“common vision” with the company. He did not, however, elaborate on the issue of 
the common vision. 
 
Political considerations influenced the choice of BEE partners for many white and 
foreign-owned companies. This is expressed in different forms. Ms Juanita Meijsen 
(Total Coal) indicated that the choice of Mmakau mining out of other competitive 
proposals was because it was led by a respectable business woman who knew her 
way around communities and had a clear understanding of South Africa‟s political 
and social environment. The business woman in question was Ms Bridgette Radebe, 
wife of Mr Radebe (the longest serving cabinet member, having been in the cabinet 
since 1994). Mr Cory (Assore) said that Shanduka was chosen, partly because of the 




word, “good will,” he said it implied the ability and willingness to handle the 
communities in which the company operated. These, he said, could be handled better 
with the political power that Shanduka is associated with. He, particularly, 
mentioned Cyril Ramaphosa, a top ANC stalwart who was the Secretary General of 
the ANC before entering into business and is currently South Africa‟s deputy 
president. 
 
Mr Hollard (Gold Fields) was much more straightforward on his company‟s choice 
of BEE partners for South Deep. The partners were chosen because of “their 
contribution to the peaceful transition to democracy in South Africa.” He mentioned 
Mandla Msimanga, Bafana Ngwenya and Baleka Mbethe who are members of the 
Invictus consortium. Ms Mbethe is associated with Turncard Trading, which holds 
shares in Invictus. Ms Mbethe has been the speaker of the national assembly twice, is 
current chairman of the ANC and acted briefly as deputy president of South Africa. 
Gold Fields partnership with Mvelapanda Resources was also influenced by its 
association with Tokyo Sekwale, former Gauteng premier turned businessman who 
recently served in president Zuma‟s first term cabinet. The issue of political 
connectivity of the BEE beneficiaries was criticised by Khehla and Reddy (2006), 
Gqubule (2006), Mbeki (2007) and Cargill (2010). It is, however taken by Khan and 
Grey (2005) and Booth and Mutebi (2012) as part of the process of capital 
accumulation at an early stage of capitalist development. 
 
Three issues were raised in relation to the problems white and foreign-owned 
companies faced with their BEE partners. These were: lack of own funds, limited 
knowledge of mining operations and costs for organising BEE deals. Mr Paul Dunne 
(Impala Platinum) complained that:  
 
“Black owned-companies enter into BEE deals unprepared. When they sign the 
business deal, they sound promising, but a few months down the line they often fail to 
produce what they promised.”  
 
When probed further on what he meant by that, he said that they could not produce 




running costs in a continuous manner. They had poor organisational skills and no 
understanding of how the business partnership in mining projects worked. He gave 
an example of contracting out mining activities which needed follow up. He stressed 
that “as new comers, BEE partners had to learn faster the technicalities of running 
mines.” 
 
Mr Graham Briggs (Harmony) also touched on the same things and said that BEE 
companies lacked funds to pay for the assets as well as the operational capital to run 
these assets. As stated in Chapter Five, the company had to buy back some gold 
assets sold to Pamodzi Gold. He especially said that “you sell something with value 
but buy it back with little value.” He further said that BEE partners had poor 
organisation skills and did not understand well how the business partnership in 
mining projects worked. An example was given on issues of contracting out mining 
activities and obligations that went with joint ventures and contributing to costs 
promptly and dealing with other administrative and management tasks. 
 
From interviews with executives of black-owned companies, it became clear that 
most of these companies were engaged in a number of partnerships with white and 
foreign-owned companies across different mining categories. Carl Kekana (Mmakau 
Mining) said that his company had partnerships with Impala Platinum, Total Coal, 
Hernie Ferrochrome and Tasmin Pacific. Sipho Mofokeng (Mvelapanda Resources) 
indicated that his company was involved with Northam Platinum, Trans Hex 
(diamonds) and Gold Fields and that it was always looking for promising 
opportunities for investment even if it might fail in others. He stated that “business 
was a learning curve and that diversification was a way of spreading the risks and 
maximizing returns that they should not be taken as evidence of greed.” 
 
Clyde Johnson (Sedibeng Mining) said that his company was involved in steel with a 
company named Total Steel, in diamonds with Petras and had some projects that it 
ran independently. Nchakha Moloi (Motjoli Resources) mentioned Lafarge in cement 
and Exxaro in Coal. The respondent at African Spirit Holdings (name withheld) said 




deal in steel with Jindal Steel. Andre Wilkens (ARM) pointed to his company‟s 
involvement with many partners in various mining categories. These included joint 
ventures with Anglo Platinum, Impala Platinum, Harmony (gold), Xstrata (coal) and 
Assore (manganese). From the above, there is a general tendency for BEE companies 
to diversify into as many mining ventures spreading in different mining categories.  
 
There was, however, very little information given on the partnerships between the 
black-owned companies and black-owned companies or broad-based groups, despite 
many executives raising complaints about their being expected to act as lead partners 
to handle business relationships with community partners.  
 
In terms of what attracted the BEE companies to their white and foreign partners, the 
common answer was financial capacity. This included strong profit history, good 
cash flows, a strong management team, growth potential and the help and 
cooperation that they get afterwards which cements their cooperation. The fact of the 
matter, however, is that the BEE companies go out of their way to search for white 
and foreign partners.  
Sipho Mofokeng (Mvelapanda Resources) had this to say:  
 
“Depends on who opens a door when you knock and prospects you see ahead. Some 
of our business proposals were not answered. But, in general we made deals with 
companies from whom we could extract the most value and gain support.” 
 
When asked to explain more on the kind of supports offered, he went on and added: 
 
“The support that comes from white and foreign-owned companies is important, they 
use their „financial muscle‟ to provide us guarantees with financial institutions for 
loans and grant us cash to cover our running costs while waiting for loan tranches. 
They invite us to board meetings and to formal and informal company circles from 
which we acquire new contacts and experience.”  
 
Mr Nchaka Moloi (Motjoli Resources) shared his experience in this case and said 
that his company took the initiative to look for white and foreign-owned companies. 
The company had to make proposals and shop around for partners. The strategy was 




chances of being selected. That was not an easy task and sometimes it took months. 
At times the company had to use a go- between who knew the world of business and 
people around. This was easily done with the help of people with business 
management, financial management, mining experts and lawyers. But the company 
found out that entering in coal ventures was more manageable. The second route of 
getting foreign and white partners was through acquiring prospecting and exploration 
licenses and entering into projects together.  
 
Mr Bongani Mashishu of BSC Resources pointed out that it obtained exploration 
licences and carried out some exploration and then sold the projects at an advanced 
stage to white and foreign-owned companies. It was easier for his company to sell a 
bankable project than to wait to be picked up by white and foreign-owned companies 
as a business partner. The bottleneck here was caused by the delays in the performing 
of due diligence over the projects the company wanted to sell. When due diligence 
took too long it affected the company‟s cash flow position. Mr Clyde Johnson 
(Sedibeng Mining) noted that the company‟s partners purchased a controlling share 
of its exploration projects and other projects that the company had developed to a 
bankable feasibility stage. He indicated that:  
 
“After struggling with getting BEE deals, we succeeded in finding a new strategy 
that brings income. We started acquiring exploration licences, doing some feasibility 
studies to a bankable level and selling them to mining companies at a profit while 
incurring minimal investments on our part. This has worked better than just waiting 
for partners.” 
 
Selling projects was good for the company‟s reputation and made it easier for the 
company to be trusted by financial institutions.  
 
The experience of the three companies, Matjoli Resources, BSC Resources and 
Sedibeng Mining indicate promising cases of BEE companies. This involves a 
movement away from being mere shareholders and business partners to white and 
foreign-owned companies to creating their own assets. Their successes call for 
government support similar to that offered by Japan to its local emerging companies 





Executives of black-owned companies pointed to the following problems 
experienced in their partnerships with white and foreign-owned companies. These 
include: Lack of finance, limited expertise in operations of mining activities, 
difficulties in accessing export markets and, shouldering responsibilities with the 
consortium and community partners. The lack of finance is dealt with in the next 
section. Mr Sipho Mofokeng (Mvelapanda Resources) explained lengthily about the 
other problems faced by black-owned companies. He started by pointing to the fact 
that as new comer in the industry and CEO, he had to invest much time in 
understanding how the mining industry works, how contracting out certain functions 
are conducted and problems encountered, how to source high skilled labour (from 
very competitive market) and how to meet obligations as a lead partner. Talking 
about being a lead partner to communities he said: 
 
“Many communities assume that as lead partners we know better and can organise 
the communities to form companies; educating them about share earnings and 
losses; secure funding; arrange for legal advice and deal with the management 
issues.”  
 
Carl Kekana (Mmakau Mining) said that his company had to assume the 
responsibility of organising communities which required explaining the nature of the 
deals they were entering in and liaise on their behalf with white and foreign-owned 
company partners. It also involved helping communities establish trusts. He said that 
the process was always costly and time consuming and needed constant collaboration 
with community leaders. Mr Clyde Johnson (Sedibeng Mining) complained of being 
placed in the middle of the communities and white and foreign owned-companies. 
These companies expected their BEE partners like Sedibeng to manage community 
relations. He said:  
 
“Strangely, it seems as if it is our duty to manage communities on their behalf. On 
the other hand smaller consortiums and communities expect to exploit services from 





The respondent at African Spirit Holdings also shared the frustrations he had 
encountered in dealing with communities in which there were no central, legitimate 
or acceptable leadership. He said that: 
 
“Community leaders expected you to handle all the problems they were having with 
white and foreign-owned companies that they were dealing with, and that it was not 
uncommon to get caught in the community leadership squabbles.”  
 
The respondent did not elaborate more on the kind of squabbles apart from saying 
that community leaders hardly agree on what decisions they have to take for the 
benefit of communities.  
 
Shouldering too many responsibilities was also mentioned by Ms Nonkubela (co-
founder of Motjoli Resources) who indicated that to avoid such frustrations it was 
better to refrain from consortium transactions although her company could not avoid 
community shareholders. Increasing responsibilities with communities was also 
indicated by Mr Bongani Mashishu (CEO of BSC Resources) who indicated that in 
the future his company would be considering limiting the number of consortiums to 
minimise added obligations. Mr Clyde Johnson suggested that the government 
should provide guidance to how relationships between communities and mining 
companies are supposed to be conducted and how lead partners are to organise 
communities. What is happening is that lead partners are always able to shoulder 
responsibilities with no guidance from the government.  
 
Almost all the executives of black-owned companies interviewed acknowledged the 
lack of expertise on mining issues in general. Mr Clyde Johnson of Sedibeng Mining 
stated that:  
 
“It‟s hard for a black businessman to understand how proper assessment of ore body 
and other geological data mean to a mine valuation. Sometimes the sellers do not 
give us all the relevant data. We buy in mine projects without knowing the history of 
extraction costs and other historical data at the mine that would make one assess 
better the value of the assets and risks involved. Since our companies are small and 
are new we have to use consultants who also serve the interests of the same foreign 
and white-owned companies who sell us the assets. This raises the danger of us being 




analysis of mining ventures it is difficult to convince financial institutions to fund 
mining projects.” 
 
The respondent at African Spirit Holdings also mentioned the above problems but he 
thought that white companies were only interested in selling mines that were at the 
end of their lifespan and that required major capital investments. He said: “It is not 
surprising that BEE companies are buying in some mineral reserves that are getting 
deeper and deeper.” Mr Mangisi Gule (ARM Coal) and Mr Nchaka Moloi (Matjoli 
Resources) had suspicions that the white and foreign-owned companies sold to 
black-owned companies the projects in areas with poor infrastructure which they had 
kept as potential reserve. Mr Moloi stated that:  
 
“When the (BEE) policy came, some of the white companies offloaded to us those 
mining ventures that had no access to infrastructure and that made it difficult to 
develop. It is not surprising that many BEE companies are selling their mining 
ventures after buying them without adding value. It is an experience to learn from.” 
 
Carl Kekana (Mmakau Mining) expected the selling party (white or foreign-owned 
company) would play a bigger role and unpack the resource base of the mining assets 
at the time of sale. Unfortunately, he continued, sellers hardly did that, as a BEE 
company that buys into a project or mine venture has to struggle to find other hidden 
realities of the mining venture. It is often difficult to clearly assess the opportunities 
and the risks involved in a mining venture. He thus gave the following advice: 
 
“BEE partners as buyers and starters in the mining industry have to be clever 
enough to avoid being sold very marginal and unproductive assets. They should 
know genuine contractors for various mining tasks. This is a hard part and needs 
moral obligation from contractors. In short there is a long list of huddles to cross.”  
 
A director of a company, who wanted to remain completely anonymous, talked at 
length about the problems of access to both the domestic and export coal markets. He 
said that the major mining companies often had contracts with Sasol or Eskom to 
supply coal. He said that, however, if a BEE company buys into a project from these 
companies, there was no assurance of taking over the coal supply allocations that 
were given to the major mining companies in the project that they had sold to blacks. 




take over the existing allocations or source supplies elsewhere. Even where a BEE 
company managed to take over the supply allocations, upon the expiry of the 
contract, the supply allocations has to be re-negotiated with Sasol or Eskom afresh. It 
is not uncommon for a BEE company to lose the battle. 
 
The second challenge is meeting the requirements of the coal export market. The 
anonymous director further said, a BEE company entering in the export market has 
to depend on technology, washing facilities, transport networks and export markets 
already established by the old major companies.
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 He stated that:  
 
“What I am trying to say is that mineral extraction is a tough business and there are 
a lot of imbalances between BEE companies and major miners. They have the 
experience, the finance, the technology, the facilities, the smelters and the export 
connections. We have to struggle and cooperate with them. That‟s not always easy.” 
 
Such statements indicate the existence of an information asymmetry and other 
imbalance of economic opportunities that exist between the incumbents (white and 
foreign-owned companies) and the new comers (BEE companies). In short 
government is called upon to support BEE companies.  
 
The DMR officials were asked whether the department was involved in the creation 
of partnerships between white and foreign-owned companies. Mr Tladi said that 
initially the DMR helped to show-case the activities of BEE companies and 
distributed brochures and lists of emerging BEE companies and about the B-BBEE 
policy at seminars and conferences. The provincial offices also kept such 
information. Companies seeking BEE partners were provided with such information. 
In contrast to expectation, the DMR did not and does not act as a match maker to 
those who aspire to enter into BEE deals. It can only confront white and foreign-
owned companies when they fail to take on blacks as partners. 
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The answers from the DMR on the issue of problems being faced by the BEE 
companies and the possible solutions according to Mr Tladi is that, the Department 
was aware of the problems being faced by the BEE companies; that BEE companies 
lacked capital, some are being liquidated, they lack expertise to deal with the mining 
issues. These predicaments include the inability by community shareholders, in 
particular, those with no strong administrative structures and inadequate 
understanding the mining policies, to draft agreements or understand what has been 
signed for in the mining deals. The Department, however, has no concrete 
programmes in place to aid the BEE companies in such issues, and insisted that black 
companies that enter in the mining industry should be left alone to struggle under the 
market mechanism and to compete with other incumbent mining companies.  
 
7.5 BEE Funding and Conditions Attached 
The study sought answers from executives of white and foreign-owned companies on 
their major sources of funding (Q9.1). They were also asked how and to what extent 
they helped to secure funding for BEE transaction and the conditions that they attach 
to the BEE transactions (9.2, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5 and 9.6). Finally, the executives were 
asked to indicate how the financial position (debt situation) of their BEE partners had 
affected the white and foreign-owned companies (Q9.7 and 9.8). The problem of 
blacks lacking own funds for capital finance and to buy shares from white and 
foreign-owned companies was highlighted in previous chapters. Executives of BEE 
companies were therefore asked to indicate their major sources of funding (Q10), the 
type of funding received from different sources (Q11), the conditions attached to the 
funding (Q12) and whether they were facing financial difficulties and how they have 
dealt with them (Q13). Officials at the DMR were asked to indicate whether there 
were any special programmes in place to help BEE companies financially (Q4.1) and 
whether the white and foreign-owned companies fulfilled their R100billion pledge in 
support of BEE transactions (Q4.2). 
 
The following funding sources were highlighted by the executives of white and 
foreign-owned companies interviewed: JP Morgan, HSBC, UBS, Bank of America, 




interviews was that mining needed a lot of funding in terms of capital and 
operational costs. 
 
The help that white and foreign-owned companies offered to their BEE partners 
included: direct provision of loans; bridging finance; guarantees for loans from other 
sources, covering BEE partners‟ transaction costs and buying back shares that once 
were sold to BEE partners. Mr Mahomed Sadat (BHP Billiton) stated that his 
company provided loans and loan guarantees to many of its BEE partners. Mr Mark 
Cutifani (AngloGold Ashanti) said that it was hard to quantify all the financial 
obligations that went into BEE deals. He pointed out, however, that his company 
funded its ESOP partners at a cost of R1.8 billion (£150million) in 2006. This is 
apart from footing legal and administrative fees for the transaction.  
 
Mr Hollard (Gold Fields) related how his company had facilitated the financing of 
Mvelapanda Resources when it acquired Gold Fields shares. He was bitter that, 
despite all the successful efforts to secure capital on behalf of Mvelapanda 
Resources, they could not hold on to the shares. Mr Paul Dunne (Impala Platinum) 
revealed that it provided guarantees to its BEE partners in the Marula Platinum Mine 
for the outstanding loans of R885million (£80million) in 2010. Mr Godfrey Gomwe 
(Anglo American Plc) pointed to the support Anglo Platinum had given to Anoorag 
(a black-owned company) in order for Anoorag to operate its projects. Godfrey 
Gomwe also indicated that Anglo American Plc offered Anoorag contract jobs like 
cleaning services, pumping services and transport services and procurement facilities 
to other BEE partners related to Anoorag for such partners to improve revenue. (For 
more on Anoorag‟s deals and funding see Chapter Five). 
 
Ms Juanita Meijsen (Total Coal) stated that she could not disclose financial dealings 
with their BEE partners as this was deemed confidential. She claimed that she 
needed authorisation from the company headquarters abroad to diverge such 
information. Ms Meijsen‟s statement non-disclosure corresponds to a point raised by 
Welch et al (2002:615) that elite interviewees may refuse to provide information, 





Mr Mashego Mashego (Harmony) spoke extensively about his company‟s loss of 
Pamodzi Gold which was liquidated in 2010, when asked whether white and foreign-
owned companies had lost any BEE partners as a result of debt. His company had to 
buy back its Free State mine assets which it had sold to Pamodzi Gold in 2008.  
 
Executives from black-owned companies interviewed indicated that they obtained 
funding from local investment companies, commercial banks, development banks 
(DBSA and IDC), pension funds, stock market and from white and foreign business 
partners. The financial help comes in terms of loans and capital injections when 
white and foreign-owned companies buy shares in BEE companies or projects. Mr 
Bongani Mashishu (BSC Resources) and Mr Clyde Johnson (Sedibeng Mining) said 
that the acquisitions made by white and foreign-owned business partners in their 
projects were their major source of funding. 
 
All the executives from black owned companies noted that they were facing debts. 
None of them, however, was prepared to mention the amounts of debt their 
companies were facing. Sipho Mofokeng (Mvelapanda Resources) complained that 
operational costs in mining ventures were huge and that financial institutions neither 
covered these costs nor provided bridging finance. Bridging finance is very crucial in 
keeping things going while waiting for a loan tranche. He continued to say that it was 
the white and foreign business partners who had helped to keep the company afloat. 
The support could not meet all the costs and it reached a point when Mvelapanda 
Resources was forced to sell its shares in both Gold Fields and Northam to repay its 
debts. When he was asked if state financial institutions were not helping, Mr Sipho 
Mofokeng said that it was not possible to get big money from state funders. He 
suggested that the government should have had concrete long-term programmes in 
place to finance black investors in other sectors as well as in mining.  
 
Harold Motaung (Anoorag Resources) indicated that his company received financial 
support from Anglo Platinum without which it would have been impossible to 




Platinum) who is a director of finance remarked that it had been extremely difficult 
for Wesizwe to raise enough funds to kick start the mining process. He said that 
financial negotiations took time, that he had to shop around, and that the company 
ultimately raised funds from the Chinese Jinchuan Company in order to operate the 
Bakubungu Platinum mine. Mr Nchaka Moloi (Motjoli Resources) had to sell its 
stakes in Coal of Africa to pay for its debts and raise capital. He explained that 
mining involved a chain of activities, including exploration, project evaluation, mine 
construction and mine production. Each stage in the chain, Moloi continued, 
demanded different kinds of financial resources, and that some were not funded by 
financial institutions. Moloi also said that “the major bottleneck for BEE companies 
was raising funds for kick-starting a project. It is here that government funding 
should be focused.” The anonymous director of African Spirit Holdings said that it 
was against company policy to openly disclose debts and also jokingly said: 
 
“If you indicate your debt situation openly, you are likely to be in trouble with your 
shareholders and lenders and you tarnish your reputation. The good policy is to 
indicate how you are dealing with debts.”  
 
It was important to get opinions from government officials on financial support to 
BEE companies. When asked about support to BEE companies, Mr Tladi (DMR) 
pointed to the existence of the National Empowerment Fund (NEF), a financial 
institution established specifically to support BEE initiatives and the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC). He further pointed to the country having a strong 
private financial base that BEE individuals and companies can benefit from. When 
he was further asked about the possibility of using selective intervention to support 
those BEE companies that were showing progress, he hastened to say that the 
government respected the autonomy that the financial institutions had been given and 
that the government had no power to interfere with their funding decisions or tell 
them to favour a certain BEE company. 
 
In the course of this study, questionnaires to the IDC, DBSA and NEF were sent, 
asking for data in respect of their BEE funding in the mining sector. Upon not 




from one office to another, Ms Ntanzi, the head of the Strategic Fund Department at 
NEF, disclosed that the NEF only supported some small mining companies. She also 
said that up to the end of December 2011, NEF had funded four transactions in the 
mining sector worth R90.4 million (£6.9million). She, however, refused to divulge 
the names of the beneficiaries on the grounds that such information was protected by 
the financial regulations confidentiality rules. Mr Fikile Khumalo (the head of 
mining at the IDC) acknowledged by phone that the IDC had funded BEE deals in 
the mining sector but could not provide the actual figures, despite numerous requests 
and promises. Chapter Five reveals a number of IDC funded BEE transactions and 
shares the IDC purchased in mining companies.  
 
In response to the question on the conditions attached to BEE deals, a variety of 
responses were received by executives of white and foreign-owned companies. Mr 
Mark Cutifani (AngloGold Ashanti) noted that one of the conditions for its ESOP 
deal was that shares could not be sold on the open market but transferred between 
employees. He said that this was because such shares were normally issued at a 
discount to help the employee of the firm. He also remarked that it was important to 
ensure continuation of such benefits to other employees which were left out. Mr 
Cory (Assore) indicated that his company used lock-in conditions to ensure shares 
were only traded with other BEE companies in order not to lose the BEE status. The 
foresaid conditions contrast with Mr Paul Dunne (Impala Platinum), where terms 
prescribe commitments to partnership so as to avoid a situation which he calls “rush 
in rush out” (meaning companies quickly getting in business partnerships and 
quickly quitting) on the part of its BEE partners. Mr Mark Hollard (Gold Fields) also 
specified that lock-in conditions were also used to make the business deals more 
binding. He gave an example of his company‟s experience with Mvelapanda 
Resources which had sold most of its Gold Field shares and leaving it with little 
black shareholding. Hollard insisted that the long lock-in periods are preferred to 
prevent a repeat of a similar situation from happening.  
 
From Gold Fields‟ company reports, it showed that the company used a 30 years lock 




of the mine. Such a long lock in period means that the BEE partners are permanently 
tied to the deal until the mine closes. In response to why the company had given 
itself, as opposed to a completely new company, the first option to back its assets, Mr 
Mahomed Sedat (BHP Billiton) said:  
 
“These assets belonged to the company, it sold them because of compliance to the 
Mining Charter, and then it is right to get back the assets if they are sold again.”  
 
It is the opinion of this study that Mr Mahomed‟s answer indicates the quest for the 
white and foreign-owned companies like BHP Billiton to hold on their assets.  
 
All the executives from black-owned companies interviewed complained about the 
conditions attached to the BEE transactions with their white and foreign partners. 
The main conditions mentioned are related to the use of the lock-in periods and the 
demand to resell assets back to their white and foreign partners. They were not 
willing to discuss further how these conditions affected them. Carl Kekana (Mmakau 
Mining) and Bongani Mashishu (BSC Resources) both noted that they had to accept 
the conditions before the deals could be signed. Mr Kekana said specifications of 
conditions were confidential between the parties who had signed and that it was 
improper for one party to disclose them without the consent of the other party. The 
inference is that, while strongly justified by the white and foreign-owned companies, 
the lock-in clauses may limit BEE companies from making strategic decisions. For 
example, it would be difficult for a BEE company to make profits if share prices rose 
and to minimise risks when share prices tumble. It would not be wrong to say that 
white and foreign-owned companies use these strategies to protect assets and ensure 
wealth flowed back if for whatever reason BEE companies failed to hold on to their 
shares or mining assets.  
 
7.6 The Role of Government in the Implementation of the B-BBEE 
Policy 
Executives of white and foreign-owned companies were asked whether the 
government assisted them in their BEE partnerships (Q10), to remark on the role that 




how the mining policies had helped, constrained and generally affected white and 
foreign-owned companies‟ operations (Q12). Executives of BEE companies were 
asked to indicate how the government had assisted them (Q14), what role they 
thought the government should play in the mining industry (Q15) and to assess how 
the mining policies had affected the BEE companies (16).  
 
Most of the executives of the white and foreign-owned companies responded that the 
government had no definite role in the BEE deals apart from ensuring that, in the 
conversion of old-order rights to new-order rights, the companies had accommodated 
blacks. Mr Cory (Assore), Mr Graham Briggs (Harmony) and Mark Cutifani (Anglo 
Gold Ashanti) mentioned the government‟s facilitative role in the license conversion, 
in particular, with respect to mines that were already in operation. According to these 
executives, the period given for conversion of licences allowed their companies to 
smoothly continue with their activities. According to Mr Cutifani, government 
cooperated with regard to being a regulator, and also enabled the company to convert 
all its old order licenses without any problems. Ms Juanita Meijsen (Total Coal) said 
that it was difficult to source BEE partners. She also said that she had expected the 
government to have had a list of BEE companies, or to have at least organised the 
prospective blacks aspiring to enter into mining. She stated that: 
 
“One had to rely on what was written in the media to identify black companies and 
we ended up approaching the same companies which were prominent in the media. 
Now we get the feeling that was bad, and that we concluded deals with the same 
companies over and over. What were we supposed to do? From the beginning, the 
government was supposed to make necessary preparations to support the policy 
implementation process and how to include blacks.”  
 
As a government instrument, licencing succeeded in forcing the white and foreign-
owned companies to take on blacks. Mr Paul Dunne (Impala Platinum), in particular, 
said the company received a directive from the government to accommodate 
community BEE partners before its license conversion could be effected. But this 
does not mean the government was involved in day to day negotiations of BEE deals 





There was a general view amongst the executives of white and foreign-owned 
companies interviewed that government should focus on creating and implementing 
policies that ensure the success and growth of the mining sector as a whole. 
According to Mark Cutifani, the government has removed the legal restrictions that 
acted as barriers for blacks to enter into the industry as owners. Since there are no 
longer legal restrictions, the government had to concentrate on the growth of the 
mining industry as a whole. He said that if the industry grew, black-owned 
companies would also grow. He specified more and said, the government would, 
have to concentrate on removing infrastructure bottlenecks such as electricity and 
water supply, roads and railways. 
 
Both Mr Hollard (Gold Fields) and Mr Cutifani (AngloGold Ashanti) suggested that 
the government should play a major role in helping BEE companies with funding due 
to the fact that they were struggling to source funds so as to exploit opportunities in a 
capital intensive industry as mining. Mr Cutifani stated that to reap any returns, BEE 
companies needed capital from the start until when their operations were stable. He 
further stated that what the existing white and foreign-owned companies and the 
financial institutions can offer is not enough. He suggested that the government and 
all the mining companies needed to sit together identify the hurdles and find 
solutions. He insisted that apart from funding, the government should provide BEE 
companies with legal advice, technological and business expertise, and help them to 
access international markets. Assisting BEE companies to access the international 
markets was also mentioned by Mr Mahomed Sedat (BHP Billiton). Mahomed Sedat 
elaborates:  
 
“One gets a feeling that BEE companies expect white and foreign-owned companies 
to be like export market brokers for them. The government should increase its role in 
this regard.”  
 
Relationships at the community level and the use of lead partners in BEE deals were 
interrogated in the interview with executives of white and foreign-owned companies. 
Mr Cutifani (Anglo- Gold Ashanti) and Mr Dunne (Impala Platinum) said that lead 




communities, however, are conducted without any guidance from the government. 
Mr Cutifani then suggested that the government should provide clear guidance on 
how to deal with the community shareholding and what each party (the communities 
and the mining companies operating in the area) has to do. When asked to specify 
what kind of guidance was needed, he said that:  
 
“There are cases where more than one company becomes a partner to the same 
community. The way in which each company deals with the community may differ, 
one may do more and another do less. This may lead to conflicts or both companies 
taking it easy in their roles. Those who will suffer are communities, especially those 
with no centralized strong leadership. Currently, the government has no guidelines 
on how to engage with community shareholders.” 
 
When he was further asked which rules were guiding the company in its deals with 
the communities, Mr Cutifani said that his company was guided by Social Economic 
Assessment Tool Box (SEAT) developed by its mother company in early 2000s. He 
said that SEAT was also used for his company mining ventures in South American 
countries.  
 
Responding to how the regulatory framework had impacted the mining companies‟ 
operations, executives of white and foreign-owned companies provided different 
answers which some were complaints. The major complaint was the wide coverage 
of elements that companies have to comply with. Mr Johan Dippenaar (Petras 
Diamonds) complained that the policy coverage was too wide and included equity 
transfer, employment equity, housing for miners, management, procurement, 
enterprises and skills development. These were on top of the normal community 
social responsibilities. Dippenaar said that there was need to narrow these elements. 
He did not specify what should be dropped. Johan Nelson (Pan African Resources) 
also complained about the same issues and said he understood the importance of 
housing, and also remarked that mine towns grew fast and died if there were no mine 
activities and attracted squatters. He also noted that the government was in a better 






Mr Mkululi Dube (Aquarius) complained that it took time for the government to 
offer clarity on policy changes that were openly being discussed in the media. He 
said: “Delays on the government‟s position on issues concerning policy directions 
create confusions and uncertainty. At the end, share values are negatively affected as 
investors worry about their investments.” The same sentiments were also expressed 
by Mr Ian Farmer (Lonmin) who gave an example of when the government took too 
long to respond to the issues of nationalisation of mines that were raised by the ANC 
Youth League in 2010 and the possible changes in the mine tax regimes. While the 
media was awash with reports of controversies, the government kept quiet. Mr 
Hollard (Gold Fields) said that there was a great need to synchronise the MPRDA, 
Mining Charter, the Score Card for the mining industry, the Generic Score Card and 
the Code of Good Practices, in order to avoid unnecessary confusion. He gave an 
example of the Generic Score Card that allowed foreign companies to only 
contribute to a lump-sum of money in lieu of equity. He also cited the Mining 
Charter that bound a company to so many things, including equity transfer and the 
sharing of management.  
 
The answers from executives of black-owned companies on the role of the 
government were rather different from those provided by the white and foreign-
owned companies. There was a unanimous acknowledgement and appreciation of the 
BEE policy among all executives of the BEE companies interviewed. Mr Bongani 
Mashishu (BSC Resources) stated that:  
 
„„We are here because the new mining regulatory regime allowed us to enter the 
industry in the first place and forced large companies to transfer assets to small 
players like us. Then we expect to grow and expand. Issues that might arise from now 
onwards, may just explain the impediments on our part as miners and not the case of 
blacks being prevented to enter the industry like in the time of apartheid.”  
 
Carl Kekana (Mmakau Mining) referred to the BEE policy as the “miracle of the new 
democracy”, because, according to him, it had enabled black peoples‟ entry into a 
formally and racially restricted business area. Mr Rowan Smith (Shanduka 
Resources) hailed the government for having negotiated with the white 




in the B-BBEE Act, the MPRDA, the Mining Charter and many other charters that 
have mushroomed. He said the challenge involved how blacks were benefiting and 
how they could gain benefit more.  
 
Most executives of the BEE companies indicated that the government‟s role during 
the implementation stage was limited. Mr Sipho Nkosi (Exxaro) and Mr Nchaka 
Moloi (Motjoli Resources) indicated that the government was involved in the 
creation of Exxaro and ensuring that it became successful. Both executives could not 
provide specifics on how the government was involved in the Exxaro deal. They 
indicated that they had not received any government support since then. However, 
Sipho Mofokeng (Mvelapanda Resources) and Steven Mashalane (ARM Platinum) 
indicated that the government (and not necessary the DMR) helped in the relocating 
of people to give way to new and BEE-compliant mining operations. Carl Kekana 
(Mmakau Mining) said that, publicly, the government had confronted the white and 
foreign-owned companies on their limited compliance with the BEE equity transfer.  
 
There was a mixed reaction from executives of black-owned companies on what role 
the government should play. Some of the answers provided were in a form of 
grievances. In general, BEE companies would like the government‟s role not to be 
limited to the making of the laws and regulations but extended to monitoring and 
enforcing compliance; providing infrastructure; sourcing of funds; nurturing the BEE 
companies to maturity and helping them with community shareholders. Mr Nchaka 
Moloi said that he expected the government to cancel the mining rights of those 
companies that failed to comply so that they would feel the impact of the policy. 
Sipho Mofokeng was emphatic on the necessity of the government‟s enforcement 
mechanism to be put in place and to be utilised. He noted that establishing a 
compliance system would force the white and foreign-owned companies to comply. 
Mr Mofokeng insisted that: 
 
“Those mining companies that have not complied with the MPRDA and the Mining 
Charter should be investigated and forced to enter into partnership with BEE 
companies and no favouritism should be entertained. There should be the 




undertaken to find out the truth so that it comes up with a programme to enforce 
compliance on a continuous basis.” 
 
However, it is doubtful that blacks have the finance to buy shares, mine assets and 
enter into partnerships and sustain them, and while also lacking capital and facing 
impediments.  
 
Mr Mashiatshidi (Wesizwe Platinum), Mr Harold Motaung (Anoorag), Andre 
Wilkens (ARM) and the respondent of African Spirit Holdings (whose name is 
withheld) expressed the need for the government to focus on the provision of 
infrastructure that would be necessary for the mining companies to operate. Mr 
Mashiatshidi added that the government should also help the BEE companies with 
technology and export markets. It is only Mr Clyde Johnson (Sedibeng Mining) who 
differed with the rest, insisting that the government should not dictate what the 
companies should do or how they had to run their business.  
 
It was difficult to identify women groups that could be used in the study sample. No 
question on the role of women was put in the interview questions. An opportunity 
availed itself to talk to Nolutando Langeni of the South African Women in Mining 
Association (SAWIMA), met at the Mining for Change Conference (held at Sandton 
Conference Centre on 6-7 September 2010). She highlighted three things about the 
limited role of women in the mining industry; a situation that she said had to change. 
She said that, there was discrimination against employment of women in the 
industry: 
 
“Mining companies think that women have got no place both in surface and 
underground mining activities. Where few are employed they are not even provided 
amenities suitable for women. Second is mining companies are reluctant to partner 
with women-owned mining companies. When women submit their applications they 
do not get answers and we keep on wondering how men get selected as partners. 
Third was the lack of political will. Under the former Minister of Mineral and 
Energy, Pumzile Ngucka, women received a lot of help, but, under Minister Susan 
Shabangu, women were struggling and kept on knocking at her door which rarely 
opened. What we want is the adoption of a set aside-principle whereby women are 





Responding to the question whether there were women who were participating in 
extraction activities, she said that there were few. She continued that she knew many 
who wanted to partake but were frustrated by the system and the government‟s lack 
of support.  
 
7.7 The Future of B-BEE Policy 
The question on the future of the B-BBEE policy was asked to white and foreign-
owned companies (Q13) and to BEE companies (Q17). The DMR on its part was 
asked to share its views on the future of the B-BBEE policy and its implementation 
(Q6).  
 
The general response from executives of white and foreign owned-companies was 
that they expected the Mining Charter targets to remain enforceable after 2014. The 
executives also indicated that they anticipated the continuous entry of new BEE 
companies and some current BEE partners to sell their equity. Mr Nicholas Hollard 
(Gold Fields) and Mr Graham Briggs (Harmony) were optimistic that more assets 
were going to be transferred to blacks, that the current BEE partners would increase 
their shareholding, and that the government would force the white and foreign-
owned companies to take completely new faces as partners. Ms Juanita Meijsen 
(Total Coal) and Mr Paul Dunne (Impala Platinum), however, expected their BEE 
partners to exit from the current deals, due to possibly accumulating of debts.  
 
What emerged from the interviews with the executives of BEE companies is that 
there was almost a consensus about them exiting from their current partnerships. Mr 
Nchakha Moloi (Motjoli Resources) indicated that his company was going to sell its 
stake in Exxaro and use the proceeds to finance its own projects. Mr Clyde Johnson 
(Sedibeng Mining) stated that he had always intended to sell the BEE stake and to go 
on his own. Sipho Mofokeng pointed out that Mvelapanda Resources had already 
streamlined its business and disposed of shareholding in areas deemed not to be 
strategic. Mofokeng also noted that he expected to exploit the opportunity when the 
existing conditions expired in 2014. The respondent at African Spirit Holdings was 




from the sale and “scratch” capital from other sources to develop other projects in the 
hope that this would help the company to qualify for listing on the JSE.  
 
The impression is that executives of black owned companies are not happy with the 
existing partnerships. These are problems that need to be investigated further. 
 
Other executives, however, wanted to retain the existing partnerships. Mr Andre 
Wilkens (ARM) stated that his company worked hard to reach where it was. Wilkens 
also said that he intended to expand and become stronger in the mining industry. Carl 
Kekana (Mmakau Mining) was uncertain on what would happen after 2014. He was 
not sure whether his company was going to get more cash by selling the current 
equity, or was going to persevere by staying with the current partners. He said that all 
depended on the future market for the mineral products and investment opportunities 
that were remaining ahead.  
 
Mr Tladi of the DMR indicated that the government expects mining companies to 
comply and to be on guard. He stated that:  
 
“For the time being, we are like soldiers. We are on guard and we have to wait and 
see. We will have to go back to the drawing board if the compliance levels are not 
met.” 
 
With these words, one should expect a more stringent enforcement of the policy, 




This chapter sought to identify factors that had helped or hindered the BEE 
implementation policy in the mining sector (objective four). The discussion also 
sought to identify what the stakeholders in the industry expected to be the role of the 
government in the implementation of its BEE policy (objective five). What has 




helped the implementation of the MPRDA and the Mining Charter. The first is 
licensing. The demand for white and foreign-owned companies to convert their old 
order rights to new order rights forced them to take blacks as partners. This is clear 
from what was found out in chapter five and the responses given by executives from 
these companies. The black executives on their part have applauded the new mining 
regulatory framework and the use of licensing as a policy tool, as it enabled their 
companies to enter the mining industry and to acquire prospecting, exploration and 
mining rights. It is the licensing demands that brought about BEE transactions and 
deals in the mining sector. The deals have taken different forms, but, all in all, have 
involved the sale of equity to blacks at the company levels, in existing mine 
operations or the complete sale of mines or mine projects to blacks.  
 
The second is the acceptance by the white and foreign-owned companies of the BEE 
regulatory framework. The reasons for these companies‟ acceptance have been 
highlighted in the BEE literature in Chapter One (see discussions in Chapter One by 
Iheduru 2004, 2008; Dansereau 2005; Burton and Hawthorne 2007; Sartorius and 
Botha 2008; Marais 2011; Capps 2012; Lynch 2012). It is the executives of these 
companies who took the responsibility for the implementation of the Mining Charter. 
These created specific companies to accommodate black shareholders (SPVs), in 
some cases provided free shares (or at a discount), arranged for loans and provided 
for guarantees for loans from other sources. This, in a way, gave the white and 
foreign-owned companies a leeway of establishing their own criteria for choosing 
partners that included those with previous business experience and political 
connectivity. White and foreign-owned companies were also free to set the 
conditions in the transactions like using lock-in periods so that blacks did not easily 
get out of the BEE deals.  
 
There are some positive aspects that this Chapter has revealed as corroborated by the 
findings in Chapter Five. There have emerged a new set of successful black-owned 
mining companies. A reference is made to Motjoli, BSC and African Spirit Holdings. 
These three companies add up to a list of well-known companies like ARM, 




developing better strategies is growing. These enter into exploration projects, 
develop them to a bankable stage and sell them at a profit. Cases like these should 
call for a selective intervention approach, as used in Japan (see discussion by Kaplan 
1972; Lall 1996 and Rhee 2004 in section 3.4.1 of this thesis). Japan supported its 
local industries until they could stand on their own and break into international 
markets. The government in South Africa should learn from the Japanese experience 
and hand-pick such successful companies and offer them support and nurture them 
until they could stand on their own.  
 
Blacks‟ participation in equity ownership, control and management in the mining 
industry has not been an easy ride for them. A number of factors have hindered 
blacks‟ success. These include: lack of own funds, lack of appropriate data on mining 
ventures that they buy, difficulties in accessing land, lack of government policy 
directive on community shareholding and limited government support.  
 
The impacts of factors that hinder the successful operations of black companies were 
discussed above. The irony is that the government is aware of the problems, but, its 
stance has remained the same: to leave the blacks to fend for themselves under the 
free market forces. Scholars like Sowel (2004), who was against the USA‟s 
affirmative action, called for similar action from the government. However, all the 
executives of the mining companies interviewed from white, foreign and black-
owned companies would like the government to play a more direct role. In particular, 
executives from white and foreign-owned companies called upon the government to 
provide infrastructure (water, electricity and transport network), help find export 
markets for blacks, and provide extra funding. On the other hand, executives from 
black-owned companies expected the government to support them and play an 
enforcement role and ensure that equity transfer to blacks took place. They were 
calling upon the government to carry out an audit of all the white and foreign-owned 
mining companies to see if they had complied with the equity targets; those which 





8 Study Discussion Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In order to redress the economic imbalances created by the apartheid regime, the 
ANC government has embarked on economic intervention measures to enable blacks 
participate in all sectors of the South African economy. This thesis contributes to the 
understanding on how economic empowerment has been implemented in the mining 
industry and its outcome. The study in particular sought to analyse changes in equity 
ownership, control and management of South Africa‟s mining industry with the 
coming of the MPRDA (2002) and the Mining Charter (2002) which together are the 
core of the B-BBEE policy for the mining industry. The MPRDA tied the conversion 
of old-order mining rights to new-order mining rights by the mining companies that 
existed at the time to the incorporation of blacks. The Mining Charter required the 
white and foreign-owned mining companies to transfer 15 per cent equity to blacks 
by 2009, reaching 26 per cent by 2014. The Charter also required that white and 
foreign-owned companies take blacks as business partners. The Charter equally 
demanded that white and foreign-owned companies incorporate blacks in the 
management of their companies irrespective of the amount of shareholding in the 
hands of blacks. The target set was 40 per cent black representation in management 
positions. This was clarified in the Amended Mining Charter (2010) to 40 per cent 
black representation on the boards and senior management of these companies 
irrespective of the amount of shareholding in the hands of blacks. The 40 per-cent 
black representation was expected to de-racialise the boards and management of 
white and foreign-owned companies. It was therefore important for this study to also 
explore the extent of black control and management in the mining sector.  
 
The rationale behind this study focus as indicated in Chapter One is that BEE equity 
and ownership transfer represented a new model for citizen participation in the 
natural resources sector. A brief comparison was made between this model and how 




own and control mineral resources through state ownership, nationalization and 
indigenisation.  
 
The structural adjustment programs (SAPs) under the auspices of the World Bank 
and the IMF that followed in the 1980s reversed nationalization and indigenisation 
and governments began to focus on liberalization (acceptance of the free market 
system), privatization (de-nationalization) and promotion of foreign direct 
investments. In this new policy shift, what was missing was policy focus on citizens 
or indigenous ownership of mining assets. South Africa‟s MPRDA and the Mining 
Charter that came two decades later represented a re-emergence of another form of 
indigenisation which was hailed elsewhere in the continent for signalling a new hope 
of using mineral resources not only for economic growth but also acting as a model 
for changing the ownership structure that would include indigenous citizens while 
not excluding foreign investors. Zimbabwe and Namibia have introduced similar 
programs. The questions in people‟s mind were (and still are); has South Africa‟s 
BEE policy succeeded? What would make South Africa succeed or not? 
 
From the beginning of B-BBEE implementation process, the focus of researchers and 
the government has been on how to estimate the equity ownership transferred to 
blacks and control and management of mining companies by blacks. Earlier studies 
that focused on equity transferred to blacks looked at the number and value of BEE 
deals concluded between white and foreign-owned companies and blacks 
(Empowerdex 2004, 2008; Ernest and Young 2011); counting the number of black-
owned companies operating in the mining sector (Research Africa 2006, 2008; DME 
2008b) and estimating the value of black equity ownership (DME 2009; KIO 2010). 
All these studies were limited to JSE listed companies and the use of market 
capitalisation. This thesis also replicated the use of market capitalisation of JSE 
companies and like its precedents found that compliance levels are low. 
 
While the use of market capitalisation of JSE listed mining companies is informative, 
it was argued in the study that it has some limitations (see Chapter Four). This is 




changes in equity ownership structure at company level, fail to reveal mining assets 
that are exchanged between white and foreign-owned companies and their black 
counterparts, does not disclose strategies that are used in concluding mining deals 
and conditions attached to the deals. Furthermore the use of JSE data reveals little 
about the changes in the organisation structure of mining companies (board 
characteristics) and structures management (management characteristics). The 
characteristics that add to a better understanding of compliance include race and 
gender and size which are important to give a clearer picture and a deeper 
understanding on the extent by which blacks attain control and management of 
mining assets. No other study known in South Africa has such a broader coverage. 
 
The study was done by first using the market capitalisation of JSE listed mining 
companies to estimate equity owned by blacks. Then the study used a sample of 72 
mining companies in all mine categories (PGM, diamonds, gold, coal and ferrous and 
non-ferrous minerals) and traced over 100 mining companies to explore changes in 
equity ownership structures (shareholding and mine assets). The concentration was in 
the mining deals that were concluded by white and foreign-owned companies with 
black owned companies in order to reveal how the individual companies complied. 
Second, the study looked at changes in the organisation structure of mining 
companies in terms of directorship and management, 468 directors and 226 managers 
of mining companies were explored. This helped to explain the extent by which 
blacks have attained management and control of mining assets. Third, interviews 
were conducted with executives from 27 white, foreign and black-owned mining 
companies, few government officials and other experts to get more insights on BEE 
related issues. The focus on the changes in the structure of individual mining 
companies has revealed strategies that are used to transfer mine assets to blacks and 
conditions attached.  
 
What follows below is a summary of the findings on the main objectives of the 
study. This is followed by the recommendations on how the implementation process 





8.2 Findings with Regard to Research Objectives 
To execute this study, the objectives of the study were broken down into the 
following sub-headings: Mining companies‟ compliance with BEE equity ownership 
and management and control (objective one); reclassification of mining companies 
(objective two); Strategies used by white and foreign-owned companies to transfer 
equity ownership to blacks (objective three); Forces that facilitated or hindered the 
BEE implementation process in the mining industry (objective four) and; The role of 
the government (objective five). Below these are expanded in accordance with the 
findings of the study. 
 
8.2.1 Mining Companies Compliance with BEE Equity Ownership and 
Management and Control 
Chapter Five showed compliance by white and foreign-owned companies with equity 
transfer to blacks in three specific elements. The first is compliance with the 
MPRDA demand for the conversion of old-order rights to new-order rights, a process 
which was to be accompanied with the taking on of blacks as shareholders and 
business partners. The detailed analysis in the chapter reveals that all white and 
foreign-owned companies that existed before the policy have converted their old-
order rights to new-order rights. New companies all obtained new licenses and 
complied with the demand of having black shareholders and business partners.  
 
The second element is compliance with the Mining Charter targets of 15 per cent 
equity transfer to blacks by 2009 and 26 per cent by 2014. The findings of this study 
with reference to equity transfer based on market capitalisation of the entire JSE 
listed mining companies (by 12 July 2011) is that it stood at 7.4 per cent. This is in 
line with the findings of the DMR (2009c) which found out that black equity 
ownership was at 9 per cent. KIO‟s study (2010) put this at 5.27 per cent. Both of 
these studies used 25 mining companies that represent 85 per cent of JSE market 
capitalisation. Thus the compliance levels are low. At a closer look, only three black-
owned companies have significant shares on the JSE. These are Exxaro, ARM and 





However, apart from the low compliance levels indicated above, the Chamber of 
Mines (2010) disputed the compliance levels given by the DMR (2009c) indicated 
above. The Chamber claimed that its members had achieved the 15 per cent target in 
2009 and most have gone over the 26 per cent requirement. This study explored the 
source of the disparities. These emanate from the interpretations of equity ownership 
that had been used in the policy documents, changes on how to define equity 
ownership that came later, different valuations mechanisms used to assess mineral 
assets and the fact that some mining companies are not listed in the JSE (see Chapter 
Five). It is suggested by this study that the DMR needed to clarify how equity 
calculations are to be done at both the company level and the entire sector. 
 
Due to the limitations of using the market capitalisation of mining companies listed 
in the JSE, this study has gone beyond using the JSE data. It looked at changes in the 
equity ownership structure of mining companies (company shareholding and mining 
assets) and organisation and management structures. This has enabled a broad 
analysis. The changes in equity ownership made possible in particular to explore 
mining deals concluded by individual mining companies in all mining categories. 
Starting with the study sample of 72 companies extended in all mine categories, this 
thesis revealed over 100 mining companies that have been involved in economic 
empowerment deals or what are referred in the thesis as BEE deals. The deals 
involved individual companies and broad based groups like consortiums ESOPs and 
community trusts. The existence of community shareholders signify that white and 
foreign-owned companies cannot bypass the communities where mining takes place 
and ESOPs -workers in their companies.  
 
By exploring mining deals, the study has revealed the names of the white and 
foreign-owned companies that have complied, the strategies that they used to transfer 
mine assets to blacks, the mines assets that they chose to sell to blacks and those that 
they retained 100 per cent shareholding, which mine assets they sold, whether they 
sold at the mine level or main company level, and the kind of black-owned 




in the industry and helped to explain challenges of blacks attaining management and 
control of mining assets of the country.  
 
The thesis has also revealed that most BEE deals were concluded by two companies-
Anglo American Plc and BHP Billiton. These are the two companies that were more 
involved in the unbundling process that occurred in the early 1990s before the 
official B-BBEE policy was established. These two companies spearheaded the 
selling and buying of mine assets among white-owned companies and few were sold 
to black-owned companies. When the B-BBEE policy came, the old BEE deals were 
recognised under the „continuous consequences principle‟ allowed in the Mining 
Charter. The problem of upholding to this principle is that it tends to exaggerate the 
actual number of BEE deals that a white or foreign-owned company has as it is 
common for a black shareholder to fall out from such deals for any reason.  
 
The third element is the demand of 40 per cent black representation on the boards 
and senior management of white and foreign-owned companies. The study findings 
from Chapter Six have revealed that those companies with more shareholding (50 + 1 
share) tend to have more directors and managers of people of their own race. This 
tendency is rooted in the past ownership structure which was of concentrated 
ownership, cross ownership, family and institutional ownership, interlocking 
directorship and the use of a dual share ownership structure, in particular, low voting 
shares. Despite the unbundling that occurred in the early 1990s and that is discussed 
in Chapter Two of this study, the elements of the past ownership structure has 
remained. This was indicated by Halse (1982); Barr and Kantor (1995); Kantor 
(1998); Malherbe and Segal (2001); Judin (2003); Chabane et al., (2006). Their 
findings are similar with the findings of Chapter Five of this thesis, that white and 
foreign-owned companies still own and control the bulk of the assets in South 
Africa‟s mining industry and there is significant cross holding.  
 
It was revealed in Chapter Five that there was still a significant shareholding 
controlled by foreign-owned companies, financial institutions and families, and that 




American Plc, BHP Billiton and Xstrata-Glencore control over 50 per cent of the JSE 
listed mining companies. These companies are likely to make major decisions in 
their companies and not blacks, challenging the Mining Charter‟s demand for black 
control and management. In short the call for 40 per cent black representation on the 
boards and senior management of white and foreign-owned mining companies does 
not automatically translate into management control.  
 
The demand of transferring BEE equity ownership control and management was 
done under the assumptions of Berle and Means (1932) thesis of separation of 
ownership and control. The scholars‟ main argument was that modern firms are of 
dispersed ownership where there is a separation between equity ownership and 
control and that managers and not shareholders tend to control firms. The structure of 
South Africa‟s firms even under the BEE policy does not strictly apply to Berle and 
Means (1932) argument. Thus board membership and senior management in South 
Africa is likely to reflect the existing ownership structures (of concentrated nature) 
rather and may not easily accommodate the Mining Charter‟s demands.  
 
The arguments of the thesis that equity ownership determines control of mining 
companies. This is corroborated by the findings of this thesis in Chapter Six which 
analysed control (board characteristics) and management (management 
characteristics) that were explored from the organisation structure of mining firms in 
the sample. To capture the analysis a phrase, „control what you own‟, is used in 
section 6.4 of this thesis to explain the tendency that equity ownership determines 
control. By exploring the organisation structure, the study has explored 468 directors 
and 226 managers. It was found that black managers are concentrated in mining 
companies where blacks have majority shares. Black presentation on the board of all 
mining companies in the study sample stood at 32.2 per cent (151 out of 468). Black 
representation on the boards of foreign-owned companies in stood at 19.6 per cent 
and in white-owned companies at 31.1 per cent. Although these aggregates look 
promising, a closer look at black representation in the board of white and foreign 
owned of mining companies was concentrated in just a few companies. Within the 




companies – Lonmin, Coal of Africa, Gold One International and DRD Gold. In the 
white-owned companies black representation is concentrated in three companies – 
Impala Platinum, Harmony and Gold Fields. This is different from black 
representation in black-owned companies where blacks constitute 53.7 per cent of 
the board members. Thus, white and foreign-owned companies have more white 
directors in their companies and black-owned companies have also more black 
directors.  
Overall black representation in the senior management of mining companies stood at 
27.8 per cent. However, for foreign-owned companies black representation in senior 
management was 18.5 per cent. These were concentrated in Anglo American 
subsidiaries – Kumba and Anglo Platinum and Palabora Mining. It should be noted 
that Palabora Mining is jointly owned by Anglo American and Rio Tinto. Black 
representation in white-owned companies stood at 20.5 per cent. Black 
representation in the senior management in BEE companies stood at 35.7 per cent. 
There are still a number of white-owned companies without black people in senior 
management (see section 6.5.2 of the thesis). Black women representation in the 
board of mining companies has been only 4.5 per cent, most however are white 
women. It is noted here that the B-BBEE policy regards both white and black female 
as disadvantaged group.  
 
The board sizes of mining companies are not large. Findings of this study indicate 
that the average size is 10. Most white and foreign-owned companies have small 
number of board members, for example Impala has 6, Gold Fields 5 and Harmony 5, 
which corroborates with He and Sommer (2006:9) and Lipton and Lorch (1992:65) 
arguments that globally the trend has been to firms‟ preference for small board size. 
This questions the extent by which the white and foreign-owned firms would 
accommodate blacks in their boards.  
 
From the above analysis the control what you own tendency is realistic in the mining 
industries corporate structure. It is stated here that in the face of blacks lacking funds 
to afford shares or their own assets, 26 per cent black equity and the 40 per cent 




companies as demanded by the Mining Charter is limited. In other words, blacks‟ 
affordability should be enhanced by concrete support mechanism. What is stated here 
supports what Capps (2012) says that the new regulations eliminated barriers to 
investments and resulted to rapid growth of the sector, but his growth has not been 
accompanied by the anticipated de-racialization and growing black ownership and 
control of the economy which was seen as an imperative after the apartheid policies 
that excluded blacks. The challenge of BEE policy makers then becomes how to 
afford the acquisitions by blacks in the industry. Japan‟s model of economic 
intervention and discussed in this thesis may provide the answer.  
 
8.2.2 Reclassification of Mining Companies under B-BBEE Policy  
It was the expectation of those who drafted the Mining Charter that incorporating of 
blacks in the mining industry would black enterprises (those with 50 + 1 vote), black 
controlled companies (25 + 1 vote). The findings of this study from Chapter Five 
have revealed the existence of those with 50 + 1 share) which have become large 
companies. These include ARM, Exxaro, Royal Bafokeng Holdings, Shanduka 
Resources, Mvelapanda Resources and Optimum Coal. These are well-known black-
owned mining companies. The thesis has further revealed that BEE companies are 
concentrated in the coal and PGM sectors. PGM has attracted big black-owned 
mining companies like ARM, while coal has attracted middle and small-scale mining 
companies. This is understandable, because of the simple technology that is used and 
the large domestic market fuelled by demands from Eskom (to make electricity) and 
Sasol (liquid fuels).  
 
Apart from the companies mentioned here, Chapter Five has also highlighted the 
emergence of a new group of smaller BEE companies which have 50 +1 share. 
Reference is made to Motjoli Resources and BSC. Although these companies are not 
large, they initiate better strategies to survive in the industry by entering into 
exploration and developing projects independently and then selling them at much 
higher gains to white and foreign-owned companies. It is expected that the 
government could pay more attention supporting such companies. There are also 




of foreign-owned companies transferred 26 per cent shareholding to blacks upon 
receiving their licenses. These companies qualified to be classified as black-
empowered companies. Examples include Savanna Consortium, Imbani Platinum 
and Sedibeng Mining. 
 
The thesis has explained the challenge of maintaining black shareholding and the 
emerging dilution of BEE equity. Thus, by the time of writing, three companies had 
lost their BEE status (no longer having 50+1 share), as, having become too indebted, 
they had sold their shares back to the white or foreign-owned companies. These 
include Wesizwe Platinum, Northam Platinum and Optimum Coal. Unless the 
government solves the funding problems of black-owned companies, more and more 
companies are likely to revert to white and foreign ownership.  
 
It was also pointed out in the findings in Chapter Five that most companies owned by 
blacks are made up of community shareholders, ESOPs, groups and consortiums. 
Among large community shareholders is Royal Bafokeng which is a majority 
shareholder (50+1) and has a permanent and strong administrative structure. 
However, a number of the communities do not have such strong administrative 
structures. Most consortiums are made up of diverse individual shareholders and 
small groups where each might have small percentages of shareholding (1-5 
percentages). A reference is made to Invictus (see figure 5.6 of the thesis). 
Consortiums are often led by a lead partner, that is, those individuals or companies or 
group with the largest stake in the consortium deal. Lead partners act as a bridge 
between the consortiums or groups with white and foreign-owned companies. From 
the interviews conducted for this study, lead partners complain of shouldering too 
much responsibility and lack of government direction to guard such relations. This 
calls for the need to understand more on the dynamics of consortiums in order to 





8.2.3 Strategies Used by Foreign and White-Owned Companies to 
Transfer Equity Ownership  
It is pointed out in the thesis that the implementation of the BEE policy has been left 
in the helm of market forces without enforcement and support mechanisms from the 
government, notably funding. This was explained in Chapter One of this thesis as a 
major setback of the policy. Leaving the implementation process under the free 
market forces gave white and foreign-owned companies the freedom to choose what 
assets to keep 100 per cent to themselves and what to sell to blacks; the kind of 
shares to offer (low voting shares); whether to conclude deals at the mine level or at 
the project level; who to enter into partnership with; how to structure the sales and 
what conditions to attach on the transactions. These strategies have implication for 
blacks‟ attainment of control of mining assets as the strategies mentioned here helped 
the white and foreign-owned mining companies to protect their assets.  
 
This study has observed this the tendency where white and foreign-owned companies 
retained the most lucrative assets for themselves and sold marginal mines and 
projects to blacks. A good example of this is represented by Anglo American Plc in 
its coal BEE transactions (see section 5.4.4 of the thesis). The company also created 
a separate subsidiary-Anglo Inyosi in which it placed its mine projects and sold 26 
per cent shares to blacks. From the interviews conducted by this study, executives 
from black-owned companies also complained about white and foreign-owned 
companies offloading their marginal mines, those with declining reserves or those 
that were difficult to mine. Black executives also complained that they have scant 
knowledge about mining assets they buy and sellers do not divulge historical data on 
the mines. This has basically limited the extent by which blacks exploit opportunities 
provided by the MPRDA and the Mining Charter.  
 
The study also found out that white and foreign-owned companies established special 
purpose vehicles (SPVs) and Holding Companies (HOLDCOs). For example, Anglo 
American Plc which has various subsidiaries created HOLDCOs including Eyesizwe 
in 1999, Pelewani Investments (Anoorag Resources) in 2004, Exxaro in 2005 and 




transactions with blacks. The SPVs and HOLDCOs are legally controlled by black 
companies as they hold 50+1 shares in them. What happened is that the white and 
foreign-owned companies retained substantial shareholding (over 20 per cent) in the 
SPVs and HOLDCOs and in some cases offered their black shareholders. This was 
also corroborated by literature on BEE policy and its implementation in Chapter One 
of this thesis (see Gqubule 2006; Bull 2007; Buttler 2007 and Cargill 2010). Their 
retention of substantive shareholding in the SPVs and HOLDCO ensures that they 
have a say in how the created companies operate. It is right to say that their strategies 
indicate their quest to hold on to their mine assets. As we have seen from the analysis 
in Chapter Six, a 20 per cent shareholding is enough to give owners control as 
indicated by Mizruchi (2005:11) and Leech (2002:18) who put the thresholds at 4 to 
25 per cent.  
The findings revealed conditions that white and foreign-owned companies use in 
concluding the mining deals. This has often involved the use of „lock-in clauses‟ 
which bind black partners to remain for a specified period of time. This enables the 
sellers (white and foreign-owned companies) to remain BEE compliant for the set 
period. Lock-in clauses, however, comes at a cost to BEE shareholders because it ties 
down their investment and makes it difficult for them to get out of deals if poor 
returns are experienced or share prices plummet or make profits if share prices rise. 
BEE partners are also prevented from selling to third parties but only to their sellers 
(white and foreign-owned companies) who have the first option to buy back their 
assets.  
 
This study has revealed that the choice of BEE partners by white and foreign-owned 
companies was influenced by whether the aspiring partner has had own assets, had 
been engaged in previous deals and of course had political connections. All these 
qualities are connected as BEE beneficiaries in the first phase (1990-2004) (before 
the coming of MPRDA and the Mining Charter) were connected to the ANC and 
were handpicked by the party. These initial beneficiaries then qualified for new 
partnerships in the second phase (2004-2009) because of having engaged in previous 
deals, having business experience and having own assets acquired in the first round. 




and individuals with family, political party and professional affiliations. Thus, ARM 
and Shanduka have become beneficiaries in a variety of transactions stretching 
through many mining categories. Cronyism and patronage is therefore entrenched in 
South Africa‟s BEE policy implementation process.  
 
From the literature used in this thesis (see Chapter One) cronyism and political 
patronage has been portrayed as a means of primitive accumulation in a situation 
where capitalism has not taken root. This in the hands of a strong authoritative state 
and limited opposition from the citizens can be used to foster economic development 
and transformation as indicated by (Khan and Grey 2005, Southall 2007, Booth and 
Mutebi 2012, Kelsall 2013, Beresford 2015). But as argued in Chapter One, there is a 
thin line between cronyism, rent seeking and corruption as all are likely to generate 
hostility in society. In addition, it is hard to ascertain that capital accumulated from 
cronyism and patronage is being channelled to economic development and 
transformation. This is despite the claim by Booth and Mutebi (2012:381-2) that 
President Kagame of Rwanda had succeeded in using cronyism to create a group of 
capitalists that are transforming Rwanda. In South Africa, the ANC hand-picked few 
of its members to benefit from mining deals, but, then it even the ANC itself has 
made itself a BEE beneficiary through its companies and funds itself through crony 
business relations (Beresford 2015:3, Cargill 2010:93-95).  
 
The questions that the study raises and cannot be definitely answered here are: is the 
ANC leadership able to channel economic resources to their cronies who will then be 
able to produce enough capital to achieve the BEE policy goals? Is the party 
preparing for a democratically and racial free economy in which everyone has an 
equal economic opportunity? Will cronyism be tolerated in South Africa with its 
strong civil society and vigilant opposition political parties? 
 
8.2.4 Forces that Facilitates or Hinder the BEE Implementation Process  
From the general literature in Chapter One, the analysis of compliance of the white 
and foreign-owned companies made in Chapter Five and interview conducted by this 




hinder the implementation of the MPRDA and the Mining Charter are identified. The 
main two forces that facilitate are the government regulations namely licensing and 
the white and foreign-owned companies‟ acceptance of the MPRDA and the Mining 
Charter. From interviews that this study has conducted with executives from black-
owned companies, the introduction of the BEE policy broke the legal barriers that 
were used during the time of apartheid to keep blacks from participation in the 
industry. Licensing has allowed blacks‟ entry in the mining industry and become 
owners of companies. The acceptance of the BEE policy by white and foreign-owned 
companies has enabled blacks to be shareholders, and business partners. Thus black-
owned companies have become a reality. The challenge now is not the entry of 
blacks in the industry but their survival given the existing impediments and for the 
objectives of the MPRDA and Mining Charter to be realised.  
 
From the interviews conducted by this study, executives of black owned companies 
have mentioned various impediments that they face in the mining industry. These 
include lack of own funds; lack of appropriate data on mining assets that blacks buy, 
limited understanding about how investments in the mining industry are conducted; 
poor technological knowhow; lack of knowledge and strategies to access 
international markets, difficulties in accessing land and lack of government policy 
directive on how to conduct relationships between white and foreign-owned 
companies with community shareholders. All these hinder blacks a better chance of 
exploitation of opportunities that B-BBEE policy offer in the mining industry. 
 
Funds have become critical in order for blacks to buy shares from the white and 
foreign-owned companies and to run their own mining operations. Before 
unbundling, the mining houses were crucial in helping mining companies that came 
up with viable mine projects. It was the mining houses that organised finance, 
sponsored mining companies to list on the JSE, helped in acquiring technology and 
sourcing important skills including foreign labour (see section 2.3 of the thesis). 
After unbundling, some of these functions ceased. There are no concrete support 
mechanisms for black-owned companies. As new comers to the industry they have to 




few or no assets to offer as collateral; experience difficulties in obtaining loans from 
competitive financial markets; may not qualify for public listing and their companies 
may take time to realise enough internal returns that can be channelled back to 
capital. The government was expected to intervene and provide BEE funding beyond 
what the state financial institutions provide and offer relevant support. The Business 
Map (2205), Southall ((2006), Wendy and Bull (2007), President Mbeki (1999) and 
Cargill (2010) all called the government to establish funding programs for BEE 
beneficiaries including those the mining industry.  
 
Black-owned companies also rely on the white and foreign-owned companies to 
offer them collateral, offer them shares at a discount and loans and finance to cover 
the running costs. All these come at a cost of black-owned companies accepting 
awkward conditions as explained above. Some of them have debts which forces them 
to sell shares or even mine projects. This causes dilution of shareholding and a loss 
of control of their assets. Reference was made in Chapter Five of Mvelaphanda 
Resources that had to sell its shares in Northam to meet its debt obligations and 
hence dilution. Likewise, Wesizwe had to sell 49 per cent of its shareholding in order 
to raise capital, thus diluting black shareholding and forcing the company to 
relinquish the overall management to a Chinese company that had bought its shares 
and gained control of the company. Pamodzi Gold has been liquidated. These are just 
few examples that indicate the importance of funding in the sustainability of mining 
deals. It should not be surprising if more of the BEE companies lost their BEE status 
or are taken over by white and foreign-owned companies.  
 
One of the arguments the study has made is that, unless government initiates a 
support strategy in particular on funding, of tackling problems faced by black-owned 
companies, there will be limited success in meeting the demands of the Mining 
Charter. In short, the government should offer BEE companies support and the 
concentration should be on those BEE companies that are making promising 
progress. These are situations that should inspire the BEE policy makers in South 
Africa to use selective intervention (as was the case in Japan) and hand-pick those 




stand on their own. Building successful entrepreneurs mat take time and its success 
may require commitment from the government.  
 
Enforcement mechanism is also inadequate. This has been highlighted in Chapter 
One section 1.4, as one of the main weakness that has led to managerialisation of the 
BEE policy. The government has resorted to using private assessors to determine the 
extent to which white and foreign-owned companies have complied and issue them 
with certificates to determine the level that they have reached. But private assessors 
do this for profit. The lack of an enforcement mechanism implies that the 
government is unable to properly gauge the achievements of the policy. The Bee 
commission came later (2015) and has not shown its power to enforce the policy. 
Executives of black-owned companies are calling upon the government to conduct an 
audit on the compliance of white and foreign-owned companies and use punitive 
measures against those that have not complied. In Chapter Three the experiences of 
USA and Nigeria showed that there is a tendency for economic empowerment 
policies to be opposed by those who used to benefit in the pre-regulation era or those 
negatively affected by preferences offered.  
 
It is acknowledged in the study that in 2010, the B-BBEE Presidential Advisory 
Council was established in line with the B-BBEE Act (2003), and in 2015, the BEE 
Commission was created following the amendment to the B-BBEE Act (2014). It is 
hoped that these institutions will be more vigilant in enforcing policy, check the 
loopholes, shortfalls and gaps and offer solutions. There is also a need to integrate 
the BEE policy in the implementation of the recently elaborated national 
development plan. 
 
8.2.5 The Role of the Government 
In Chapter Three, a number of factors were identified as being crucial to the success 
of the affirmative action policies in the USA, economic empowerment policies in 
Malaysia and the indigenous policies in Nigeria. These include political will, the 
establishment of institutions to enforce the implementation of the policy and putting 




empowerment policies have a tendency of being opposed by those who benefited 
from the status quo as indicated in the experiences of USA‟s Affirmative Action and 
Nigeria‟ indigenisation policy. The failure of the indigenisation policy in Nigeria 
partly was attributed to the lack of proper planning, limited promotion of 
entrepreneurial pool, lack of proper monitoring and enforcement mechanisms and the 
absence of penalties for non-compliance. 
 
It is argued in the thesis that the transfer of equity to blacks involves the promotion 
of black entrepreneurs that are capable of entering and surviving in the mining 
industry. For this reason the thesis explored other cases that were relevant for 
entrepreneurial development. The experience of Japan is relevant in this regard, as 
the government there as indicated by Lall (1996), Wade (2004) and Kohl (2004) used 
what has been described as selective, targeted, pervasive and intrusive intervention to 
ensure economic transformation and promotion of strong local entrepreneurs who 
could break into world markets. The success of Japan also depended on its long term 
centralized planning and coordination, the establishment of permanent consultative 
mechanisms between the government and the business sector and control of financial 
institutions. It is the control of finance that was essential to continuously offer 
extensive incentives (carrots) and coercive enforcements (sticks) to gain compliance 
from businesses. MITI in Japan played a central role in hand-picking firms that 
performed better and giving them various incentives and supports including finance, 
technology, management and even helping to resolve their daily business huddles. 
 
These are the missing elements in South Africa‟s implementation of its BEE policy. 
As indicated by Tangri and Southall (2008:702) the government‟s priority at the time 
of policy formulation was to promote peace, reconciliation and not to frighten 
domestic and foreign investments. It was thus willing to cooperate with corporate 
capital to come up with a policy that would be acceptable to the foreign companies 
and local industry provided blacks are accommodating blacks in the South Africa‟s 
economic landscape. At the implementation stage, the government has adopted a 
hands-off approach and relies on the price mechanism not only to formulate 




managers are accommodated but even to assess the implementation. The government 
expects its hand-off policy in implementation will bring about increased black 
participation in the mining industry. Thus, the successes of BEE dependents on the 
willingness of the very companies that were being regulated (white and foreign-
owned companies). Scholars like Cargill (2010) has been calling for the government 
to put in place a financial support mechanism. This was also echoed by South 
Africa‟s former President Mbeki (1999) who said that the government should aid 
black entrepreneurs.  
 
What is emerging from the interviews conducted by this study with the executives 
from white and foreign-owned companies is that the government should play a 
supporting role in the implementation of the BEE policy. In particular the 
government should establish a funding programme for black-owned companies in 
mining, offer them business skills and pave their ways to international markets. 
Executives from the BEE companies are also calling on the government to monitor 
and enforce BEE compliance, support them with funding, offer them skills related to 
mining and take responsibility with community shareholders. 
 
8.3 Recommendations and Areas for Further Studies 
This study contributes to the understanding of the implementation of the B-BBEE in 
South Africa‟s mining industry by highlighting the extent to which white and 
foreign-owned companies through strategizing their BEE deals and transactions have 
controlled the BEE implementation process. This control involves them having a free 
hand in the choice of black-owned companies; what assets to transfer to their black 
partners and what to retain 100 per cent to themselves; the type of shares they offer 
(low voting shares), the conditions to attach to the transactions (lock-in clauses); and 
the manner that they deal with their partners from where mining takes place 
(community partners). This situation arose mainly because first blacks lack their own 
funds to buy shares and even to operate their mine projects and other host of 
impediments that they face. Second the government offered little support to 




market forces, and; third lack of enforcement institutions since the inception of the 
B-BBEE policy until recently (2015).  
 
Lack of funds led to black-owned companies to accumulate debts and some to be 
liquidated. There are also impediments that black-owned companies‟ face that adds 
to their injury. These include difficulties in accessing land in mineral areas; accessing 
international markets; obtaining historical data on the mining ventures they purchase 
and having limited knowledge on how to successfully run mining ventures. The 
government‟s stand to leave black entrepreneurs in the helm of the market forces 
makes the B-BBEE policy look like an appendage to the accepted free market 
economic principles, something to be tolerated but not vigorously supported. This is 
despite the fact that the government itself acknowledges the impediments that blacks 
faced.  
 
The lack of support from the government in particular additional funding has resulted 
in the loss of BEE status for a number of black-owned companies such as Wesizwe, 
Northam and Optimum Coal. Thus the call by President Mbeki (1999) that the 
government should aid black entrepreneurs has not materialized. The government has 
to understand that equity transfer and conferring control and management to blacks 
boils down to having black entrepreneurs entering and surviving in the mining 
industry. 
Apart from diminishing of its importance in the economy, there has been a 
phenomenal growth in value of the mining industry from R760billion (£69billion) of 
market capitalisation in 2002 to R2trillion (£181billion) in 2009. The growth of black 
equity ownership has not matched this phenomenal growth and stood roughly at 
R143billion (£13billion) or 7.4 per cent of the 2009 figure indicted here. More 
worrisome was the fact that only two companies – Exxaro Resources and African 
Rainbow Minerals accounted for 72.5 per cent (R104billion –£9.4 billion) of the total 
value owned by blacks. But at a closer look, this study has revealed the existence of a 
growing number of BEE beneficiaries. Chapter Five has revealed over 100 mining 
companies and those owned by blacks have been substantial. These are organised 




based groups which are offered small percentage of shareholding (1-5 percentages). 
The growth in number of black-owned companies negates the earlier critics of BEE 
policy who claimed that the implementation of the policy has produced few 
beneficiaries (Khehla and Reddy 2006; Gqubule 2006; Mbeki 2007). Blacks may 
lose such potential if the government does not put in place a concrete support 
mechanism.  
 
On the bases of the above, the study is making the following policy proposals. The 
government should intervene and offer direct support to black-owned companies in 
terms of finance, business skills, technological knowhow, and access to land and 
international markets. South Africa needs to learn from the Japanese experience of 
selective intervention in support of its local entrepreneurs and companies until they 
can stand on their own. The government should not expect its regulatory power to 
produce positive outcomes if it does not directly involve itself in the B-BBEE policy 
implementation process. Otherwise the BEE will not sting nor produce honey!  
 
As indicated above from the beginning, there was no monitoring and enforcement 
mechanism. The government in South Africa has resorted to using private assessors 
who do it for profit to determine the extent to which white and foreign-owned 
companies have complied. This is a shortfall that has limited the ability of the 
government to properly enforce compliance and gauge the achievements of the 
policy. It is much later (2015) that the government created the BEE Commission. It 
hoped that this institution has enough power and capacity to enforce compliance in 
the mining industry.  
 
There are few recommendations that are made here. First the institution should 
urgently provide guidelines on how mining companies should deal with 
communities. A large number of BEE beneficiaries are community shareholders. 
Mining companies have resorted to using lead partners who act as a bridge between 
them and consortium or community shareholders. The findings from the interviews 
conducted by this study, lead partners are complaining on lack of policy guidance 




The institution should also clarify on the future of the BEE policy whose cut-off date 
was 2014 but extended to 2015. Currently the policy has a short term focus. This 
creates uncertainty. Policy-makers should realise that it will take time to minimise 
the impact of the past injustices. Thus they need to take a long-term view for the 
policy to have a lasting impact.  
 
The institution should also come up with a method of how to estimate equity owned 
by blacks. This is an area that has brought conflict between the Chamber of Mines 
and the DMR.  
 
While this study has highlighted some of the challenges faced by black- owned 
companies, no detailed analysis was carried to reveal more on firm level factors that 
may lead to success or act as impediments. This has been a limitation of the study 
that calls for further research at the firm level of black-owned companies. There is in 
particular need for a deeper investigation on business strategies, the funding 
mechanisms used; challenges faced and how have been dealt with. Findings could 
help the government to formulate a more meaningful support mechanism for black-
owned companies. 
 
Another area that needs further detailed research is the existing relationship between 
communities and mining companies. The feeling of lead partners carrying a lot of 
responsibilities with little direction indicates a problem exists or may exist 
somewhere also the chain of relationships. The findings may help to properly grasp 
on the dynamics of consortiums relationships that are beneficial to all stake holders. 
This would useful in formulating proper guidelines of such relationships.   
 
To sum up, this study has indicated the limitations of regulations that seek to deal 
with economic imbalances. Thus, without putting in place supporting mechanisms 
and institutions to monitor how the regulations are implemented, little can be 
achieved. This was the case for B-BBEE policy in South Africa‟s mining industry in 
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10.1 Amended Score Card for South Africa's Mining Industry  
 



















10.3 Generic Score Card: Elements and Weightings Points 
 Element Indicator: Weighing Code  
1 Direct Empowerment: 
divided into 2 
   
 a) Equity ownership  %share of economic benefits (20%) 100 
(b) Management control % black persons in executive 
management and executive board and 
board committees 
(10%) 200 
2  Human resource 
development: divided 2 
   
(a) Employment equity Weighted employment equity analysis (15%) 300 
(b) skills development Skills development expenditure as   
proportion of total payroll 
(15%) 400 
3 Indirect Empowerment : 
Divided into 2 
   
(a)  Preferential affirmative 
procurement 
Procurement from black-owned and 
empowered enterprises as a 
proportion of total procurement  
20%) 500 
(b) Enterprise development Investment in black-owned and 





 To be determined by a sector or 
enterprise based on Social-economic 
development initiatives 
5% 700 
 Total  100%  









                                                 
100
 The residual element is to be calculated on the basis of whether the enterprise adheres to enterprise 
development (engagement in beneficiation), corporate social investment, labour-intensive production 
and construction methods, and investment in social wages of its employees (by providing housing, 
transport, health care etc.). This means the 10 per-cent score is left to the economic sectors themselves 




10.4 Questionnaire to the DMR Officials   
 
Name and designation 
 
 
INFORMATION CONCERNING LICENSING  
1 Is it possible from your records to know how many licenses in various categories have been 
issued since 2004 to white companies, foreign companies and HIDSA companies)? 
 
Licenses White Companies Foreign companies HDSA Companies 
Prospecting    
Exploration    
Mining     
Others    
 
1.1 Have the licenses to all new companies been issued on the basis of HDSA partnership? 
 
 
1.2 Are there cases where HDSA/ white / foreign applicants have been denied licensing? In such 
cases what have been the major reasons for refusal? 























1.4 There have been complaints of black partners selling their prospecting\exploration licenses to 
white companies instead of actually participating in exploration or extraction. How true are these 




2 How does the DMR or any other government institution that you are aware of help HDSA 
companies in:  
 





2.2 Accessing exploration information 
 
 
2.3 Getting black or white or foreign partners to enter into BEE partnership 
 
 




Compliance with the Mining Charter 
3 Several studies including the one done by your office indicated that compliance of the 
ownership element of the Mining Charter stands at around 8 to 9 per cent. But the Chamber of Mines 
CEO Mr Bheki in his presentation to Parliament in September 2011 indicated that they had reached 15 
per cent or more equity transfer as far back as 2009 and some had even surpassed the 26 per cent 
equity level.  
 What brings the disparity on compliance levels reported? 
 
 
3.2 What do you attribute the low compliance in general? 
 
 
3.3 What do you attribute to the low compliance in Management and Control?  
 
 
3.4 There are also low compliance levels for women. What are the major reasons for that? 
 
 
3.5 What measures have been put in place to enforce more compliance? 
 
 




4 HIDSA companies are facing a problem of lack of finance for both buying equity and daily 
operational functions. Others are struggling with debts and even collapsing.  
 




4.2 Have the mining companies fulfilled their R100 billion pledges made in 2002 when signing 
the Mining Charter? If not what steps have been taken? 
 
 
5  Most studies reveal that the DMR lacks the capacity to oversee the BEE implementation 






6 What are other general burning issues concerning BEE policy and its implementation in the 
mining industry that you would like to share with us? 
 
 
10.5 Questionnaire to Executives of White and Foreign-owned 
Companies  
 
General Company Information  
 
1 Name and Address of Company 
 
 
2 Ownership profile of the company 
2.1 Major/White-owned mining company   Foreign-owned Company  
 
2.2 Type of company (e.g., mining investment, exploration, extraction, and marketing)  
 
2.3 Sectors that you operate in or invest in 
 
PGM Diamond Gold Coal Ferrous Non-Ferrous Sand and Aggregate 
 
 
INFORMATION ON LICENSING  
 
4 Complying with the MPRDA Act meant converting your old-order right licenses to new-order 
rights and getting a BEE partner.  
 












5 Please share with us difficulties if any you experienced in obtaining any kind of licenses and 




6 Getting a BEE partner was a requirement in getting licenses  
 






6.2 What attracted you in the choice of the partners you have? (empowered/black businesses, 
black junior miners, communities and (ESSOPs) 
 
 





7  Please list all your BEE partners and consortiums indicating percentage of 
shareholding that you own and that you offered to your partners. 
 
Name of BEE Partner Type of Partnership (e.g., ESOP, 
Community, consortium, black junior 
or major miner ) 
Percentage shareholding 
   
   
 
8  Low compliance of major mining companies on equity ownership, management and 
control is one of issues widely discussed in the media. 
 
8.1 Has your company complied with the 15 per cent HDSA ownership by 2009?  
 
 
8.2 What method did you use to calculate the equity compliance you transferred to HDSAs? 
 
 
8.3 Are you likely to meet the 26 per cent target of HDSA ownership by 2014? 
 
 




8.5 Please share with us those factors that you think have positively influenced your success in 
reaching your compliance targets (equity and management control).  
 




8.7 If you have not reached your MANAGEMENT and CONTROL compliance targets, what 




8.8 In general what problems do you face in being in partnership with HDSA partners either as 
shareholders, partners in extractive activities or managers? 
 
 




9 The capital intensity in mining raises the issues of financial capacity for both buying equity 
and cover for daily operational costs. The problem is much worse for HDSA partners that some are 
being liquidated. 
 
9.1 What are the major sources of finance? 
 
 
9.2 Did you directly provide finance for your BEE partners-to buy equity or to cover for 
operation costs? Please give us an approximate amount. 
Equity Operations 
9.3 Were you involved in guaranteeing loan(s) for HDSA companies? 
 
 
9.4 Were you involved in organizing for other funders for your HDSA partners? 
 
 
9.5 Did you offer any other –financial assistance to HDSA companies? 
 
 
9.6 What conditions did you attach to the financial support to your BEE partner(s)?  
 
 
9.7 Have you lost any partner (s) because of debts or any other reason? 
 
 





10 How has the government been assisting you in matters of BEE partnership? 
 
 
11 What do you think the government‟s role should be in helping the mining companies and in 
particular HDSA companies? 
 
 
12. What aspects of the following policies have helped or constrained your company. Please 





12.2 The Mining Charter 
 
 
12.3 The Generic Codes of Good Practice  
 







13 What do you expect to happen to the existing HDSA partnership agreements and deals you 
are engaged in after 2014 
 
 
15. What are other burning issues in general related to the new regulatory frame-work as whole 







10.6 Questionnaire to Executives of BEE Companies 
 
General Company Information  
1 Name and Address of Company  
 
 
1.1 Type of Company (e.g., HOLDCO) 
 
 
1.2 Major activities (e.g., exploration, extraction, marketing) 
 
 
1.3 Sub-sectors that you are operating in (e.g., PGM, gold, coal, etc. 
PGM Diamond Gold Coal Ferrous Non-Fe Sand and Ag 
 
INFORMATION ON LICENSING 
 










4 Please share with us your experiences with regard to the following issues:  
 
4.1 Access to land 
 
 
4.2 Access to exploration information 
 




5 Please name your partners and the nature of partnership in the following category 
 
5.1 Major/White-owned mining company partner(s)  
 
 
5.2 Foreign-owned mining company partner 
 
 
5.3 Other black-owned mining partners 
 






6 What attracted you in the choice of the partners you have in the following categories?  
6.1 Foreign-owned mining company partner 
 
6.2 Local Major/White Partner 
 
6.3 Other black-owned mining company partner 
 
6.4 Other partners (e.g., Community, and ESOP) 
 
 
7 Please share with us any problems you are experiencing in getting and entering into 
partnership with the following category of partners 
 
7.1 Major/Local white companies 
 
 
7.2 Foreign companies 
 
7.3 Other black companies  
 
 
7.4 Women companies  
 
 





8 Please share with us your experiences in concluding deals with regard to:  
 
8.1 The role you played (i.e. steps you took to initiate the deal) 
 
 
8.2 Roles played by different categories of your partners?  
 
 
8.3 Roles played by government institution(s) 
 
 
8.4  Roles played by financial institution 
 
 
8.5 Roles played by other parties which you know 
 
 
9 How do you participate in the partnership that you are engaged in?  
 






9.2 Executive management 
 
 





10 The capital intensity in mining raises the issues of financial capacity for both buying equity 
and cover for daily operational costs.  
 
10.1 What are your major sources of finance? 
 
 
11 What funding assistance did you receive from the following? Please indicate an average 
amount and their names. 
 
11.1 Local white partner(s)? 
 
 
11.2 Foreign Partners 
 
11.3 Local financial institution 
 
 
11.4 Foreign financial institution 
 
 
11.5 Government institution 
 
 
12 Were there any funding conditions attached to the deals? If so please explain  
 
 
13 Some HDSA companies are facing heavy debts to an extent that some are facing liquidation.  
 
13.1 If any, on average how much debt do you have in the BEE mining deals you are engaged in 
and with whom? 
 
 
13.2 Have you lost any mining shareholding or failed to conclude deals due to debts 
 
 
13.3 In general, how has lack of finance affected your equity ownership and the attaining of 





14 How has the government (of South Africa or any of its government Department) been 






15 What do you think the government‟s role should be in helping the mining companies and in 
particular HDSA companies? 
 
 
16. What aspects of the following policies have helped or constrained your company. Please 





16.2 The Mining Charter 
 
 
16.3 The Generic Codes of Good Practice  
 
 





17 What do you expect to happen to the existing HDSA partnership agreements and deals you 
are engaged in after 2014 
 
 
18. What are other burning issues related to the new regulatory frame-work as whole (B-BBEE, 
the MPRDA and Mining Charter) and the implementation in general that you would like to change? 







10.7 A Sample of Companies Used in the Study and Interviewees 














1 BHP Billiton Plc. F, JSE Mr Mahomed Sadat- Chief Operations Office SA 16/8/2010 







F, JSE  Mr Godfrey Gomwe - Executive Director  20/9/2010 
   Mr Chris Griffith Executive Director 27/9/2010 
3 Kumba Iron Ore Ltd F, JSE  Not Accessed 
4 Anglo American Platinum Ltd F, JSE  Not Accessed 
5 Anglo Gold Ashanti Ltd F, JSE Mr Mark Cutifani-CEO  5/11/2010 
6 Impala Platinum W, JSE Paul Dune Executive Director-SA 15/10/2010 
7 Gold Fields SA W, JSE Mr NJ Holland –CEO  19/11/2010 
   Mr Peter Turner Ex VP-SA 12/11/2010 
8 Exxaro Resources Ltd BEE, JSE Sipho Nkosi- CEO 14/10/2011 
9 African Rainbow Minerals Ltd BEE, JSE Mr Andre Wilkens-CEO 22/11/2010 
   Mr Mangisi Gule-CEO ARM Coal 12/9/2011 
   Mr Steven Mashalane CEO ARM Platinum 30/9/2011 
10 Harmony Gold Mining  W, JSE Mr Graham Briggs 7/6/2011 
   Mr H E Masheo-Masheo –Transformation Director 13/6/2011 
11 Assore W, JSE Mr SJ Cory-CEO 19/8/2011 
12 Lonmin plc F, JSE Mr Ian Farmer-CEO 27/8/2011 
13 Uranium One Inc F, JSE  Not Accessed 
14 Aquarius Platinum  F, JSE Mr Mkululi  Dube-Director Human Resources 22/8/2010 
15 Northam Platinum BEE, JSE  Mr G F Lewis-CEO 15/10/2010 
16 Royal Bafokeng Resources BEE, JSE  Not Accessed 
17 Metorex Ltd F, JSE  Not Accessed 
18 Optimum Coal Holdings Ltd  BEE, JSE  Not Accessed 
19  Palaborwa Mining Corporation  F, JSE  Not Accessed 
20 Great Basin Gold  F, JSE  Not Accessed 
21 Eastern Platinum Ltd F, JSE  Not Accessed 
22 Coal of Africa Ltd F, JSE  Not Accessed 
23 Evraz Highveld Steel F, JSE  Not Accessed 
24 Platmin Ltd  F, JSE  Not Accessed 
25 Wesizwe Platinum BEE, JSE Mr AB Mashiatshidi- CEO 28/10/2011 
   Mr Jack de Vert-Director Finance 31/10/2011 
26 Gold One International Ltd F, JSE  Not Accessed 
27 Merafe Resources Ltd BEE, JSE  Not Accessed 
28 Pan African Resources  F, JSE Mr Johan Nelson-CEO 12/8/2011 
29 Petmin Ltd F, JSE  Not Accessed 
30 Sentula Mining  W, JSE  Not Accessed 
31 DRDGOLD Ltd F, JSE  Not Accessed 
32 Witwatersrand Consolidated Gold 
Resources Ltd 
W, JSE  Not Accessed 
33 Village Main Reef Ltd W, JSE  Not Accessed 
34 First Uranium Corp F, JSE  Not Accessed 
35 Anoorag Resources Corporation  BEE, JSE Mr Harold Motaung-CEO 4/11/2011 
36 Infrassors Holdings Ltd  W, JSE  Not Accessed 
37 Jubilee Platinum Plc F, JSE  Not Accessed 




39 ZCI Ltd F, JSE  Not Accessed 
40 Sephaku Holdings Ltd BEE, JSE Mr N C Lazarus CEO 17/6/2011 
41 Firestone Energy W, JSE  Not Accessed 
42 Hwange Colliery Company Ltd  F, JSE  Not Accessed 
43 Trans Hex Group Ltd W, JSE  Not Accessed 
44 Tawana Resources NL F,JSE  Not Accessed 
45 RandGold & Exploration Co Ltd W, JSE  Not Accessed 
46 Bauba Platinum Ltd  W, JSE  Not Accessed 
47 Miranda Mineral Holdings Ltd W, JSE,  Not Accessed 
48 Delrand Resources Ltd W, JSE  Not Accessed 
49 Wescoal Holdings Ltd W, JSE  Not Accessed 
50 Goliath Gold Mining Ltd W, JSE  Not Accessed 
51  Rockwell Diamonds Inc F, JSE  Not Accessed 
52 Sallies Ltd W, JSE  Not Accessed 
53 Central Rand Gold Ltd F, JSE  Not Accessed 
54 Platfields Ltd F, JSE  Not Accessed 
55 South African Coal Mining 
Holdings 
BEE, JSE  Not Accessed 
56 Simmer and Jack Mines Ltd W, JSE  Not Accessed 
57 Xstrata Plc F, Non-JSE  Not Accessed 
58 De Beers Consolidated Mines.  F, Non-JSE  Not Accessed 
59  Petras Diamonds  F, Non-JSE Mr Johan Dippenaar –CEO 24/6/2011 
60 Richards Bay Minerals F, Non-JSE Ms Elane Dorward –King Managing Director 11/7/2011 
   Jabu Khubela -General Manager Corporate Relations 12/7/2011 
61 Total Coal Africa  F, Non-JSE Ms Juanita Meijsen –CEO 14/6/2011 
62 Mvelapanda Holdings BEE, Non-JSE Mr Sipho Mofokeng-CEO 6/6/2011 
63 Sedibeng Mining BEE, Non-JSE  Mr Clyde Johnson-CEO 10/10/2011 
64 Mmakau Mining BEE, Non-JSE Mr Carl Kekana-CEO 16/10/2011 
65 Motjoli Resources BEE, Non-JSE Mr Nchaka Moloi-CEO 20/6/2011 
   Ms Nonkubela Mazwai-Co Founder 23/6/2011 
66 African Spirit Holdings BEE Non-JSE Respondent  –Name withheld 5/7/2011 
67 Gubevu Platinum BEE, Non-JSE  Not Accessed 
68 BSC Resources BEE, Non-JSE  Mr Bongani Mashishu-CEO 15/7/2011 
69 Shanduka Resources BEE, Non-JSE Rowan Smith-Managing Director 8/8/2011 
70 Panohalo Holding BEE, Non-JSE   Not Accessed 
71 Ngazana Consortium BEE, Non-JSE   Not Accessed 
72 Moepi Group BEE, Non-JSE   Not Accessed 
73 DTI  Paul Radebe- BEE Unit 4/9/2009 
74 DME  Tshepo Tladi 18/9/2009 
   Special Studies- (name withheld) 28/9/2009 
   A Magomezulu-Dep-Director Mineral Policy 28/9/2009 
75 DMR  Tshepo Tladi 9/11/2011 
   Direct Special Studies (name withheld 9/11/2011 
 Informal Interview  
1 University of Pretoria Academic  Mr Clive Knobe-, Lecturer 16/9/2009 
2 University of Pretoria Academic Prof (Emeritus)-Gerald Dekker 7/9/2011 




4 AngloGold Ashanti-  Robert Louis-Head of Tautomer Mine 26/9/2009 
5   President –SAWEMA 7/9/2010 
 Anglo American former Engineer   Carl de Jaeger 6/11/2015 
6 Independent Researcher and 
MINTEK 
 Paul Jourdan 7/9/2010 
   Women Mining Group-Limpopo(name withheld 11/11/2011 






10.8 JSE Mining Companies: Market Capitalisation  
JSE MINING COMPANIES 
Number Company 





1 BHP Billiton Plc R556 865.00 28.58% 28.58% 
2 Anglo American plc R445 035.00 22.84% 51.42% 
3 Kumba Iron Ore Ltd R162 958.00 8.36% 59.79% 
4 Anglo American Platinum Ltd R158 111.00 8.11% 67.90% 
5 AngloGold Ashanti Ltd R109 320.00 5.61% 73.51% 
6 Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd R108 528.00 5.57% 79.08% 
7 Gold Fields Ltd R71 611.00 3.68% 82.76% 
8 Exxaro Resources Ltd R64 000.00 3.28% 86.04% 
9 African Rainbow Minerals Ltd R40 173.00 2.06% 88.10% 
10 Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd R38 381.00 1.97% 90.07% 
11 Assore Ltd R31 326.00 1.61% 91.68% 
12 Lonmin plc R30 545.00 1.57% 93.25% 
13 Uranium One Inc R19 345.00 0.99% 94.24% 
14 Aquarius Platinum Ltd R15 736.00 0.81% 95.05% 
15 Northam Platinum Ltd R15 109.00 0.78% 95.83% 
16 Royal Bafokeng Platinum Ltd R10 254.00 0.53% 96.35% 
17 Metorex Ltd R8 436.00 0.43% 96.78% 
18 Optimum Coal Holdings Ltd R6 672.00 0.34% 97.13% 
19 Palabora Mining Company Ltd R6 241.00 0.32% 97.45% 
20 Great Basin Gold Ltd R6 146.00 0.32% 97.76% 
21 Eastern Platinum Ltd R5 413.00 0.28% 98.04% 
22 Coal of Africa Ltd R4 780.00 0.25% 98.29% 
23 Evraz Highveld Steel and Vanadium Ltd R4 759.00 0.24% 98.53% 
24 Platmin Ltd R3 605.00 0.19% 98.72% 
25 Wesizwe Platinum Ltd R3 060.00 0.16% 98.87% 
26 Gold One International Ltd R2 968.00 0.15% 99.02% 
27 Merafe Resources Ltd R2 848.00 0.15% 99.17% 
28 Pan African Resources PLC R2 016.00 0.10% 99.27% 
29 Petmin Ltd R1 788.00 0.09% 99.37% 
30 Sentula Mining Ltd R1 537.00 0.08% 99.44% 
31 DRDGOLD Ltd R1 309.00 0.07% 99.51% 
32 
Witwatersrand Consolidated Gold 
Resources Ltd R1 293.00 0.07% 99.58% 
33 Village Main Reef Ltd R1 118.00 0.06% 99.64% 
34 First Uranium Corporation R856.00 0.04% 99.68% 




36 Infrasors Holdings Ltd R605.00 0.03% 99.75% 
37 Jubilee Platinum Plc R590.00 0.03% 99.78% 
38 Keaton Energy Holdings Ltd R530.00 0.03% 99.81% 
39 ZCI Ltd R529.00 0.03% 99.84% 
40 Sephaku Holdings Ltd R508.00 0.03% 99.86% 
41 Firestone Energy Ltd R378.00 0.02% 99.88% 
42 Hwange Colliery Company Ltd R360.00 0.02% 99.90% 
43 Trans Hex Group Ltd R339.00 0.02% 99.92% 
44 Tawana Resources NL R257.00 0.01% 99.93% 
45 Randgold & Exploration Co Ltd R184.00 0.01% 99.94% 
46 Bauba Platinum Ltd R169.00 0.01% 99.95% 
47 Miranda Mineral Holdings Ltd R137.00 0.01% 99.96% 
48 Delrand Resources Ltd R130.00 0.01% 99.96% 
49 Wescoal Holdings Ltd R127.00 0.01% 99.97% 
50 Goliath Gold Mining Ltd R115.00 0.01% 99.98% 
51 Rockwell Diamonds Inc R99.00 0.01% 99.98% 
52 Sallies Ltd R94.00 0.00% 99.99% 
53 Central Rand Gold Ltd R93.00 0.00% 99.99% 
54 Platfields Ltd R71.00 0.00% 100.00% 
55 South African Coal Mining Holdings Ltd R54.00 0.00% 100.00% 
56 Simmer and Jack Mines Ltd R38.00 0.00% 100.00% 
  Total R1 948 380.00 100.00% 200.00% 
 
